| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Esnp Property Builder And Developers Private Limited v. State Tax Officer (ST), Group-V & Others | 28-08-2026 | Whether Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods/services used for construction of immovable property intended for leasing can be denied under Section 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act, without considering the ratio of the Supreme Court in Safari Retreats. | View Download |
BackgroundIn W.P. Nos. 21432 and 21433 of 2026, assessment orders were challenged whereby the petitioner's claim for ITC relating to construction-cum-leasing services was rejected. The petitioner had relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Chief Commissioner of CGST and Others v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. and Others, particularly its interpretation of construction undertaken for leasing or licensing purposes vis-à-vis construction on the taxable person's own account. The petitioner contended that this judgment had not been properly considered while passing the assessment orders.In W.P. No. 22392 of 2026, the petitioner sought re-credit/refund of amounts debited from its electronic cash and credit ledgers pursuant to the assessment orders. It was contended that recovery was made without the prior intimation contemplated under Rule 142B(1) and without allowing the prescribed seven-day period.Court ObservationThe Court noted that the Supreme Court in Safari Retreats had held that construction cannot be regarded as being on the taxable person's own account where it is intended for sale, lease or licence. The Court observed that, in the factual context where the inputs were procured for construction and leasing, the proper officer ought to have considered the Supreme Court's judgment before recording findings.The Court found that the impugned assessment orders instead recorded that leasing could not convert otherwise blocked ITC into eligible credit, but these findings were entered without considering the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Safari Retreats. Consequently, the Court held that reconsideration of the assessment orders was warranted.With regard to recovery, the Court examined Rule 142B and observed that the proper officer is required to intimate the person in default regarding the recoverable amount and provide seven days from the date of intimation for payment. Recovery proceedings under the specified rules can be initiated only if the amount remains unpaid after expiry of that period. The Court found that this requirement had not been complied with in the present cases.Final VerdictThe assessment orders challenged in W.P. Nos. 21432 and 21433 of 2026 were set aside and the matters were remanded for reconsideration. The respondents were directed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and issue fresh orders within five months from the date of receipt of the Court's order.In W.P. No. 22392 of 2026, considering the non-compliance with Rule 142B and the fact that the underlying assessment orders had been set aside, the Court directed the respondents to re-credit/refund the amounts debited from the electronic cash or credit ledgers to the corresponding ledger within two weeks from receipt of the order. The writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.Case Referred by CourtChief Commissioner of CGST and Others v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. and Others — Supreme Court, reported in (2024) 121 GSTR 184 (SC). | ||||
| Esnp Property Builder And Developers Private Limited v. State Tax Officer (ST), Group-V & Others 28-08-2026 Whether Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods/services used for construction of immovable property intended for leasing can be denied under Section 17(5)(d) of the CGST Act, without considering the ratio of the Supreme Court in Safari Retreats.BackgroundIn W.P. Nos. 21432 and 21433 of 2026, assessment orders were challenged whereby the petitioner's claim for ITC relating to construction-cum-leasing services was rejected. The petitioner had relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Chief Commissioner of CGST and Others v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. and Others, particularly its interpretation of construction undertaken for leasing or licensing purposes vis-à-vis construction on the taxable person's own account. The petitioner contended that this judgment had not been properly considered while passing the assessment orders.In W.P. No. 22392 of 2026, the petitioner sought re-credit/refund of amounts debited from its electronic cash and credit ledgers pursuant to the assessment orders. It was contended that recovery was made without the prior intimation contemplated under Rule 142B(1) and without allowing the prescribed seven-day period.Court ObservationThe Court noted that the Supreme Court in Safari Retreats had held that construction cannot be regarded as being on the taxable person's own account where it is intended for sale, lease or licence. The Court observed that, in the factual context where the inputs were procured for construction and leasing, the proper officer ought to have considered the Supreme Court's judgment before recording findings.The Court found that the impugned assessment orders instead recorded that leasing could not convert otherwise blocked ITC into eligible credit, but these findings were entered without considering the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Safari Retreats. Consequently, the Court held that reconsideration of the assessment orders was warranted.With regard to recovery, the Court examined Rule 142B and observed that the proper officer is required to intimate the person in default regarding the recoverable amount and provide seven days from the date of intimation for payment. Recovery proceedings under the specified rules can be initiated only if the amount remains unpaid after expiry of that period. The Court found that this requirement had not been complied with in the present cases.Final VerdictThe assessment orders challenged in W.P. Nos. 21432 and 21433 of 2026 were set aside and the matters were remanded for reconsideration. The respondents were directed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and issue fresh orders within five months from the date of receipt of the Court's order.In W.P. No. 22392 of 2026, considering the non-compliance with Rule 142B and the fact that the underlying assessment orders had been set aside, the Court directed the respondents to re-credit/refund the amounts debited from the electronic cash or credit ledgers to the corresponding ledger within two weeks from receipt of the order. The writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.Case Referred by CourtChief Commissioner of CGST and Others v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. and Others — Supreme Court, reported in (2024) 121 GSTR 184 (SC). | ||||
