BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs.
Andaman Timber Industries vs Commissioner of Central Excise 02-09-2026
BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs.
Case Facts:The department issued two show cause notices raising substantial tax, interest, and penalty demands against the petitioner. The petitioner sought documents relied upon in the notices, but claimed inability to access them as they were uploaded on a different portal. Due to this, no reply was filed and ex parte assessment orders were passed creating liability of about Rs. 159 crore. The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition citing availability of alternative remedy under Section 107 requiring pre-deposit. Court Decision:The Court noted the petitioner’s grievance regarding lack of opportunity and financial difficulty in complying with the statutory pre-deposit. It directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 3.50 crore within two weeks as a condition for further consideration of the matter. Upon such deposit, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents. The Court further ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken pursuant to the assessment orders subject to deposit.
Simla Gomti Pan Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax U.P. & Ors. 20-08-2026
Case Facts:The department issued two show cause notices raising substantial tax, interest, and penalty demands against the petitioner. The petitioner sought documents relied upon in the notices, but claimed inability to access them as they were uploaded on a different portal. Due to this, no reply was filed and ex parte assessment orders were passed creating liability of about Rs. 159 crore. The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition citing availability of alternative remedy under Section 107 requiring pre-deposit. Court Decision:The Court noted the petitioner’s grievance regarding lack of opportunity and financial difficulty in complying with the statutory pre-deposit. It directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 3.50 crore within two weeks as a condition for further consideration of the matter. Upon such deposit, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents. The Court further ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken pursuant to the assessment orders subject to deposit.
BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025 in Writ Tax No. 2707/2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vS Bambino Agro Industries Ltd & Anr. 29-05-2026
BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025 in Writ Tax No. 2707/2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits.
BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding
Pune Bar Association vs. Union of India and Others 22-05-2026
BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding
BACKGROUNDTata Steel Limited filed a Writ Petition (WPT No. 2485/2026) before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, which was decided against it vide order dated 23-04-2026. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The core issue revolves around the question of alternative remedy in the context of proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — a provision dealing with determination of tax not paid or short paid on account of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner's senior counsel submitted before the Supreme Court that the identical question of law — i.e., whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — is already pending consideration before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025. Given this, the petitioner sought a stay on further proceedings before the lower forum and prayed that this matter be tagged along with the earlier SLP. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Mr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that identical issue about alternative remedy arising out of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 is pending consideration before this Court.""Till next date of hearing, the further proceedings shall remain stayed. The interim order is subject to the Court hearing SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025 being satisfied that the issues in this case are similar to SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025." FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court issued notice, directed the matter to be listed along with SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025, and stayed further proceedings till the next date of hearing — subject to the Court being satisfied that the issues in the present case are similar to those in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025.👐 FLAT (Interim stay granted — conditional; neither a final victory nor a loss for the assessee)
Tata Steel Limited vs. Union of India & Ors. 23-04-2026
BACKGROUNDTata Steel Limited filed a Writ Petition (WPT No. 2485/2026) before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, which was decided against it vide order dated 23-04-2026. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The core issue revolves around the question of alternative remedy in the context of proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — a provision dealing with determination of tax not paid or short paid on account of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner's senior counsel submitted before the Supreme Court that the identical question of law — i.e., whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — is already pending consideration before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025. Given this, the petitioner sought a stay on further proceedings before the lower forum and prayed that this matter be tagged along with the earlier SLP. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Mr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that identical issue about alternative remedy arising out of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 is pending consideration before this Court.""Till next date of hearing, the further proceedings shall remain stayed. The interim order is subject to the Court hearing SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025 being satisfied that the issues in this case are similar to SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025." FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court issued notice, directed the matter to be listed along with SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025, and stayed further proceedings till the next date of hearing — subject to the Court being satisfied that the issues in the present case are similar to those in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025.👐 FLAT (Interim stay granted — conditional; neither a final victory nor a loss for the assessee)
Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited 13-03-2026
Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 28-02-2026
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
BACKGROUND The assessee had made a statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Jharkhand GST Act, 2017 for maintaining an appeal before the appellate authority, in which it thereafter succeeded. The assessee then sought refund of the pre-deposit amount. The High Court of Jharkhand, while granting relief, interpreted and applied Section 54 of the Jharkhand GST Act to order the refund. The State of Jharkhand challenged this before the Supreme Court, contending that the refund of statutory pre-deposit in such a case is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and that Section 54 had no application in this context. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel that the subject refund was relatable to Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and to that extent, the exercise undertaken by the High Court with regard to Section 54 thereof was unnecessary." FINAL VERDICT The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interpretation of Section 54 as unnecessary in this context, clarified that refund of statutory pre-deposit on success in appeal is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and directed refund of the amount with interest within four weeks. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. ↔️
