BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer had exported goods and claimed refund of accumulated ITC. The original authority rejected the refund claims on alleged deficiencies, while the First Appellate Authority allowed the refund claims and set aside the original orders. The Revenue challenged the appellate orders before the Tribunal.The Revenue relied, inter alia, upon alleged absence of toll-plaza movement in the State from which the goods were stated to have been dispatched and alleged cancellation of registrations of suppliers further up the supply chain. The goods, however, had been received at the ship-to location and subsequently exported.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal observed that the goods were transported under the Bill-to-Ship-to model and the documents produced included e-way bills, bilty copies, shipping bills, EGM details, transporter certificate and banking records. The Tribunal found that these documents substantiated the movement and subsequent export and that the Revenue had not disputed them. The conditions under Section 16(2) were therefore satisfied.The Tribunal held that toll-plaza receipts are not mandatory documents for establishing transportation of goods or for availing ITC. It also held that the taxpayer could not be denied refund merely because of irregularities relating to a second-line supplier with whom it had no direct transaction.The Tribunal further held that the additional grounds raised by the Revenue for the first time before the Tribunal could not be considered as additional evidence in the absence of the documents/investigation material required under Rule 45(1) of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 and Rule 112(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal dismissed both Revenue appeals and upheld the impugned appellate orders allowing the refund claims.CASE REFERRED BY COURTRaghuvansh Agro Farms Ltd. v. State of U.P. — Allahabad High Court — 17.12.2025.
PR. COMMISSIONER, CGST & CX, SILIGURI COMMISSIONERATE v. AGARWALA’S BITUMEX PRIVATE LIMITED 08-08-2026
BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer had exported goods and claimed refund of accumulated ITC. The original authority rejected the refund claims on alleged deficiencies, while the First Appellate Authority allowed the refund claims and set aside the original orders. The Revenue challenged the appellate orders before the Tribunal.The Revenue relied, inter alia, upon alleged absence of toll-plaza movement in the State from which the goods were stated to have been dispatched and alleged cancellation of registrations of suppliers further up the supply chain. The goods, however, had been received at the ship-to location and subsequently exported.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal observed that the goods were transported under the Bill-to-Ship-to model and the documents produced included e-way bills, bilty copies, shipping bills, EGM details, transporter certificate and banking records. The Tribunal found that these documents substantiated the movement and subsequent export and that the Revenue had not disputed them. The conditions under Section 16(2) were therefore satisfied.The Tribunal held that toll-plaza receipts are not mandatory documents for establishing transportation of goods or for availing ITC. It also held that the taxpayer could not be denied refund merely because of irregularities relating to a second-line supplier with whom it had no direct transaction.The Tribunal further held that the additional grounds raised by the Revenue for the first time before the Tribunal could not be considered as additional evidence in the absence of the documents/investigation material required under Rule 45(1) of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 and Rule 112(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal dismissed both Revenue appeals and upheld the impugned appellate orders allowing the refund claims.CASE REFERRED BY COURTRaghuvansh Agro Farms Ltd. v. State of U.P. — Allahabad High Court — 17.12.2025.
BACKGROUNDThe adjudicating authority directed reversal of proportionate ITC attributable to exempt supplies for the financial years 2017-18 to 2019-20 and imposed interest and an equivalent penalty under Section 74. The First Appellate Authority subsequently allowed the taxpayer's appeal by applying the 2022 amendment to Rule 43 retrospectively.The Revenue challenged the retrospective application of the amendment and the dropping of the demand. The Tribunal therefore considered the monetary-limit objection, the temporal operation of the 2022 amendment and the validity of the Section 74 proceedings.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal held that the amendment to Rule 43 was specifically brought into force from 05.07.2022. Although Section 164(3) empowered retrospective rulemaking, the rule-making authority chose to make the amendment prospective. The First Appellate Authority therefore erred in applying it retrospectively to transactions of 2017-2020.On Section 74, the Tribunal held that the Revenue had failed to bring material establishing a deliberate intention to evade tax. The Tribunal relied upon the strict meaning of “suppression of facts” and concluded that the Section 74(1) notice was not sustainable.Consequently, under Section 75(2), the proper officer was directed to determine the tax liability as if the notice had been issued under Section 73.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority was incorrect in giving retrospective effect to the 2022 amendment to Rule 43. However, since the invocation of Section 74 was not sustainable for want of established fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, the matter was directed to be dealt with under Section 75(2) as a Section 73 proceeding.CASE REFERRED BY COURTSedco Forex International Drill Inc. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Dehradun — Supreme CourtHitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra — Supreme CourtSuchitra Components Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur — Supreme CourtAllied Motors (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax — Supreme Court.Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v. Dr. Manu — Supreme Court.Pushpam Pharmaceutical Company v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay — Supreme Court.Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. — Supreme Court.
