BACKGROUND The petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions challenging the final judgment dated 22.11.2012 passed in a Writ Petition before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi and the subsequent order dated 28.04.2014 passed in a Letters Patent Appeal arising therefrom. The petitions were filed with applications for condonation of delay in filing and refiling. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)The Supreme Court passed only the following operative order and made no detailed observations on merits:"Delay condoned. The special leave petitions are dismissed. However, the issue relating to maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal, is kept open." FINAL VERDICT The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions after condoning the delay, without going into the merits. The question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal was expressly kept open. 👎

BackgroundThis was a non-tax, criminal matter arising from a matrimonial dispute. The case reached the Court against the backdrop of rampant misuse of Section 498-A IPC (a cognizable, non-bailable offence carrying up to three years' imprisonment), which had acquired "a dubious place of pride" as a weapon to harass husbands and their relatives. NCRB data cited showed nearly 1.98 lakh persons arrested under the provision in 2012 — a quarter of them women (mothers and sisters of husbands) — with a 93.6% charge-sheeting rate but only 15% conviction, the lowest across all heads. The Court took up the matter to curb the "arrest first, proceed with the rest" attitude of the police.FactsThe appellant, husband of respondent no. 2 (married on 01.07.2007), apprehended arrest in a case under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The wife alleged that a demand for Rs. 8 lakhs, a Maruti car, an air-conditioner, a television set and other items was made by her in-laws; that when informed, the appellant supported his mother and threatened to marry another woman; and that she was driven out of the matrimonial home for non-fulfilment of the dowry demand. The appellant denied the allegations and sought anticipatory bail, which was rejected first by the Sessions Judge and then by the High Court, bringing him to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition.Court's Observations (verbatim)"The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.""No arrest should be made only because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another… No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person.""In pith and core, the police office before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve?""Before a Magistrate authorises detention under Section 167, Cr.PC, he has to be first satisfied that the arrest made is legal and in accordance with law and all the constitutional rights of the person arrested is satisfied. If the arrest effected by the police officer does not satisfy the requirements of Section 41 of the Code, Magistrate is duty bound not to authorise his further detention and release the accused.""The Magistrate before authorising detention will record its own satisfaction, may be in brief but the said satisfaction must reflect from its order. It shall never be based upon the ipse dixit of the police officer…"Directions Issued (binding safeguards)The Court directed, inter alia, that police shall not automatically arrest in Section 498-A cases but satisfy themselves of necessity under Section 41 Cr.PC parameters; officers be given a check-list under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) and forward it with reasons while producing the accused; the Magistrate authorise detention only after recording satisfaction on that report; notice under Section 41A be served within two weeks; and that failure to comply would invite departmental action and contempt proceedings. These directions were extended to all offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, not just Section 498-A.Final VerdictThe appeal was allowed. The Court made absolute its earlier order dated 31.10.2013 granting the appellant provisional bail, subject to the directions framed to prevent unnecessary arrests and mechanical authorisation of detention. Cases / Authorities Referred by the CourtThe judgment did not turn on prior case-law citations; the Court relied on statutory provisions and official reports, namely:Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961Sections 41, 41A, 57 & 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Article 22(2), Constitution of India177th Report of the Law Commission of India (2001); 152nd & 154th Reports (1994)"Crime in India 2012 Statistics," National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs

Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue and upheld the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal classifying the goods as jute carpets.The Court held that:The carpets manufactured by the respondent contained more than 50% jute by weight and had no separate base fabric, as established by reports of the Indian Jute Industries Research Association and the Department’s Chemical Examiner.Since the goods fell under Chapter 57 and consisted of more than one textile material, classification had to be determined in accordance with Section Note 2(A) and Section Note 14(A) of Section XI of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, which mandate classification based on the textile material predominating by weight. As jute predominated over each other single textile material, the carpets were classifiable as jute carpets.Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 57 only defines “carpets and other textile floor coverings” for the purpose of that Chapter and cannot override the predominance test for classification.The Revenue’s attempt to classify the goods under the residuary sub-heading was rejected. The Court reiterated that when goods reasonably fall under a specific heading, they cannot be classified under a residuary entry.The argument based on the “essential character” or “surface test” was rejected, as predominance by weight was the governing principle under the statutory notes.The plea based on Rule 3 of the Rules for Interpretation of the Schedule was rejected, as classification was clear from the Section and Chapter Notes, and Rule 3 applies only when classification cannot be determined otherwise. Further, a case not made out in the show cause notice cannot be argued subsequently.The Court found no perversity in the concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal and affirmed the classification as jute carpets.Cases Referred by Court:HPL Chemicals Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh (2006) 5 SCC 208Dunlop India Ltd. vs Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241Bharat Forge and Press Industries (P) Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise (1990) 1 SCC 532Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad vs Fenoplast (P) Ltd. (1994) 72 ELT 513 (SC)M/s Indo International Industries vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 528Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Simplex Mills Co. Ltd. (2005) 3 SCC 51Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs Toyo Engineering India Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 592Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 89Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716Novopan India Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606Hindustan Poles Corporation vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2006) 4 SCC 85Kemrock Industries & Exports Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2007) 9 SCC 52

