The petitioner, Sanjay Jain, filed a set of Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 07 May 2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CRMBA No. 46321 of 2024. The petitions arose from criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner.At the stage of hearing, the Court directed the respondents to file their counter affidavit within three weeks. The petitioner was allowed to file a rejoinder, if any, within one week thereafter. The matter was ordered to be listed after four weeks for further hearing.The Supreme Court also directed that the interim order earlier granted in favour of the petitioner shall continue to operate until the next date of hearing.
The petitioner, Sanjay Jain, filed a set of Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 07 May 2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CRMBA No. 46321 of 2024. The petitions arose from criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner.At the stage of hearing, the Court directed the respondents to file their counter affidavit within three weeks. The petitioner was allowed to file a rejoinder, if any, within one week thereafter. The matter was ordered to be listed after four weeks for further hearing.The Supreme Court also directed that the interim order earlier granted in favour of the petitioner shall continue to operate until the next date of hearing.
The appellant, Kesari Nandan Mobile, challenged before the Supreme Court the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 29 January 2025, which had dismissed its writ petition. The dispute arose from the respondent’s action of re-issuing provisional attachment orders dated 13 November 2024 and 18 December 2024 under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”), even after the earlier attachments of October 2023 had lapsed upon completion of one year.The appellant argued that the CGST Act does not permit renewal of provisional attachments after expiry of their statutory one-year life under Section 83(2). It contended that the respondent’s subsequent orders, purporting to “renew” the attachments, were without jurisdiction and violated the statutory limitation. The Gujarat High Court, however, had upheld the respondent’s action, holding that there was no legal bar to issuing fresh attachments for safeguarding revenue.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined Section 83 of the CGST Act and Rule 159 of the CGST Rules, noting the draconian nature of provisional attachment powers. The Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 83 clearly limits the life of such attachment to one year, and there is no statutory provision authorizing renewal or re-issuance. Permitting repeated or renewed attachments would render sub-section (2) nugatory and violate legislative intent.The Court rejected the Gujarat High Court’s reasoning that absence of a specific prohibition allows fresh attachment. It emphasized that statutory authorities can only act within powers expressly conferred by law, and any act not authorized is ultra vires. The Court also took note of the GST Council’s recommendation to amend Rule 159 to align it with Section 83, recognizing the one-year limit on provisional attachment.Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned attachment orders dated 13 November 2024 and 18 December 2024, and directed de-freezing of the appellant’s bank accounts. The Court clarified, however, that the revenue authorities may continue their investigation in accordance with law.
Kesari Nandan Mobile v. Office of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax (2), Enforcement Division–5 14-08-2025
The appellant, Kesari Nandan Mobile, challenged before the Supreme Court the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 29 January 2025, which had dismissed its writ petition. The dispute arose from the respondent’s action of re-issuing provisional attachment orders dated 13 November 2024 and 18 December 2024 under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”), even after the earlier attachments of October 2023 had lapsed upon completion of one year.The appellant argued that the CGST Act does not permit renewal of provisional attachments after expiry of their statutory one-year life under Section 83(2). It contended that the respondent’s subsequent orders, purporting to “renew” the attachments, were without jurisdiction and violated the statutory limitation. The Gujarat High Court, however, had upheld the respondent’s action, holding that there was no legal bar to issuing fresh attachments for safeguarding revenue.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined Section 83 of the CGST Act and Rule 159 of the CGST Rules, noting the draconian nature of provisional attachment powers. The Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 83 clearly limits the life of such attachment to one year, and there is no statutory provision authorizing renewal or re-issuance. Permitting repeated or renewed attachments would render sub-section (2) nugatory and violate legislative intent.The Court rejected the Gujarat High Court’s reasoning that absence of a specific prohibition allows fresh attachment. It emphasized that statutory authorities can only act within powers expressly conferred by law, and any act not authorized is ultra vires. The Court also took note of the GST Council’s recommendation to amend Rule 159 to align it with Section 83, recognizing the one-year limit on provisional attachment.Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned attachment orders dated 13 November 2024 and 18 December 2024, and directed de-freezing of the appellant’s bank accounts. The Court clarified, however, that the revenue authorities may continue their investigation in accordance with law.
