| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41 | Mayank Bansal vs The Union of India & Ors. | 08-06-2026 | Whether penalty under Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act can be imposed on the partners of a firm (the taxable person), and whether it can apply to periods prior to 01.01.2021, the date Section 122(1A) came into force. | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioners are partners of M/s Quantum Infratech, a partnership firm engaged in construction of residential buildings, which is the "taxable person." Following an investigation alleging GST evasion (on construction services to landowners, reverse charge on transfer of development rights, and ineligible ITC for July 2017 to March 2023), penalty equivalent to the tax evaded was imposed on each partner under Section 122(1A). The partners challenged this on two jurisdictional grounds — that 122(1A) penalty can only fall on the taxable person, and that it cannot apply retrospectively for the pre-01.01.2021 period. FACTSA Show Cause Notice was issued on 03.08.2024 to the firm, both petitioners, and the accountant under Section 74(1) read with Sections 122(1A) and 122(3)(a). Specific allegations against each partner were made at paragraphs 9.6 and 9.7 of the SCN — that they retained the benefit of transactions and at their instance such transactions (suppression of turnover, supply without invoices, collection of undisclosed cash) were conducted. The petitioners did not submit any reply to these specific allegations, though they appeared for personal hearing. The Order-in-Original dated 04.02.2025 found both partners liable under Section 122(1A) to the extent of the evaded tax, and the Order-in-Appeal dated 26.08.2025 dismissed all appeals. Two points were framed for determination: (i) whether the partners of the taxable firm can be imposed penalty under Section 122(1A); and (ii) if (i) is decided against them, whether Section 122(1A) can apply for the period prior to 01.01.2021. The petitioners relied on the Bombay High Court rulings in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari and Amit Manilal Haria (penalty only on taxable person; no retrospective application), while the Revenue relied on the distinct statutory use of "taxable person," "any person," and "registered person," and on the Delhi High Court rulings in Gurudas Mallik Thakur and Bhupender Kumar. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On who can be penalised under Section 122(1A):"True, if the taxable person is the sole proprietor or an individual who solely is responsible for the commission of the violations contained in Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017, then the taxable person would be the person as mentioned in Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017. But let this Court take the example of a Company, LLP, Partnership Firm, or any juridical person which is the taxable person. Can the Company, LLP, Partnership Firm or any juridical person on its own without the involvement of a natural person commit the violations as mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The answer would be a simple 'No'." (Para 36)"Therefore with great respect, this Court cannot agree with the proposition of law laid down by the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (supra) and Amit Manilal Haria (supra)... if accepted, it would render the provision of Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017 otiose and nugatory." (Paras 37–38)On retrospective application:"Therefore Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 do not create any independent violation nor does it enlarges the violations contemplated under Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The legislative intent behind Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is solely to identify the person at whose instance the violations took place and if the person had retained the benefits, the person would be liable to a penalty as mentioned therein." (Para 50)"...there being no new violations created by Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, there is no question of the said Sub-Section to be applied retrospectively." (Para 51)"...the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court failed to take note of the difference between an offence and penalty in respect to a civil adjudication while applying Article 20(1) of the Constitution." (Para 52)"Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is complementary to Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 would not spring into action and until violations of Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017 by the taxable person is adjudicated upon. Under such circumstances, the question of applying Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 retrospectively or not does not arise." (Para 53) FINAL VERDICT 👎Both jurisdictional issues decided against the petitioners — penalty under Section 122(1A) can be imposed on partners (not only the taxable firm), and it applies even for transactions prior to 01.01.2021. Writ petitions disposed of with liberty to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days, interim protection continued, and the question of quantum/findings of fact left open. CASES REFERREDAlso Noted/Relied on by the Court:Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. — 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3324 (SLP (Civil) No.18178/2025 pending; SC stayed recovery on 04.08.2025 subject to 25% deposit)Jawala Ram & Ors. v. State of Pepsu (Constitution Bench, on the offence-vs-penalty distinction under Article 20(1)) — 1961 SCC OnLine SC 47 | ||||
| Mayank Bansal vs The Union of India & Ors. 08-06-2026 Whether penalty under Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act can be imposed on the partners of a firm (the taxable person), and whether it can apply to periods prior to 01.01.2021, the date Section 122(1A) came into force.BACKGROUNDThe petitioners are partners of M/s Quantum Infratech, a partnership firm engaged in construction of residential buildings, which is the "taxable person." Following an investigation alleging GST evasion (on construction services to landowners, reverse charge on transfer of development rights, and ineligible ITC for July 2017 to March 2023), penalty equivalent to the tax evaded was imposed on each partner under Section 122(1A). The partners challenged this on two jurisdictional grounds — that 122(1A) penalty can only fall on the taxable person, and that it cannot apply retrospectively for the pre-01.01.2021 period. FACTSA Show Cause Notice was issued on 03.08.2024 to the firm, both petitioners, and the accountant under Section 74(1) read with Sections 122(1A) and 122(3)(a). Specific allegations against each partner were made at paragraphs 9.6 and 9.7 of the SCN — that they retained the benefit of transactions and at their instance such transactions (suppression of turnover, supply without invoices, collection of undisclosed cash) were conducted. The petitioners did not submit any reply to these specific allegations, though they appeared for personal hearing. The Order-in-Original dated 04.02.2025 found both partners liable under Section 122(1A) to the extent of the evaded tax, and the Order-in-Appeal dated 26.08.2025 dismissed all appeals. Two points were framed for determination: (i) whether the partners of the taxable firm can be imposed penalty under Section 122(1A); and (ii) if (i) is decided against them, whether Section 122(1A) can apply for the period prior to 01.01.2021. The petitioners relied on the Bombay High Court rulings in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari and Amit Manilal Haria (penalty only on taxable person; no retrospective application), while the Revenue relied on the distinct statutory use of "taxable person," "any person," and "registered person," and on the Delhi High Court rulings in Gurudas Mallik Thakur and Bhupender Kumar. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On who can be penalised under Section 122(1A):"True, if the taxable person is the sole proprietor or an individual who solely is responsible for the commission of the violations contained in Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017, then the taxable person would be the person as mentioned in Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017. But let this Court take the example of a Company, LLP, Partnership Firm, or any juridical person which is the taxable person. Can the Company, LLP, Partnership Firm or any juridical person on its own without the involvement of a natural person commit the violations as mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The answer would be a simple 'No'." (Para 36)"Therefore with great respect, this Court cannot agree with the proposition of law laid down by the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (supra) and Amit Manilal Haria (supra)... if accepted, it would render the provision of Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017 otiose and nugatory." (Paras 37–38)On retrospective application:"Therefore Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 do not create any independent violation nor does it enlarges the violations contemplated under Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The legislative intent behind Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is solely to identify the person at whose instance the violations took place and if the person had retained the