THE COMMISSIONER, CGST & CX, KOLKATA NORTH COMMISSIONERATE v. POWER TECH GLOBAL PRIVATE LIMITED 05-08-2026
BACKGROUNDThe adjudicating authority directed reversal of proportionate ITC attributable to exempt supplies for the financial years 2017-18 to 2019-20 and imposed interest and an equivalent penalty under Section 74. The First Appellate Authority subsequently allowed the taxpayer's appeal by applying the 2022 amendment to Rule 43 retrospectively.The Revenue challenged the retrospective application of the amendment and the dropping of the demand. The Tribunal therefore considered the monetary-limit objection, the temporal operation of the 2022 amendment and the validity of the Section 74 proceedings.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal held that the amendment to Rule 43 was specifically brought into force from 05.07.2022. Although Section 164(3) empowered retrospective rulemaking, the rule-making authority chose to make the amendment prospective. The First Appellate Authority therefore erred in applying it retrospectively to transactions of 2017-2020.On Section 74, the Tribunal held that the Revenue had failed to bring material establishing a deliberate intention to evade tax. The Tribunal relied upon the strict meaning of “suppression of facts” and concluded that the Section 74(1) notice was not sustainable.Consequently, under Section 75(2), the proper officer was directed to determine the tax liability as if the notice had been issued under Section 73.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority was incorrect in giving retrospective effect to the 2022 amendment to Rule 43. However, since the invocation of Section 74 was not sustainable for want of established fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, the matter was directed to be dealt with under Section 75(2) as a Section 73 proceeding.CASE REFERRED BY COURTSedco Forex International Drill Inc. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Dehradun — Supreme CourtHitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra — Supreme CourtSuchitra Components Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur — Supreme CourtAllied Motors (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax — Supreme Court.Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v. Dr. Manu — Supreme Court.Pushpam Pharmaceutical Company v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay — Supreme Court.Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. — Supreme Court.
BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer transitioned credit from the pre-GST regime into GST under Section 140. The credit had been reflected in the pre-GST returns and had not been disputed under the erstwhile regime. The Department subsequently issued proceedings challenging the eligibility of the transitioned credit.The lower authorities confirmed recovery of the disputed transitional credit along with interest and penalty. The taxpayer challenged the denial, contending that credit validly existing under the erstwhile law could not be denied merely because it had transitioned into GST.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal examined the legal effect of transition from the pre-GST regime and held that the transitional credit could not be denied merely by raising objections that had not been raised under the erstwhile regime. In respect of Krishi Kalyan Cess, the Tribunal relied upon the existing legal position and held that its transition was in order.The Tribunal also held that the VAT credit transitioned under Section 140(6) could not be denied in the absence of a specific contrary finding or evidence. Other objections such as invoice description/address issues were also found insufficient where such objections had not been raised at the relevant stage.The Tribunal further found invocation of Section 74 and the 100% penalty wholly unjustified, since the proceedings arose from disclosures made through TRAN-1 and subsequent submissions rather than concealment.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that the transitional ITC was eligible, set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.CASE REFERRED BY COURTGodrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. — Bombay High Court .Usha Martin Limited — High Court — order dated 10.11.2022. Kunjal Synergies Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of CGST & CEX — Calcutta High Court.Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand — Jharkhand High Court.