The petitioner, M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd., engaged in providing security services, challenged the summons issued by the Central GST authorities under Section 70 of the CGST Act, 2017. Earlier, the State GST authority had issued a show-cause notice for the same tax period (April 2020–March 2021) regarding non-reconciliation of turnover and excess input tax credit (ITC) claims. Subsequently, the Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued separate summons for production of documents.The petitioner contended that the Central authority lacked jurisdiction to issue such summons since proceedings on the same subject matter had already been initiated by the State authority, invoking the bar under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that issuance of summons was merely an investigative step, not initiation of proceedings.The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s decision, ruling that the issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act does not amount to “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b). The Court clarified that “proceedings” in the said provision refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74, and not preliminary steps like searches or investigations.The Court harmonized various High Court decisions and emphasized that Section 6(2)(b) seeks to prevent dual adjudication, not parallel investigations. It concluded that inquiries by Central authorities are valid even where the State authorities have commenced proceedings on a similar issue, provided no adjudicatory overlap occurs. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Another 14-08-2025
The petitioner, M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd., engaged in providing security services, challenged the summons issued by the Central GST authorities under Section 70 of the CGST Act, 2017. Earlier, the State GST authority had issued a show-cause notice for the same tax period (April 2020–March 2021) regarding non-reconciliation of turnover and excess input tax credit (ITC) claims. Subsequently, the Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued separate summons for production of documents.The petitioner contended that the Central authority lacked jurisdiction to issue such summons since proceedings on the same subject matter had already been initiated by the State authority, invoking the bar under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that issuance of summons was merely an investigative step, not initiation of proceedings.The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s decision, ruling that the issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act does not amount to “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b). The Court clarified that “proceedings” in the said provision refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74, and not preliminary steps like searches or investigations.The Court harmonized various High Court decisions and emphasized that Section 6(2)(b) seeks to prevent dual adjudication, not parallel investigations. It concluded that inquiries by Central authorities are valid even where the State authorities have commenced proceedings on a similar issue, provided no adjudicatory overlap occurs. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
The petitioners, Commissioner, CGST Appeal-1, Delhi and others, filed Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the common final judgment and order dated 12 December 2024 passed by the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) Nos. 13211, 14710, and 16477 of 2024. The High Court’s decision had granted relief to the respondents, M/s Bharti Airtel Limited and others, in connection with issues arising under the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) framework.At the hearing, the Supreme Court first considered the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay. The Court condoned the delay of 105 days in filing the petitions, allowing the interlocutory application.After hearing arguments from both sides, including the learned Additional Solicitor General for the petitioners and senior counsel for the respondents, the Court found no ground to interfere with the judgment of the Delhi High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. All pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.
Commissioner, CGST Appeal-1, Delhi & Ors. v. M/s Bharti Airtel Limited & Ors. 08-08-2025
The petitioners, Commissioner, CGST Appeal-1, Delhi and others, filed Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the common final judgment and order dated 12 December 2024 passed by the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) Nos. 13211, 14710, and 16477 of 2024. The High Court’s decision had granted relief to the respondents, M/s Bharti Airtel Limited and others, in connection with issues arising under the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) framework.At the hearing, the Supreme Court first considered the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay. The Court condoned the delay of 105 days in filing the petitions, allowing the interlocutory application.After hearing arguments from both sides, including the learned Additional Solicitor General for the petitioners and senior counsel for the respondents, the Court found no ground to interfere with the judgment of the Delhi High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. All pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.
The petitioner, Mukesh Kumar Garg, filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment and order dated 09 May 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 5737/2025. The dispute arose in relation to the applicability of penal provisions under Section 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“the Act”).Two principal contentions were raised before the Court. First, the petitioner argued that Section 122(1) of the CGST Act was inapplicable to him as he was a non-taxable person and therefore not liable under that provision. Second, it was contended that Section 122(1A) of the Act, which came into force on 1 January 2021, could not be applied retrospectively to assessment years 2017–2020.The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. Pending disposal of the matter, the Court ordered a stay on recovery of the amount directed to be deposited, subject to the condition that the petitioner deposits 25% of the demand before the GST Department, either through the electronic ledger or cash ledger.
Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. 04-08-2025
The petitioner, Mukesh Kumar Garg, filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment and order dated 09 May 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 5737/2025. The dispute arose in relation to the applicability of penal provisions under Section 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“the Act”).Two principal contentions were raised before the Court. First, the petitioner argued that Section 122(1) of the CGST Act was inapplicable to him as he was a non-taxable person and therefore not liable under that provision. Second, it was contended that Section 122(1A) of the Act, which came into force on 1 January 2021, could not be applied retrospectively to assessment years 2017–2020.The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. Pending disposal of the matter, the Court ordered a stay on recovery of the amount directed to be deposited, subject to the condition that the petitioner deposits 25% of the demand before the GST Department, either through the electronic ledger or cash ledger.