benefits, the person would be liable to a penalty as mentioned therein." (Para 50)"...there being no new violations created by Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, there is no question of the said Sub-Section to be applied retrospectively." (Para 51)"...the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court failed to take note of the difference between an offence and penalty in respect to a civil adjudication while applying Article 20(1) of the Constitution." (Para 52)"Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is complementary to Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 would not spring into action and until violations of Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017 by the taxable person is adjudicated upon. Under such circumstances, the question of applying Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 retrospectively or not does not arise." (Para 53) FINAL VERDICT 👎Both jurisdictional issues decided against the petitioners — penalty under Section 122(1A) can be imposed on partners (not only the taxable firm), and it applies even for transactions prior to 01.01.2021. Writ petitions disposed of with liberty to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days, interim protection continued, and the question of quantum/findings of fact left open. CASES REFERREDAlso Noted/Relied on by the Court:Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. — 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3324 (SLP (Civil) No.18178/2025 pending; SC stayed recovery on 04.08.2025 subject to 25% deposit)Jawala Ram & Ors. v. State of Pepsu (Constitution Bench, on the offence-vs-penalty distinction under Article 20(1)) — 1961 SCC OnLine SC 47 | ||||
| 42 | Best Road Carriers vs. Principal Commissioner of CGST, Alwar | 05-06-2026 | Whether a transporter who merely transports goods by road without issuing a consignment note is a Goods Transport Agency (GTA) liable to service tax, or a Goods Transport Operator (GTO) covered under the negative list under Section 66D(p) of the Finance A | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe appellant is engaged in the activity of transportation of goods by road. The department received third-party TDS data from the Income Tax Department showing gross receipts of Rs. 16,90,38,430/- by the appellant under Sections 194C/194H/194I/194J of the Income Tax Act. The department issued summons requiring the appellant to submit Income Tax Returns, TDS Returns, Balance Sheet, 3CD, Trial Balance and service-wise receipts chart. The appellant did not comply. The department alleged that the appellant had rendered taxable services without discharging service tax liability and issued Show Cause Notice No. 54/2016 dated 09.09.2019 proposing recovery of service tax of Rs. 2,08,93,150/- along with interest and penalties. The demand was confirmed by the Principal Commissioner vide Order-in-Original dated 06.01.2022, holding the appellant to be a GTA. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal before CESTAT.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the statutory definition and twin conditions for GTA (Para 4.2):"It is clear that to be called 'Goods Transport Agency' a person should fulfill two conditions, namely: a) It should provide service in relation to transport of goods by road; b) It should issue consignment note, by whatever name called."On the distinction between GTA and GTO — from Jaikumar Fulchand Ajmera (Para 4.3):"We observe that since GTA definition has used the words, 'in relation to', it means that for being a GTA, it should provide service to a person in relation to transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage. The service provided is a single composite service which may include various intermediary and ancillary services such as loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, transshipment, temporary warehousing. For the service provided, GTA issues a consignment note and the invoice issued by the GTA for providing the said services includes the value of intermediary and ancillary services. In such a case, the intermediary or ancillary activities are to be treated as part of GTA service... Whereas GTO is the activity simpliciter for transport of goods by roads without issuance of Consignment Note, irrespective transporter being GTA or not."On the definition of GTA remaining unchanged under negative list regime (Para 4.4):"We also observe that the definition of GTA remained the same even after introduction of negative list regime. Service being determined by issuance of consignment note under the statute, it is not within the ambit of a subordinate legislation to create the class of taxable persons by imposing a condition that would, perforce, bring such persons within the tax net."On undisputed facts establishing appellant as GTO (Para 4.5):"(i) Appellant is not registered under Carriage by Road Act, 2007 and hence, is not a GTA; hence, is not at all required to issue a 'consignment note'; (ii) Appellant charges 'mere freight', as agreed, but does not charge 'gross freight'; (iii) Appellant engages merely in the service of providing transportation of goods by road but does not provide the services 'in relation thereof'..."On the Schedule of Responsibilities further establishing GTO character (Para 4.5):"a. Loading of the consignment is done by Safexpress personnel in the vehicles. b. The delivery must be done within transit time and the appellant shall ensure to maintain the same despite various unavoidable causes of delay. c. All waybills as well as transit documents are provided by Safexpress and carried by the appellant. d. Appellant is not responsible for any damage to the property unless it is caused out of his own negligence like rash driving of the driver. e. Appellant will submit the waybills, permits, transit passes etc. at the destination with the due endorsements. f. Unloading of the consignment is done by the recipient at destination."On the final conclusion (Para 5):"Since under GTA it is only such of these services which are in relation to transport of goods by road which are taxable and not the actual transport of goods by road itself. And that appellant has not rendered any service in relation to transport of goods by road like loading/unloading nor even for reimbursing for damage and not issuing the consignment note except mere transport of Goods by road. No evidence to the contrary is produced by the department. Resultantly we hold that appellant's activity is wrongly held to be taxable service of Goods Transport Agency."FINAL VERDICTThe CESTAT set aside the Order-in-Original and allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant is a Goods Transport Operator (GTO) and not a Goods Transport Agency (GTA). The activity of mere transportation of goods by road without issuance of a consignment note and without rendering ancillary services is covered under the negative list under Section 66D(p)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 and is not liable to service tax. 👍 | ||||
| Best Road Carriers vs. Principal Commissioner of CGST, Alwar 05-06-2026 Whether a transporter who merely transports goods by road without issuing a consignment note is a Goods Transport Agency (GTA) liable to service tax, or a Goods Transport Operator (GTO) covered under the negative list under Section 66D(p) of the Finance ABACKGROUNDThe appellant is engaged in the activity of transportation of goods by road. The department received third-party TDS data from the Income Tax Department showing gross receipts of Rs. 16,90,38,430/- by the appellant under Sections 194C/194H/194I/194J of the Income Tax Act. The department issued summons requiring the appellant to submit Income Tax Returns, TDS Returns, Balance Sheet, 3CD, Trial Balance and service-wise receipts chart. The appellant did not comply. The department alleged that the appellant had rendered taxable services without discharging service tax liability and issued Show Cause Notice No. 54/2016 dated 09.09.2019 proposing recovery of service tax of Rs. 2,08,93,150/- along with interest and penalties. The demand was confirmed by the Principal Commissioner vide Order-in-Original dated 06.01.2022, holding the appellant to be a GTA. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal before CESTAT.