Facts of the CaseThe matter arose from a Special Leave Petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. During the hearing, an important legal question emerged regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence and the necessity of videography at crime scenes. The Court also considered whether the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic records.In earlier proceedings, the Court had recorded submissions from the Additional Solicitor General regarding the usefulness of videography in crime scene investigation. It was noted that videography and digital photography could enhance transparency and accuracy in investigation. The Union Government had also constituted a Committee of Experts to prepare a roadmap and Standard Operating Procedure for videography at crime scenes.Simultaneously, a legal issue arose in connected matters concerning the interpretation of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The apprehension expressed was that if the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) was treated as mandatory in all circumstances, electronic evidence produced by a person not in control of the device would be excluded, resulting in denial of justice.The questions decided by the Court were:Whether electronic evidence is admissible only in compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act.Whether the certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory in all cases.Whether procedural requirements under Section 65B can be relaxed in appropriate cases.Court Observations and DecisionThe Court examined earlier decisions dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence. It noted that electronic evidence is admissible subject to safeguards regarding authenticity and reliability. The Court observed that Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions intended to supplement the law on admissibility of electronic records.The Court clarified that primary electronic evidence is admissible under Section 62 of the Evidence Act and is not governed by Section 65B. Section 65B applies to secondary electronic evidence.Importantly, the Court held that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory. The requirement applies when electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in possession and control of the device from which the electronic record is generated and is capable of producing such certificate.Where electronic evidence is produced by a person who is not in possession of the device, Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act can be invoked. In such cases, insisting on a certificate under Section 65B(4) would result in denial of justice.The Court clarified the legal position that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is procedural and can be relaxed by the Court in the interest of justice. Electronic evidence cannot be excluded merely on technical grounds if it is otherwise relevant and authentic.Case ReferredRam Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, Supreme Court of India.R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, Court of Criminal Appeal (UK).R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699, Court of Appeal (UK).Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, Supreme Court of India.Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Supreme Court of India.Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, Supreme Court of India.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, Supreme Court of India.

Facts :The petitioners, registered dealers under the DVAT Act, claimed Input Tax Credit on purchases supported by valid tax invoices from registered selling dealers. The tax authorities denied ITC on the ground that the selling dealers had not deposited the tax with the Government or had not properly disclosed the transactions. The denial was based on Section 9(2)(g) of the DVAT Act. Petitioners contended that they had complied with all statutory requirements and could not control the conduct of selling dealers. Court Decision:The High Court held Section 9(2)(g) unconstitutional to the extent it denies ITC to bona fide purchasing dealers. The Court held that the provision fails to distinguish between genuine purchasers and those involved in fraud or collusion, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that a purchasing dealer who has taken all reasonable steps, such as verifying registration and obtaining valid tax invoices, cannot be denied ITC due to default of the selling dealer. However, ITC can be denied where fraud, collusion, or lack of genuineness is established. Cases Referred by Court:•    K.T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala •    State of Kerala v. Haji and Haji •    Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar •    Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar •    Gheru Lal Bal Chand v. State of Haryana •    Shanti Kiran India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Trade and Tax Department •    Rajbala v. State of Haryana •    Binoy Viswam v. Union of India •    Shayara Bano v. Union of India •    Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing & Oil Industries v. State of Maharashtra •    Jayam & Co. v. Assistant Commissioner   

Facts :A search and seizure operation was conducted on the assessee, followed by block assessment determining undisclosed income. The Assessing Officer later sought to levy surcharge through rectification and revision proceedings. The assessee challenged the levy, contending that the proviso to Section 113 (inserted in 2002) could not apply to earlier block periods. The Tribunal and High Court held the proviso to be prospective, leading to appeal before the Supreme Court.Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 113 is prospective and not clarificatory. It ruled that prior to insertion of the proviso, levy of surcharge on block assessment was ambiguous and uncertain, particularly regarding the applicable Finance Act and rate. Since the proviso imposed an additional tax burden, it could not be applied retrospectively in absence of clear legislative intent. The Court also emphasized the principle that taxing statutes are presumed to be prospective unless expressly stated otherwise, and rejected the earlier view in Suresh N. Gupta treating the proviso as clarificatory.Cases Referred:Commissioner of Income Tax v. Suresh N. GuptaCommissioner of Income Tax v. Sanjiv BhataraGovinddas v. Income Tax OfficerController of Estate Duty v. M.A. MerchantCIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.Govindasaran Gangasaran v. Commissioner of Income TaxKeshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal BhagwandasGovernment of India v. Indian Tobacco AssociationVijay v. State of MaharashtraPhillips v. EyreL’Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.

Facts :The appellant, a registered dealer, purchased goods from registered selling dealers against valid tax invoices and claimed input tax credit. The VAT authorities disallowed ITC on the ground that selling dealers had deposited disproportionately low tax and their registrations were later cancelled. The assessment orders, objection orders, and Tribunal upheld denial of ITC and imposed tax, interest, and penalty. The appellant challenged these findings before the High Court. Court Decision:The High Court held that denial of ITC was not justified in the absence of any statutory provision (during the relevant period) requiring the purchasing dealer to ensure that the selling dealer deposited tax. It held that Section 9(2) did not contain such a condition prior to insertion of clause (g), and the Tribunal’s interpretation was erroneous. The Court allowed the appeals and directed grant of input tax credit to the appellant after verification. Cases Referred by Court:•    State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Trading Company •    Althaf Shoes Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (CT) •    V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax •    Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar •    Bihar State Council of Ayurvedic and Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar •    R.S. Joshi v. Ajit Mills •    Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax •    George Oakes (Private) Ltd. v. State of Madras •    Commissioner of Central Excise v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal •    State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh •    J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan  

Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue and upheld the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal classifying the goods as jute carpets.The Court held that:The carpets manufactured by the respondent contained more than 50% jute by weight and had no separate base fabric, as established by reports of the Indian Jute Industries Research Association and the Department’s Chemical Examiner.Since the goods fell under Chapter 57 and consisted of more than one textile material, classification had to be determined in accordance with Section Note 2(A) and Section Note 14(A) of Section XI of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, which mandate classification based on the textile material predominating by weight. As jute predominated over each other single textile material, the carpets were classifiable as jute carpets.Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 57 only defines “carpets and other textile floor coverings” for the purpose of that Chapter and cannot override the predominance test for classification.The Revenue’s attempt to classify the goods under the residuary sub-heading was rejected. The Court reiterated that when goods reasonably fall under a specific heading, they cannot be classified under a residuary entry.The argument based on the “essential character” or “surface test” was rejected, as predominance by weight was the governing principle under the statutory notes.The plea based on Rule 3 of the Rules for Interpretation of the Schedule was rejected, as classification was clear from the Section and Chapter Notes, and Rule 3 applies only when classification cannot be determined otherwise. Further, a case not made out in the show cause notice cannot be argued subsequently.The Court found no perversity in the concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal and affirmed the classification as jute carpets.Cases Referred by Court:HPL Chemicals Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh (2006) 5 SCC 208Dunlop India Ltd. vs Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241Bharat Forge and Press Industries (P) Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise (1990) 1 SCC 532Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad vs Fenoplast (P) Ltd. (1994) 72 ELT 513 (SC)M/s Indo International Industries vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 528Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Simplex Mills Co. Ltd. (2005) 3 SCC 51Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs Toyo Engineering India Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 592Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 89Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716Novopan India Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606Hindustan Poles Corporation vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2006) 4 SCC 85Kemrock Industries & Exports Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2007) 9 SCC 52