Facts :The petitioner, a telecom service provider with multiple GST registrations, operated as an Input Service Distributor (ISD) for distribution of common input tax credit across its units. It challenged Rule 39(1)(a) requiring distribution of ITC in the same month as the invoice, both prior to and after amendment to Section 20 w.e.f. 01.04.2025. The petitioner contended that prior to amendment, there was no statutory power to prescribe such time limit and that the requirement was arbitrary and impossible to comply with. Show cause notices were issued alleging improper distribution of ITC not done in the same month as receipt of invoices.Court Decision:The Court upheld the validity of Rule 39(1)(a) of the CGST Rules. It held that prescription of time limit for distribution of ITC is within rule-making power and is a procedural requirement governing distribution mechanism. The requirement of distribution in the same month was held not arbitrary and having nexus with proper administration of GST and prevention of misuse. The Court rejected the contention that such requirement is impossible to comply with and held that ITC is a statutory benefit subject to conditions. The challenge to show cause notices was declined, holding that the petitioner can raise all contentions in adjudication proceedings.Cases Referred:Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam vs K.I. AbrahamJayam & Co. vs Assistant CommissionerUnion of India vs VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.ALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. vs Commercial Tax Officer
Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. vs Union of India & Others 05-03-2026
Facts :The petitioner, a telecom service provider with multiple GST registrations, operated as an Input Service Distributor (ISD) for distribution of common input tax credit across its units. It challenged Rule 39(1)(a) requiring distribution of ITC in the same month as the invoice, both prior to and after amendment to Section 20 w.e.f. 01.04.2025. The petitioner contended that prior to amendment, there was no statutory power to prescribe such time limit and that the requirement was arbitrary and impossible to comply with. Show cause notices were issued alleging improper distribution of ITC not done in the same month as receipt of invoices.Court Decision:The Court upheld the validity of Rule 39(1)(a) of the CGST Rules. It held that prescription of time limit for distribution of ITC is within rule-making power and is a procedural requirement governing distribution mechanism. The requirement of distribution in the same month was held not arbitrary and having nexus with proper administration of GST and prevention of misuse. The Court rejected the contention that such requirement is impossible to comply with and held that ITC is a statutory benefit subject to conditions. The challenge to show cause notices was declined, holding that the petitioner can raise all contentions in adjudication proceedings.Cases Referred:Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam vs K.I. AbrahamJayam & Co. vs Assistant CommissionerUnion of India vs VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.ALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. vs Commercial Tax Officer
Case Facts:The petitioner challenged a show-cause notice proposing blocking of ITC under Rule 86A and seeking restoration of ₹1.96 crore. The allegation was that the petitioner issued invoices without actual supply of goods, enabling M/s. Million Lights to avail wrongful ITC. The petitioner contended that Rule 86A applies only when ITC is wrongly availed by the assessee itself and not by its customer. The department asserted ongoing investigation and alleged admissions regarding issuance of invoices without supply.Court Decision:The Court held that Rule 86A empowers restriction on utilization of ITC only when the credit in the electronic credit ledger of the concerned assessee is fraudulently availed or is ineligible under specified circumstances such as absence of supply, non-existent supplier, non-payment of tax, or lack of valid documents. The Rule is limited to these conditions and cannot be invoked otherwise. In the present case, the allegation was that the petitioner issued invoices without actual supply, leading to wrongful ITC availment by the recipient. Such allegation does not pertain to ITC availed by the petitioner itself. Therefore, invocation of Rule 86A against the petitioner was improper as the statutory conditions were not satisfied.
Sri Padmavathi Marketing v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 04-03-2026
Case Facts:The petitioner challenged a show-cause notice proposing blocking of ITC under Rule 86A and seeking restoration of ₹1.96 crore. The allegation was that the petitioner issued invoices without actual supply of goods, enabling M/s. Million Lights to avail wrongful ITC. The petitioner contended that Rule 86A applies only when ITC is wrongly availed by the assessee itself and not by its customer. The department asserted ongoing investigation and alleged admissions regarding issuance of invoices without supply.Court Decision:The Court held that Rule 86A empowers restriction on utilization of ITC only when the credit in the electronic credit ledger of the concerned assessee is fraudulently availed or is ineligible under specified circumstances such as absence of supply, non-existent supplier, non-payment of tax, or lack of valid documents. The Rule is limited to these conditions and cannot be invoked otherwise. In the present case, the allegation was that the petitioner issued invoices without actual supply, leading to wrongful ITC availment by the recipient. Such allegation does not pertain to ITC availed by the petitioner itself. Therefore, invocation of Rule 86A against the petitioner was improper as the statutory conditions were not satisfied.
