| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Fresenius Medical Care India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST – Delhi East | 24-08-2026 | Taxability of Equipment Leasing as Deemed Sale or Service under Article 366(29A)(d) and Section 66E. | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe appellant was engaged in trading dialysis equipment and providing maintenance and leasing services. Service tax was paid on AMC and CMC services, while leasing of equipment was treated as deemed sale and subjected to VAT. During audit, the Department took the view that the leasing transactions were taxable services because ownership, possession and effective control remained with the appellant.The Department alleged that the taxable leasing services had not been declared in ST-3 returns and that the appellant had suppressed the relevant facts with intent to evade service tax. A show cause notice was issued invoking the extended limitation and the proposed demand, interest and penalties were subsequently confirmed by the Order-in-Original.COURT OBSERVATIONSThe Tribunal examined the distinction between a deemed sale and a taxable service. It noted that Article 366(29A)(d) covers transfer of the right to use goods, whereas Section 66E covers transfer of goods by hiring, leasing or licensing without transfer of the right to use those goods.The Tribunal relied upon the principles laid down in BSNL v. Union of India, under which a transfer of the right to use goods requires, among other things, a legal right in the transferee to use the goods and exclusion of the transferor during the relevant period.On examining the actual agreement, the Tribunal found that the equipment could be used only in accordance with the appellant's specifications and instructions, the appellant retained maintenance and insurance responsibilities, and it retained rights of inspection. The Tribunal held that the relevant conditions for transfer of the right to use were not satisfied.The Tribunal concluded that mere permission to inspect and maintain the equipment was insufficient to establish a deemed sale. The usage of the equipment remained subject to the appellant's approval and maintenance and insurance expenses remained with the appellant. Payment of VAT was also held insufficient to change the character of the transaction.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal found no infirmity in the Order-in-Original and held that the activity constituted a taxable service. The appeal filed by the appellant was therefore dismissed.CASE REFERRED BY COURTBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India (BSNL) — Supreme Court of India — 2006; exact order date not stated in the PDF. The Tribunal applied the principles concerning transfer of the right to use goods.Indian Compressors v. Union of India — Delhi High Court — 2025; exact order date not stated in the PDF. The Tribunal expressly stated that it drew support from this decision. | ||||
| Fresenius Medical Care India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST – Delhi East 24-08-2026 Taxability of Equipment Leasing as Deemed Sale or Service under Article 366(29A)(d) and Section 66E.BACKGROUNDThe appellant was engaged in trading dialysis equipment and providing maintenance and leasing services. Service tax was paid on AMC and CMC services, while leasing of equipment was treated as deemed sale and subjected to VAT. During audit, the Department took the view that the leasing transactions were taxable services because ownership, possession and effective control remained with the appellant.The Department alleged that the taxable leasing services had not been declared in ST-3 returns and that the appellant had suppressed the relevant facts with intent to evade service tax. A show cause notice was issued invoking the extended limitation and the proposed demand, interest and penalties were subsequently confirmed by the Order-in-Original.COURT OBSERVATIONSThe Tribunal examined the distinction between a deemed sale and a taxable service. It noted that Article 366(29A)(d) covers transfer of the right to use goods, whereas Section 66E covers transfer of goods by hiring, leasing or licensing without transfer of the right to use those goods.The Tribunal relied upon the principles laid down in BSNL v. Union of India, under which a transfer of the right to use goods requires, among other things, a legal right in the transferee to use the goods and exclusion of the transferor during the relevant period.On examining the actual agreement, the Tribunal found that the equipment could be used only in accordance with the appellant's specifications and instructions, the appellant retained maintenance and insurance responsibilities, and it retained rights of inspection. The Tribunal held that the relevant conditions for transfer of the right to use were not satisfied.The Tribunal concluded that mere permission to inspect and maintain the equipment was insufficient to establish a deemed sale. The usage of the equipment remained subject to the appellant's approval and maintenance and insurance expenses remained with the appellant. Payment of VAT was also held insufficient to change the character of the transaction.FINAL VERDICTThe Tribunal found no infirmity in the Order-in-Original and held that the activity constituted a taxable service. The appeal filed by the appellant was therefore dismissed.CASE REFERRED BY COURTBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India (BSNL) — Supreme Court of India — 2006; exact order date not stated in the PDF. The Tribunal applied the principles concerning transfer of the right to use goods.Indian Compressors v. Union of India — Delhi High Court — 2025; exact order date not stated in the PDF. The Tribunal expressly stated that it drew support from this decision. | ||||
| 2 | Ravinder Mehta v. State of Uttar Pradesh | 17-07-2026 | Regular bail in a trap case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — whether an accused can be kept in custody where the charge-sheet stands filed but sanction for prosecution has still not been granted, leaving the trial court unable | View Download |