The petitioner, Pradeep Goyal, filed this writ petition under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution of India, seeking directions to the Union of India and the GST Council to establish a robust mechanism for tracking and ensuring compliance of Overseas Online Information and Database Access or Retrieval (OIDAR) service providers with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) laws.The petitioner requested several measures, including a system to monitor GST paid by non-taxable online recipients (Non-NTORs) under reverse charge, modification of GSTR-5A returns to include such data, verification of receipts earned by foreign OIDAR providers, mandating fixed establishments in India for such providers, and ensuring proper reporting, audit, and compliance mechanisms for overseas OIDAR entities similar to those applicable to domestic service providers.The Supreme Court, after hearing both parties, disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation along with a copy of the petition to the GST Council. The Court directed that, upon receipt of such representation, the GST Council shall examine the petitioner’s grievances and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.The Court, while not issuing any substantive directions on the policy measures sought, ensured that the petitioner’s concerns would be duly considered by the competent authority. All pending applications were disposed of.
Pradeep Goyal v. Union of India & Others 29-07-2025
The petitioner, Pradeep Goyal, filed this writ petition under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution of India, seeking directions to the Union of India and the GST Council to establish a robust mechanism for tracking and ensuring compliance of Overseas Online Information and Database Access or Retrieval (OIDAR) service providers with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) laws.The petitioner requested several measures, including a system to monitor GST paid by non-taxable online recipients (Non-NTORs) under reverse charge, modification of GSTR-5A returns to include such data, verification of receipts earned by foreign OIDAR providers, mandating fixed establishments in India for such providers, and ensuring proper reporting, audit, and compliance mechanisms for overseas OIDAR entities similar to those applicable to domestic service providers.The Supreme Court, after hearing both parties, disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation along with a copy of the petition to the GST Council. The Court directed that, upon receipt of such representation, the GST Council shall examine the petitioner’s grievances and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.The Court, while not issuing any substantive directions on the policy measures sought, ensured that the petitioner’s concerns would be duly considered by the competent authority. All pending applications were disposed of.
The appellant, M/s ASP Traders, a registered dealer of red arecanut from Karnataka, consigned goods to Delhi which were detained by the Mobile Squad, Jhansi, under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”). The detention was based on alleged discrepancies in documents and missing goods. A notice under Section 129(3) was issued on 21 January 2022, to which the appellant replied. Owing to business exigencies, the appellant deposited ₹7,20,440 towards IGST and secured the release of goods on 27 January 2022.However, no final order was passed under Section 129(3). Despite repeated representations, the authorities maintained that proceedings stood concluded under Section 129(5) of the Act. The Allahabad High Court upheld this view, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant and holding that once payment was made and goods were released, proceedings were deemed to have concluded.On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that every show cause notice must culminate in a reasoned, speaking order. The payment made by the appellant could not be treated as voluntary when objections were already on record. The Court emphasized that Section 129(5) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement under Section 129(3) to pass an order, which is necessary to preserve the taxpayer’s statutory right to appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act.The Court relied upon the CBIC Circular No. 41/15/2018-GST dated 13 April 2018, which mandates issuance of a formal order in Form GST MOV-09 and its summary in Form GST DRC-07. It held that failure to do so violates procedural fairness and Article 265 of the Constitution, as no tax or penalty can be levied or collected without authority of law.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and directed the concerned officer to pass a reasoned final order under Section 129(3) in Form GST MOV-09, upload its summary in Form GST DRC-07, and grant an opportunity of hearing to the appellant within one month.
M/s ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 24-07-2025
The appellant, M/s ASP Traders, a registered dealer of red arecanut from Karnataka, consigned goods to Delhi which were detained by the Mobile Squad, Jhansi, under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”). The detention was based on alleged discrepancies in documents and missing goods. A notice under Section 129(3) was issued on 21 January 2022, to which the appellant replied. Owing to business exigencies, the appellant deposited ₹7,20,440 towards IGST and secured the release of goods on 27 January 2022.However, no final order was passed under Section 129(3). Despite repeated representations, the authorities maintained that proceedings stood concluded under Section 129(5) of the Act. The Allahabad High Court upheld this view, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant and holding that once payment was made and goods were released, proceedings were deemed to have concluded.On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that every show cause notice must culminate in a reasoned, speaking order. The payment made by the appellant could not be treated as voluntary when objections were already on record. The Court emphasized that Section 129(5) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement under Section 129(3) to pass an order, which is necessary to preserve the taxpayer’s statutory right to appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act.The Court relied upon the CBIC Circular No. 41/15/2018-GST dated 13 April 2018, which mandates issuance of a formal order in Form GST MOV-09 and its summary in Form GST DRC-07. It held that failure to do so violates procedural fairness and Article 265 of the Constitution, as no tax or penalty can be levied or collected without authority of law.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and directed the concerned officer to pass a reasoned final order under Section 129(3) in Form GST MOV-09, upload its summary in Form GST DRC-07, and grant an opportunity of hearing to the appellant within one month.