Facts:The petitioner was issued a show cause notice seeking recovery of alleged wrongful ITC availed by his deceased father. The father had passed away in September 2022, while the notice was issued in April 2024. The petitioner contended that recovery proceedings under Sections 74 and 93 could not be initiated against him for liabilities of the deceased. It was also argued that the adjudication order was passed without considering his reply, violating principles of natural justice. Court Decision:The Court held that considering the facts, the petitioner should be granted an opportunity of hearing before the adjudicating authority. It directed the petitioner to appear before the authority and allowed him to raise all contentions, including on applicability of Sections 74 and 93. The authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting hearing and considering all submissions. All issues, including challenge to statutory provisions, were kept open.
Vinay Hiroo Thadani v. Deputy Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise & Ors. 04-03-2026
Facts:The petitioner was issued a show cause notice seeking recovery of alleged wrongful ITC availed by his deceased father. The father had passed away in September 2022, while the notice was issued in April 2024. The petitioner contended that recovery proceedings under Sections 74 and 93 could not be initiated against him for liabilities of the deceased. It was also argued that the adjudication order was passed without considering his reply, violating principles of natural justice. Court Decision:The Court held that considering the facts, the petitioner should be granted an opportunity of hearing before the adjudicating authority. It directed the petitioner to appear before the authority and allowed him to raise all contentions, including on applicability of Sections 74 and 93. The authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting hearing and considering all submissions. All issues, including challenge to statutory provisions, were kept open.
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 28-02-2026
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
BACKGROUND The petitioner-assessee held a 95-year lease of an industrial plot allotted by MIDC. In exercise of the transferable rights under the lease deed, the petitioner assigned the entire leasehold rights in favour of a third party with prior consent of MIDC, receiving consideration for the said assignment. The Department issued a Show Cause Notice under Section 73(5) of the Maharashtra GST Act, 2017 alleging that the petitioner had concealed this transaction and had not paid GST on it. The Department's case was that this assignment amounted to supply of services classifiable under other miscellaneous services taxable at 18% under Entry No. 35 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate). It was also admitted in the notice itself that the transaction did not amount to a sub-lease, as the petitioner's rights stood extinguished upon assignment. An adjudication order was passed on 30.12.2025 confirming the demand, which was challenged before the High Court.CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"In the case before us, the transaction under question is assignment of leasehold rights by the petitioner in favour of assignee, which, admittedly, is not a lease nor does it amount to sub-lease. In fact, in the show cause notice issued by respondent no.1, he has categorically mentioned that the transaction under question does not amount to sub-lease, as the petitioner's right stands extinguished by the said transaction.""Such petty services, in our view, cannot be extended to assignment of leasehold rights in an immovable property, to term it to be other miscellaneous services, as classified under Clause at Sr. No. 35 of the Notification. In that view of the matter, the notice could be said to be bad in law on this count alone.""This transaction, on the face of record, constitute transfer of immovable property by the petitioner to M/s. Kothari Belting Company. The transaction pertains exclusively to transfer of benefits arising out of an immovable property and has no nexus whatsoever with the business of the petitioner Company. Consequently, the essential element of supply of service, in the course of business or in furtherance of business, is completely absent.""We subscribe to this view for the reasons quoted in earlier part of our judgment so also because the view, in our considered opinion, is in consonance with the provisions of law on supply of services." (referring to Gujarat HC conclusion)"Further, the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court is binding on the authorities, i.e. the respondents in terms of the judgment of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Smt. Godavaridevi Saraf Tumsar [1978 (2) ELTJ 624 Bombay], wherein, the Court held that until a contrary decision is given by any other competent High Court, which is binding on Tribunal in the State of Bombay, it has to proceed on the footing that the law declared by the High Court, though of another State, is the final law of land.""We subscribe to the finding of the Gujarat High Court that the assignment by sale and transfer of leasehold rights of the plot of land allotted by the Corporation, like GIDC or MIDC to the lessee in favour of third party-assignee for a consideration, shall be assignment/sale/transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property by the lessee-assignor in favour of third party, and in such circumstances, the transaction would not be subject to levy of GST in terms of the GST Act."FINAL VERDICT The Writ Petition was allowed, the adjudication order dated 30.12.2025 was quashed and set aside, holding that assignment of leasehold rights in an MIDC plot constitutes transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property and is not liable to GST as it lacks the essential element of supply in the course or furtherance of business. 👍
