BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in Crime No. 652 of 2023 registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.

Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.

Case Facts:The respondent constructed a shopping mall for leasing purposes and paid GST on inputs like materials and services used in construction, accumulating substantial ITC. The department denied ITC relying on Section 17(5)(d), which blocks credit for construction of immovable property. The Orissa High Court read down the provision and allowed ITC, holding denial would defeat GST objectives. The Revenue challenged this before the Supreme Court along with similar matters questioning the constitutional validity of Section 17(5)(c) and (d).Court Decision:The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the CGST Act and held that ITC is a statutory right subject to conditions and restrictions under the Act. Section 17(5)(c) and (d) clearly restrict ITC on construction of immovable property (other than plant and machinery), and such restriction must be interpreted strictly.The Court upheld the validity of the provisions and rejected the interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that:A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly based on plain language.ITC cannot be claimed contrary to express statutory restrictions.The legislature is competent to restrict ITC and such restriction does not violate constitutional provisions.The expression “plant or machinery” cannot be expansively interpreted to include buildings like malls merely to claim ITC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that ITC is not available on construction of immovable property used for renting under Section 17(5)(d).Cases Referred by Court:Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Union of IndiaBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of IndiaShreya Singhal v. Union of IndiaUnion of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of IndiaR.K. Garg v. Union of IndiaTwyford Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of KeralaNitdip Textile Processors Pvt. Ltd.P. Laxmi Devi v. State of Andhra PradeshIndore Development Authority v. ManoharlalALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax OfficerHari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of IndiaJoseph Shine v. Union of IndiaCommissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of CustomsVegetable Products Ltd.R.S. Raghunath v. State of KarnatakaUnion of India v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.

BACKGROUNDThe National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directed the appellant to pay Rs.265.01 Crores with interest at 10% p.a. from 19.09.2016. The complainant had obtained two insurance policies from the appellant by paying a premium of Rs.10,38,03,912/-, obtained for a construction contract awarded by the Government of Basra, Iraq. When the contract was withdrawn due to internal conflict and payments were suspended, the appellant rejected the insurance claim. The complaint was filed and decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, depositing Rs.50,000/- as pre-deposit in accordance with the 1986 Act. However, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had come into force on 20.07.2020, and under Section 67 of the 2019 Act, the condition for filing an appeal is deposit of 50% of the entire awarded amount — with no upper ceiling — which would mean depositing approximately Rs.132 Crores. FACTSThe pre-deposit condition under the two Acts is starkly different. Under the 1986 Act, the condition was 50% of the awarded amount or Rs.50,000, whichever is less. Under the 2019 Act, it is a flat 50% of the awarded amount with no ceiling whatsoever. The appellant filed an Interlocutory Application praying that the appeal be entertained under the conditions prescribed by the 1986 Act, i.e., the law applicable at the time the complaint was filed and proceedings were initiated. The respondent contended that the 2019 Act applies as it was in force at the time of filing of the appeal and that pre-deposit is a mere procedural requirement, hence retrospective. The Court examined a long line of Constitution Bench judgments on the doctrine of vested right of appeal and whether imposition of a more onerous pre-deposit condition amounts to curtailing a substantive right that had already accrued. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)(From Hoosein Kasam Dada — approved and relied upon by the Court): "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right."(From Garikapati Veeraya — Constitution Bench principles approved and applied): "(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."(From State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange — applied by the Court): "it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment."(Court's own final conclusion — Para 34): "In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Interlocutory Application was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will not apply to appeals arising from complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The right of appeal is a vested substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of the proceedings, and it cannot be curtailed by the new law unless the new law expressly or by necessary intendment says so.👍 IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT      KEY CASES REFERRED AND RELIED UPON BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.AIR 1931 Cal. 100 (Calcutta HC — approved by SC)2Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court)3Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.AIR 1957 SC 540 (Constitution Bench)4State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.AIR 1960 SC 980 (Three-Judge Bench)5Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., NagpurAIR 1967 SC 344 (Constitution Bench)6M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court)7K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.(2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court)8Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1975) 2 SCC 175 (Four-Judge Bench)9Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors.(1996) 3 SCC 142 (Supreme Court)10M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 428 (Supreme Court)11Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.(2011) 6 SCC 739 (Supreme Court)12Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.2021 SCC OnLine SC 225 (Supreme Court)13Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (Three-Judge Bench)14New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra(1975) 2 SCC 840 (Supreme Court)15M/s. Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 decided on 18.04.2016 (Madras HC, Division Bench) 

Facts:The dispute arose from demands of sales tax on supply of food and drinks by clubs to their permanent members. The clubs contended that such supplies were governed by the doctrine of mutuality and did not constitute “sale”. The Tribunal and High Court held that no taxable sale occurred as members and the club were not distinct persons. The matter was referred to a larger Bench to examine the impact of the 46th Constitutional Amendment on the doctrine of mutuality. Court Decision:The Court held that the doctrine of mutuality continues to apply even after the 46th Constitutional Amendment. It ruled that Article 366(29-A)(e) applies only to unincorporated associations and does not cover incorporated clubs. The Court held that in members’ clubs, there is no transfer of property from one person to another, as members and the club are not distinct. Accordingly, supply of food and beverages by clubs to their members does not constitute a “sale” and is not liable to sales tax/VAT. Cases Referred by Court:•    C.T.O. v. Young Men’s Indian Association •    State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. •    Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi •    State of Punjab v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. •    Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Enfield India Ltd. •    Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax •    Graff v. Evans •    Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald•    BSNL v. Union of India