BackgroundThe appellant, a company with its registered office at Mumbai, had availed a loan from the Bhopal branch of State Bank of India. The respondent issued a notice for repayment of the loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). Questioning the constitutional validity of the said Act, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court challenging that dismissal. Crucial FactsThe sole submission of the appellant, both before the High Court and the Supreme Court, was that since the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act was under challenge, the Delhi High Court had requisite jurisdiction as Parliament sits in Delhi. No part of the cause of action — neither the loan, nor the notice of demand, nor any executive action — arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The registered office of the appellant was in Mumbai and the demand notice was issued from Bhopal. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner."— S.B. Sinha, J."A writ petition, however, questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act shall not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi only because the seat of the Union of India is in Delhi."— S.B. Sinha, J. (Citing Abdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354)"Situs of office of the Parliament, Legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof."— S.B. Sinha, J."The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court."— S.B. Sinha, J."When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place."— S.B. Sinha, J."Even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens."— S.B. Sinha, J. (On Forum Conveniens) Note — Overruled DecisionThe view in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. (1995) 4 SCC 738 — that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government confers jurisdiction on the High Court — was expressly overruled to the extent it held otherwise. Final Verdict👎 Appeal dismissed. The Delhi High Court rightly declined jurisdiction as no cause of action — neither wholly nor in part — arose within its territorial limits. Mere location of Parliament in Delhi does not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging a Parliamentary enactment. No costs. Cases Referred by the CourtMussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh — 15 IA 156 — Definition and scope of cause of actionOil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. — (1994) 4 SCC 711 — Territorial jurisdiction; integral facts testState of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr. — (1985) 3 SCC 217 — Mere service of notice not integral cause of actionAligarh Muslim University & Anr. vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. — (1994) 4 SCC 710 — Abuse of jurisdictionUnion of India & Ors. vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr. — (2002) 1 SCC 567 — Integral facts must form cause of action for High Court jurisdictionNational Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s. Haribox Swalram & Ors. — JT 2004 (4) SC 508 — Mere carrying on of business at a place not integral cause of actionAbdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India & Ors. — AIR 1979 Cal 354 — Delhi HC not automatically having jurisdiction over Parliament seatNasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal — AIR 1976 SC 331 — Cause of action; appellate order situs (distinguished)U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. & Ors. — (1995) 4 SCC 738 — Overruled to the extent of holding situs of notification issuance as conferring jurisdictionLt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. The Union of India & Anr. — (1961) 2 SCR 828 — Pre-Art.226(2) amendment; distinguished on facts 

The appellant, Vishwa Mitter, was a dealer in beedies and the constituted attorney of Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, the registered owner of certain trademarks. He filed a criminal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging that the respondents had infringed registered trademarks by selling inferior quality beedies in deceptively similar wrappers, thereby committing offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Section 420 IPC.Initially, the Magistrate issued process after preliminary inquiry. However, on revision, the High Court quashed the order on a technical ground and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Upon rehearing, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint holding that the complainant, being only a dealer and not the registered trademark owner, was not competent to file the complaint. The revision petition filed against this dismissal was rejected in limine by the High Court. The matter then reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a Magistrate can decline to take cognizance of an offence on the sole ground that the complainant is not the registered owner of the trademark, and whether any statutory provision restricted the right to file such complaint only to the registered proprietor.Court Observations and DecisionThe Supreme Court examined Sections 4 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It observed that Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence, without prescribing any qualification for the complainant. The Court held that, generally, anyone can set the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary.The Court further noted that under Section 4(2) CrPC, offences under other laws are to be dealt with according to the CrPC unless a special statute provides otherwise. It examined Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which restricts cognizance for offences under Sections 81, 82, and 83 to complaints made by the Registrar or authorized officer. However, no such restriction exists for offences under Sections 78 and 79. Therefore, there was no statutory bar preventing the appellant from filing the complaint.The Court also observed that even in the absence of specific statutory qualification, a person having a subsisting interest in the protection of a registered trademark cannot be said to lack standing. The appellant, being both a dealer in the concerned products and a constituted attorney of the registered proprietor, had sufficient interest.The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of lack of competency and that the High Court was also wrong in dismissing the revision petition in limine.The appeal was allowed. The orders of the Magistrate dated 20 February 1980 and of the High Court dated 4 November 1980 were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law in light of the Court’s observations.Cases ReferredThe judgment does not record reliance on any specific prior decided cases. The Court referred to statutory provisions including:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4, 190, 195, 198, 199Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 – Sections 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – Section 20Companies Act, 1956 – Section 621