Hindustan Equipment Craft vs. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. 27-02-2026
BACKGROUND The petitioner-assessee held a 95-year lease of an industrial plot allotted by MIDC. In exercise of the transferable rights under the lease deed, the petitioner assigned the entire leasehold rights in favour of a third party with prior consent of MIDC, receiving consideration for the said assignment. The Department issued a Show Cause Notice under Section 73(5) of the Maharashtra GST Act, 2017 alleging that the petitioner had concealed this transaction and had not paid GST on it. The Department's case was that this assignment amounted to supply of services classifiable under other miscellaneous services taxable at 18% under Entry No. 35 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate). It was also admitted in the notice itself that the transaction did not amount to a sub-lease, as the petitioner's rights stood extinguished upon assignment. An adjudication order was passed on 30.12.2025 confirming the demand, which was challenged before the High Court.CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"In the case before us, the transaction under question is assignment of leasehold rights by the petitioner in favour of assignee, which, admittedly, is not a lease nor does it amount to sub-lease. In fact, in the show cause notice issued by respondent no.1, he has categorically mentioned that the transaction under question does not amount to sub-lease, as the petitioner's right stands extinguished by the said transaction.""Such petty services, in our view, cannot be extended to assignment of leasehold rights in an immovable property, to term it to be other miscellaneous services, as classified under Clause at Sr. No. 35 of the Notification. In that view of the matter, the notice could be said to be bad in law on this count alone.""This transaction, on the face of record, constitute transfer of immovable property by the petitioner to M/s. Kothari Belting Company. The transaction pertains exclusively to transfer of benefits arising out of an immovable property and has no nexus whatsoever with the business of the petitioner Company. Consequently, the essential element of supply of service, in the course of business or in furtherance of business, is completely absent.""We subscribe to this view for the reasons quoted in earlier part of our judgment so also because the view, in our considered opinion, is in consonance with the provisions of law on supply of services." (referring to Gujarat HC conclusion)"Further, the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court is binding on the authorities, i.e. the respondents in terms of the judgment of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Smt. Godavaridevi Saraf Tumsar [1978 (2) ELTJ 624 Bombay], wherein, the Court held that until a contrary decision is given by any other competent High Court, which is binding on Tribunal in the State of Bombay, it has to proceed on the footing that the law declared by the High Court, though of another State, is the final law of land.""We subscribe to the finding of the Gujarat High Court that the assignment by sale and transfer of leasehold rights of the plot of land allotted by the Corporation, like GIDC or MIDC to the lessee in favour of third party-assignee for a consideration, shall be assignment/sale/transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property by the lessee-assignor in favour of third party, and in such circumstances, the transaction would not be subject to levy of GST in terms of the GST Act."FINAL VERDICT The Writ Petition was allowed, the adjudication order dated 30.12.2025 was quashed and set aside, holding that assignment of leasehold rights in an MIDC plot constitutes transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property and is not liable to GST as it lacks the essential element of supply in the course or furtherance of business. 👍
BackgroundThe petitioner, Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited (GSTIN: 33AAGCK4135K1ZK), had its ITC blocked vide Reference No. BL3312250000204 dated 05.12.2025 for the tax period 01.10.2025 to 31.12.2025 under Rule 86A of the GST Rules by the Commercial Tax Officer, Virudhachalam Assessment Circle, Cuddalore.Crucially, on the previous day i.e., 04.12.2025, an inspection was conducted by the authorities, wherein statements were recorded from the petitioner's Managing Director, Ms. R. Kavitha Ramesh, from which it was apparent that the petitioner had been availing ITC on the basis of bogus/block invoices. It was in this background that the ITC was blocked on 05.12.2025.The petitioner raised two grounds before the Court: (i) that there was no valid basis for blocking ITC under Rule 86A; and (ii) that only an Assistant Commissioner or a Senior Officer is competent to block ITC under Rule 86A, and therefore the blocking by the Commercial Tax Officer was without jurisdiction.Court Observations (Verbatim)On the first ground of challenge to blocking:"It is in this background, the Input Tax Credit was blocked on 05.12.2025 vide impugned proceedings. Therefore, the challenge to the blocking of the Input Tax Credit under Rule 86A of the respective GST Rules on this count cannot be countenanced."On the second ground regarding competency/jurisdiction, the Court relied upon the Madurai Bench decision in W.P.