BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court#    Case Name    Citation1    R. v. B & Anr.    2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a Goods Transport Agency, filed an application under Section 97 of the RGST Act, 2017 before the Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) seeking a ruling on whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport services. The jurisdictional SGST officer participated in the AAR proceedings and categorically supported the petitioner's stand that GST is not leviable on FOC diesel. The AAR vide ruling dated 16.06.2022 held in favour of the petitioner that FOC diesel is not includable in the taxable value of GTA services. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against this ruling — one by the CGST authority and one by the very same SGST officer who had earlier supported the petitioner — both beyond the prescribed limitation period and without proper condonation applications. The petitioner raised detailed preliminary objections before the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling (AAAR). The AAAR rejected all preliminary objections vide impugned order dated 01.07.2024 and directed the matter to be heard on merits. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition — notably, its second approach to the High Court, the first having been disposed of in 2022 directing preliminary objections to be decided first. CRUCIAL FACTSThe AAR ruling dated 16.06.2022 was uploaded on the GST portal on 17.06.2022. The CGST authority claimed receipt on 29.06.2022 and filed its appeal on 12.08.2022 (56 days — within the maximum 60-day permissible period). The SGST officer claimed receipt on 15.09.2022 and filed its appeal on 14.10.2022 (within 30 days of claimed receipt). The petitioner contended that both appeals were time-barred, as the ruling was duly communicated via Speed Post and portal upload in June 2022 itself, supported by India Post tracking data and a letter dated 15.09.2022 from AAR confirming Speed Post dispatch on 21.06.2022. The AAAR, however, accepted the dates of actual receipt as claimed by the departmental appellants, condoned the marginal delay of 21 days in CGST's case, and rejected all five preliminary objections — on 90-day adjudication limit, limitation for filing, hard copy filing, locus of CGST authority, and estoppel against the department for reversing its earlier stand. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)On 90-day mandatory vs. directory — Section 101(2):"There is no provision in the CGST or RGST Act that provides for automatic lapsing of an appeal upon expiry of the 90-day period, nor does the Act prescribe any consequence for non-compliance with this timeline. The absence of a penal consequence for delay is itself a strong indicator that the provision is directory. The petitioner's reliance on mere passage of time, without any prejudice demonstrated, cannot be a ground to shut out a legitimate appeal on merits.""A provision whose strict construction destroys the very right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90-day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of appellate power.""The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not by itself render a provision mandatory in every case... whether 'shall' is mandatory or directory depends upon the context, the object of the provision, the scheme of the statute, and the consequences that would flow from the interpretation thereof."On Limitation:"Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual receipt where such date is specifically established.""No further elaborate reasons are required to be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State. There is no infirmity in this finding."On Locus Standi of CGST Authority:"The Act does not restrict the right of appeal to whichever of the two happened to participate in the advance ruling proceedings. The statute confers the right of appeal on both, and this right cannot be extinguished on the ground that one of them did not appear or represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the proceedings below."On Estoppel:"It is a settled and fundamental principle of constitutional and administrative law that there is no estoppel against the State in matters of taxation and statutory duty. A representation or stand taken by a subordinate officer without due authority and without proper application of mind by the competent authority cannot bind the State or the department... The department's right to correct such an error through the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be defeated by the doctrine of estoppel."On Hard Copy Filing:"Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly permits manual filing of documents notwithstanding any provision that prescribes electronic filing... A procedural prescription cannot be elevated into a jurisdictional bar, and the appeals cannot be thrown out on this purely technical ground."On Petitioner's Conduct:"This conduct reveals a clear attempt to indefinitely delay the final adjudication on merits. The petitioner cannot be permitted to use the writ jurisdiction of this Court as an instrument of delay." FINAL VERDICTThe writ petition is dismissed as bereft of merit. The petitioner is directed to join proceedings before the Appellate Authority. All preliminary objections against maintainability of departmental appeals stand rejected.👎 THUMBS DOWN (Against Assessee)

BackgroundAn impugned order dated 30th December 2025 was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee, an officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner. The personal hearing in the matter, however, had been conducted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, another Additional Commissioner who had earlier been manning the same post. Upon Mr. Jha's transfer, Mr. Banerjee assumed charge and passed the final order. The Petitioners challenged the impugned order before the Delhi High Court by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All three petitions raised identical issues and were decided by a common order, with the facts in W.P.