| 2 | E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited v. Deputy Commissioner (ST) GST Appeal, | 30-07-2026 | Exclusion of rectification period under Section 161 while computing appeal limitation under Section 107 of the CGST Act. | View Download |
BackgroundThe batch of writ petitions arose from appeals that had been rejected as time-barred after the respective taxpayers had first pursued rectification proceedings under Section 161. The petitioners contended that they had bona fide pursued the rectification remedy and that the period spent in those proceedings should be excluded while computing the three-month limitation under Section 107. The Revenue opposed this, arguing that GST is a self-contained code, that limitation under Section 107 begins from communication of the original order, and that filing a rectification petition does not stop or suspend the limitation period.In the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the rectification petition was primarily based on the non-consideration of credit notes that had been submitted before the order-in-original. The petitioner had also relied upon the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in SPK and Co. while pursuing the matter. On examination, the Court found that there was a genuine basis for pursuing rectification and that the requirements of good faith and due diligence were satisfied.Court ObservationThe Limitation Act, as such, does not apply to quasi-judicial authorities, including GST appellate authorities. However, the principles underlying Section 14 can apply to GST appellate proceedings.GST legislation does not expressly or impliedly exclude the principles underlying Section 14. The fact that Section 107 permits condonation only for a further period of one month does not mean that Section 14's principle of exclusion of time is also excluded.A rectification petition rejected because there is “no error apparent” can, in an appropriate case, constitute a bona fide mistaken remedy falling within “other cause of a like nature” under the principles of Section 14. Such rejection is not necessarily a full-fledged adjudication of the larger dispute.However, exclusion is not automatic merely because a rectification petition was filed. The proceedings must concern the same matter and parties, and the earlier proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and in good faith. Good faith requires the Court to broadly examine whether there was some basis for filing the rectification petition, so that the provision is not abused merely to extend the appeal period.Where the requirements are satisfied, the entire period from filing of the rectification petition until its rejection is liable to be excluded. Thus, the taxpayer gets the prescribed three-month appeal period after such exclusion, subject to the further one-month period available under Section 107(4).The Court clarified that limitation under Section 107 ordinarily starts from communication of the specific order being appealed against. Therefore, an appeal against the original order runs from communication of that original order; filing rectification does not itself replace that starting point.Final VerdictIn the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the Court held that the petitioner had established good faith and due diligence because the rectification petition concerned non-consideration of credit notes submitted before the original order. Accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to exclusion of the time spent in the rectification proceedings.The Court ultimately set aside the impugned appellate order and directed the appellate authority to receive and dispose of the appeal on merits. W.P. No.2629 of 2026 was specifically included among the seven writ petitions allowed for this purpose.Case Referred by CourtThe Court considered, among others, the following authorities in arriving at its conclusions:M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central ExciseConsolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal SecretaryCCE v. Hongo India (P) Ltd..Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Parson Tools and Plants. | ||||
| E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited v. Deputy Commissioner (ST) GST Appeal, 30-07-2026 Exclusion of rectification period under Section 161 while computing appeal limitation under Section 107 of the CGST Act.BackgroundThe batch of writ petitions arose from appeals that had been rejected as time-barred after the respective taxpayers had first pursued rectification proceedings under Section 161. The petitioners contended that they had bona fide pursued the rectification remedy and that the period spent in those proceedings should be excluded while computing the three-month limitation under Section 107. The Revenue opposed this, arguing that GST is a self-contained code, that limitation under Section 107 begins from communication of the original order, and that filing a rectification petition does not stop or suspend the limitation period.In the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the rectification petition was primarily based on the non-consideration of credit notes that had been submitted before the order-in-original. The