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the statutory definition and twin conditions for GTA (Para 4.2):"It is clear that to be called 'Goods Transport Agency' a person should fulfill two conditions, namely: a) It should provide service in relation to transport of goods by road; b) It should issue consignment note, by whatever name called."On the distinction between GTA and GTO — from Jaikumar Fulchand Ajmera (Para 4.3):"We observe that since GTA definition has used the words, 'in relation to', it means that for being a GTA, it should provide service to a person in relation to transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage. The service provided is a single composite service which may include various intermediary and ancillary services such as loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, transshipment, temporary warehousing. For the service provided, GTA issues a consignment note and the invoice issued by the GTA for providing the said services includes the value of intermediary and ancillary services. In such a case, the intermediary or ancillary activities are to be treated as part of GTA service... Whereas GTO is the activity simpliciter for transport of goods by roads without issuance of Consignment Note, irrespective transporter being GTA or not."On the definition of GTA remaining unchanged under negative list regime (Para 4.4):"We also observe that the definition of GTA remained the same even after introduction of negative list regime. Service being determined by issuance of consignment note under the statute, it is not within the ambit of a subordinate legislation to create the class of taxable persons by imposing a condition that would, perforce, bring such persons within the tax net."On undisputed facts establishing appellant as GTO (Para 4.5):"(i) Appellant is not registered under Carriage by Road Act, 2007 and hence, is not a GTA; hence, is not at all required to issue a 'consignment note'; (ii) Appellant charges 'mere freight', as agreed, but does not charge 'gross freight'; (iii) Appellant engages merely in the service of providing transportation of goods by road but does not provide the services 'in relation thereof'..."On the Schedule of Responsibilities further establishing GTO character (Para 4.5):"a. Loading of the consignment is done by Safexpress personnel in the vehicles. b. The delivery must be done within transit time and the appellant shall ensure to maintain the same despite various unavoidable causes of delay. c. All waybills as well as transit documents are provided by Safexpress and carried by the appellant. d. Appellant is not responsible for any damage to the property unless it is caused out of his own negligence like rash driving of the driver. e. Appellant will submit the waybills, permits, transit passes etc. at the destination with the due endorsements. f. Unloading of the consignment is done by the recipient at destination."On the final conclusion (Para 5):"Since under GTA it is only such of these services which are in relation to transport of goods by road which are taxable and not the actual transport of goods by road itself. And that appellant has not rendered any service in relation to transport of goods by road like loading/unloading nor even for reimbursing for damage and not issuing the consignment note except mere transport of Goods by road. No evidence to the contrary is produced by the department. Resultantly we hold that appellant's activity is wrongly held to be taxable service of Goods Transport Agency."FINAL VERDICTThe CESTAT set aside the Order-in-Original and allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant is a Goods Transport Operator (GTO) and not a Goods Transport Agency (GTA). The activity of mere transportation of goods by road without issuance of a consignment note and without rendering ancillary services is covered under the negative list under Section 66D(p)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994 and is not liable to service tax. 👍 | ||||
| 43 | Dow Chemical International Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of State Tax, | 04-06-2026 | Whether procurement facilitation services received by an Indian company (Dow India) from its Swiss group entity (Dow Europe GmbH), functioning as a centralised procurement hub, constitute | View Download |
Background & Relevant FactsThe appellant, M/s. Dow Chemical International Pvt. Ltd. (Dow India), is an Indian company engaged in manufacturing and distributing chemical components. For streamlining its procurement operations, Dow India entered into a written Procurement Agreement dated 01.07.2021 with Dow Europe GmbH, a Switzerland-incorporated company and a related entity within the global Dow Group, functioning as a centralised procurement hub for the entire Dow Group worldwide.Under the Procurement Agreement, Dow Europe undertook a comprehensive range of activities including identification, selection and approval of foreign suppliers, negotiation of terms and conditions of procurement agreements, development of procurement strategies, reviewing and signing of contracts and purchase orders, procurement governance, supplier risk management, supplier relationship management, procurement analytics, strategic sourcing, quality audits, and spend analytics. The consideration payable to Dow Europe was structured as 3.5% of the total purchases made by Dow India — i.e., no procurement, no payment.During January 2022 to June 2022, Dow India, under the impression that services received from Dow Europe constituted "import of services" under Section 2(11) of the IGST Act, paid IGST under the Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) on the consideration paid to Dow Europe aggregating to Rs. 13,41,89,994/-. Subsequently, Dow India formed the view that Dow Europe was in fact an "intermediary" under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act and that the place of supply under Section 13(8)(b) was Switzerland (outside India), making the transaction non-taxable in India. Accordingly, Dow India reversed the ITC availed and filed refund applications under Section 54(1) read with Rule 89 of the MGST Act/Rules for all six months.The Adjudicating Authority rejected the refund claims. The First Appellate Authority (Joint Commissioner of State Tax, Appeals, Belapur) confirmed the rejection vide orders dated 11.09.2025, holding that Dow Europe provided services on its own account (principal-to-principal), not as an intermediary, and that the change in classification was an afterthought. Aggrieved, Dow India filed six appeals before GSTAT.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The Revenue has treated any services provided by the India Company to its counterpart outside India as intermediary service and not export of services and therefore, levied GST, holding India to be the place of supply. At the same breath, the Revenue has treated any services provided by the foreign company to an Indian Company as import of services and not intermediary services and levied GST on it, holding the place of supply to be in India. We are of the opinion that both the views cannot be taken. One view is to be taken.""We are of the considered opinion that the second consideration is not satisfied because of the fact that both the Dow Europe and Dow India are, either direct or indirect, subsidiaries of one company, i.e. 'Dow INC', which is collectively, known as 'Dow Group'. Dow Europe, a company located in Switzerland, functions as the Centralized Procurement Hub for the entire Dow Group and thereby giving a core service to the entire Dow Group located throughout the world.""We are of the opinion that the Dow Europe renders services on his own account to the service receivers located in India, and the acts of the said foreign company are those of an independent contractor, and it does not represent or bind the Indian client in the course of its services.""In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that services received by Dow India are in the nature of an import and the place of supply shall be in India, not in Europe. Thus, it will not come within the purview of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, and definition provided in Section 2(13) of the IGST Act.""It cannot be stated that every application for refund of tax, paid to the revenue under a misconception, will be hit by the principles of action arising as an afterthought. To this extent, we disagree with the First Appellate Authority." [On the afterthought objection — GSTAT disagreed with the FAA on this limited point.]"Services provided by Dow Europe cannot be termed as 'intermediary service' and as it is not in the nature of the ancillary service, rather it is a core service provided by it to one of its sisters concerned, who is operating under the global concern, i.e., 'Dow INC'."Final VerdictAll six appeals dismissed. GSTAT held that services provided by Dow Europe GmbH to Dow India are import of services (not intermediary services), place of supply is India, and IGST under RCM was correctly paid. Refund claims rejected. Orders of the First Appellate Authority confirmed. 👎 Against Assessee. | ||||
| Dow Chemical International Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of State Tax, 04-06-2026 Whether procurement facilitation services received by an Indian company (Dow India) from its Swiss group entity (Dow Europe GmbH), functioning as a centralised procurement hub, constituteBackground & Relevant FactsThe appellant, M/s. Dow Chemical International Pvt. Ltd. (Dow India), is an Indian company engaged in manufacturing and distributing chemical components. For streamlining its procurement operations, Dow India entered into a written Procurement Agreement dated 01.07.2021 with Dow Europe GmbH, a Switzerland-incorporated company and a related entity within the global Dow Group, functioning as a centralised procurement hub for the entire Dow Group worldwide.Under the Procurement Agreement, Dow Europe undertook a comprehensive range of activities including identification, selection and approval of foreign suppliers, negotiation of terms and conditions of procurement agreements, development of procurement strategies, reviewing and signing of contracts and purchase orders, procurement governance, supplier risk management, supplier relationship management, procurement analytics, strategic sourcing, quality audits, and spend analytics. The consideration payable to Dow Europe was structured as 3.5% of the total purchases made by Dow India — i.e., no procurement, no payment.During January 2022 to June 2022, Dow India, under the impression that services received from Dow Europe constituted "import of services" under Section 2(11) of the IGST Act, paid IGST under the Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) on the consideration paid to Dow Europe aggregating to Rs. 13,41,89,994/-. Subsequently, Dow India formed the view that Dow Europe was in fact an "intermediary" under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act and that the place of supply under Section 13(8)(b) was Switzerland (outside India), making the transaction non-taxable in India. Accordingly, Dow India reversed the ITC availed and filed refund applications under Section 54(1) read with Rule 89 of the MGST Act/Rules for all six months.The Adjudicating Authority rejected the refund claims. The First Appellate Authority (Joint Commissioner of State Tax, Appeals, Belapur) confirmed the rejection vide orders dated 11.09.2025, holding that Dow Europe provided services on its own account (principal-to-principal), not as an intermediary, and that the change in classification was an afterthought. Aggrieved, Dow India filed six appeals before GSTAT.