| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | M/s Moral Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. | 18-09-2026 | Challenge to CBIC Circulars assigning “proper officer” functions to central tax officers rejected; writ against an appealable Section 74 order not entertained. | View Download |
BackgroundOn the basis of data received from DGA (Central), Lucknow, an SCN dated 12.07.2024 under Section 74 proposed GST of Rs.5,10,00,146/- (CGST and SGST Rs.2,55,00,073/- each) for July 2017–March 2018 for alleged false declaration of taxable value. After reply dated 07.08.2024 and a hearing, the order dated 13.11.2024 confirmed tax of Rs.2,91,39,160/- with interest and an equal penalty under Section 74(1) read with Section 122(2)(b), dropping Rs.2,18,60,986/-. The petitioner challenged Circulars No. 3/3/2017-GST, 31/05/2018-GST and 169/01/2022-GST as beyond the Board’s power (relying on Canon India), and also the SCN/order for want of digital signature, personal hearing, ASMT-10, the Section 74 pre-conditions and limitation.Final VerdictNoting that the Bombay HC decision in Fomento Resorts & Hotels is under appeal but no Supreme Court direction restrains High Courts, the Court agreed with that view that Canon India is distinguishable, since the officers concerned are admittedly central tax officers appointed under Section 3 read with Section 5 via the notification dated 19.06.2017, and held that the pleas questioning the three circulars have no basis to stand. Finding that the order was passed after considering the reply and granting a personal hearing, and that none of the Chhabil Dass Agarwal exceptions applied, the Court declined to act as a fact-finding body and relegated the petitioner to the statutory appeal. Liberty was granted to appeal within 30 days; since the writ was filed on 07.03.2025, within 30 days after expiry of the three-month appeal period, the Appellate Authority would not oust the petitioner on limitation. The writ was disposed of accordingly. | ||||
| M/s Moral Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 18-09-2026 Challenge to CBIC Circulars assigning “proper officer” functions to central tax officers rejected; writ against an appealable Section 74 order not entertained.BackgroundOn the basis of data received from DGA (Central), Lucknow, an SCN dated 12.07.2024 under Section 74 proposed GST of Rs.5,10,00,146/- (CGST and SGST Rs.2,55,00,073/- each) for July 2017–March 2018 for alleged false declaration of taxable value. After reply dated 07.08.2024 and a hearing, the order dated 13.11.2024 confirmed tax of Rs.2,91,39,160/- with interest and an equal penalty under Section 74(1) read with Section 122(2)(b), dropping Rs.2,18,60,986/-. The petitioner challenged Circulars No. 3/3/2017-GST, 31/05/2018-GST and 169/01/2022-GST as beyond the Board’s power (relying on Canon India), and also the SCN/order for want of digital signature, personal hearing, ASMT-10, the Section 74 pre-conditions and limitation.Final VerdictNoting that the Bombay HC decision in Fomento Resorts & Hotels is under appeal but no Supreme Court direction restrains High Courts, the Court agreed with that view that Canon India is distinguishable, since the officers concerned are admittedly central tax officers appointed under Section 3 read with Section 5 via the notification dated 19.06.2017, and held that the pleas questioning the three circulars have no basis to stand. Finding that the order was passed after considering the reply and granting a personal hearing, and that none of the Chhabil Dass Agarwal exceptions applied, the Court declined to act as a fact-finding body and relegated the petitioner to the statutory appeal. Liberty was granted to appeal within 30 days; since the writ was filed on 07.03.2025, within 30 days after expiry of the three-month appeal period, the Appellate Authority would not oust the petitioner on limitation. The writ was disposed of accordingly. | ||||
| 12 | Metalloids India, Pathanamthitta v. Commissioner of State Tax, Kerala | 17-09-2026 | Whether the value of the principal’s goods returned by a job worker must be included in the consignment value declared in the e-way bill, and whether Section 129 penalty is sustainable. | View Download |
BackgroundAluminium colour-coated coils belonging to the appellant (principal), returned by its job worker Roofstyle Industries, were intercepted on 04.05.2023 under a job-work invoice of Rs. 1,841, a return e-way bill showing nil quantity, and the original delivery challan. Penalty of Rs. 2,50,884 was imposed under Section 129(3) for want of a valid delivery challan and e-way bill, and was upheld in first appeal. Before the Tribunal, Revenue argued that the e-way bill had to reflect the Rs. 6,96,900 value of the material.Final VerdictThe Tribunal found that the SCN rested on facts falsified by the department’s own records: the job-work tax invoice, the principal’s delivery challan (as required by Circular 38/12/2018) and e-way bill No. 521496456415 were all tendered at interception. The adjudication order impermissibly introduced a new ground of an “invalid” e-way bill and was non-speaking, while the appellate order relied on a ground outside the SCN (an e-way bill from A.S. Metals); Revenue’s attempt to improve the SCN at the Tribunal stage was rejected. On the question of law, reading Explanation 2 to Rule 138 with Section 15, it held that on return after job work the supply is only of job-work services, so the consignment value is the job-work charges plus tax, and the value of the principal’s goods is not includable in the e-way bill. As the consignment value of Rs. 1,841 was below the Rs. 50,000 threshold, no e-way bill was mandatory and proceedings for a defective or missing e-way bill were void ab initio. The appeal was allowed with consequential relief. | ||||