(C) 2630/2026 taken as the lead matter.Relevant FactsThe Petitioners contended that the personal hearing was granted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, but the final order was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee who had not conducted that hearing — a clear violation of the principle that the deciding authority must itself hear the parties. The Revenue contended that there was no statutory embargo preventing the successor officer from passing the order based on the notes of the final hearing prepared by Mr. Jha. When confronted on this point, the Court was unable to satisfy itself that any such notes by Mr. Jha were actually available to or considered by Mr. Banerjee before passing the impugned order. The Revenue further raised a preliminary objection that the Petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable. The Petitioners also raised an additional grievance that the documents relied upon in the proceedings were not supplied to them, which itself amounted to a denial of opportunity of hearing.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and order impugned as such goes contrary to the constitutional protections guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."— Para 6 (Court's own observation)"In the aforesaid background, we have no hesitation to entertain the present petition, even if, there exits an alternate remedy as the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice."— Para 9 (Court's own observation)From Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority & Ors. — relied upon by Court (Para 7):"if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality."— Para 83, as quoted in Para 7"In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly."— Para 84, as quoted in Para 7From Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others — (1998) 8 SCC 1 — relied upon by Court (Para 8):"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged…"— Para 15, as quoted in Para 8Final VerdictAll three writ petitions allowed. Impugned order dated 30th December 2025 set aside as being passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner permitted to appear before the Additional Commissioner with written submissions on 25th May 2026. The Respondent directed to supply the documents sought by the Petitioner and to deal with the matter afresh. All rights and contentions of the Petitioner kept open.Cases Referred by CourtAutomotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority and Ors.Supreme Court of India  |  Citation not specified in the order  |  Paras 83 & 84 relied upon — held that when one officer hears and another decides, personal hearing becomes an empty formality and the final order offends the basic principle of natural justice.Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and OthersSupreme Court of India  |  (1998) 8 SCC 1  |  Para 15 relied upon — held that existence of alternative remedy is not a bar to a writ petition in cases involving violation of natural justice, fundamental rights, or orders without jurisdiction.  

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner challenged an order in original passed under GST on the ground that the same was never validly served upon him. The respondents (Union of India and others) contended in their counter affidavit that the order was duly served — first, by uploading it on the GST common portal on 08.06.2023, and second, by dispatching it through Speed Post on 01.06.2023 to the address registered in the GST records. FACTSThe respondents, in support of their claim of valid service by Speed Post, produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch. However, they failed to produce the Acknowledgement card, which is the document returned to the sender after the article is received by the addressee bearing the signature of the addressee or his representative. Further, the Department of Posts, Government of India, vide its communication dated 07.04.2026, informed the petitioner that there is no evidence of service of the said article upon the petitioner after it was dispatched by the respondents. The court also noted the earlier interim order dated 17.12.2025 already granted in favour of the petitioner. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"mere uploading of the order in the GST Portal would not suffice, and that the respondents ought to choose other modes of service also, which would be a proper exercise of the power of the respondents when there are other choices also made available under Section 169 of the Act.""what sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 169 of the Act requires is that the order in original should be sent by Speed Post with 'Acknowledgement due'.""Though the respondents have produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch by Speed Post, they have not produced the 'Acknowledgment' card which would have been returned to the respondent after the article sent by speed post is received by the petitioner with signature of petitioner's representative.""Therefore, prima facie it cannot be said that there is compliance of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the CGST Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was admitted and the interim order dated 17.12.2025 already in favour of the petitioner was made absolute. The Court held, prima facie, that neither uploading the order on the GST portal alone nor dispatch by Speed Post without producing the Acknowledgement card satisfies the requirement of valid service under Section 169(1)(b) of the CGST Act.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationSharp Tanks and Structurals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner (GST) (Appeals), Tirunelveli(2025) 34 CENTEX 426 (Madras High Court) 

BACKGROUNDA group of petitioners (purchasing dealers) challenged Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017 as arbitrary, ultra vires, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 265, and 300A of the Constitution of India. In the alternative, they prayed that the provision be read down so as to apply only to fraudulent or collusive transactions, thereby protecting bona fide purchasers. The common thread across all petitions was that ITC was being denied to them solely because their respective suppliers had failed to deposit the tax collected with the Government — a default entirely outside the purchaser's control or knowledge.