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The Revenue has treated any services provided by the India Company to its counterpart outside India as intermediary service and not export of services and therefore, levied GST, holding India to be the place of supply. At the same breath, the Revenue has treated any services provided by the foreign company to an Indian Company as import of services and not intermediary services and levied GST on it, holding the place of supply to be in India. We are of the opinion that both the views cannot be taken. One view is to be taken.""We are of the considered opinion that the second consideration is not satisfied because of the fact that both the Dow Europe and Dow India are, either direct or indirect, subsidiaries of one company, i.e. 'Dow INC', which is collectively, known as 'Dow Group'. Dow Europe, a company located in Switzerland, functions as the Centralized Procurement Hub for the entire Dow Group and thereby giving a core service to the entire Dow Group located throughout the world.""We are of the opinion that the Dow Europe renders services on his own account to the service receivers located in India, and the acts of the said foreign company are those of an independent contractor, and it does not represent or bind the Indian client in the course of its services.""In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that services received by Dow India are in the nature of an import and the place of supply shall be in India, not in Europe. Thus, it will not come within the purview of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, and definition provided in Section 2(13) of the IGST Act.""It cannot be stated that every application for refund of tax, paid to the revenue under a misconception, will be hit by the principles of action arising as an afterthought. To this extent, we disagree with the First Appellate Authority." [On the afterthought objection — GSTAT disagreed with the FAA on this limited point.]"Services provided by Dow Europe cannot be termed as 'intermediary service' and as it is not in the nature of the ancillary service, rather it is a core service provided by it to one of its sisters concerned, who is operating under the global concern, i.e., 'Dow INC'."Final VerdictAll six appeals dismissed. GSTAT held that services provided by Dow Europe GmbH to Dow India are import of services (not intermediary services), place of supply is India, and IGST under RCM was correctly paid. Refund claims rejected. Orders of the First Appellate Authority confirmed. 👎 Against Assessee. | ||||
| 44 | Noordeen Enterprises & MNS Enterprises vs. Additional Director General, DGGI & Additional Commissioner of CGST, South Commissionerate | 03-06-2026 | Validity of letters issued by DGGI to customers of the petitioner-taxpayers, directing those customers to remit amounts payable to the petitioners directly to the GST authorities — issued at a stage when no order-in-original determining tax liability ha | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioners are suppliers of goods. During the course of investigation by the Directorate of GST Intelligence (DGGI), Chennai Zonal Unit, letters were issued by the respondents directly to the customers of the petitioners, who were liable to make payment to the petitioners in respect of goods supplied. One such customer, upon receipt of such a letter, remitted a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs directly to the GST authorities. This had earlier been the subject matter of W.P. No. 20067 of 2021, wherein the same petitioner (MNS Enterprises) had sought refund of amounts recovered from its customers. That writ petition was disposed of on 04.03.2022 with express findings that such recovery could not have been made either under Section 79(1)(c) or Section 83 of the applicable GST enactments, and the petitioner was granted liberty to apply for refund under Section 54. However, the petitioner did not avail of that remedy. Subsequently, orders-in-original determining tax liability were passed on 28.03.2023, and those orders are subject matter of separate writ petitions. In the present petitions, the petitioners sought a Mandamus directing the respondents to issue a "No Objection Certificate" enabling the petitioners to receive payments from their customers without interference.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the invalidity of letters issued before crystallization of tax liability (Para 4):"From the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is clear that a communication was addressed by DGGI Chennai Zonal Unit to Sumangala Steel. At that time the said communication was issued, a tax proposal had been made, but the same had not crystallised into a tax liability. In those circumstances, by order dated 04.03.2022, this Court recorded findings that neither Section 79(1)(c) nor Section 83 could have been pressed into service."On the petitioner not availing refund remedy (Para 4):"For reasons difficult to discern, said petitioner did not adopt this course of action."Final disposal terms (Para 7):"(i) Any letters issued by the respondents to customers of the respective petitioner, prior to the issuance of the order-in-original determining the tax liability of said petitioner, are invalid and cannot be the basis for further action;""(ii) This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to initiate appropriate action for recovery, including by recourse to Section 79(1)(c) of applicable GST enactments pursuant to the orders-in-original; and""(iii) There shall be no order as to costs."FINAL VERDICTThe High Court declared that all letters issued by DGGI to the petitioners' customers prior to the passing of the order-in-original are invalid and cannot be the basis for any further action. However, the department's right to initiate recovery proceedings including under Section 79(1)(c) after passing of the order-in-original is expressly preserved. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. 👐 | ||||
| Noordeen Enterprises & MNS Enterprises vs. Additional Director General, DGGI & Additional Commissioner of CGST, South Commissionerate 03-06-2026 Validity of letters issued by DGGI to customers of the petitioner-taxpayers, directing those customers to remit amounts payable to the petitioners directly to the GST authorities — issued at a stage when no order-in-original determining tax liability haBACKGROUNDThe petitioners are suppliers of goods. During the course of investigation by the Directorate of GST Intelligence (DGGI), Chennai Zonal Unit, letters were issued by the respondents directly to the customers of the petitioners, who were liable to make payment to the petitioners in respect of goods supplied. One such customer, upon receipt of such a letter, remitted a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs directly to the GST authorities. This had earlier been the subject matter of W.P. No. 20067 of 2021, wherein the same petitioner (MNS Enterprises) had sought refund of amounts recovered from its customers. That writ petition was disposed of on 04.03.2022 with express findings that such recovery could not have been made either under Section 79(1)(c) or Section 83 of the applicable GST enactments, and the petitioner was granted liberty to apply for refund under Section 54. However, the petitioner did not avail of that remedy. Subsequently, orders-in-original determining tax liability were passed on 28.03.2023, and those orders are subject matter of separate writ petitions. In the present petitions, the petitioners sought a Mandamus directing the respondents to issue a "No Objection Certificate" enabling the petitioners to receive payments from their customers without interference.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the invalidity of letters issued before crystallization of tax liability (Para 4):"From the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is clear that a communication was addressed by DGGI Chennai Zonal Unit to Sumangala Steel. At that time the said communication was issued, a tax proposal had been made, but the same had not crystallised into a tax liability. In those circumstances, by order dated 04.03.2022, this Court recorded findings that neither Section 79(1)(c) nor Section 83 could have been pressed into service."On the petitioner not availing refund remedy (Para 4):"For reasons difficult to discern, said petitioner did not adopt this course of action."Final disposal terms (Para 7):"(i) Any letters issued by the respondents to customers of the respective petitioner, prior to the issuance of the order-in-original determining the tax liability of said petitioner, are invalid and cannot be the basis for further action;""(ii) This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to initiate appropriate action for recovery, including by recourse to Section 79(1)(c) of applicable GST enactments pursuant to the orders-in-original; and""(iii) There shall be no order as to costs."FINAL VERDICTThe High Court declared that all letters issued by DGGI to the petitioners' customers prior to the passing of the order-in-original are invalid and cannot be the basis for any further action. However, the department's right to initiate recovery proceedings including under Section 79(1)(c) after passing of the order-in-original is expressly preserved. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. 👐 | ||||