| Metalloids India, Pathanamthitta v. Commissioner of State Tax, Kerala 17-09-2026 Whether the value of the principal’s goods returned by a job worker must be included in the consignment value declared in the e-way bill, and whether Section 129 penalty is sustainable.BackgroundAluminium colour-coated coils belonging to the appellant (principal), returned by its job worker Roofstyle Industries, were intercepted on 04.05.2023 under a job-work invoice of Rs. 1,841, a return e-way bill showing nil quantity, and the original delivery challan. Penalty of Rs. 2,50,884 was imposed under Section 129(3) for want of a valid delivery challan and e-way bill, and was upheld in first appeal. Before the Tribunal, Revenue argued that the e-way bill had to reflect the Rs. 6,96,900 value of the material.Final VerdictThe Tribunal found that the SCN rested on facts falsified by the department’s own records: the job-work tax invoice, the principal’s delivery challan (as required by Circular 38/12/2018) and e-way bill No. 521496456415 were all tendered at interception. The adjudication order impermissibly introduced a new ground of an “invalid” e-way bill and was non-speaking, while the appellate order relied on a ground outside the SCN (an e-way bill from A.S. Metals); Revenue’s attempt to improve the SCN at the Tribunal stage was rejected. On the question of law, reading Explanation 2 to Rule 138 with Section 15, it held that on return after job work the supply is only of job-work services, so the consignment value is the job-work charges plus tax, and the value of the principal’s goods is not includable in the e-way bill. As the consignment value of Rs. 1,841 was below the Rs. 50,000 threshold, no e-way bill was mandatory and proceedings for a defective or missing e-way bill were void ab initio. The appeal was allowed with consequential relief. | ||||
| 13 | Md Qamaruddin Khan v. M/s YRK Constructions, Hyderabad | 17-09-2026 | Whether the appellate authority could revoke cancellation of registration on verification of returns and tax alone, without ensuring payment of interest, late fee and penalty under the proviso to Rule 23(1). | View Download |
BackgroundThe respondent’s registration was cancelled from 12.11.2020 for not filing GSTR-3B for six months. Finding that all returns had been filed after the show cause notice, the First Appellate Authority revoked the cancellation and directed the proper officer to verify the filing of returns and payment of tax. The department appealed, contending that interest, late fee and penalty also had to be paid under Rule 23(1). The respondent did not appear despite three opportunities.Final VerdictThe Tribunal held that the liability under returns extends to interest, late fee and penalty, and that by not applying the proviso to Rule 23(1), the First Appellate Authority committed a jurisdictional and substantive error. It also observed that admitted dues are recoverable through Section 79, which the department ought to invoke before seeking the Tribunal’s aid for collection. Reading the appellate order as intending recovery of the Rule 23 amounts, it held that the department was free to collect interest under Section 50 and late fee under Section 47, and imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,000 under Rule 23, modifying the order to that extent. Since the revocation of cancellation was left intact and only ancillary dues and penalty were added, the outcome is neutral (partly in favour of each side). | ||||
| Md Qamaruddin Khan v. M/s YRK Constructions, Hyderabad 17-09-2026 Whether the appellate authority could revoke cancellation of registration on verification of returns and tax alone, without ensuring payment of interest, late fee and penalty under the proviso to Rule 23(1).BackgroundThe respondent’s registration was cancelled from 12.11.2020 for not filing GSTR-3B for six months. Finding that all returns had been filed after the show cause notice, the First Appellate Authority revoked the cancellation and directed the proper officer to verify the filing of returns and payment of tax. The department appealed, contending that interest, late fee and penalty also had to be paid under Rule 23(1). The respondent did not appear despite three opportunities.Final VerdictThe Tribunal held that the liability under returns extends to interest, late fee and penalty, and that by not applying the proviso to Rule 23(1), the First Appellate Authority committed a jurisdictional and substantive error. It also observed that admitted dues are recoverable through Section 79, which the department ought to invoke before seeking the Tribunal’s aid for collection. Reading the appellate order as intending recovery of the Rule 23 amounts, it held that the department was free to collect interest under Section 50 and late fee under Section 47, and imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,000 under Rule 23, modifying the order to that extent. Since the revocation of cancellation was left intact and only ancillary dues and penalty were added, the outcome is neutral (partly in favour of each side). | ||||
| 14 | Commissioner, CGST & CX, Siliguri Commissionerate v. M/s Santosh Fragrance | 16-09-2026 | Inverted duty refund under Section 54(3)(ii) to an agarbatti manufacturer – whether para 3.2 of CBIC Circular 135/05/2020-GST bars the refund. | View Download |
BackgroundThe respondent manufactures agarbatti (HSN 3307) taxed at 5%, using perfumes, fragrances, chemicals and packaging materials taxed at 12–18%. A refund of Rs. 4,00,000 of ITC accumulated due to inverted tax structure (April 2022–March 2023) was sanctioned on 18.01.2024 and upheld by the First Appellate Authority. Revenue appealed, contending that para 3.2 of Circular 135/05/2020-GST (as substituted by Circular 173/05/2022-GST) took the case outside Section 54(3)(ii).Final VerdictThe Tribunal framed two questions: whether the credit had accumulated because the tax rate on inputs was higher than on output, and whether para 3.2 of the Circular stood in the way. Applying the definition of “inputs” in Section 2(59) and VKC Footsteps (SC), it held that the perfumes, chemicals and packaging materials were commercially distinct inputs taxed at higher rates than agarbatti, so the ITC had accumulated on account of an inverted rate structure squarely within Section 54(3)(ii). Para 3.2 applies only where input and output are the same goods taxed at different rates at different points of time, and has no application here. Reiterating its own view in Power Tech Global and that of the Principal Bench in Dow Chemical, the Tribunal held that CBIC circulars bind departmental officers but not the Tribunal, and are at most persuasive. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were affirmed and Revenue’s appeal dismissed. | ||||