The petitioners, the Additional Director of the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) and another officer, filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court challenging the common order dated 15 January 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 10680 of 2024 and 14723 of 2024. The High Court’s judgment concerned disputes arising from the exercise of investigatory and regulatory powers under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in relation to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). The DGGI alleged procedural lapses and sought reversal of the High Court’s findings that curtailed its investigative authority.The Supreme Court, after hearing the Additional Solicitor General and senior counsel appearing for both sides, declined to interfere with the High Court’s decision. The Court found no sufficient grounds to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The petitions were dismissed at the admission stage, and all pending applications, including those for condonation of delay and interim relief, were disposed of accordingly.
Additional Director, Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) & Another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 21-07-2025
The petitioners, the Additional Director of the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) and another officer, filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court challenging the common order dated 15 January 2025 passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 10680 of 2024 and 14723 of 2024. The High Court’s judgment concerned disputes arising from the exercise of investigatory and regulatory powers under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in relation to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). The DGGI alleged procedural lapses and sought reversal of the High Court’s findings that curtailed its investigative authority.The Supreme Court, after hearing the Additional Solicitor General and senior counsel appearing for both sides, declined to interfere with the High Court’s decision. The Court found no sufficient grounds to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The petitions were dismissed at the admission stage, and all pending applications, including those for condonation of delay and interim relief, were disposed of accordingly.
The petitioners, Union of India and others, filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment and order dated 18 December 2024 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application Nos. 14649 to 14653 of 2020. The High Court had granted relief to the respondents relying upon its earlier decision in Ascent Meditech Ltd. v. Union of India and Others decided on 17 October 2024 in SCA No. 18317 of 2023.It was noted that the said judgment in Ascent Meditech Ltd. had already been challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 8134 of 2025 and was dismissed on 28 March 2025. Despite this fact, the present petition, filed in June 2025, did not disclose that the earlier SLP had been dismissed.Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court and accordingly dismissed the Special Leave Petition. All pending applications were also disposed of.
Union of India & Ors. v. M/s Tirth Agro Technology Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. 18-07-2025
The petitioners, Union of India and others, filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment and order dated 18 December 2024 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application Nos. 14649 to 14653 of 2020. The High Court had granted relief to the respondents relying upon its earlier decision in Ascent Meditech Ltd. v. Union of India and Others decided on 17 October 2024 in SCA No. 18317 of 2023.It was noted that the said judgment in Ascent Meditech Ltd. had already been challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 8134 of 2025 and was dismissed on 28 March 2025. Despite this fact, the present petition, filed in June 2025, did not disclose that the earlier SLP had been dismissed.Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court and accordingly dismissed the Special Leave Petition. All pending applications were also disposed of.
The Union of India filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court challenging three judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 29 January 2025 in Writ Petitions Nos. 27108, 22055, and 21998 of 2021. The High Court had held that “flavoured milk” is classifiable under Tariff Item 0403 (“buttermilk, curdled milk, and other fermented or acidified milk and cream”) and therefore taxable at 5% under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime.The Union of India contended that flavoured milk is a distinct product that falls under Tariff Item 2202 (“beverages containing milk”), taxable at 12%. It argued that the process of flavouring, sweetening, and heat treatment transforms the product into a beverage, not plain or fermented milk. The respondents, M/s Heritage Foods Ltd. and others, argued that flavoured milk remains milk in composition and character, with flavouring merely enhancing taste, not altering classification.The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions filed by the Union of India. It noted that the issue of classification of “flavoured milk” had already been decided by the Court in Union of India v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. (SLP (C) Diary No. 17602 of 2025), where it upheld classification under Tariff Item 0403 with 5% GST.Following that precedent, the Court held that the High Court’s decision in favour of the 5% rate was consistent with the law. Consequently, the present petitions were dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
Union of India v. M/s Heritage Foods Limited & Another 17-07-2025
The Union of India filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court challenging three judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 29 January 2025 in Writ Petitions Nos. 27108, 22055, and 21998 of 2021. The High Court had held that “flavoured milk” is classifiable under Tariff Item 0403 (“buttermilk, curdled milk, and other fermented or acidified milk and cream”) and therefore taxable at 5% under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime.The Union of India contended that flavoured milk is a distinct product that falls under Tariff Item 2202 (“beverages containing milk”), taxable at 12%. It argued that the process of flavouring, sweetening, and heat treatment transforms the product into a beverage, not plain or fermented milk. The respondents, M/s Heritage Foods Ltd. and others, argued that flavoured milk remains milk in composition and character, with flavouring merely enhancing taste, not altering classification.The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions filed by the Union of India. It noted that the issue of classification of “flavoured milk” had already been decided by the Court in Union of India v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. (SLP (C) Diary No. 17602 of 2025), where it upheld classification under Tariff Item 0403 with 5% GST.Following that precedent, the Court held that the High Court’s decision in favour of the 5% rate was consistent with the law. Consequently, the present petitions were dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