petitioner had also relied upon the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in SPK and Co. while pursuing the matter. On examination, the Court found that there was a genuine basis for pursuing rectification and that the requirements of good faith and due diligence were satisfied.Court ObservationThe Limitation Act, as such, does not apply to quasi-judicial authorities, including GST appellate authorities. However, the principles underlying Section 14 can apply to GST appellate proceedings.GST legislation does not expressly or impliedly exclude the principles underlying Section 14. The fact that Section 107 permits condonation only for a further period of one month does not mean that Section 14's principle of exclusion of time is also excluded.A rectification petition rejected because there is “no error apparent” can, in an appropriate case, constitute a bona fide mistaken remedy falling within “other cause of a like nature” under the principles of Section 14. Such rejection is not necessarily a full-fledged adjudication of the larger dispute.However, exclusion is not automatic merely because a rectification petition was filed. The proceedings must concern the same matter and parties, and the earlier proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and in good faith. Good faith requires the Court to broadly examine whether there was some basis for filing the rectification petition, so that the provision is not abused merely to extend the appeal period.Where the requirements are satisfied, the entire period from filing of the rectification petition until its rejection is liable to be excluded. Thus, the taxpayer gets the prescribed three-month appeal period after such exclusion, subject to the further one-month period available under Section 107(4).The Court clarified that limitation under Section 107 ordinarily starts from communication of the specific order being appealed against. Therefore, an appeal against the original order runs from communication of that original order; filing rectification does not itself replace that starting point.Final VerdictIn the case of E2E Supply Chain Solutions Limited, the Court held that the petitioner had established good faith and due diligence because the rectification petition concerned non-consideration of credit notes submitted before the original order. Accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to exclusion of the time spent in the rectification proceedings.The Court ultimately set aside the impugned appellate order and directed the appellate authority to receive and dispose of the appeal on merits. W.P. No.2629 of 2026 was specifically included among the seven writ petitions allowed for this purpose.Case Referred by CourtThe Court considered, among others, the following authorities in arriving at its conclusions:M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central ExciseConsolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal SecretaryCCE v. Hongo India (P) Ltd..Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Parson Tools and Plants. | ||||
| 3 | V. Damayanti vs The Superintendent of GST and Central Excise | 16-06-2026 | Whether fresh assessment proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act can be initiated for the first time against the legal heir of a deceased proprietor where the business stood discontinued and no proceedings whatsoever were initiated during the lifetim | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioner's husband was the proprietor of a chemicals firm supplying industrial soaps and polishes. He died on 05.03.2019, after which the business was discontinued and closed, and the registration was cancelled w.e.f. 31.12.2019. Despite this, the Revenue initiated proceedings for FY 2018-19 against the legal heir (wife), leading to this writ challenging the demand on the ground that no proceeding had ever commenced while the proprietor was alive.FACTSAfter cancellation of registration, the petitioner received a communication dated 10.03.2025, followed by a notice in Form DRC-01A dated 20.05.2025, alleging that the firm had failed to file returns for certain e-way bills generated during FY 2018-19. The petitioner replied that, following her husband's death on 05.03.2019, the business had been discontinued and closed, and that she was neither involved in nor aware of the business dealings. A show cause notice in Form DRC-01 was thereafter issued on 26.06.2025, to which the petitioner again replied on 24.10.2025 reiterating her stand. Rejecting her explanation, the respondent passed the impugned order dated 11.12.2025 under Section 74, determining a tax liability of Rs.3,42,355/- with interest and penalty. The core legal issue was whether the words "determined after his death" in Section 93 permit initiation of fresh proceedings against the legal heir, or whether they apply only where proceedings were already pending at the time of death. The petitioner argued that "person chargeable with tax" in Section 74 means only the person on whom the incidence of levy falls, and that Section 93 read with Sections 9 and 2(107) cannot bring in a legal heir who did not continue the business. The Revenue contended that Section 93 expressly creates a statutory liability on the legal heir, covering both liability determined before death and liability "determined after his death," and that Income Tax principles cannot be mechanically imported into the CGST scheme.