| Commissioner, CGST & CX, Siliguri Commissionerate v. M/s Santosh Fragrance 16-09-2026 Inverted duty refund under Section 54(3)(ii) to an agarbatti manufacturer – whether para 3.2 of CBIC Circular 135/05/2020-GST bars the refund.BackgroundThe respondent manufactures agarbatti (HSN 3307) taxed at 5%, using perfumes, fragrances, chemicals and packaging materials taxed at 12–18%. A refund of Rs. 4,00,000 of ITC accumulated due to inverted tax structure (April 2022–March 2023) was sanctioned on 18.01.2024 and upheld by the First Appellate Authority. Revenue appealed, contending that para 3.2 of Circular 135/05/2020-GST (as substituted by Circular 173/05/2022-GST) took the case outside Section 54(3)(ii).Final VerdictThe Tribunal framed two questions: whether the credit had accumulated because the tax rate on inputs was higher than on output, and whether para 3.2 of the Circular stood in the way. Applying the definition of “inputs” in Section 2(59) and VKC Footsteps (SC), it held that the perfumes, chemicals and packaging materials were commercially distinct inputs taxed at higher rates than agarbatti, so the ITC had accumulated on account of an inverted rate structure squarely within Section 54(3)(ii). Para 3.2 applies only where input and output are the same goods taxed at different rates at different points of time, and has no application here. Reiterating its own view in Power Tech Global and that of the Principal Bench in Dow Chemical, the Tribunal held that CBIC circulars bind departmental officers but not the Tribunal, and are at most persuasive. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were affirmed and Revenue’s appeal dismissed. | ||||
| 15 | Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Kolkata North v. M/s HP Cotton Casuals Pvt. Ltd. | 10-09-2026 | Inverted duty refund to a garment processor – whether denied because input and output share the same HSN, or on “manufacture”, verification and period-wise computation objections. | View Download |
BackgroundThe respondent buys fabric and pre-stitched garments (5%) and chemicals and packing materials (12–18%), and supplies finished apparel at 5% after bleaching, dyeing, printing, stitching, branding and packing. Its inverted duty refunds of Rs. 34,47,623 (March 2024) and Rs. 7,86,037 (February 2024) were rejected on the ground that input and output fall under the same HSN. The First Appellate Authority allowed them, and Revenue appealed, also alleging non-verification of capital-goods invoices, GSTR-2B mismatches, export ITC and annual (rather than period-wise) computation.Final VerdictThe Tribunal held that the concept of “manufacture” is no longer relevant under GST, since the levy under Section 9(1) is on supply, so refund eligibility does not depend on whether the claimant is a trader or a manufacturer. Para 3 of Circular 135/05/2020-GST, by its very heading, deals with accumulation due to a reduction in the GST rate, and para 3.2 applies only where the same goods attract different rates at different points of time; it has no application where there is no rate reduction. Following the Madras High Court in Vindhya Spinning Mills (14.07.2026), it held that Section 54(3)(ii) draws no distinction between principal and other inputs, so where higher-taxed chemicals and packing materials cause the accumulation, refund cannot be denied because one input shares the output’s rate or HSN. Computation had been period-specific under Rule 89(5), and the verification objections had already been examined by both lower authorities and were not rebutted by any evidence. Revenue’s appeals were dismissed. | ||||
| Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Kolkata North v. M/s HP Cotton Casuals Pvt. Ltd. 10-09-2026 Inverted duty refund to a garment processor – whether denied because input and output share the same HSN, or on “manufacture”, verification and period-wise computation objections.BackgroundThe respondent buys fabric and pre-stitched garments (5%) and chemicals and packing materials (12–18%), and supplies finished apparel at 5% after bleaching, dyeing, printing, stitching, branding and packing. Its inverted duty refunds of Rs. 34,47,623 (March 2024) and Rs. 7,86,037 (February 2024) were rejected on the ground that input and output fall under the same HSN. The First Appellate Authority allowed them, and Revenue appealed, also alleging non-verification of capital-goods invoices, GSTR-2B mismatches, export ITC and annual (rather than period-wise) computation.Final VerdictThe Tribunal held that the concept of “manufacture” is no longer relevant under GST, since the levy under Section 9(1) is on supply, so refund eligibility does not depend on whether the claimant is a trader or a manufacturer. Para 3 of Circular 135/05/2020-GST, by its very heading, deals with accumulation due to a reduction in the GST rate, and para 3.2 applies only where the same goods attract different rates at different points of time; it has no application where there is no rate reduction. Following the Madras High Court in Vindhya Spinning Mills (14.07.2026), it held that Section 54(3)(ii) draws no distinction between principal and other inputs, so where higher-taxed chemicals and packing materials cause the accumulation, refund cannot be denied because one input shares the output’s rate or HSN. Computation had been period-specific under Rule 89(5), and the verification objections had already been examined by both lower authorities and were not rebutted by any evidence. Revenue’s appeals were dismissed. | ||||
| 16 | Shree Hanumant Steel Traders & Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner, Circle-5, Division-1, | 09-09-2026 | Challenge to notices issued under Section 74(9) of the GST Act, 2017, alleging availment of input tax credit through fake invoices without actual supply of goods. | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioners challenged the respective notices issued by the respondent authority under Section 74(9) of the GST Act, 2017, dated 16.10.2025. The notices related to allegations that input tax credit had been availed by issuing fake invoices without actual supply of goods. The petitioners contended that the notices did not contain the foundational facts necessary to support the allegations of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression.The respondent authority opposed the petitions, submitting that the notices had appropriately set out the foundational facts and that the petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy of filing appeals under Section 107 of the GST Act.Court ObservationThe Court, on careful perusal of the impugned notices, found that the authority failed to assign sufficient reasons while issuing the notices under Section 74(9).Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Tata Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court observed that where an extended limitation period is invoked on allegations of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression, the foundational facts leading to such inference must be evident from the notice itself. Mere use or mechanical recitation of these expressions does not demonstrate application of mind or justify recovery beyond the normal limitation period.Final VerdictThe High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 74(9) dated 16.10.2025 were unsustainable and accordingly quashed the respective notices. The writ petitions were therefore allowed.The Court, however, granted liberty to the respondent authority to issue fresh notices strictly in accordance with law, if so advised.Case Referred by CourtTata Steels Ltd. v. Union of India — Supreme Court of India — 2026 | ||||
