Ziva Auto Sales Thru. Prop. Akhand Pratap and Another vs State of U.P. Thru. Secy. State Tax Lko. and AnotherCourt Name: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow BenchOrder Date: 28 January 2026Court Decision:The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order dated 11 February 2025 passed under Section 73(9) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, along with the show cause notice dated 13 November 2024, were quashed and set aside.The Court held that Section 75(7) of the Act, 2017 mandates that the amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in the order shall not exceed the amount specified in the show cause notice and no demand shall be confirmed on grounds other than those specified in the notice.In the present case, the show cause notice did not quantify any interest for the period April 2020 to March 2021, though interest was later imposed in the adjudication order. The Court held that failure to quantify interest in the show cause notice, despite the relevant period being known to the authorities, was in contravention of Section 75(7).The contention of the GST authorities relying on Section 75(9), that interest is payable whether or not specified in the order, was rejected. The Court held that Section 75(9) applies to non-specification of interest in the order determining tax liability, and not to non-quantification in the show cause notice.Liberty was granted to the authorities to issue a fresh show cause notice in accordance with law and proceed afresh.Cases Referred by Court:M/s Vrinda Automation vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, Writ Tax No. 2006 of 2025, decided on 14 May 2025

Chaurasiya Zarda Bhandar Thru. Proprietor Rakesh Chaurasiya and Another vs State of U.P. Thru. Commissioner State Tax Lko. and OthersCourt Name: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow BenchOrder Date: 19 November 2025Court Decision:The writ petition was allowed. The assessment and demand order dated 29.08.2024, as well as the consequential attachment order dated 11.09.2025, were quashed and set aside.The Court held that the show cause notice for the financial year 2019–20 proposed recovery of tax amounting to Rs. 29,07,002/- and did not contain any proposal for imposition of interest or penalty.However, the impugned order imposed interest and penalty under CGST and SGST totaling Rs. 55,71,191/-. The Court found that such imposition was contrary to Section 75(7), which provides that the amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in the order shall not be in excess of the amount specified in the notice and no demand shall be confirmed on grounds other than those specified in the notice.Since the show cause notice contained no reference to interest or penalty, the impugned order was held to be unsustainable and arbitrary.The matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law.Cases Referred by Court:No case law was referred to in the order.  

Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.

Facts of the CaseThe matter arose from a Special Leave Petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. During the hearing, an important legal question emerged regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence and the necessity of videography at crime scenes. The Court also considered whether the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic records.In earlier proceedings, the Court had recorded submissions from the Additional Solicitor General regarding the usefulness of videography in crime scene investigation. It was noted that videography and digital photography could enhance transparency and accuracy in investigation. The Union Government had also constituted a Committee of Experts to prepare a roadmap and Standard Operating Procedure for videography at crime scenes.Simultaneously, a legal issue arose in connected matters concerning the interpretation of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The apprehension expressed was that if the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) was treated as mandatory in all circumstances, electronic evidence produced by a person not in control of the device would be excluded, resulting in denial of justice.The questions decided by the Court were:Whether electronic evidence is admissible only in compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act.Whether the certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory in all cases.Whether procedural requirements under Section 65B can be relaxed in appropriate cases.Court Observations and DecisionThe Court examined earlier decisions dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence. It noted that electronic evidence is admissible subject to safeguards regarding authenticity and reliability. The Court observed that Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions intended to supplement the law on admissibility of electronic records.The Court clarified that primary electronic evidence is admissible under Section 62 of the Evidence Act and is not governed by Section 65B. Section 65B applies to secondary electronic evidence.Importantly, the Court held that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory. The requirement applies when electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in possession and control of the device from which the electronic record is generated and is capable of producing such certificate.Where electronic evidence is produced by a person who is not in possession of the device, Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act can be invoked. In such cases, insisting on a certificate under Section 65B(4) would result in denial of justice.The Court clarified the legal position that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is procedural and can be relaxed by the Court in the interest of justice. Electronic evidence cannot be excluded merely on technical grounds if it is otherwise relevant and authentic.Case ReferredRam Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, Supreme Court of India.R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, Court of Criminal Appeal (UK).R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699, Court of Appeal (UK).Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, Supreme Court of India.Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Supreme Court of India.Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, Supreme Court of India.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, Supreme Court of India.

The appellant, Vishwa Mitter, was a dealer in beedies and the constituted attorney of M/s Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, the registered owner of certain trademarks. He filed a criminal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging that the respondents had infringed registered trademarks by selling inferior quality beedies in deceptively similar wrappers, thereby committing offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Section 420 IPC.Initially, the Magistrate issued process after preliminary inquiry. However, on revision, the High Court quashed the order on a technical ground and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Upon rehearing, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint holding that the complainant, being only a dealer and not the registered trademark owner, was not competent to file the complaint. The revision petition filed against this dismissal was rejected in limine by the High Court. The matter then reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a Magistrate can decline to take cognizance of an offence on the sole ground that the complainant is not the registered owner of the trademark, and whether any statutory provision restricted the right to file such complaint only to the registered proprietor.Court Observations and DecisionThe Supreme Court examined Sections 4 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It observed that Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence, without prescribing any qualification for the complainant. The Court held that, generally, anyone can set the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary.The Court further noted that under Section 4(2) CrPC, offences under other laws are to be dealt with according to the CrPC unless a special statute provides otherwise. It examined Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which restricts cognizance for offences under Sections 81, 82, and 83 to complaints made by the Registrar or authorized officer. However, no such restriction exists for offences under Sections 78 and 79. Therefore, there was no statutory bar preventing the appellant from filing the complaint.The Court also observed that even in the absence of specific statutory qualification, a person having a subsisting interest in the protection of a registered trademark cannot be said to lack standing. The appellant, being both a dealer in the concerned products and a constituted attorney of the registered proprietor, had sufficient interest.The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of lack of competency and that the High Court was also wrong in dismissing the revision petition in limine.The appeal was allowed. The orders of the Magistrate dated 20 February 1980 and of the High Court dated 4 November 1980 were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law in light of the Court’s observations.Cases ReferredThe judgment does not record reliance on any specific prior decided cases. The Court referred to statutory provisions including:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4, 190, 195, 198, 199Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 – Sections 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – Section 20Companies Act, 1956 – Section 621