TATA UNISTORE LIMITED v. COMMISSIONER, CGST & CENTRAL EXCISE, NAVI MUMBAI COMMISSIONERATE 31-07-2026
BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer transitioned credit from the pre-GST regime into GST under Section 140. The credit had been reflected in the pre-GST returns and had not been disputed under the erstwhile regime. The Department subsequently issued proceedings challenging the eligibility of the transitioned credit.The lower authorities confirmed recovery of the disputed transitional credit along with interest and penalty. The taxpayer challenged the denial, contending that credit validly existing under the erstwhile law could not be denied merely because it had transitioned into GST.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal examined the legal effect of transition from the pre-GST regime and held that the transitional credit could not be denied merely by raising objections that had not been raised under the erstwhile regime. In respect of Krishi Kalyan Cess, the Tribunal relied upon the existing legal position and held that its transition was in order.The Tribunal also held that the VAT credit transitioned under Section 140(6) could not be denied in the absence of a specific contrary finding or evidence. Other objections such as invoice description/address issues were also found insufficient where such objections had not been raised at the relevant stage.The Tribunal further found invocation of Section 74 and the 100% penalty wholly unjustified, since the proceedings arose from disclosures made through TRAN-1 and subsequent submissions rather than concealment.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that the transitional ITC was eligible, set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.CASE REFERRED BY COURTGodrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. — Bombay High Court .Usha Martin Limited — High Court — order dated 10.11.2022. Kunjal Synergies Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of CGST & CEX — Calcutta High Court.Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand — Jharkhand High Court.
BackgroundThe batch of writ petitions arose from appeals that had been rejected as time-barred after the respective taxpayers had first pursued rectification proceedings under Section 161. The petitioners contended that they had bona fide pursued the rectification remedy and that the period spent in those proceedings should be excluded while computing the three-month limitation under Section 107. The Revenue opposed this, arguing that GST is a self-contained code, that limitation under Section 107 begins from communication of the original order, and that filing a rectification petition does not stop or suspend the limitation period.In the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the rectification petition was primarily based on the non-consideration of credit notes that had been submitted before the order-in-original. The petitioner had also relied upon the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in SPK and Co. while pursuing the matter. On examination, the Court found that there was a genuine basis for pursuing rectification and that the requirements of good faith and due diligence were satisfied.Court ObservationThe Limitation Act, as such, does not apply to quasi-judicial authorities, including GST appellate authorities. However, the principles underlying Section 14 can apply to GST appellate proceedings.GST legislation does not expressly or impliedly exclude the principles underlying Section 14. The fact that Section 107 permits condonation only for a further period of one month does not mean that Section 14's principle of exclusion of time is also excluded.A rectification petition rejected because there is “no error apparent” can, in an appropriate case, constitute a bona fide mistaken remedy falling within “other cause of a like nature” under the principles of Section 14. Such rejection is not necessarily a full-fledged adjudication of the larger dispute.However, exclusion is not automatic merely because a rectification petition was filed. The proceedings must concern the same matter and parties, and the earlier proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and in good faith. Good faith requires the Court to broadly examine whether there was some basis for filing the rectification petition, so that the provision is not abused merely to extend the appeal period.Where the requirements are satisfied, the entire period from filing of the rectification petition until its rejection is liable to be excluded. Thus, the taxpayer gets the prescribed three-month appeal period after such exclusion, subject to the further one-month period available under Section 107(4).The Court clarified that limitation under Section 107 ordinarily starts from communication of the specific order being appealed against. Therefore, an appeal against the original order runs from communication of that original order; filing rectification does not itself replace that starting point.Final VerdictIn the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the Court held that the petitioner had established good faith and due diligence because the rectification petition concerned non-consideration of credit notes submitted before the original order. Accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to exclusion of the time spent in the rectification proceedings.The Court ultimately set aside the impugned appellate order and directed the appellate authority to receive and dispose of the appeal on merits. W.P. No.2629 of 2026 was specifically included among the seven writ petitions allowed for this purpose.Case Referred by CourtThe Court considered, among others, the following authorities in arriving at its conclusions:M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central ExciseConsolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal SecretaryCCE v. Hongo India (P) Ltd..Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Parson Tools and Plants.