| Shree Hanumant Steel Traders & Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner, Circle-5, Division-1, 09-09-2026 Challenge to notices issued under Section 74(9) of the GST Act, 2017, alleging availment of input tax credit through fake invoices without actual supply of goods.BackgroundThe petitioners challenged the respective notices issued by the respondent authority under Section 74(9) of the GST Act, 2017, dated 16.10.2025. The notices related to allegations that input tax credit had been availed by issuing fake invoices without actual supply of goods. The petitioners contended that the notices did not contain the foundational facts necessary to support the allegations of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression.The respondent authority opposed the petitions, submitting that the notices had appropriately set out the foundational facts and that the petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy of filing appeals under Section 107 of the GST Act.Court ObservationThe Court, on careful perusal of the impugned notices, found that the authority failed to assign sufficient reasons while issuing the notices under Section 74(9).Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Tata Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court observed that where an extended limitation period is invoked on allegations of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression, the foundational facts leading to such inference must be evident from the notice itself. Mere use or mechanical recitation of these expressions does not demonstrate application of mind or justify recovery beyond the normal limitation period.Final VerdictThe High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 74(9) dated 16.10.2025 were unsustainable and accordingly quashed the respective notices. The writ petitions were therefore allowed.The Court, however, granted liberty to the respondent authority to issue fresh notices strictly in accordance with law, if so advised.Case Referred by CourtTata Steels Ltd. v. Union of India — Supreme Court of India — 2026 | ||||
| 17 | ROHIT GARG & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. | 07-09-2026 | Validity of proceedings and penalties under Section 122 of the CGST Act, including officer competence and natural justice. Applicability of Sections 122(1), 122(1A), 122(3)(a), amended Section 107(6), and writ jurisdiction under Article 226. | View Download |
BackgroundThe proceedings arose from a GST investigation concerning allegations of issuance of invoices without actual supply of goods, wrongful availment or passing on of Input Tax Credit and allied contraventions under the CGST Act. The investigation involved search proceedings and reliance by the Department on statements, electronic material and handwritten records. The Petitioners disputed the allegations and contended that the material relied upon did not independently establish their involvement in the alleged transactions.SCNs were issued under Section 122 proposing penalties under various provisions of Section 122. The Petitioners challenged the consequential adjudication orders on several grounds, including lack of jurisdiction of the officer issuing the SCNs, non-supply of relied-upon documents, denial of effective personal hearing and cross-examination, reliance on untested statements/electronic material, multiplication of penalties under different clauses of Section 122(1), and alleged inconsistencies in findings arising from the same investigation.Court ObservationThe Court held that Section 122(1) predicates liability upon a person being a “taxable person”, whereas Section 122(1A) is differently worded and operates upon “any person” in the specified circumstances. However, whether a particular person satisfies the statutory description and the precise role attributed to that person are intertwined with the factual material. The Court therefore left the question of applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a taxable person open, as the issue is pending before the Supreme Court.Regarding the competence of the officer issuing the SCN, the Court observed that the expression “proper officer” under Section 2(91) is function-specific and that merely being an officer of central tax does not automatically make an officer the proper officer for every statutory function. At the same time, the Court noted that Notification Nos. 02/2017 and 14/2017 had to be considered along with Sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act.The Court was unable to hold that absence of a specific assignment under Section 2(91), by itself, rendered the concerned central tax officer legally without authority. Notification No.14/2017 invested DGGI officers with powers corresponding to officers of the relevant rank, while Notification No.02/2017 assigned specified functions. Therefore, the question of competence could not be determined merely by relying upon the subsequent Circular dated 27.10.2025.The Court further observed that the objection regarding officer competence was not a patent or self-evident absence of jurisdiction warranting interference under Article 226. It involved interpretation of the statutory scheme, notifications, the subsequent Circular and the relationship between proceedings under Sections 73/74 and consequential penalties under Section 122. These issues could be examined by the statutory Appellate Authority under Section 107.The Court also found that the remaining challenges—relating to replies, relied-upon documents, personal hearing, cross-examination, evidentiary material, multiplication of penalties, clubbing