| 45 | PEI Industries & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. | 29-05-2026 | Whether a writ petition is maintainable challenging an Order in Original passed by Central GST Authorities under Section 74 of CGST Act, 2017, when State GST Authorities had already closed proceedings on the same set of documents under Section 73, and whe | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe Petitioners challenged an Order in Original dated 30th March, 2026, passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudication), CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, primarily on the ground that the Central GST proceedings are barred under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, 2017. The State GST Authorities, exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act, had previously closed proceedings against the Petitioners on the very same set of documents. Thereafter, the Central GST Authorities initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the Act based on the very same evidence and passed an adverse Order in Original.RELEVANT FACTSThe Petitioners contended that the documents submitted in response to the Show Cause Notice were the identical set of documents which had formed the basis for closure of proceedings by the State GST Authorities under Section 73; however, the Central GST Authorities refused to accept the same. It was further urged that no notice was issued to the Petitioners for producing additional documents which the respondents intended to obtain. Out of four dates for personal hearing as noted in the impugned order, hearing was effectively granted only on two days. The Petitioners also contended the impugned order is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution as the Central GST Authorities passed an indifferent order on the same set of documents on which the State GST Authorities had granted closure. The Petitioners further contended that material found sufficient by the State GST Authorities was binding on the Central GST Authorities for closure of proceedings under Section 74.The Respondents raised a preliminary objection on maintainability, urging that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available. It was further contended by the Respondents that Section 73 and Section 74 operate in entirely different arenas, that appreciation of evidence is the domain of the Appellate Authority, and that a speaking order was duly passed after grant of hearing. In rejoinder, the Petitioners urged that relegation to alternate remedy would burden them with the obligation of statutory pre-deposit. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 9: "It is apparent that Section 73 and Section 74 of the Act operates in different arenas. The language of said sections, recourse to be taken in regard to said sections, can very well be looked into by its face value."Para 10: "Just because the petitioner was exonerated in the proceedings under Section 73, by itself, cannot lead to the petitioner being proceeded against by the Central GST Authorities under Section 74 of the Act. Both these sections operate on altogether different considerations."Para 11: "Apart from above, the material that was placed on record by petitioner in response to Show Cause Notice is very much independently available for scrutiny and appreciation."Para 13: "Appreciation, re-appreciation of evidence in regard to same are vested with the competent authorities. It is not in dispute that jurisdiction of Appellate Authority is restricted, rather it can be inferred from the very language of the jurisdiction vested in the Appellate Authority that it can reappreciate the entire evidence and if so required, may permit the petitioner to produce additional evidence."Para 14: "Merely because the petitioner shall be burdened with the satisfaction of condition of statutory pre-deposit, that by itself, cannot give leverage to the petitioner to claim before this Court that inappropriate appreciation of evidence or non-grant of sufficient opportunity to produce additional evidence to the satisfaction, amounts to denial of personal hearing. Re-appreciation and production of additional evidence can be very well looked into by the Appellate Authority."Para 15: "In that eventuality, we see no reason to exercise writ jurisdiction in the present matter, particularly, when the proceedings are barred by statutory remedy of appeal."FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition stands dismissed. The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction holding that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available, the Appellate Authority is fully empowered to re-appreciate evidence and permit production of additional evidence, and the burden of statutory pre-deposit alone is not a ground to bypass the appeal mechanism. 👎 | ||||
| PEI Industries & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 29-05-2026 Whether a writ petition is maintainable challenging an Order in Original passed by Central GST Authorities under Section 74 of CGST Act, 2017, when State GST Authorities had already closed proceedings on the same set of documents under Section 73, and wheBACKGROUNDThe Petitioners challenged an Order in Original dated 30th March, 2026, passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudication), CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, primarily on the ground that the Central GST proceedings are barred under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, 2017. The State GST Authorities, exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act, had previously closed proceedings against the Petitioners on the very same set of documents. Thereafter, the Central GST Authorities initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the Act based on the very same evidence and passed an adverse Order in Original.RELEVANT FACTSThe Petitioners contended that the documents submitted in response to the Show Cause Notice were the identical set of documents which had formed the basis for closure of proceedings by the State GST Authorities under Section 73; however, the Central GST Authorities refused to accept the same. It was further urged that no notice was issued to the Petitioners for producing additional documents which the respondents intended to obtain. Out of four dates for personal hearing as noted in the impugned order, hearing was effectively granted only on two days. The Petitioners also contended the impugned order is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution as the Central GST Authorities passed an indifferent order on the same set of documents on which the State GST Authorities had granted closure. The Petitioners further contended that material found sufficient by the State GST Authorities was binding on the Central GST Authorities for closure of proceedings under Section 74.The Respondents raised a preliminary objection on maintainability, urging that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available. It was further contended by the Respondents that Section 73 and Section 74 operate in entirely different arenas, that appreciation of evidence is the domain of the Appellate Authority, and that a speaking order was duly passed after grant of hearing. In rejoinder, the Petitioners urged that relegation to alternate remedy would burden them with the obligation of statutory pre-deposit. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 9: "It is apparent that Section 73 and Section 74 of the Act operates in different arenas. The language of said sections, recourse to be taken in regard to said sections, can very well be looked into by its face value."Para 10: "Just because the petitioner was exonerated in the proceedings under Section 73, by itself, cannot lead to the petitioner being proceeded against by the Central GST Authorities under Section 74 of the Act. Both these sections operate on altogether different considerations."Para 11: "Apart from above, the material that was placed on record by petitioner in response to Show Cause Notice is very much independently available for scrutiny and appreciation."Para 13: "Appreciation, re-appreciation of evidence in regard to same are vested with the competent authorities. It is not in dispute that jurisdiction of Appellate Authority is restricted, rather it can be inferred from the very language of the jurisdiction vested in the Appellate Authority that it can reappreciate the entire evidence and if so required, may permit the petitioner to produce additional evidence."Para 14: "Merely because the petitioner shall be burdened with the satisfaction of condition of statutory pre-deposit, that by itself, cannot give leverage to the petitioner to claim before this Court that inappropriate appreciation of evidence or non-grant of sufficient opportunity to produce additional evidence to the satisfaction, amounts to denial of personal hearing. Re-appreciation and production of additional evidence can be very well looked into by the Appellate Authority."Para 15: "In that eventuality, we see no reason to exercise writ jurisdiction in the present matter, particularly, when the proceedings are barred by statutory remedy of appeal."FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition stands dismissed. The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction holding that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available, the Appellate Authority is fully empowered to re-appreciate evidence and permit production of additional evidence, and the burden of statutory pre-deposit alone is not a ground to bypass the appeal mechanism. 👎 | ||||