BackgroundThe batch of writ petitions arose from appeals that had been rejected as time-barred after the respective taxpayers had first pursued rectification proceedings under Section 161. The petitioners contended that they had bona fide pursued the rectification remedy and that the period spent in those proceedings should be excluded while computing the three-month limitation under Section 107. The Revenue opposed this, arguing that GST is a self-contained code, that limitation under Section 107 begins from communication of the original order, and that filing a rectification petition does not stop or suspend the limitation period.In the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the rectification petition was primarily based on the non-consideration of credit notes that had been submitted before the order-in-original. The petitioner had also relied upon the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in SPK and Co. while pursuing the matter. On examination, the Court found that there was a genuine basis for pursuing rectification and that the requirements of good faith and due diligence were satisfied.Court ObservationThe Limitation Act, as such, does not apply to quasi-judicial authorities, including GST appellate authorities. However, the principles underlying Section 14 can apply to GST appellate proceedings.GST legislation does not expressly or impliedly exclude the principles underlying Section 14. The fact that Section 107 permits condonation only for a further period of one month does not mean that Section 14's principle of exclusion of time is also excluded.A rectification petition rejected because there is “no error apparent” can, in an appropriate case, constitute a bona fide mistaken remedy falling within “other cause of a like nature” under the principles of Section 14. Such rejection is not necessarily a full-fledged adjudication of the larger dispute.However, exclusion is not automatic merely because a rectification petition was filed. The proceedings must concern the same matter and parties, and the earlier proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and in good faith. Good faith requires the Court to broadly examine whether there was some basis for filing the rectification petition, so that the provision is not abused merely to extend the appeal period.Where the requirements are satisfied, the entire period from filing of the rectification petition until its rejection is liable to be excluded. Thus, the taxpayer gets the prescribed three-month appeal period after such exclusion, subject to the further one-month period available under Section 107(4).The Court clarified that limitation under Section 107 ordinarily starts from communication of the specific order being appealed against. Therefore, an appeal against the original order runs from communication of that original order; filing rectification does not itself replace that starting point.Final VerdictIn the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the Court held that the petitioner had established good faith and due diligence because the rectification petition concerned non-consideration of credit notes submitted before the original order. Accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to exclusion of the time spent in the rectification proceedings.The Court ultimately set aside the impugned appellate order and directed the appellate authority to receive and dispose of the appeal on merits. W.P. No.2629 of 2026 was specifically included among the seven writ petitions allowed for this purpose.Case Referred by CourtThe Court considered, among others, the following authorities in arriving at its conclusions:M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central ExciseConsolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal SecretaryCCE v. Hongo India (P) Ltd..Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Parson Tools and Plants.
BACKGROUNDThe appeal arose from an order imposing penalties under Sections 122 and 125 read with Section 20 of the IGST Act. The Registry raised the issue of statutory pre-deposit for admission of the appeal.The SCN, original adjudication order and appellate order had all been issued before 01.10.2025, when the Finance Act, 2025 amendment introducing the additional pre-deposit for penalty-only orders came into force.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal noted that the amended proviso to Section 112(8) became effective only from 01.10.2025 and did not indicate retrospective application. Since the impugned appellate order was issued before the amendment, the Tribunal held that the amended pre-deposit condition could not be imposed on the appeal.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that no pre-deposit was required under Section 112 for the present appeal. It clarified that the order would not prejudice the merits and that, if at the final hearing the Tribunal concluded that the amended pre-deposit provision was applicable, the appellant would have to comply with that requirement. Notice was issued and the matter was directed to be listed after four weeks.CASE REFERRED BY COURTBarjinder Singh Kohli v. Assistant Commissioner & Others — Calcutta High Court — 03.11.2025. The Tribunal held that the decision squarely covered the issue of pre-deposit in a penalty-only matter where the proceedings commenced before 01.10.2025.
BACKGROUNDThe appeal arose from an order imposing penalties under Sections 122 and 125 read with Section 20 of the IGST Act. The Registry raised the issue of statutory pre-deposit for admission of the appeal.The SCN, original adjudication order and appellate order had all been issued before 01.10.2025, when the Finance Act, 2025 amendment introducing the additional pre-deposit for penalty-only orders came into force.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal noted that the amended proviso to Section 112(8) became effective only from 01.10.2025 and did not indicate retrospective application. Since the impugned appellate order was issued before the amendment, the Tribunal held that the amended pre-deposit condition could not be imposed on the appeal.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal held that no pre-deposit was required under Section 112 for the present appeal. It clarified that the order would not prejudice the merits and that, if at the final hearing the Tribunal concluded that the amended pre-deposit provision was applicable, the appellant would have to comply with that requirement. Notice was issued and the matter was directed to be listed after four weeks.CASE REFERRED BY COURTBarjinder Singh Kohli v. Assistant Commissioner & Others — Calcutta High Court — 03.11.2025. The Tribunal held that the decision squarely covered the issue of pre-deposit in a penalty-only matter where the proceedings commenced before 01.10.2025.