(MD).No.21670 of 2025 and quoted the following observations therefrom:"18. Rules 86A(2) contemplates that the Commissioner or the Officer authorised by him under Sub Rule 1, may, upon being satisfied that the condition disallowing the debit of electronic credit no longer existed and allow such credit.19. However, considering the fact that notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01, it is unlikely that the power will be exercised under Rule 86A(2) of the respective GST Rules. The question as to whether the proceedings were within the power of the State Tax Officer and contrary to the requirements of the circular dated 02.11.2021 bearing reference CBEC-20/16/05/2021-GST is concerned, it has to be construed that the senior official would have authorised the blocking of the credit.20. There is a clear embargo under Rule 86A, officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner not to block where credit has been availed fraudulently or the credit is ineligible. However, the blocking would have been made with the permission of the senior in the hierarchy. That apart, it is the internal matter and particularly in the light of the fact that the notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01 dated 07.07.2025 by State Tax Officer. The State Tax Officer is a proper officer for issuance of show cause notice also proper officer under Rule 74. Therefore, the objection on the jurisdiction cannot be countenanced."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the blocking of ITC in view of the Managing Director's own admission during inspection. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a representation before the concerned officer, who shall pass appropriate orders within 30 days of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall be heard before final orders are passed.
Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited vs. The Commercial Tax Officer 26-02-2026
BackgroundThe petitioner, Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited (GSTIN: 33AAGCK4135K1ZK), had its ITC blocked vide Reference No. BL3312250000204 dated 05.12.2025 for the tax period 01.10.2025 to 31.12.2025 under Rule 86A of the GST Rules by the Commercial Tax Officer, Virudhachalam Assessment Circle, Cuddalore.Crucially, on the previous day i.e., 04.12.2025, an inspection was conducted by the authorities, wherein statements were recorded from the petitioner's Managing Director, Ms. R. Kavitha Ramesh, from which it was apparent that the petitioner had been availing ITC on the basis of bogus/block invoices. It was in this background that the ITC was blocked on 05.12.2025.The petitioner raised two grounds before the Court: (i) that there was no valid basis for blocking ITC under Rule 86A; and (ii) that only an Assistant Commissioner or a Senior Officer is competent to block ITC under Rule 86A, and therefore the blocking by the Commercial Tax Officer was without jurisdiction.Court Observations (Verbatim)On the first ground of challenge to blocking:"It is in this background, the Input Tax Credit was blocked on 05.12.2025 vide impugned proceedings. Therefore, the challenge to the blocking of the Input Tax Credit under Rule 86A of the respective GST Rules on this count cannot be countenanced."On the second ground regarding competency/jurisdiction, the Court relied upon the Madurai Bench decision in W.P.(MD).No.21670 of 2025 and quoted the following observations therefrom:"18. Rules 86A(2) contemplates that the Commissioner or the Officer authorised by him under Sub Rule 1, may, upon being satisfied that the condition disallowing the debit of electronic credit no longer existed and allow such credit.19. However, considering the fact that notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01, it is unlikely that the power will be exercised under Rule 86A(2) of the respective GST Rules. The question as to whether the proceedings were within the power of the State Tax Officer and contrary to the requirements of the circular dated 02.11.2021 bearing reference CBEC-20/16/05/2021-GST is concerned, it has to be construed that the senior official would have authorised the blocking of the credit.20. There is a clear embargo under Rule 86A, officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner not to block where credit has been availed fraudulently or the credit is ineligible. However, the blocking would have been made with the permission of the senior in the hierarchy. That apart, it is the internal matter and particularly in the light of the fact that the notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01 dated 07.07.2025 by State Tax Officer. The State Tax Officer is a proper officer for issuance of show cause notice also proper officer under Rule 74. Therefore, the objection on the jurisdiction cannot be countenanced."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the blocking of ITC in view of the Managing Director's own admission during inspection. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a representation before the concerned officer, who shall pass appropriate orders within 30 days of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall be heard before final orders are passed.