of financial years and alleged inconsistent findings—required detailed examination of the underlying record and factual position of the respective noticees.Importantly, the Court held that the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6), effective from 01.10.2025, would not apply to appeals arising from SCNs issued before that date. Such appeals would be governed by Section 107(6) as it stood on the date on which the respective adjudicatory proceedings commenced.Final VerdictThe High Court disposed of the writ petitions on the ground that an efficacious statutory remedy was available under Section 107 of the CGST Act. The Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and permitted the Petitioners to pursue statutory appeals. The Appellate Authority was directed to examine all grounds, including the issues left open by the judgment, independently and uninfluenced by the observations made by the High Court.The Court specifically directed that appeals arising from SCNs issued before 01.10.2025 would be governed by the Section 107(6) pre-deposit provision applicable on the respective dates of issuance of the SCNs and could not be rejected merely because the Orders-in-Original were passed after 01.10.2025. The Petitioners were also permitted to seek exclusion of the period during which the writ petitions remained pending for limitation purposes.Cases Referred by CourtGaurav Jain & Anr. v. Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II), CGST Delhi Zone & Anr. — 2026:DHC:6124-DB.Considered on the applicability of the amended Section 107(6) pre-deposit requirement.Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. — SLP(C) No.18178/2025.The issue concerning applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a “taxable person” was pending before the Supreme Court.Arun Kumar Jain v. Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi West & Ors. — 2026:DHC:6609-DB.Considered regarding applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a taxable person.Devender Singh v. Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi West — 2025:DHC:9881-DB.Considered on the competence of the Additional Commissioner/officer to issue SCNs under Section 122.Sunil Chauhan, Proprietor of Shree Chem India v. Principal Commissioner of CGST, Delhi North & Ors. — 2026:DHC:5477-DB.Considered regarding the relationship between proceedings under Sections 73/74 and consequential penalties under Section 122.Alokadei Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax — W.P. No.4426/2026.Considered on the competence of the officer and the relationship between the statutory adjudication and Section 122 penalty proceedings.Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. — [2025] 99 GSTL 7 (Allahabad).Considered on whether consequential Section 122 penalty forms part of the adjudicatory exercise under Sections 73/74; the Court noted that the decision was under challenge before the Supreme Court.Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. v. Commercial Steel Limited — (2022) 16 SCC 447.Referred to on the principles governing exercise of writ jurisdiction where an alternative statutory remedy exists.Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. — 1953 SCC OnLine SC 33.Referred to in the context of the contention concerning the substantive/vested nature of the right of appeal and the applicable pre-deposit requirement.Amit Manilal Haria & Ors. v. Joint Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise & Ors. — W.P. No.5001/2025 (Bombay High Court).Referred to concerning the contention against retrospective application of Section 122(1A).Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors. — SLP(Crl.) No.3543/2020.Referred to in relation to the safeguards concerning statements recorded under Section 70 of the CGST Act. | ||||
| ROHIT GARG & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 07-09-2026 Validity of proceedings and penalties under Section 122 of the CGST Act, including officer competence and natural justice. Applicability of Sections 122(1), 122(1A), 122(3)(a), amended Section 107(6), and writ jurisdiction under Article 226.BackgroundThe proceedings arose from a GST investigation concerning allegations of issuance of invoices without actual supply of goods, wrongful availment or passing on of Input Tax Credit and allied contraventions under the CGST Act. The investigation involved search proceedings and reliance by the Department on statements, electronic material and handwritten records. The Petitioners disputed the allegations and contended that the material relied upon did not independently establish their involvement in the alleged transactions.SCNs were issued under Section 122 proposing penalties under various provisions of Section 122. The Petitioners challenged the consequential adjudication orders on several grounds, including lack of jurisdiction of the officer issuing the SCNs, non-supply of relied-upon documents, denial of effective personal hearing and cross-examination, reliance on untested statements/electronic material, multiplication of penalties under different clauses of Section 122(1), and alleged inconsistencies in findings arising from the same investigation.Court ObservationThe Court held that Section 122(1) predicates liability upon a person being a “taxable person”, whereas Section 122(1A) is differently worded and operates upon “any person” in the specified circumstances. However, whether a particular person satisfies the statutory description and the precise role attributed to that person are intertwined with the factual material. The Court therefore left the question of applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a taxable person open, as the issue is pending before the Supreme Court.Regarding the competence of the officer issuing the SCN, the Court observed that the expression “proper officer” under Section 2(91) is function-specific and that merely being an officer of central tax does not automatically make an officer the proper officer for every statutory function. At the same time, the Court noted that Notification Nos. 02/2017 and 14/2017 had to be considered along with Sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act.The Court was unable to hold that absence of a specific assignment under Section 2(91), by itself, rendered the concerned central tax officer legally without authority. Notification No.14/2017 invested DGGI officers with powers corresponding to officers of