BackgroundThe matter arose from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 749/2025, which considered the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act in the context of ITC where the supplier fails to pay the requisite tax. The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of the differences between the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the CGST Act, 2017, including the scheme governing availment of ITC under GST.The High Court also considered Section 41 and Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, observing that under the GST regime, reversed ITC could be re-availed after the supplier-dealer discharges the tax liability. The Gujarat High Court consequently found no ground to declare Section 16(2)(c) unconstitutional or to read down its provisions.Court ObservationThe Supreme Court noted that although a special leave petition had been entertained in relation to the Tripura High Court's decision in Sahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors., the exercise undertaken by the Gujarat High Court was materially different. The Supreme Court specifically accepted the Gujarat High Court's detailed distinction between the Delhi VAT Act and the CGST Act and held that there was no possibility of drawing parity between the two enactments for treating a purchasing dealer under the CGST Act on the same footing as a bona fide purchasing dealer under the Delhi VAT Act when the supplier fails to pay tax.The Court further agreed with the Gujarat High Court's consideration of Sections 41, 73 and 74 of the CGST Act regarding re-availment of reversed ITC upon discharge of the supplier's tax liability.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court was fully justified in concluding that no grounds existed to declare Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act unconstitutional or to read down the provision. The Supreme Court expressed its complete and respectful agreement with the Gujarat High Court's view and affirmed and upheld the impugned judgment.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.Case Referred by CourtSahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors. — Tripura High Court, decision referred to as (2026) 154 GSTR 108 (Tri.). The Supreme Court considered the distinction between the Tripura High Court decision and the Gujarat High Court's analysis in the present matter.
Bhandari Scrap Traders v. Union of India & Ors. 24-07-2026
BackgroundThe matter arose from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 749/2025, which considered the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act in the context of ITC where the supplier fails to pay the requisite tax. The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of the differences between the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the CGST Act, 2017, including the scheme governing availment of ITC under GST.The High Court also considered Section 41 and Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, observing that under the GST regime, reversed ITC could be re-availed after the supplier-dealer discharges the tax liability. The Gujarat High Court consequently found no ground to declare Section 16(2)(c) unconstitutional or to read down its provisions.Court ObservationThe Supreme Court noted that although a special leave petition had been entertained in relation to the Tripura High Court's decision in Sahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors., the exercise undertaken by the Gujarat High Court was materially different. The Supreme Court specifically accepted the Gujarat High Court's detailed distinction between the Delhi VAT Act and the CGST Act and held that there was no possibility of drawing parity between the two enactments for treating a purchasing dealer under the CGST Act on the same footing as a bona fide purchasing dealer under the Delhi VAT Act when the supplier fails to pay tax.The Court further agreed with the Gujarat High Court's consideration of Sections 41, 73 and 74 of the CGST Act regarding re-availment of reversed ITC upon discharge of the supplier's tax liability.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court was fully justified in concluding that no grounds existed to declare Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act unconstitutional or to read down the provision. The Supreme Court expressed its complete and respectful agreement with the Gujarat High Court's view and affirmed and upheld the impugned judgment.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.Case Referred by CourtSahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors. — Tripura High Court, decision referred to as (2026) 154 GSTR 108 (Tri.). The Supreme Court considered the distinction between the Tripura High Court decision and the Gujarat High Court's analysis in the present matter.
BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer supplied frozen poultry products to institutional consumers. During one period, the brand logos were removed from the packaging, while the corporate name and address continued to be printed to comply with statutory requirements under food-safety and legal-metrology laws. The taxpayer claimed exemption under Notification No. 02/2017-CT(Rate).The adjudicating authority denied the exemption and confirmed tax, interest and penalty under Section 74(1). The First Appellate Authority subsequently set aside the demand, leading the Revenue to file the appeals before the Tribunal.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal held that printing the manufacturer's name and address pursuant to a statutory obligation for traceability and safety does not amount to affixing a brand name intended to establish a commercial connection. The goods did not bear the specific brand logos during the relevant period.For the period after 18.07.2022, the Tribunal held that packages intended for institutional consumers do not qualify as “pre-packaged commodities meant for retail sale” under Rule 3 of the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011. It also held that merely mentioning a brand name on an invoice does not make the physical goods branded.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal upheld the First Appellate Authority's order granting the exemption and held that the demand of tax, interest and penalty could not be sustained. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed.CASE REFERRED BY COURTRDB Textiles v. CCE — Supreme CourtTarai Foods Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut — Supreme CourtNarasus Sarathy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. AC, GST & CE, Salem — Madras High CourtCCE v. Grasim Industries Ltd. — Supreme CourtCCE v. Australian Foods India (P) Ltd. — Supreme CourtSarvasidhi Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. — Tripura High Court
COMMISSIONER, CGST & CENTRAL EXCISE v. GODREJ TYSON FOODS LIMITED 22-07-2026
BACKGROUNDThe taxpayer supplied frozen poultry products to institutional consumers. During one period, the brand logos were removed from the packaging, while the corporate name and address continued to be printed to comply with statutory requirements under food-safety and legal-metrology laws. The taxpayer claimed exemption under Notification No. 02/2017-CT(Rate).The adjudicating authority denied the exemption and confirmed tax, interest and penalty under Section 74(1). The First Appellate Authority subsequently set aside the demand, leading the Revenue to file the appeals before the Tribunal.COURT OBSERVATIONThe Tribunal held that printing the manufacturer's name and address pursuant to a statutory obligation for traceability and safety does not amount to affixing a brand name intended to establish a commercial connection. The goods did not bear the specific brand logos during the relevant period.For the period after 18.07.2022, the Tribunal held that packages intended for institutional consumers do not qualify as “pre-packaged commodities meant for retail sale” under Rule 3 of the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011. It also held that merely mentioning a brand name on an invoice does not make the physical goods branded.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal upheld the First Appellate Authority's order granting the exemption and held that the demand of tax, interest and penalty could not be sustained. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed.CASE REFERRED BY COURTRDB Textiles v. CCE — Supreme CourtTarai Foods Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut — Supreme CourtNarasus Sarathy Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. AC, GST & CE, Salem — Madras High CourtCCE v. Grasim Industries Ltd. — Supreme CourtCCE v. Australian Foods India (P) Ltd. — Supreme CourtSarvasidhi Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. — Tripura High Court
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant figured as an accused in FIR registered in December 2025, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was arrested on the same date. His prayer for regular bail was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment and order dated 20 March 2026, against which he approached the Supreme Court.Investigation was completed and the charge-sheet came to be filed on 07 February 2026. The prosecution proposed to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant, so that once the trial began its conclusion was likely to take time. What weighed with the Court, however, was that sanction for prosecution was yet to be granted, on account of which the trial court was not in a position to take cognizance of the offence. The Court specifically enquired of counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh whether sanction had been granted, and no clear answer was furnished. The Court accordingly proceeded on the basis that sanction was still awaited. In these circumstances, Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that this was an appropriate case for release on bail pending trial. The appellant had remained in custody from the date of his arrest on 09 December 2025.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S ¶5. “We find that the charge-sheet has been filed on 07th February, 2026 upon completion of investigation. Prosecution proposes to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant. As it is, once the trial starts, conclusion thereof is likely to take time.”¶6. “However, what is of significance is that the sanction for prosecution is yet to be granted and, hence, the trial court is not in a position to take cognizance of the offence.”¶7. “We have enquired of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh, as to whether sanction has been granted or not. No clear answer is furnished to us.”¶9. “We proceed on the basis that sanction is yet to be granted. The charge-sheet having been filed as far back as on 07th February, 2026, we are surprised that the sanctioning authority is yet to activate itself.”¶10. “The delay in grant of sanction to prosecute cannot be used to the disadvantage of a citizen for curtailing his liberty.”¶11. “Taking an overall view of the matter, we find that further detention of the appellant in custody is unnecessary; hence, we are inclined to accept the appeal and grant relief as prayed by admitting the appellant to an order for grant of bail.”¶17. “We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.”F I N A L V E R D I C TAppeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to conditions including that he shall not induce, threaten or promise any person acquainted with the facts so as to dissuade disclosure to the court, and that he shall diligently attend the trial proceedings unless exempted. The trial court is at liberty to cancel bail on breach.Section 7 prevention of corruption act - Section 7 makes it an offence for a public servant to obtain, accept, or attempt to obtain an undue advantage (bribe) in return for performing or improperly performing a public duty or as a reward for such performance.