Court DecisionThe Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the show cause notices and the Order-in-Original dated 1 February 2025 insofar as they imposed penalties of ₹133,60,60,889/- each on the petitioners under Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.The Court held:Section 122(1A) applies to a “taxable person”:On a conjoint reading of Section 122(1) and 122(1A), the Court held that sub-section (1A) necessarily applies to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. The petitioners, being employees of M/s. Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd., were not taxable persons in their individual capacity and hence could not be proceeded against under Section 122(1A).Jurisdictional requirement not satisfied:Section 122(1A) requires that the person must (i) retain the benefit of the transaction covered under specified clauses of Section 122(1), and (ii) the transaction must be conducted at his instance. The impugned order did not record any finding that the petitioners retained any benefit of the alleged transactions. Therefore, the jurisdictional ingredients were not satisfied.No vicarious liability under Section 122(1A):The Court held that there is no principle of vicarious liability incorporated in Section 122 or Section 137 of the CGST Act so as to fasten such penalty on employees merely because they held managerial positions.Retrospective application impermissible:Section 122(1A) came into force with effect from 1 January 2021. The show cause notice covered the period from July 2017 onwards. The Court held that the penal provision could not be applied retrospectively for the period prior to 1 January 2021, in view of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.Accordingly, the impugned order was held to be illegal and without jurisdiction insofar as it related to the petitioners.Cases Referred by the Court1. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India, 2024 (89) G.S.T.L. 62 (Bom.)2. Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari, (2025) 27 Centax 14 (S.C.)3. Bharat Parihar vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Writ Petition No. 3742 of 2023, decided on 30/06/2023.4. Mukesh Kumar Garg vs. Union of India & Ors., 2025 (5) TMI 922 – Delhi High Court
Amit Manilal Haria & Ors. vs. The Joint Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise & Anr. 25-02-2026
Court DecisionThe Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the show cause notices and the Order-in-Original dated 1 February 2025 insofar as they imposed penalties of ₹133,60,60,889/- each on the petitioners under Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.The Court held:Section 122(1A) applies to a “taxable person”:On a conjoint reading of Section 122(1) and 122(1A), the Court held that sub-section (1A) necessarily applies to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. The petitioners, being employees of M/s. Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd., were not taxable persons in their individual capacity and hence could not be proceeded against under Section 122(1A).Jurisdictional requirement not satisfied:Section 122(1A) requires that the person must (i) retain the benefit of the transaction covered under specified clauses of Section 122(1), and (ii) the transaction must be conducted at his instance. The impugned order did not record any finding that the petitioners retained any benefit of the alleged transactions. Therefore, the jurisdictional ingredients were not satisfied.No vicarious liability under Section 122(1A):The Court held that there is no principle of vicarious liability incorporated in Section 122 or Section 137 of the CGST Act so as to fasten such penalty on employees merely because they held managerial positions.Retrospective application impermissible:Section 122(1A) came into force with effect from 1 January 2021. The show cause notice covered the period from July 2017 onwards. The Court held that the penal provision could not be applied retrospectively for the period prior to 1 January 2021, in view of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.Accordingly, the impugned order was held to be illegal and without jurisdiction insofar as it related to the petitioners.Cases Referred by the Court1. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India, 2024 (89) G.S.T.L. 62 (Bom.)2. Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari, (2025) 27 Centax 14 (S.C.)3. Bharat Parihar vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Writ Petition No. 3742 of 2023, decided on 30/06/2023.4. Mukesh Kumar Garg vs. Union of India & Ors., 2025 (5) TMI 922 – Delhi High Court
BACKGROUNDAn Order-in-Original dated 18th December 2023 confirmed a tax liability against the Petitioner. The Petitioner's appeal before the Appellate Authority was rejected by an Order-in-Appeal dated 12th June 2024. The Petitioner then filed an appeal before the GST Tribunal on 5th February 2026 against the Order-in-Appeal.FACTSThe Petitioner received demand intimations by e-mails dated 3rd February 2026 and 6th February 2026. It informed the Respondent that the demand amount had been deposited/adjusted through Form GST DRC-03A and that the appeal was pending before the Tribunal. Despite this, a Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was issued, and coercive steps were sought to be taken. The Petitioner approached the Bombay High Court under Article 226, seeking quashing of the Intimation and Recovery Notices and interim stay, on the ground that the Tribunal has no express power under the CGST Act/Rules to grant interim stay of recovery, and hence no efficacious alternative remedy existed. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On the scope of Section 113:"Considering the nature of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 113 to pass such orders 'as it thinks fit'... it cannot be inferred, that although the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to pass substantive final orders on the Appeal... it would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders. The power to grant interim relief, including protection against recovery pending the Appeal, is inherent and incidental to the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal."On rejecting the Petitioner's proposition:"Also, on first principles, we are unable to accept a proposition that although the Appellate Tribunal is a statutory forum created under the scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, 2017, it would nevertheless be powerless to grant interim relief. Such an interpretation would render the appellate remedy illusory and defeat the legislative intent..."On the High Court not being a substitute forum:"This can never be the legislative intent, that the High Court should function as a forum for grant of interim relief, in matters squarely falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This is inconceivable."On the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 (Rules 10 & 29) supporting inherent power to grant interim relief — referred to as making "the position crystal clear."Reliance placed on Income Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 71, where the Supreme Court held (in the context of Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a provision "quite similar" to Section 113 of the CGST Act):"It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective... The powers which have been conferred by Section 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective." CASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationIncome Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi1968 SCC OnLine SC 71 FINAL VERDICTThe Court held that the GST Appellate Tribunal does have inherent jurisdiction to grant interim relief/stay of recovery pending appeal, and directed the Petitioner to move an interim application before the Tribunal within two weeks. As limited interim protection, the Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was directed not to be acted upon until the Tribunal decides the interim application. Petition disposed of with no order as to costs; merits of the underlying dispute kept open.
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra through the Secretary to the Government Revenue Dept. & Ors. 20-02-2026
BACKGROUNDAn Order-in-Original dated 18th December 2023 confirmed a tax liability against the Petitioner. The Petitioner's appeal before the Appellate Authority was rejected by an Order-in-Appeal dated 12th June 2024. The Petitioner then filed an appeal before the GST Tribunal on 5th February 2026 against the Order-in-Appeal.FACTSThe Petitioner received demand intimations by e-mails dated 3rd February 2026 and 6th February 2026. It informed the Respondent that the demand amount had been deposited/adjusted through Form GST DRC-03A and that the appeal was pending before the Tribunal. Despite this, a Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was issued, and coercive steps were sought to be taken. The Petitioner approached the Bombay High Court under Article 226, seeking quashing of the Intimation and Recovery Notices and interim stay, on the ground that the Tribunal has no express power under the CGST Act/Rules to grant interim stay of recovery, and hence no efficacious alternative remedy existed. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On the scope of Section 113:"Considering the nature of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 113 to pass such orders 'as it thinks fit'... it cannot be inferred, that although the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to pass substantive final orders on the Appeal... it would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders. The power to grant interim relief, including protection against recovery pending the Appeal, is inherent and incidental to the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal."On rejecting the Petitioner's proposition:"Also, on first principles, we are unable to accept a proposition that although the Appellate Tribunal is a statutory forum created under the scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, 2017, it would nevertheless be powerless to grant interim relief. Such an interpretation would render the appellate remedy illusory and defeat the legislative intent..."On the High Court not being a substitute forum:"This can never be the legislative intent, that the High Court should function as a forum for grant of interim relief, in matters squarely falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This is inconceivable."On the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 (Rules 10 & 29) supporting inherent power to grant interim relief — referred to as making "the position crystal clear."Reliance placed on Income Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 71, where the Supreme Court held (in the context of Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a provision "quite similar" to Section 113 of the CGST Act):"It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective... The powers which have been conferred by Section 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective." CASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationIncome Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi1968 SCC OnLine SC 71 FINAL VERDICTThe Court held that the GST Appellate Tribunal does have inherent jurisdiction to grant interim relief/stay of recovery pending appeal, and directed the Petitioner to move an interim application before the Tribunal within two weeks. As limited interim protection, the Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was directed not to be acted upon until the Tribunal decides the interim application. Petition disposed of with no order as to costs; merits of the underlying dispute kept open.