the relevant rank, while Notification No.02/2017 assigned specified functions. Therefore, the question of competence could not be determined merely by relying upon the subsequent Circular dated 27.10.2025.The Court further observed that the objection regarding officer competence was not a patent or self-evident absence of jurisdiction warranting interference under Article 226. It involved interpretation of the statutory scheme, notifications, the subsequent Circular and the relationship between proceedings under Sections 73/74 and consequential penalties under Section 122. These issues could be examined by the statutory Appellate Authority under Section 107.The Court also found that the remaining challenges—relating to replies, relied-upon documents, personal hearing, cross-examination, evidentiary material, multiplication of penalties, clubbing of financial years and alleged inconsistent findings—required detailed examination of the underlying record and factual position of the respective noticees.Importantly, the Court held that the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6), effective from 01.10.2025, would not apply to appeals arising from SCNs issued before that date. Such appeals would be governed by Section 107(6) as it stood on the date on which the respective adjudicatory proceedings commenced.Final VerdictThe High Court disposed of the writ petitions on the ground that an efficacious statutory remedy was available under Section 107 of the CGST Act. The Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and permitted the Petitioners to pursue statutory appeals. The Appellate Authority was directed to examine all grounds, including the issues left open by the judgment, independently and uninfluenced by the observations made by the High Court.The Court specifically directed that appeals arising from SCNs issued before 01.10.2025 would be governed by the Section 107(6) pre-deposit provision applicable on the respective dates of issuance of the SCNs and could not be rejected merely because the Orders-in-Original were passed after 01.10.2025. The Petitioners were also permitted to seek exclusion of the period during which the writ petitions remained pending for limitation purposes.Cases Referred by CourtGaurav Jain & Anr. v. Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II), CGST Delhi Zone & Anr. — 2026:DHC:6124-DB.Considered on the applicability of the amended Section 107(6) pre-deposit requirement.Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. — SLP(C) No.18178/2025.The issue concerning applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a “taxable person” was pending before the Supreme Court.Arun Kumar Jain v. Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi West & Ors. — 2026:DHC:6609-DB.Considered regarding applicability of Section 122(1) to a person who is not a taxable person.Devender Singh v. Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi West — 2025:DHC:9881-DB.Considered on the competence of the Additional Commissioner/officer to issue SCNs under Section 122.Sunil Chauhan, Proprietor of Shree Chem India v. Principal Commissioner of CGST, Delhi North & Ors. — 2026:DHC:5477-DB.Considered regarding the relationship between proceedings under Sections 73/74 and consequential penalties under Section 122.Alokadei Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Tax — W.P. No.4426/2026.Considered on the competence of the officer and the relationship between the statutory adjudication and Section 122 penalty proceedings.Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. — [2025] 99 GSTL 7 (Allahabad).Considered on whether consequential Section 122 penalty forms part of the adjudicatory exercise under Sections 73/74; the Court noted that the decision was under challenge before the Supreme Court.Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. v. Commercial Steel Limited — (2022) 16 SCC 447.Referred to on the principles governing exercise of writ jurisdiction where an alternative statutory remedy exists.Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. — 1953 SCC OnLine SC 33.Referred to in the context of the contention concerning the substantive/vested nature of the right of appeal and the applicable pre-deposit requirement.Amit Manilal Haria & Ors. v. Joint Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise & Ors. — W.P. No.5001/2025 (Bombay High Court).Referred to concerning the contention against retrospective application of Section 122(1A).Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors. — SLP(Crl.) No.3543/2020.Referred to in relation to the safeguards concerning statements recorded under Section 70 of the CGST Act. | ||||
| 18 | Union of India & Anr. v. Vodafone Idea Limited | 07-09-2026 | The matter was a Special Leave Petition (Civil), Diary No. 47708/2026, filed by the Union of India against the final judgment and order dated 29 April 2026 passed by the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 6637/2025. | View Download |
BackgroundThe Union of India filed the present Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the judgment and order dated 29 April 2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. No. 6637/2025. The record identifies the Union of India and another as petitioners and Vodafone Idea Limited as the respondent.The matter was placed before the Supreme Court on 07 September 2026. An application for condonation of delay in filing the SLP was also before the Court. After hearing the counsel appearing for both sides and examining the materials available on record, the Supreme Court considered whether the impugned order of the High Court called for interference.Court ObservationAfter hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the materials on record, the Supreme Court expressly recorded that it was “not inclined to interfere” with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Court therefore declined to exercise its jurisdiction to interfere with the Bombay High Court's order.The order does not record any detailed discussion on the underlying GST dispute or the reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court's recorded consideration is limited to hearing the parties, examining the materials on record, and deciding not to interfere with the impugned order.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court first condoned the delay in filing the Special Leave Petition. Thereafter, having heard the parties and examined the material on record, it declined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Bombay High Court.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The Court further directed that the pending application(s), if any, would stand disposed of. | ||||