State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. BLA Infrastructure Private Limited 09-01-2026
BACKGROUND The assessee had made a statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Jharkhand GST Act, 2017 for maintaining an appeal before the appellate authority, in which it thereafter succeeded. The assessee then sought refund of the pre-deposit amount. The High Court of Jharkhand, while granting relief, interpreted and applied Section 54 of the Jharkhand GST Act to order the refund. The State of Jharkhand challenged this before the Supreme Court, contending that the refund of statutory pre-deposit in such a case is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and that Section 54 had no application in this context. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel that the subject refund was relatable to Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and to that extent, the exercise undertaken by the High Court with regard to Section 54 thereof was unnecessary." FINAL VERDICT The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interpretation of Section 54 as unnecessary in this context, clarified that refund of statutory pre-deposit on success in appeal is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and directed refund of the amount with interest within four weeks. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. ↔️
Facts:An FIR was registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police alleging that the accused induced a large number of investors by falsely claiming divine powers to triple their money. Around 1,852 victims were cheated of approximately ₹46.40 crores. The police registered a single FIR and treated complaints of other victims as statements during investigation. The Delhi High Court held that each deposit constituted a separate transaction requiring separate FIRs. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court was premature as the investigation had not concluded. The Court observed that whether multiple acts constitute the “same transaction” must be determined based on the facts emerging from the investigation.The Court noted that when offences arise from a common conspiracy and may form part of the same transaction, it is permissible to register one FIR and treat subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC. The police were justified in registering a single FIR alleging criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and treating complaints of other victims as statements.The Court clarified that the Magistrate will determine at the stage of framing of charges whether the acts constitute the same transaction under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, enabling joint trial. If the acts are distinct transactions, separate trials may be conducted subject to Section 219 CrPC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s answers which mandated separate FIRs for each transaction and allowed the appeal filed by the State.Cases Referred by Court:• S. Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras• Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India• State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao• State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav• Amish Devgan vs. Union of India• T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala• Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India• Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India• Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka• Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab• Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar• Satinder Singh Bhasin vs. State of Uttar Pradesh• Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana• Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi• Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India
The State (NCT) of Delhi vs. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 06-01-2026
Facts:An FIR was registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police alleging that the accused induced a large number of investors by falsely claiming divine powers to triple their money. Around 1,852 victims were cheated of approximately ₹46.40 crores. The police registered a single FIR and treated complaints of other victims as statements during investigation. The Delhi High Court held that each deposit constituted a separate transaction requiring separate FIRs. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court was premature as the investigation had not concluded. The Court observed that whether multiple acts constitute the “same transaction” must be determined based on the facts emerging from the investigation.The Court noted that when offences arise from a common conspiracy and may form part of the same transaction, it is permissible to register one FIR and treat subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC. The police were justified in registering a single FIR alleging criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and treating complaints of other victims as statements.The Court clarified that the Magistrate will determine at the stage of framing of charges whether the acts constitute the same transaction under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, enabling joint trial. If the acts are distinct transactions, separate trials may be conducted subject to Section 219 CrPC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s answers which mandated separate FIRs for each transaction and allowed the appeal filed by the State.Cases Referred by Court:• S. Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras• Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India• State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao• State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav• Amish Devgan vs. Union of India• T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala• Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India• Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India• Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka• Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab• Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar• Satinder Singh Bhasin vs. State of Uttar Pradesh• Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana• Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi• Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India
Facts The issue before the Court was whether purchasing dealers who paid tax to registered selling dealers are entitled to Input Tax Credit even if the selling dealers failed to deposit the tax with the Government. The selling dealers were registered at the time of transactions but later defaulted and their registrations were cancelled. The Delhi High Court held that the purchasing dealers were bona fide and entitled to ITC. The Revenue challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision. It held that where transactions and invoices are genuine and the selling dealer was registered at the time of transaction, ITC cannot be denied to bona fide purchasing dealers. The Court found no reason to interfere with the grant of ITC after due verification. Cases Referred by Court:• On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Ltd.
Commissioner of Trade and Tax, Delhi v. Shanti Kiran India (P) Ltd. 09-10-2025
Facts The issue before the Court was whether purchasing dealers who paid tax to registered selling dealers are entitled to Input Tax Credit even if the selling dealers failed to deposit the tax with the Government. The selling dealers were registered at the time of transactions but later defaulted and their registrations were cancelled. The Delhi High Court held that the purchasing dealers were bona fide and entitled to ITC. The Revenue challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision. It held that where transactions and invoices are genuine and the selling dealer was registered at the time of transaction, ITC cannot be denied to bona fide purchasing dealers. The Court found no reason to interfere with the grant of ITC after due verification. Cases Referred by Court:• On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Ltd.