BackgroundAn Order-in-Original was passed under the CGST Act on 18th December 2023, confirming a tax liability against the Petitioner. The Petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was rejected by an Order-in-Appeal dated 12th June 2024. The Petitioner then filed a further appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal on 5th February 2026. In the interregnum, the Petitioner received demand intimations by e-mails dated 3rd February 2026 and 6th February 2026. The Petitioner informed the Revenue that the demand amount had been deposited and adjusted through Form GST DRC-03A and that an appeal was pending before the Tribunal. Despite this, a Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was issued and steps were sought to be taken to implement the same. The Petitioner thereupon filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that coercive recovery proceedings ought not to continue while the appeal was pending before the Tribunal.Relevant FactsThe Revenue's counsel submitted that since the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, the Petitioner should have approached the Tribunal for interim relief — including on the basis of Section 112(9) of the CGST Act, which provides that upon payment of the pre-deposit amount under Section 112(8), recovery proceedings for the balance amount shall be deemed stayed till disposal of the appeal. The Petitioner's counsel countered that there is no express provision under the CGST Act or the Rules framed thereunder empowering the Tribunal to grant interim orders staying recovery proceedings, and therefore no efficacious alternative remedy existed before the Tribunal, necessitating recourse to this Court under Article 226. The sole question before the Court was whether the GSTAT, under the statutory scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, is empowered to pass interim orders, including a stay of recovery proceedings, pending disposal of an appeal.Court Observations (Verbatim)"...it cannot be inferred, that although the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to pass substantive final orders on the Appeal to confirm, modify or annul the decision or order appealed against...it would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders. The power to grant interim relief, including protection against recovery pending the Appeal, is inherent and incidental to the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal. Thus, the appellate power of the Tribunal being wide in its sweep, necessarily wields with the appellate tribunal, the authority and jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders relevant to subject matter of the appeal, so as to make the appellate remedy effective."— Para 10"...we are unable to accept a proposition that although the Appellate Tribunal is a statutory forum created under the scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, 2017, it would nevertheless be powerless to grant interim relief. Such an interpretation would render the appellate remedy illusory and defeat the legislative intent, cumulatively and wholesomely gathered from the provisions as noted hereinabove, surrounding the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal."— Para 11"The consequence of what is urged on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that although the Appellate Tribunal would have powers to set aside the order impugned before it, the interim relief authority would be vested with the High Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. This can never be the legislative intent, that the High Court should function as a forum for grant of interim relief, in matters squarely falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This is inconceivable."— Para 12GST Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 — Notification dated 24 April 2025, Ministry of Finance:Rule 10 — Inherent Powers: "Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Appellate Tribunal to make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Appellate Tribunal."Rule 29 — Interlocutory Applications: "Every interlocutory application for stay, direction, rectification in order, condonation of delay, early hearing, exemption from production of copy of order appealed against or extension of time prayed for in pending matters shall include all the information as per the prescribed GSTAT FORM-01..."(Quoting Supreme Court in ITO Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi): "The powers which have been conferred by Section 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective."— Para 14 (SC observation relied upon)Final VerdictThe Court held that GSTAT has jurisdiction to pass interim orders including stay of recovery, and rejected the Petitioner's contention to the contrary. The Writ Petition was disposed of with a direction to the Petitioner to file an interim application before the Tribunal within two weeks. As limited interim protection, the Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was restrained from being acted upon until the Tribunal decides such interim application. Tribunal Registry was also directed to enable filing of interim applications on its portal. No order as to costs.Cases Referred by CourtIncome Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed KunhiSupreme Court of India | 1968 SCC OnLine SC 71 | Held: ITAT has inherent power to stay recovery pending appeal even without express provision, as power to pass "such orders as it thinks fit" under Section 254 of the Income Tax Act implies all ancillary and incidental powers to make appellate jurisdiction effective.