| Union of India & Anr. v. Vodafone Idea Limited 07-09-2026 The matter was a Special Leave Petition (Civil), Diary No. 47708/2026, filed by the Union of India against the final judgment and order dated 29 April 2026 passed by the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 6637/2025.BackgroundThe Union of India filed the present Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the judgment and order dated 29 April 2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. No. 6637/2025. The record identifies the Union of India and another as petitioners and Vodafone Idea Limited as the respondent.The matter was placed before the Supreme Court on 07 September 2026. An application for condonation of delay in filing the SLP was also before the Court. After hearing the counsel appearing for both sides and examining the materials available on record, the Supreme Court considered whether the impugned order of the High Court called for interference.Court ObservationAfter hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the materials on record, the Supreme Court expressly recorded that it was “not inclined to interfere” with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Court therefore declined to exercise its jurisdiction to interfere with the Bombay High Court's order.The order does not record any detailed discussion on the underlying GST dispute or the reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court's recorded consideration is limited to hearing the parties, examining the materials on record, and deciding not to interfere with the impugned order.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court first condoned the delay in filing the Special Leave Petition. Thereafter, having heard the parties and examined the material on record, it declined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Bombay High Court.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The Court further directed that the pending application(s), if any, would stand disposed of. | ||||
| 19 | Abdul Majid & Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Anr. | 05-09-2026 | Anticipatory Bail in Proceedings under Section 70 CGST Act — Arrest and Custodial Interrogation under Sections 69 & 132 | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioners were proprietors of registered firms dealing in steel and scrap materials. They had purchased aluminium scrap from certain supplier firms. The authorities subsequently conducted raids at the premises of the suppliers and arrested their proprietors. Thereafter, summons were issued to the petitioners under Section 70 of the CGST Act, requiring them to appear and produce supporting documents concerning the purchases. The petitioners apprehended arrest and approached the Court after their applications for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court were dismissed.The prosecution alleged that the suppliers had issued concocted invoices without actual supply of goods and that the petitioners had availed ITC on the basis of such invoices, with the tax amounts allegedly being encashed through hawala transactions. The petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that they had paid the invoice value and GST through banking transactions, had periodically filed their returns and were willing to produce documents such as e-way bills, transport records, weighbridge receipts and stock/sale records to establish actual receipt of goods.Court ObservationThe Court observed that ITC cannot ordinarily be denied to a purchaser merely because the supplier's registration is subsequently cancelled or the supplier ceases to exist after the transaction. Where the supplier was registered and active at the time of the transaction, the purchaser had paid the invoice value and GST through banking channels and had filed returns, recovery would ordinarily be against the defaulting supplier unless fraud and collusion are proved or exceptional circumstances exist.The Court further held that actual receipt of goods can be established through documentary evidence such as e-way bills, transport vehicle receipts, weighbridge receipts and stock and sale records. In a genuine transaction, where the purchaser has paid the invoice value and GST and regularly filed returns, custodial interrogation would normally not be necessary merely to verify receipt of goods, unless there is prima facie material showing collusion with the supplier.The Court emphasised that arrest under Section 69 read with Section 132 cannot be based merely on suspicion. The Commissioner must have a belief supported by material and evidence satisfying the statutory conditions. The Court also noted that, for the purpose of Section 132, the supplier is the principal offender in the circumstances considered in the case.The Court also considered the petitioners' cooperation, absence of similar antecedents, payment through banking channels and undertaking to produce documents. It relied upon the principle that where an accused has joined investigation, is cooperating and is not likely to abscond, custodial interrogation should be avoided.Final VerdictThe High Court allowed all three petitions and granted anticipatory bail. The respondents/authorities were directed to release the petitioners in the event of their arrest in connection with the proceedings under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act, subject to specified conditions.The petitioners were directed to appear before the authorities on 10.08.2026 and could be taken into custody for interrogation if necessary, but were to be released on the same day after interrogation, subject to execution of a ₹5 lakh personal bond with two sureties of the like amount. They were also required to cooperate with the investigation, avoid influencing witnesses, keep their mobile numbers operational, provide their location through Google Maps, surrender their passports and not leave India without permission.Cases Referred by the CourtCaseCourt Radhika Agarwal v. Union of IndiaSupreme Court of India Akram Pasha v. Senior Intelligence Officer, DGGIHigh Court of Karnataka Tarun Jain v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI)High Court of Delhi Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.Supreme Court of India Shailesh Rajpal v. CommissionerHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh GST Intelligence Directorate v. Chaman GoelHigh Court of Delhi The Court distinguished Shailesh Rajpal and Chaman Goel because those cases involved different factual circumstances concerning the suppliers and tax/ITC allegations, whereas the present case concerned purchasers who claimed payment of invoice value and GST through banking channels and were willing to establish actual receipt of goods.The Court particularly relied upon Radhika Agarwal, Akram Pasha, Tarun Jain and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre while assessing the legality and necessity of arrest/custodial interrogation. | ||||