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the SOR and the inseparable link between ITC and actual tax payment (Para 43):"The SOR emphatically mentions about 'input tax credit making it available in respect of taxes paid'. Thus, availment of ITC is intrinsically connected with the factum of 'taxes paid'."On the GST regime being distinct from the VAT regime (Para 60):"Therefore, considering the overall scheme of the Act, any 'reading down' (narrow interpretation) of Section 16(2)(c) would trigger cascading fiscal consequences. The legal position under the former VAT regime was materially different, as input tax credit was confined within the originating state. In contrast, the GST regime is destination-based; therefore, input tax credit must operate seamlessly across state lines for inter-State supplies, requiring strict compliance to maintain fiscal balance."On the purchasing dealer not being remediless (Para 62):"The scheme of ITC under the GST framework does not envisage a situation where the purchasing dealer is left remediless. The Revenue is empowered to initiate recovery proceedings against the supplier under Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act for failure to discharge tax liability in respect of the original transaction. Further, in terms of Rule 37A of the CGST Rules, 2017 once the supplier discharges such tax liability, the purchasing dealer becomes entitled to re-avail the credit in the immediately succeeding month. Thus, the statutory mechanism does not permanently deprive the purchasing dealer of ITC; rather, the credit is restored upon payment of tax into the Government treasury. Mere delay or hardship in availing ITC, therefore, cannot constitute a valid ground for reading down Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act."On double taxation argument (Para 63):"The contention regarding double taxation is misconceived. It is well settled that ITC is not a constitutional or vested right, but a statutory concession, subject to the conditions and restrictions prescribed under the Act. Where the statute provides for reversal and re-availment of credit, the same cannot be characterised as double taxation so as to invalidate the provision."On Section 16(2)(c) being clear and unambiguous (Para 67):"...in the present case, Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act is clear, self-explanatory, and unambiguous. Its plain reading does not give rise to any constitutional or legal infirmity. The underlying intent of the provision is that the Government cannot be deprived of revenue on account of illegal or defaulting conduct on the part of the supplier."On distinguishing DVAT provisions from CGST (Para 68):"On a close scrutiny of the scheme of the GST regime, it is evident that Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act cannot be equated with the VAT regime, particularly with Section 9(2)(g) of the DVAT Act, as examined by the Delhi High Court in On Quest Merchandising India (P) Ltd. (supra). It is also noticed that the Tripura High Court, while following in the case of On Quest Merchandising India (P) Ltd. (supra), has read down Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act on the ground of practical impossibility for the purchaser to ensure that the supplier has deposited tax. With respect, we are unable to agree with the said view. The Tripura High Court proceeded on the premise that ITC is intended solely to avoid double taxation under the CGST regime, but did not adequately consider the interplay of Sections 41 and 53 of the CGST Act read with Rule 37A of the CGST Rules, 2017."On burden of proof under Section 155 (Para 70):"Thus, the purchasing dealer must discharge the initial burden of establishing eligibility to claim input tax credit. Such eligibility is intrinsically linked to the fulfilment of statutory conditions, including the deposit of tax by the supplier with the Government. The expression 'eligible' in Section 155 of the CGST Act cannot be construed as dependent upon a unilateral act of claim by the purchaser; rather, it has a direct nexus with the actual payment of tax by the supplier."On conjoint reading of Section 16(2) clauses (Para 80):"Thus, the Revenue cannot be directed to stop at clause (b), since eligibility for input tax credit is established only after the receipt of goods or services or both, and upon the tax charged in respect of such supply being duly paid to the Government. A registered person (dealer) cannot be held entitled to claim input tax credit unless all the conditions up to clause (c) are satisfied."On the doctrine of reading down not being applicable (Para 82):"We do not find that the provision of Section 16(2)(c) if read with the scheme of GST regime as discussed, conflicts with constitutional or legal principles. The provision of Section 16(2)(c) cannot be read in isolation, but has to read with attendant provisions as discussed hereinabove, which enables the government to secure its interest in revenue, by keeping a check on fraudulent transactions while maintaining the interest of genuine purchasers."On the Axel Kittel principle and a balanced approach (Para 87):"A balanced approach is needed, which finds place in the decision expressed by the European Court of Justice ('ECJ') in the case of Axel Kittel & Recolta Recycling SPRL (supra). Under this principle, the availment of ITC can be denied only if it is shown that the recipient knew or ought to have known that their purchase was connected with a fraudulent evasion of tax."On Government's obligation to act (Para 88):"Albeit, we acknowledge that the provisions of Section 16(2)(c) of the Act are to be viewed from a regulatory standpoint and are anchored in the legitimate objective of maintaining the integrity of the tax chain, preventing systemic revenue loss to the Government; however, it is high time that, in order to resolve the conundrum, the Government undertakes a comprehensive re-evaluation of the dicey situation which purchasers are facing. There is a pressing need for legislative amendments or clarifications to be issued within the GST framework to alleviate the disproportionate financial and administrative burdens currently placed upon purchasers who have an honest claim of ITC. Beyond mere policy changes, the Government should implement a robust, technology-driven tracking mechanism enabling verification of payments made by suppliers against specific invoices in real time, thereby insulating bona fide recipients from the defaults of their vendors."FINAL VERDICTSection 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act is neither read down nor declared ultra vires. The Court held the provision to be constitutionally valid, clear, and unambiguous when read conjointly with Sections 41(2), 53, and 155 of the CGST Act and Rule 37A of the CGST Rules, 2017. The writ petitions are listed for decision on individual merits. 👎