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Section 74 of the CGST Act does not employ the expression 'taxable person' but uses the wider expression 'person chargeable with tax'. The said expression cannot be confined only to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. It would encompass not only registered taxable persons and persons liable for registration, but also the legal heirs from whom the tax is recoverable, and persons such as recipients liable to pay tax under the reverse charge mechanism, electronic commerce operators, etc., in cases where the statute fastens the liability upon them." (Para 4.4)"Once the statute authorises determination of liability after the death of the taxable person, the expression 'determined after his death' must necessarily include the entire adjudicatory process contemplated under Sections 73, 74 or 74A of the CGST Act, as the case may be. Such process would include not merely the passing of the final order, but also the issuance of notices and all other procedural steps preceding determination. Any other interpretation would have the effect of altering the plain, simple and clear meaning of the express words employed in Section 93 of the CGST Act." (Para 4.7)"A taxing statute creating a liability must ordinarily be construed in accordance with its plain language, and the Court cannot read into the provision limitations which the Legislature has consciously omitted." (Para 4.8)"...even in a case where the business of the deceased taxable person has been discontinued and no show cause notice or assessment proceedings had been initiated during his lifetime, fresh proceedings may nevertheless be initiated against the legal heir under Section 73, 74 or 74-A of the CGST Act, 2017 in view of section 93 of the CGST Act. However, in cases of discontinued businesses, the liability of the legal heir shall be limited to the extent to which the estate inherited by him is capable of meeting the charge." (Para 4.10)FINAL VERDICT 👎Writ Petition dismissed. Fresh proceedings can be initiated against the legal heir even where no proceedings were started during the deceased's lifetime, the liability being capped at the value of the inherited estate.CASES REFERREDRelied on by the Court:Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. — 2024 INSC 756 | ||||
| V. Damayanti vs The Superintendent of GST and Central Excise 16-06-2026 Whether fresh assessment proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act can be initiated for the first time against the legal heir of a deceased proprietor where the business stood discontinued and no proceedings whatsoever were initiated during the lifetimBACKGROUNDThe petitioner's husband was the proprietor of a chemicals firm supplying industrial soaps and polishes. He died on 05.03.2019, after which the business was discontinued and closed, and the registration was cancelled w.e.f. 31.12.2019. Despite this, the Revenue initiated proceedings for FY 2018-19 against the legal heir (wife), leading to this writ challenging the demand on the ground that no proceeding had ever commenced while the proprietor was alive.FACTSAfter cancellation of registration, the petitioner received a communication dated 10.03.2025, followed by a notice in Form DRC-01A dated 20.05.2025, alleging that the firm had failed to file returns for certain e-way bills generated during FY 2018-19. The petitioner replied that, following her husband's death on 05.03.2019, the business had been discontinued and closed, and that she was neither involved in nor aware of the business dealings. A show cause notice in Form DRC-01 was thereafter issued on 26.06.2025, to which the petitioner again replied on 24.10.2025 reiterating her stand. Rejecting her explanation, the respondent passed the impugned order dated 11.12.2025 under Section 74, determining a tax liability of Rs.3,42,355/- with interest and penalty. The core legal issue was whether the words "determined after his death" in Section 93 permit initiation of fresh proceedings against the legal heir, or whether they apply only where proceedings were already pending at the time of death. The petitioner argued that "person chargeable with tax" in Section 74 means only the person on whom the incidence of levy falls, and that Section 93 read with Sections 9 and 2(107) cannot bring in a legal heir who did not continue the business. The Revenue contended that Section 93 expressly creates a statutory liability on the legal heir, covering both liability determined before death and liability "determined after his death," and that Income Tax principles cannot be mechanically imported into the CGST scheme.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Section 74 of the CGST Act does not employ the expression 'taxable person' but uses the wider expression 'person chargeable with tax'. The said expression cannot be confined only to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. It would encompass not only registered taxable persons and persons liable for registration, but also the legal heirs from whom the tax is recoverable, and persons such as recipients liable to pay tax under the reverse charge mechanism, electronic commerce operators, etc., in cases where the statute fastens the liability upon them." (Para 4.4)"Once the statute authorises determination of liability after the death of the taxable person, the expression 'determined after his death' must necessarily include the entire adjudicatory process contemplated under Sections 73, 74 or 74A of the CGST Act, as the case may be. Such process would include not merely the passing of the final order, but also the issuance of notices and all other procedural steps preceding determination. Any other interpretation would have the effect of altering the plain, simple and clear meaning of the express words employed in Section 93 of the CGST Act." (Para 4.7)"A taxing statute creating a liability must ordinarily be construed in accordance with its plain language, and the Court cannot read into the provision limitations which the Legislature has consciously omitted." (Para 4.8)"...even in a case where the business of the deceased taxable person has been discontinued and no show cause notice or assessment proceedings had been initiated during his lifetime, fresh proceedings may nevertheless be initiated against the legal heir under Section 73, 74 or 74-A of the CGST Act, 2017 in view of section 93 of the CGST Act. However, in cases of discontinued businesses, the liability of the legal heir shall be limited to the extent to which the estate inherited by him is capable of meeting the charge." (Para 4.10)FINAL VERDICT 👎Writ Petition dismissed. Fresh proceedings can be initiated against the legal heir even where no proceedings were started during the deceased's lifetime, the liability being capped at the value of the inherited estate.CASES REFERREDRelied on by the Court:Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. — 2024 INSC 756 | ||||