| 46 | State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vS Bambino Agro Industries Ltd & Anr. | 29-05-2026 | Admission-stage order in the State's Special Leave Petition against an Allahabad High Court ruling in a Writ Tax matter — the Supreme Court condones delay, issues notice, and stays the High Court order pending final hearing. | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits. | ||||
| State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vS Bambino Agro Industries Ltd & Anr. 29-05-2026 Admission-stage order in the State's Special Leave Petition against an Allahabad High Court ruling in a Writ Tax matter — the Supreme Court condones delay, issues notice, and stays the High Court order pending final hearing.BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits. | ||||
| 47 | Pune Bar Association vs. Union of India and Others | 22-05-2026 | Constitutional validity of Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) read with its Schedule, which mandates a certificate disclosing hash value of electronic records (Part A) and a declaration by an expert (Part B) as a pre-condition fo | View Download |
BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding | ||||
| Pune Bar Association vs. Union of India and Others 22-05-2026 Constitutional validity of Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) read with its Schedule, which mandates a certificate disclosing hash value of electronic records (Part A) and a declaration by an expert (Part B) as a pre-condition foBackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding | ||||
| 48 | Samarpan Jain vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others | 21-05-2026 | Whether an Advocate who files a statutory GST appeal on behalf of his client and makes pre-deposit of 10% of disputed tax from the client's Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing Input Tax Credit — in accordance with his professional understanding of the | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioner is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of U.P., specializing in indirect taxes, direct taxes and corporate laws. His client, a proprietor of a trading firm, was subjected to substantial GST assessments under Section 74 of the SGST Act for financial years 2022-23 and 2023-24 by the Deputy Commissioner, GST, Sector-1, Rampur. The petitioner filed two online statutory appeals on behalf of his client on 15.08.2025 before the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the GST Act. The pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax was made from the client's Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing Input Tax Credit, relying upon CBIC Circular dated 06.07.2022 and the Gujarat High Court's Division Bench decision in M/s Yasho Industries Ltd., which had also been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals holding that payment of pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing ITC was not an acceptable valid tender. FACTSInstead of proceeding to recover the assessed tax, interest and penalty from the client through lawful means, the Deputy Commissioner of GST lodged an FIR on 04.10.2025 naming not only the client but also the petitioner-Advocate for the professional act of filing the appeal and making pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger, alleging GST evasion in conspiracy between the Advocate and his client. The Advocate's act of making pre-deposit was the very act forming the basis of the criminal conspiracy charge. The GST Officer, when summoned in-person and confronted by the Court on the question of why he nominated the Advocate in the FIR for his professional act, had no answer to offer. After notice was issued by the High Court in the writ petition, the police, in a swift and suspicious manner, filed the charge-sheet and the Magistrate passed a cognizance order — all on the same day, i.e., 14.05.2026. This compelled the petitioner to amend the writ petition to also challenge the charge-sheet and the cognizance order. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"what we find is that the impugned F.I.R., lodged in this case, which has led to the police report and the order of cognizance violate all known principles of criminal liability. An Advocate, by his profession, is authorized to represent his client, who may have a case of any kind to be suited in a Court or defended. An Advocate, by his profession, is authorized to defend men charged with murders, rape, terror offences and it is his/her duty to defend them. If, for doing a professional act, like preferring an appeal, an Advocate is to be held in conspiracy with his client, it would be the end of the very existence of the Bar and the right of an Advocate to practice under the Advocates Act. It would, indirectly also, deprive the citizens of their right to the much valued right to legal assistance, because a person, who practices the profession of law before defending his client, would be thinking about his own defence and, this he would be thinking about, before he files a vakalatnama and takes steps on behalf of his client. This kind of a situation, which hits as the roots of the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, cannot be permitted to happen. An Advocate has to work fearlessly and discharge his professional duties, just as an officer of the State is entitled to discharge his duties.""Here, even if the Deputy Commissioner of the GST thinks that pre-deposit of the disputed tax could not be debited to the Electronic Ledger out of the Input Tax Credit, the professional decision of the learned Advocate, to do so, does not, in any way, make him a conspirator with the assessee. It is purely a professional act and not at all something to do with his client's business. It was done in the course of filing an appeal and nothing more. It was based on a particular view of the law, whether right, wrong or utterly wrong." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was allowed. The FIR dated 04.10.2025, the cognizance order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur were all quashed insofar as they related to the petitioner-Advocate. The Court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur to make an entry in red ink in the General Diary of the concerned Police Station recording the quashing of proceedings against the petitioner. CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Yasho Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and anotherGujarat High Court — Division Bench (Exact citation not specified in judgment)2Union of India and another vs. Yasho Industries Ltd.2025 SCC OnLine SC 1526 (Supreme Court) | ||||
| Samarpan Jain vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others 21-05-2026 Whether an Advocate who files a statutory GST appeal on behalf of his client and makes pre-deposit of 10% of disputed tax from the client's Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing Input Tax Credit — in accordance with his professional understanding of theBACKGROUNDThe petitioner is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of U.P., specializing in indirect taxes, direct taxes and corporate laws. His client, a proprietor of a trading firm, was subjected to substantial GST assessments under Section 74 of the SGST Act for financial years 2022-23 and 2023-24 by the Deputy Commissioner, GST, Sector-1, Rampur. The petitioner filed two online statutory appeals on behalf of his client on 15.08.2025 before the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the GST Act. The pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax was made from the client's Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing Input Tax Credit, relying upon CBIC Circular dated 06.07.2022 and the Gujarat High Court's Division Bench decision in M/s Yasho Industries Ltd., which had also been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals holding that payment of pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger by utilizing ITC was not an acceptable valid tender. FACTSInstead of proceeding to recover the assessed tax, interest and penalty from the client through lawful means, the Deputy Commissioner of GST lodged an FIR on 04.10.2025 naming not only the client but also the petitioner-Advocate for the professional act of filing the appeal and making pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger, alleging GST evasion in conspiracy between the Advocate and his client. The Advocate's act of making pre-deposit was the very act forming the basis of the criminal conspiracy charge. The GST Officer, when summoned in-person and confronted by the Court on the question of why he nominated the Advocate in the FIR for his professional act, had no answer to offer. After notice was issued by the High Court in the writ petition, the police, in a swift and suspicious manner, filed the charge-sheet and the Magistrate passed a cognizance order — all on the same day, i.e., 14.05.2026. This compelled the petitioner to amend the writ petition to also challenge the charge-sheet and the cognizance order. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"what we find is that the impugned F.I.R., lodged in this case, which has led to the police report and the order of cognizance violate all known principles of criminal liability. An Advocate, by his profession, is authorized to represent his client, who may have a case of any kind to be suited in a Court or defended. An Advocate, by his profession, is authorized to defend men charged with murders, rape, terror offences and it is his/her duty to defend them. If, for doing a professional act, like preferring an appeal, an Advocate is to be held in conspiracy with his client, it would be the end of the very existence of the Bar and the right of an Advocate to practice under the Advocates Act. It would, indirectly also, deprive the citizens of their right to the much valued right to legal assistance, because a person, who practices the profession of law before defending his client, would be thinking about his own defence and, this he would be thinking about, before he files a vakalatnama and takes steps on behalf of his client. This kind of a situation, which hits as the roots of the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, cannot be permitted to happen. An Advocate has to work fearlessly and discharge his professional duties, just as an officer of the State is entitled to discharge his duties.""Here, even if the Deputy Commissioner of the GST thinks that pre-deposit of the disputed tax could not be debited to the Electronic Ledger out of the Input Tax Credit, the professional decision of the learned Advocate, to do so, does not, in any way, make him a conspirator with the assessee. It is purely a professional act and not at all something to do with his client's business. It was done in the course of filing an appeal and nothing more. It was based on a particular view of the law, whether right, wrong or utterly wrong." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was allowed. The FIR dated 04.10.2025, the cognizance order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur were all quashed insofar as they related to the petitioner-Advocate. The Court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur to make an entry in red ink in the General Diary of the concerned Police Station recording the quashing of proceedings against the petitioner. CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Yasho Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and anotherGujarat High Court — Division Bench (Exact citation not specified in judgment)2Union of India and another vs. Yasho Industries Ltd.2025 SCC OnLine SC 1526 (Supreme Court) | ||||
| 49 | Giri Transport Company vs. The Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, | 20-05-2026 | Whether departmental appeals filed against an Advance Ruling — on non-inclusion of free-of-cost (FOC) diesel supplied by service recipient in the taxable value of Goods Transport Agency (GTA) services — are maintainable despite objections of limitatio | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a Goods Transport Agency, filed an application under Section 97 of the RGST Act, 2017 before the Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) seeking a ruling on whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport services. The jurisdictional SGST officer participated in the AAR proceedings and categorically supported the petitioner's stand that GST is not leviable on FOC diesel. The AAR vide ruling dated 16.06.2022 held in favour of the petitioner that FOC diesel is not includable in the taxable value of GTA services. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against this ruling — one by the CGST authority and one by the very same SGST officer who had earlier supported the petitioner — both beyond the prescribed limitation period and without proper condonation applications. The petitioner raised detailed preliminary objections before the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling (AAAR). The AAAR rejected all preliminary objections vide impugned order dated 01.07.2024 and directed the matter to be heard on merits. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition — notably, its second approach to the High Court, the first having been disposed of in 2022 directing preliminary objections to be decided first. CRUCIAL FACTSThe AAR ruling dated 16.06.2022 was uploaded on the GST portal on 17.06.2022. The CGST authority claimed receipt on 29.06.2022 and filed its appeal on 12.08.2022 (56 days — within the maximum 60-day permissible period). The SGST officer claimed receipt on 15.09.2022 and filed its appeal on 14.10.2022 (within 30 days of claimed receipt). The petitioner contended that both appeals were time-barred, as the ruling was duly communicated via Speed Post and portal upload in June 2022 itself, supported by India Post tracking data and a letter dated 15.09.2022 from AAR confirming Speed Post dispatch on 21.06.2022. The AAAR, however, accepted the dates of actual receipt as claimed by the departmental appellants, condoned the marginal delay of 21 days in CGST's case, and rejected all five preliminary objections — on 90-day adjudication limit, limitation for filing, hard copy filing, locus of CGST authority, and estoppel against the department for reversing its earlier stand. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)On 90-day mandatory vs. directory — Section 101(2):"There is no provision in the CGST or RGST Act that provides for automatic lapsing of an appeal upon expiry of the 90-day period, nor does the Act prescribe any consequence for non-compliance with this timeline. The absence of a penal consequence for delay is itself a strong indicator that the provision is directory. The petitioner's reliance on mere passage of time, without any prejudice demonstrated, cannot be a ground to shut out a legitimate appeal on merits.""A provision whose strict construction destroys the very right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90-day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of appellate power.""The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not by itself render a provision mandatory in every case... whether 'shall' is mandatory or directory depends upon the context, the object of the provision, the scheme of the statute, and the consequences that would flow from the interpretation thereof."On Limitation:"Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual receipt where such date is specifically established.""No further elaborate reasons are required to be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State. There is no infirmity in this finding."On Locus Standi of CGST Authority:"The Act does not restrict the right of appeal to whichever of the two happened to participate in the advance ruling proceedings. The statute confers the right of appeal on both, and this right cannot be extinguished on the ground that one of them did not appear or represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the proceedings below."On Estoppel:"It is a settled and fundamental principle of constitutional and administrative law that there is no estoppel against the State in matters of taxation and statutory duty. A representation or stand taken by a subordinate officer without due authority and without proper application of mind by the competent authority cannot bind the State or the department... The department's right to correct such an error through the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be defeated by the doctrine of estoppel."On Hard Copy Filing:"Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly permits manual filing of documents notwithstanding any provision that prescribes electronic filing... A procedural prescription cannot be elevated into a jurisdictional bar, and the appeals cannot be thrown out on this purely technical ground."On Petitioner's Conduct:"This conduct reveals a clear attempt to indefinitely delay the final adjudication on merits. The petitioner cannot be permitted to use the writ jurisdiction of this Court as an instrument of delay." FINAL VERDICTThe writ petition is dismissed as bereft of merit. The petitioner is directed to join proceedings before the Appellate Authority. All preliminary objections against maintainability of departmental appeals stand rejected.👎 THUMBS DOWN (Against Assessee) | ||||