Ravinder Mehta v. State of Uttar Pradesh 17-07-2026
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant figured as an accused in FIR registered in December 2025, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was arrested on the same date. His prayer for regular bail was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment and order dated 20 March 2026, against which he approached the Supreme Court.Investigation was completed and the charge-sheet came to be filed on 07 February 2026. The prosecution proposed to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant, so that once the trial began its conclusion was likely to take time. What weighed with the Court, however, was that sanction for prosecution was yet to be granted, on account of which the trial court was not in a position to take cognizance of the offence. The Court specifically enquired of counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh whether sanction had been granted, and no clear answer was furnished. The Court accordingly proceeded on the basis that sanction was still awaited. In these circumstances, Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that this was an appropriate case for release on bail pending trial. The appellant had remained in custody from the date of his arrest on 09 December 2025.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S ¶5. “We find that the charge-sheet has been filed on 07th February, 2026 upon completion of investigation. Prosecution proposes to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant. As it is, once the trial starts, conclusion thereof is likely to take time.”¶6. “However, what is of significance is that the sanction for prosecution is yet to be granted and, hence, the trial court is not in a position to take cognizance of the offence.”¶7. “We have enquired of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh, as to whether sanction has been granted or not. No clear answer is furnished to us.”¶9. “We proceed on the basis that sanction is yet to be granted. The charge-sheet having been filed as far back as on 07th February, 2026, we are surprised that the sanctioning authority is yet to activate itself.”¶10. “The delay in grant of sanction to prosecute cannot be used to the disadvantage of a citizen for curtailing his liberty.”¶11. “Taking an overall view of the matter, we find that further detention of the appellant in custody is unnecessary; hence, we are inclined to accept the appeal and grant relief as prayed by admitting the appellant to an order for grant of bail.”¶17. “We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.”F I N A L V E R D I C TAppeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to conditions including that he shall not induce, threaten or promise any person acquainted with the facts so as to dissuade disclosure to the court, and that he shall diligently attend the trial proceedings unless exempted. The trial court is at liberty to cancel bail on breach.Section 7 prevention of corruption act - Section 7 makes it an offence for a public servant to obtain, accept, or attempt to obtain an undue advantage (bribe) in return for performing or improperly performing a public duty or as a reward for such performance.
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant’s son (the detenu) was detained at the airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular issued against him on 13.12.2024. The circular arose out of FIR registered at Punjab, for offences punishable under Sections 66, 72 and 84-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 78(1)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the release of his son.While disposing of that writ petition by order dated 19.12.2024, the High Court observed that, ex-facie, Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act. Aggrieved by this observation alone, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which issued a limited notice confined to the legal issue concerning Section 66 of the IT Act — the provision the High Court had treated as non-bailable. After hearing counsel for both parties, the Court took up that single question for consideration.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S “In our considered view, the High Court did not take into consideration Section 77B of the IT Act, which has to be read to ascertain the nature of offence provided under Section 66 of the IT Act.”“In such view of the matter, the view expressed by High Court that Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act, stands set aside.”F I N A L V E R D I C TThe Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s observation that Section 66 of the IT Act is not a bailable offence, holding that Section 77B of the IT Act must be read to ascertain the nature of the offence under Section 66. The appeal was disposed of with this clarification.Sections 66 & 77B, IT Act, 2000 – Strictly on the order, the Court held that whether the offence under Section 66 is bailable cannot be determined without reading Section 77B.