| 4 | Guru and Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. | 15-06-2026 | Whether notifications issued by the Central Government under Sections 9 and 11 of the CGST Act, 2017 can travel beyond the recommendations of the GST Council, and whether the GST Council has the power to ratify a notification already issued by the Central | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioners are suppliers of pulses (Moong Daal, Toor Daal) selling under brand names not registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Copyright Act, 1957. Under the original 2017 rate notifications, GST attached only to goods "put up in unit container and bearing a registered brand name," so the petitioners' unregistered-brand goods fell outside the tax net, and many traders de-registered brands to escape liability. To plug this, the Government issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and 28/2017 dated 22.09.2017 (and the State issued GO(MS) No. 114), expanding the levy to brands bearing an "actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law." Show cause notices followed, and the petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A and sought to quash the SCNs.FactsThe writ petitioners are suppliers of pulses selling under unregistered brand names. Notification No. 1/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 levied 2.5% Central Tax on dried leguminous vegetables put up in a unit container and bearing a registered brand name, and Notification No. 2/2017 exempted such goods other than those bearing a registered brand name. As the petitioners' goods carried no registered brand name, they were not liable to GST, and a substantial volume of trade in pulses fell outside the tax net.To remedy this, the Ministry of Finance issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and No. 28/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) and Integrated Tax (Rate), all dated 22.09.2017, and the State Government issued GO(MS) No. 114 dated 22.09.2017 (verbatim reproducing the Central notifications), bringing within the levy products bearing a brand name "on which an actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law is available" (other than where such claim or right was voluntarily foregone, subject to the conditions in Annexure I). The impugned show cause notices were issued to the petitioners as a consequence. The petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A to the extent they affected them and sought to quash the SCNs as null and void.The petitioners primarily relied on Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited. The respondents, through the Additional Solicitor General, contended that GST Council recommendations are not binding in the sense that the Government need not reproduce a mirror image, also relying on Mohit Minerals; they submitted that drafting mistakes in the recommendation of the 21st GST Council meeting (09.09.2017) were rectified through Notifications 27/2017 and 28/2017, and that these were duly ratified in the 22nd GST Council meeting held on 06.10.2017. Two issues thus arose: whether notifications under Sections 9 and 11 could go beyond the Council's recommendations, and whether the GST Council had the power to ratify such notifications.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 1: "Taxation is often a cat and mouse game between the authority and the assessee. The authority spreads the net and seeks to ensnare the assessee who makes every effort to slip away. The game may witness more than one round with fluctuating fortunes."Para 10 (applying Mohit Minerals): "While the GST Council's function is to make recommendations, the Central Government has the power to issue notifications. From the language of Sections 9 and 11 of the Act, it is seen that the notification by the Government will have to be 'on the recommendations' of the Council. In other words, the notification should be preceded by the recommendations... applying the very same yardstick, the recommendations of the GST Council will bind the Government when it issues statutory notifications under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act."Para 14: "A bare comparison of the notifications with the Council recommendations would show that there has been an addition of the words 'enforceable right in a court of law'... It is too obvious that the expressions 'actionable claim' and 'enforceable right in a court of law' are not synonymous. While actionable claims may be enforceable rights, the vice versa may not hold good... The Government had gone over and above what was recommended by the GST Council... We are of the view that the additions lack the foundation of recommendation and it is not 'on the recommendation' of the GST Council. Thus, the impugned notifications by the Central Government as well as the State Government have to be declared as ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression 'enforceable right in a court of law'. Minus this expression, the notifications are intra vires."Para 16: "The power of GST Council is traceable to Article 279A of the Constitution of India. Article 279A empowers the GST Council to make recommendation with respect to the matters set out in Article 279A(4). The power to ratify has no where been conferred."Para 17 (quoting Marathwada University): "These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified."Para 19–20: "...the power to ratify should also be conferred explicitly or by necessary implication. Neither the Constitution nor any statute has invested the GST Council with the power of ratification. We, therefore, hold that ratification made by the GST Council in 22nd meeting is without jurisdiction... Since the impugned show cause notices are a fallout of the impugned notifications, they are liable to be set aside and stand set aside. Liberty is given to the department to issue fresh