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 20-02-2026
BackgroundAn Order-in-Original was passed under the CGST Act on 18th December 2023, confirming a tax liability against the Petitioner. The Petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was rejected by an Order-in-Appeal dated 12th June 2024. The Petitioner then filed a further appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal on 5th February 2026. In the interregnum, the Petitioner received demand intimations by e-mails dated 3rd February 2026 and 6th February 2026. The Petitioner informed the Revenue that the demand amount had been deposited and adjusted through Form GST DRC-03A and that an appeal was pending before the Tribunal. Despite this, a Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was issued and steps were sought to be taken to implement the same. The Petitioner thereupon filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that coercive recovery proceedings ought not to continue while the appeal was pending before the Tribunal.Relevant FactsThe Revenue's counsel submitted that since the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, the Petitioner should have approached the Tribunal for interim relief — including on the basis of Section 112(9) of the CGST Act, which provides that upon payment of the pre-deposit amount under Section 112(8), recovery proceedings for the balance amount shall be deemed stayed till disposal of the appeal. The Petitioner's counsel countered that there is no express provision under the CGST Act or the Rules framed thereunder empowering the Tribunal to grant interim orders staying recovery proceedings, and therefore no efficacious alternative remedy existed before the Tribunal, necessitating recourse to this Court under Article 226. The sole question before the Court was whether the GSTAT, under the statutory scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, is empowered to pass interim orders, including a stay of recovery proceedings, pending disposal of an appeal.Court Observations (Verbatim)"...it cannot be inferred, that although the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to pass substantive final orders on the Appeal to confirm, modify or annul the decision or order appealed against...it would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders. The power to grant interim relief, including protection against recovery pending the Appeal, is inherent and incidental to the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal. Thus, the appellate power of the Tribunal being wide in its sweep, necessarily wields with the appellate tribunal, the authority and jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders relevant to subject matter of the appeal, so as to make the appellate remedy effective."— Para 10"...we are unable to accept a proposition that although the Appellate Tribunal is a statutory forum created under the scheme of Sections 111, 112 and 113 of the CGST Act, 2017, it would nevertheless be powerless to grant interim relief. Such an interpretation would render the appellate remedy illusory and defeat the legislative intent, cumulatively and wholesomely gathered from the provisions as noted hereinabove, surrounding the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal."— Para 11"The consequence of what is urged on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that although the Appellate Tribunal would have powers to set aside the order impugned before it, the interim relief authority would be vested with the High Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. This can never be the legislative intent, that the High Court should function as a forum for grant of interim relief, in matters squarely falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This is inconceivable."— Para 12GST Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 — Notification dated 24 April 2025, Ministry of Finance:Rule 10 — Inherent Powers: "Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Appellate Tribunal to make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Appellate Tribunal."Rule 29 — Interlocutory Applications: "Every interlocutory application for stay, direction, rectification in order, condonation of delay, early hearing, exemption from production of copy of order appealed against or extension of time prayed for in pending matters shall include all the information as per the prescribed GSTAT FORM-01..."(Quoting Supreme Court in ITO Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi): "The powers which have been conferred by Section 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective."— Para 14 (SC observation relied upon)Final VerdictThe Court held that GSTAT has jurisdiction to pass interim orders including stay of recovery, and rejected the Petitioner's contention to the contrary. The Writ Petition was disposed of with a direction to the Petitioner to file an interim application before the Tribunal within two weeks. As limited interim protection, the Recovery Notice dated 6th February 2026 was restrained from being acted upon until the Tribunal decides such interim application. Tribunal Registry was also directed to enable filing of interim applications on its portal. No order as to costs.Cases Referred by CourtIncome Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed KunhiSupreme Court of India | 1968 SCC OnLine SC 71 | Held: ITAT has inherent power to stay recovery pending appeal even without express provision, as power to pass "such orders as it thinks fit" under Section 254 of the Income Tax Act implies all ancillary and incidental powers to make appellate jurisdiction effective.
Facts:The petitioner, a manufacturer, transitioned input tax credit into GST regime by filing TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms. An audit was conducted, followed by a show cause notice demanding recovery of transitional credit with interest and penalty. Verification of records was carried out by departmental officers, but the verification reports were not furnished to the petitioner. Despite request and objections, the adjudicating authority passed an order confirming demand without granting opportunity to respond to such reports. Court Decision:The Court held that non-furnishing of verification reports, which formed the basis of the impugned order, amounted to breach of principles of natural justice. It observed that conclusions were drawn without giving the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the verification findings. The Court also noted that the order was passed in haste without complete verification of records. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 5 February 2025 was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication with directions to furnish verification reports and grant a proper hearing.
Pidilite Industries Limited v. Union of India & Ors. 20-02-2026
Facts:The petitioner, a manufacturer, transitioned input tax credit into GST regime by filing TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms. An audit was conducted, followed by a show cause notice demanding recovery of transitional credit with interest and penalty. Verification of records was carried out by departmental officers, but the verification reports were not furnished to the petitioner. Despite request and objections, the adjudicating authority passed an order confirming demand without granting opportunity to respond to such reports. Court Decision:The Court held that non-furnishing of verification reports, which formed the basis of the impugned order, amounted to breach of principles of natural justice. It observed that conclusions were drawn without giving the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the verification findings. The Court also noted that the order was passed in haste without complete verification of records. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 5 February 2025 was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication with directions to furnish verification reports and grant a proper hearing.