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant figured as an accused in FIR registered in December 2025, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was arrested on the same date. His prayer for regular bail was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment and order dated 20 March 2026, against which he approached the Supreme Court.Investigation was completed and the charge-sheet came to be filed on 07 February 2026. The prosecution proposed to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant, so that once the trial began its conclusion was likely to take time. What weighed with the Court, however, was that sanction for prosecution was yet to be granted, on account of which the trial court was not in a position to take cognizance of the offence. The Court specifically enquired of counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh whether sanction had been granted, and no clear answer was furnished. The Court accordingly proceeded on the basis that sanction was still awaited. In these circumstances, Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that this was an appropriate case for release on bail pending trial. The appellant had remained in custody from the date of his arrest on 09 December 2025.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S ¶5. “We find that the charge-sheet has been filed on 07th February, 2026 upon completion of investigation. Prosecution proposes to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant. As it is, once the trial starts, conclusion thereof is likely to take time.”¶6. “However, what is of significance is that the sanction for prosecution is yet to be granted and, hence, the trial court is not in a position to take cognizance of the offence.”¶7. “We have enquired of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh, as to whether sanction has been granted or not. No clear answer is furnished to us.”¶9. “We proceed on the basis that sanction is yet to be granted. The charge-sheet having been filed as far back as on 07th February, 2026, we are surprised that the sanctioning authority is yet to activate itself.”¶10. “The delay in grant of sanction to prosecute cannot be used to the disadvantage of a citizen for curtailing his liberty.”¶11. “Taking an overall view of the matter, we find that further detention of the appellant in custody is unnecessary; hence, we are inclined to accept the appeal and grant relief as prayed by admitting the appellant to an order for grant of bail.”¶17. “We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.”F I N A L V E R D I C TAppeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to conditions including that he shall not induce, threaten or promise any person acquainted with the facts so as to dissuade disclosure to the court, and that he shall diligently attend the trial proceedings unless exempted. The trial court is at liberty to cancel bail on breach.Section 7 prevention of corruption act - Section 7 makes it an offence for a public servant to obtain, accept, or attempt to obtain an undue advantage (bribe) in return for performing or improperly performing a public duty or as a reward for such performance. | ||||
| Ravinder Mehta v. State of Uttar Pradesh 17-07-2026 Regular bail in a trap case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — whether an accused can be kept in custody where the charge-sheet stands filed but sanction for prosecution has still not been granted, leaving the trial court unableB A C K G R O U N DThe appellant figured as an accused in FIR registered in December 2025, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was arrested on the same date. His prayer for regular bail was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment and order dated 20 March 2026, against which he approached the Supreme Court.Investigation was completed and the charge-sheet came to be filed on 07 February 2026. The prosecution proposed to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant, so that once the trial began its conclusion was likely to take time. What weighed with the Court, however, was that sanction for prosecution was yet to be granted, on account of which the trial court was not in a position to take cognizance of the offence. The Court specifically enquired of counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh whether sanction had been granted, and no clear answer was furnished. The Court accordingly proceeded on the basis that sanction was still awaited. In these circumstances, Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that this was an appropriate case for release on bail pending trial. The appellant had remained in custody from the date of his arrest on 09 December 2025.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S ¶5. “We find that the charge-sheet has been filed on 07th February, 2026 upon completion of investigation. Prosecution proposes to examine 19 witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant. As it is, once the trial starts, conclusion thereof is likely to take time.”¶6. “However, what is of significance is that the sanction for prosecution is yet to be granted and, hence, the trial court is not in a position to take cognizance of the offence.”¶7. “We have enquired of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh, as to whether sanction has been granted or not. No clear answer is furnished to us.”¶9. “We proceed on the basis that sanction is yet to be granted. The charge-sheet having been filed as far back as on 07th February, 2026, we are surprised that the sanctioning authority is yet to activate itself.”¶10. “The delay in grant of sanction to prosecute cannot be used to the disadvantage of a citizen for curtailing his liberty.”¶11. “Taking an overall view of the matter, we find that further detention of the appellant in custody is unnecessary; hence, we are inclined to accept the appeal and grant relief as prayed by admitting the appellant to an order for grant of bail.”¶17. “We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.”F I N A L V E R D I C TAppeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to conditions including that he shall not induce, threaten or promise any person acquainted with the facts so as to dissuade disclosure to the court, and that he shall diligently attend the trial proceedings unless exempted. The trial court is at liberty to cancel bail on breach.Section 7 prevention of corruption act - Section 7 makes it an offence for a public servant to obtain, accept, or attempt to obtain an undue advantage (bribe) in return for performing or improperly performing a public duty or as a reward for such performance. | ||||