Maharaj Saran v. State of Punjab & Ors. 16-07-2026
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant’s son (the detenu) was detained at the airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular issued against him on 13.12.2024. The circular arose out of FIR registered at Punjab, for offences punishable under Sections 66, 72 and 84-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 78(1)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the release of his son.While disposing of that writ petition by order dated 19.12.2024, the High Court observed that, ex-facie, Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act. Aggrieved by this observation alone, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which issued a limited notice confined to the legal issue concerning Section 66 of the IT Act — the provision the High Court had treated as non-bailable. After hearing counsel for both parties, the Court took up that single question for consideration.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S “In our considered view, the High Court did not take into consideration Section 77B of the IT Act, which has to be read to ascertain the nature of offence provided under Section 66 of the IT Act.”“In such view of the matter, the view expressed by High Court that Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act, stands set aside.”F I N A L V E R D I C TThe Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s observation that Section 66 of the IT Act is not a bailable offence, holding that Section 77B of the IT Act must be read to ascertain the nature of the offence under Section 66. The appeal was disposed of with this clarification.Sections 66 & 77B, IT Act, 2000 – Strictly on the order, the Court held that whether the offence under Section 66 is bailable cannot be determined without reading Section 77B.
Background. Kanakia Supremo Construction Private Limited merged into the petitioner under an order of the Bombay High Court dated 29.11.2016, with an appointed date of 01.04.2015, and stood dissolved and struck off the records of the Registrar of Companies. Its service tax registration was automatically migrated to GST under Section 139 without intimation. Despite the petitioner informing the department in 2019 that the company had ceased to exist, a show cause notice dated 25.06.2025 under Section 74 and an Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025 were issued in the dissolved company’s name.Observations of the Court. A valid show cause notice is the foundation of any tax proceeding. The department having been repeatedly informed of the amalgamation, the defect was a jurisdictional error and not a mere procedural oversight. The Court applied Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., Reliance Industries Limited v. P. L. Roongta and its own decision in Vodafone Idea Ltd., and rejected the contention that Section 87 could validate the initiation or continuation of proceedings against an entity that had ceased to exist.It accordingly held that any show cause notice issued to an amalgamating company after it had ceased to exist pursuant to its merger, based on the scheme of amalgamation, would be without jurisdiction, and that any proceeding initiated thereunder would be null and void.Final verdict. The writ petition was allowed and the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025 was set aside. The Court clarified that relief was granted solely on the ground that proceedings were initiated on a notice issued to a non-existent company, that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the claims and counter-claims, and that its order would not stand in the way of the authorities initiating proceedings in accordance with law for recovery of unpaid GST, interest and penalty from the petitioner if otherwise permissible.
Kanakia Spaces Realty Private Limited v. The Union of India 24-06-2026
Background. Kanakia Supremo Construction Private Limited merged into the petitioner under an order of the Bombay High Court dated 29.11.2016, with an appointed date of 01.04.2015, and stood dissolved and struck off the records of the Registrar of Companies. Its service tax registration was automatically migrated to GST under Section 139 without intimation. Despite the petitioner informing the department in 2019 that the company had ceased to exist, a show cause notice dated 25.06.2025 under Section 74 and an Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025 were issued in the dissolved company’s name.Observations of the Court. A valid show cause notice is the foundation of any tax proceeding. The department having been repeatedly informed of the amalgamation, the defect was a jurisdictional error and not a mere procedural oversight. The Court applied Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., Reliance Industries Limited v. P. L. Roongta and its own decision in Vodafone Idea Ltd., and rejected the contention that Section 87 could validate the initiation or continuation of proceedings against an entity that had ceased to exist.It accordingly held that any show cause notice issued to an amalgamating company after it had ceased to exist pursuant to its merger, based on the scheme of amalgamation, would be without jurisdiction, and that any proceeding initiated thereunder would be null and void.Final verdict. The writ petition was allowed and the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025 was set aside. The Court clarified that relief was granted solely on the ground that proceedings were initiated on a notice issued to a non-existent company, that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the claims and counter-claims, and that its order would not stand in the way of the authorities initiating proceedings in accordance with law for recovery of unpaid GST, interest and penalty from the petitioner if otherwise permissible.
