Facts:The petitioner association challenged GST liability on services rendered to its members under various welfare schemes. It relied on the doctrine of mutuality, contending that services by an association to its members are not taxable. Amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 inserted Section 7(1)(aa) deeming such transactions as taxable supplies retrospectively from 01.07.2017. The Single Judge upheld the validity of levy but struck down the retrospective operation, leading to cross appeals by both parties.  Court Decision:The Division Bench upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 2(17)(e) and 7(1)(aa) of the CGST/KGST Acts, holding that the legislature was competent to treat transactions between an association and its members as taxable supplies. It held that the amendment validly removes the basis of the doctrine of mutuality for GST purposes. However, the Court held that giving retrospective effect to the amendment from 01.07.2017 was not legally sustainable on principles of fairness. Accordingly, retrospective operation of the amendment was set aside, while upholding its prospective applicability.  Cases Referred by Court:•    State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Club Ltd. •    Ranchi Club Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax •    Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. Management of Gymkhana Club •    Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Bombay Labour Union •    JCTO v. Young Men’s Indian Association •    State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. •    Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. •    Jayam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu •    Rai Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar •    Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE •    Union of India v. Exide Industries Ltd.  

Facts:The petitioner challenged the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act for filing an appeal against proceedings arising from a show cause notice dated 14.06.2022 alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit for the period 2017-18 to 2019-20. The petitioner sought waiver of the pre-deposit on the ground of financial hardship and amounts allegedly receivable from Government departments.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 107(6) mandates payment of the admitted amount of tax, interest, penalty and a pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax for filing an appeal. The provision does not confer discretion on the Court to waive the statutory pre-deposit requirement.The Court declined the request for waiver of pre-deposit and held that the petitioner must comply with the statutory requirement. However, the petitioner was permitted to approach the Appellate Authority and request adjustment of amounts already lying with the department or government entities towards the pre-deposit. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the remedy before the appellate authority.Cases Referred by Court:Shubh Impex v. Union of India, (2018) 361 ELT 199 (Del)Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. CCE, (2017) 348 ELT A132 (SC)Diamond Entertainment Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Tax Commissionerate, Dehradun & Anr.Pioneer Corporation v. Union of India, (2016) 340 ELT 63Manoj Kumar Jha v. DRI, (2019) 365 ELT 166 (Del)Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash MishraA.B. Bhaskara Rao v. CBIManish Goel v. Rohini GoelState of Bihar v. Arvind Kumar

BackgroundNetgear Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. had filed a refund application claiming export of services without payment of IGST for the tax period October 2017 to March 2018. The refund was initially rejected. On appeal, the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal vide Order-in-Appeal (OIA) dated March 9, 2021, holding that the services rendered amounted to export of services and that the petitioner was not an intermediary. The Revenue neither challenged this OIA nor obtained any stay against it. The petitioner then filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking disbursement of refund in terms of the OIA. The High Court, in W.P.(C) No. 10461 of 2022 decided on May 18, 2023, directed the respondents to disburse the refund with applicable interest within four weeks. Pursuant to this, the refund of Rs. 26,88,280 along with interest of Rs. 5,04,439 was sanctioned vide order dated July 26, 2023. Thereafter, the Revenue — instead of pursuing the proper appellate remedy — issued a fresh Show Cause Notice (SCN) dated August 3, 2024 under Section 74 of the CGST Act for the same tax period, alleging that the refund was erroneously sanctioned and seeking its recovery along with interest and penalty. Court Observations (Verbatim)On the nature of the SCN and absence of fraud allegations:"The SCN carries no specific allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression against the petitioner. We are thus of the firm view that absent the same, the jurisdiction assumed by the respondent under section 74 is clearly erroneous and untenable."On the requirement for invoking Section 74:"It is pertinent to note that section 74 uses the expression 'by reason of' and thus being indicative of the power conferred by that provision being liable to be invoked only if it be found that the assessee had indulged in acts constituting fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts in order to evade tax."On mechanical issuance of the SCN:"In view of the absence of clear and specific reasoning in the impugned SCN and which could be read as justifying the invocation of section 74, we find ourselves unable to sustain the impugned SCN for a tax period that had already been assessed by the GST authorities or to countenance the SCN as operating as a fetter on the grant of refund which was affirmed and recognised by the court in Netgear Technologies India."On the real intent behind the SCN:"We are constrained to observe that the SCN appears to have been issued solely to avoid the inevitable consequences which flow from our decision rendered inter partes in the earlier round of litigation. We are of the firm opinion that a claim for refund cannot be legally or justifiably stalled by the adoption of circuitous means as the present." Cases Cited by the CourtNetgear Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of GST, Delhi East Commissionerate — 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8724 (W.P.(C) No. 10461 of 2022, May 18, 2023)Zones Corporate Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Services Tax Delhi East — 2020-VIL-302-DELAlex Tour and Travel Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner, CGST, Division-Janakpuri — (2024) 122 GSTR 81 (Delhi); 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2709Parity Infotech Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi — (2023) 120 GSTR 30 (Delhi); (2023) 4 HCC (Del) 685HCL Infotech Ltd. v. Commissioner, Commercial Tax — (2025) 141 GSTR 324 (All); 2024 SCC OnLine All 5769Raj Bahadur Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India — (1997) 6 SCC 81; (1996) 88 ELT 24 (SC)Collector of Central Excise v. H.M.M. Limited — 1995 SCC OnLine SC 82; 1995 Supp (3) SCC 322; (1995) 76 ELT 497 (SC) Final VerdictThe writ petition was allowed. The impugned SCN dated August 3, 2024 was quashed and set aside. The refund claim of the petitioner was directed to be attended to and disposed of forthwith, subject to any orders that may be passed on any appeal the respondents may institute against   

Facts :The petitioner company received a show cause notice under Section 73 CGST Act from State GST authorities for alleged tax shortfall and excess ITC.Subsequently, Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued summons under Section 70 requiring production of documents.The petitioner challenged the summons before Delhi High Court, contending that parallel proceedings on the same subject matter were barred under Section 6(2)(b).The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that summons and investigation are not “proceedings”.Court Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the SLP.It held that issuance of summons under Section 70 is part of inquiry/investigation and cannot be equated with “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b).“Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74.Summons is only a step to collect evidence and precedes formal proceedings; hence, no bar on parallel inquiry by another authority.The Court interpreted Section 6 within the framework of “single interface” and “cross-empowerment”, holding that intelligence-based enforcement actions can be initiated by both Central and State authorities.Cases Referred:G.K. Trading v. Union of IndiaKuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST IntelligenceAnurag Suri v. Director General of GST IntelligenceIndo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek PrasadK.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax OfficerRais Khan v. Addl. CommissionerM/s R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGSTTvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. GST Council SecretariatVivek Narsaria v. State of JharkhandStalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaKundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P.Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd.K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT 

Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.