| Abdul Majid & Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Anr. 05-09-2026 Anticipatory Bail in Proceedings under Section 70 CGST Act — Arrest and Custodial Interrogation under Sections 69 & 132BackgroundThe petitioners were proprietors of registered firms dealing in steel and scrap materials. They had purchased aluminium scrap from certain supplier firms. The authorities subsequently conducted raids at the premises of the suppliers and arrested their proprietors. Thereafter, summons were issued to the petitioners under Section 70 of the CGST Act, requiring them to appear and produce supporting documents concerning the purchases. The petitioners apprehended arrest and approached the Court after their applications for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court were dismissed.The prosecution alleged that the suppliers had issued concocted invoices without actual supply of goods and that the petitioners had availed ITC on the basis of such invoices, with the tax amounts allegedly being encashed through hawala transactions. The petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that they had paid the invoice value and GST through banking transactions, had periodically filed their returns and were willing to produce documents such as e-way bills, transport records, weighbridge receipts and stock/sale records to establish actual receipt of goods.Court ObservationThe Court observed that ITC cannot ordinarily be denied to a purchaser merely because the supplier's registration is subsequently cancelled or the supplier ceases to exist after the transaction. Where the supplier was registered and active at the time of the transaction, the purchaser had paid the invoice value and GST through banking channels and had filed returns, recovery would ordinarily be against the defaulting supplier unless fraud and collusion are proved or exceptional circumstances exist.The Court further held that actual receipt of goods can be established through documentary evidence such as e-way bills, transport vehicle receipts, weighbridge receipts and stock and sale records. In a genuine transaction, where the purchaser has paid the invoice value and GST and regularly filed returns, custodial interrogation would normally not be necessary merely to verify receipt of goods, unless there is prima facie material showing collusion with the supplier.The Court emphasised that arrest under Section 69 read with Section 132 cannot be based merely on suspicion. The Commissioner must have a belief supported by material and evidence satisfying the statutory conditions. The Court also noted that, for the purpose of Section 132, the supplier is the principal offender in the circumstances considered in the case.The Court also considered the petitioners' cooperation, absence of similar antecedents, payment through banking channels and undertaking to produce documents. It relied upon the principle that where an accused has joined investigation, is cooperating and is not likely to abscond, custodial interrogation should be avoided.Final VerdictThe High Court allowed all three petitions and granted anticipatory bail. The respondents/authorities were directed to release the petitioners in the event of their arrest in connection with the proceedings under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act, subject to specified conditions.The petitioners were directed to appear before the authorities on 10.08.2026 and could be taken into custody for interrogation if necessary, but were to be released on the same day after interrogation, subject to execution of a ₹5 lakh personal bond with two sureties of the like amount. They were also required to cooperate with the investigation, avoid influencing witnesses, keep their mobile numbers operational, provide their location through Google Maps, surrender their passports and not leave India without permission.Cases Referred by the CourtCaseCourt Radhika Agarwal v. Union of IndiaSupreme Court of India Akram Pasha v. Senior Intelligence Officer, DGGIHigh Court of Karnataka Tarun Jain v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI)High Court of Delhi Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.Supreme Court of India Shailesh Rajpal v. CommissionerHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh GST Intelligence Directorate v. Chaman GoelHigh Court of Delhi The Court distinguished Shailesh Rajpal and Chaman Goel because those cases involved different factual circumstances concerning the suppliers and tax/ITC allegations, whereas the present case concerned purchasers who claimed payment of invoice value and GST through banking channels and were willing to establish actual receipt of goods.The Court particularly relied upon Radhika Agarwal, Akram Pasha, Tarun Jain and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre while assessing the legality and necessity of arrest/custodial interrogation. | ||||
| 20 | Andaman Timber Industries vs Commissioner of Central Excise | 02-09-2026 | Whether the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were recorded during investigation and solely relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority while passing an excise duty demand order constitutes a serious violation of the principles | View Download |
BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs. | ||||
| Andaman Timber Industries vs Commissioner of Central Excise 02-09-2026 Whether the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were recorded during investigation and solely relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority while passing an excise duty demand order constitutes a serious violation of the principlesBackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs. | ||||