| Giri Transport Company vs. The Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, 20-05-2026 Whether departmental appeals filed against an Advance Ruling — on non-inclusion of free-of-cost (FOC) diesel supplied by service recipient in the taxable value of Goods Transport Agency (GTA) services — are maintainable despite objections of limitatioBACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a Goods Transport Agency, filed an application under Section 97 of the RGST Act, 2017 before the Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) seeking a ruling on whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport services. The jurisdictional SGST officer participated in the AAR proceedings and categorically supported the petitioner's stand that GST is not leviable on FOC diesel. The AAR vide ruling dated 16.06.2022 held in favour of the petitioner that FOC diesel is not includable in the taxable value of GTA services. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against this ruling — one by the CGST authority and one by the very same SGST officer who had earlier supported the petitioner — both beyond the prescribed limitation period and without proper condonation applications. The petitioner raised detailed preliminary objections before the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling (AAAR). The AAAR rejected all preliminary objections vide impugned order dated 01.07.2024 and directed the matter to be heard on merits. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition — notably, its second approach to the High Court, the first having been disposed of in 2022 directing preliminary objections to be decided first. CRUCIAL FACTSThe AAR ruling dated 16.06.2022 was uploaded on the GST portal on 17.06.2022. The CGST authority claimed receipt on 29.06.2022 and filed its appeal on 12.08.2022 (56 days — within the maximum 60-day permissible period). The SGST officer claimed receipt on 15.09.2022 and filed its appeal on 14.10.2022 (within 30 days of claimed receipt). The petitioner contended that both appeals were time-barred, as the ruling was duly communicated via Speed Post and portal upload in June 2022 itself, supported by India Post tracking data and a letter dated 15.09.2022 from AAR confirming Speed Post dispatch on 21.06.2022. The AAAR, however, accepted the dates of actual receipt as claimed by the departmental appellants, condoned the marginal delay of 21 days in CGST's case, and rejected all five preliminary objections — on 90-day adjudication limit, limitation for filing, hard copy filing, locus of CGST authority, and estoppel against the department for reversing its earlier stand. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)On 90-day mandatory vs. directory — Section 101(2):"There is no provision in the CGST or RGST Act that provides for automatic lapsing of an appeal upon expiry of the 90-day period, nor does the Act prescribe any consequence for non-compliance with this timeline. The absence of a penal consequence for delay is itself a strong indicator that the provision is directory. The petitioner's reliance on mere passage of time, without any prejudice demonstrated, cannot be a ground to shut out a legitimate appeal on merits.""A provision whose strict construction destroys the very right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90-day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of appellate power.""The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not by itself render a provision mandatory in every case... whether 'shall' is mandatory or directory depends upon the context, the object of the provision, the scheme of the statute, and the consequences that would flow from the interpretation thereof."On Limitation:"Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual receipt where such date is specifically established.""No further elaborate reasons are required to be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State. There is no infirmity in this finding."On Locus Standi of CGST Authority:"The Act does not restrict the right of appeal to whichever of the two happened to participate in the advance ruling proceedings. The statute confers the right of appeal on both, and this right cannot be extinguished on the ground that one of them did not appear or represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the proceedings below."On Estoppel:"It is a settled and fundamental principle of constitutional and administrative law that there is no estoppel against the State in matters of taxation and statutory duty. A representation or stand taken by a subordinate officer without due authority and without proper application of mind by the competent authority cannot bind the State or the department... The department's right to correct such an error through the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be defeated by the doctrine of estoppel."On Hard Copy Filing:"Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly permits manual filing of documents notwithstanding any provision that prescribes electronic filing... A procedural prescription cannot be elevated into a jurisdictional bar, and the appeals cannot be thrown out on this purely technical ground."On Petitioner's Conduct:"This conduct reveals a clear attempt to indefinitely delay the final adjudication on merits. The petitioner cannot be permitted to use the writ jurisdiction of this Court as an instrument of delay." FINAL VERDICTThe writ petition is dismissed as bereft of merit. The petitioner is directed to join proceedings before the Appellate Authority. All preliminary objections against maintainability of departmental appeals stand rejected.👎 THUMBS DOWN (Against Assessee) | ||||
| 50 | IDFC First Bank Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. | 17-05-2026 | Scrutiny, audit and a DRC-07 demand order pursued for years against three companies long after their amalgamation and cancellation of registration, notwithstanding repeated intimation. At issue: the validity of proceedings conducted throughout against a n | View Download |
Background. By order dated 12.12.2018 of the NCLT, Chennai, Capital First Limited, Capital First Home Finance Ltd. and Capital First Securities Ltd. were amalgamated with the petitioner. An application for cancellation of CFL’s registration was filed on 21.01.2019 and the cancellation order was passed on 14.06.2019. The department nevertheless issued ASMT-10 scrutiny, an ADT-01 audit notice for FY 2018-19, an audit report in ADT-02 alleging eighteen discrepancies, DRC-01A intimations, a DRC-01 show cause notice dated 30.12.2023 and finally a DRC-07 order dated 26.04.2024, all in CFL’s name, notwithstanding repeated intimations and a request to transfer the proceedings to the jurisdictional officer of the amalgamated entity.Observations of the Court. The Court recorded that the facts of amalgamation and the legal consequence on the existence of CFL were undisputed, leaving no doubt that CFL was a non-existent entity, and that no proceedings qua that entity could be adopted against the petitioner.It extracted and adopted its own reasoning in Vodafone Idea Ltd. and paragraphs 16 to 18 of the Delhi High Court’s judgment in HCL Infosystems Ltd., including the holding that under Section 87 the liabilities of the non-existent company in any case stand transposed to be borne by the amalgamated entity, so that this is not a case where the revenue stands to lose its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict. Both petitions were allowed and rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the impugned order. The Court expressly observed that it had not examined any other issue, and kept open all contentions of the petitioner as well as the department in relation to any other steps that may be required to be taken in law. | ||||
| IDFC First Bank Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 17-05-2026 Scrutiny, audit and a DRC-07 demand order pursued for years against three companies long after their amalgamation and cancellation of registration, notwithstanding repeated intimation. At issue: the validity of proceedings conducted throughout against a nBackground. By order dated 12.12.2018 of the NCLT, Chennai, Capital First Limited, Capital First Home Finance Ltd. and Capital First Securities Ltd. were amalgamated with the petitioner. An application for cancellation of CFL’s registration was filed on 21.01.2019 and the cancellation order was passed on 14.06.2019. The department nevertheless issued ASMT-10 scrutiny, an ADT-01 audit notice for FY 2018-19, an audit report in ADT-02 alleging eighteen discrepancies, DRC-01A intimations, a DRC-01 show cause notice dated 30.12.2023 and finally a DRC-07 order dated 26.04.2024, all in CFL’s name, notwithstanding repeated intimations and a request to transfer the proceedings to the jurisdictional officer of the amalgamated entity.Observations of the Court. The Court recorded that the facts of amalgamation and the legal consequence on the existence of CFL were undisputed, leaving no doubt that CFL was a non-existent entity, and that no proceedings qua that entity could be adopted against the petitioner.It extracted and adopted its own reasoning in Vodafone Idea Ltd. and paragraphs 16 to 18 of the Delhi High Court’s judgment in HCL Infosystems Ltd., including the holding that under Section 87 the liabilities of the non-existent company in any case stand transposed to be borne by the amalgamated entity, so that this is not a case where the revenue stands to lose its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict. Both petitions were allowed and rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the impugned order. The Court expressly observed that it had not examined any other issue, and kept open all contentions of the petitioner as well as the department in relation to any other steps that may be required to be taken in law. | ||||