show cause notices if they can be issued in terms of the impugned notifications to the extent they have been held valid."VerdictThe writ petitions were allowed. The impugned notifications of the Central and State Governments were declared ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression "enforceable right in a court of law"; minus that expression, the notifications are intra vires. The ratification made by the GST Council in its 22nd meeting was held to be without jurisdiction. The impugned show cause notices, being a fallout of the impugned notifications, were set aside, with liberty to the department to issue fresh SCNs in terms of the notifications to the extent held valid.Cases Referred by the CourtRelied upon / applied by the Court:Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited — (2022) 10 SCC 700 (relied on by both sides; ratio that the Government is bound by GST Council recommendations in rule-making extended to notifications under Sections 9 and 11)State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. Krishnamurthy — (2006) 4 SCC 517 (parameters for striking down subordinate legislation)Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan — (1989) 3 SCC 132 (ratification is alien to exercise of statutory power)Brunda Infra (P) Ltd. vs. Commr. of Central Tax — (2025) 139 GSTR 657 (Telangana HC) (ratification cannot be equated to recommendation; post-issuance ratification gives no life to a notification)Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. vs. Sunil — (2006) 5 SCC 96 (ratification assumes an invalid act retrospectively validated)Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji — (1971) 3 SCC 844 (authorities have no inherent power; power must be conferred)Hartman vs. Hornsby — 142 Mo 368, 44 SW 242, 244 (meaning of "ratification") | ||||
| Guru and Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 15-06-2026 Whether notifications issued by the Central Government under Sections 9 and 11 of the CGST Act, 2017 can travel beyond the recommendations of the GST Council, and whether the GST Council has the power to ratify a notification already issued by the CentralBackgroundThe petitioners are suppliers of pulses (Moong Daal, Toor Daal) selling under brand names not registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Copyright Act, 1957. Under the original 2017 rate notifications, GST attached only to goods "put up in unit container and bearing a registered brand name," so the petitioners' unregistered-brand goods fell outside the tax net, and many traders de-registered brands to escape liability. To plug this, the Government issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and 28/2017 dated 22.09.2017 (and the State issued GO(MS) No. 114), expanding the levy to brands bearing an "actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law." Show cause notices followed, and the petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A and sought to quash the SCNs.FactsThe writ petitioners are suppliers of pulses selling under unregistered brand names. Notification No. 1/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 levied 2.5% Central Tax on dried leguminous vegetables put up in a unit container and bearing a registered brand name, and Notification No. 2/2017 exempted such goods other than those bearing a registered brand name. As the petitioners' goods carried no registered brand name, they were not liable to GST, and a substantial volume of trade in pulses fell outside the tax net.To remedy this, the Ministry of Finance issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and No. 28/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) and Integrated Tax (Rate), all dated 22.09.2017, and the State Government issued GO(MS) No. 114 dated 22.09.2017 (verbatim reproducing the Central notifications), bringing within the levy products bearing a brand name "on which an actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law is available" (other than where such claim or right was voluntarily foregone, subject to the conditions in Annexure I). The impugned show cause notices were issued to the petitioners as a consequence. The petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A to the extent they affected them and sought to quash the SCNs as null and void.The petitioners primarily relied on Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited. The respondents, through the Additional Solicitor General, contended that GST Council recommendations are not binding in the sense that the Government need not reproduce a mirror image, also relying on Mohit Minerals; they submitted that drafting mistakes in the recommendation of the 21st GST Council meeting (09.09.2017) were rectified through Notifications 27/2017 and 28/2017, and that these were duly ratified in the 22nd GST Council meeting held on 06.10.2017. Two issues thus arose: whether notifications under Sections 9 and 11 could go beyond the Council's recommendations, and whether the GST Council had the power to ratify such notifications.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 1: "Taxation is often a cat and mouse game between the authority and the assessee. The authority spreads the net and seeks to ensnare the assessee who makes every effort to slip away. The game may witness more than one round with fluctuating fortunes."Para 10 (applying Mohit Minerals): "While the GST Council's function is to make recommendations, the Central Government has the power to issue notifications. From the language of Sections 9 and 11 of the Act, it is seen that the notification by the Government will have to be 'on the recommendations' of the Council. In other words, the notification should be preceded by the recommendations... applying the very same yardstick, the recommendations of the GST Council will bind the Government when it issues statutory notifications under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act."Para 14: "A bare comparison of the notifications with the Council recommendations would show that there has been an addition of the words 'enforceable right in a court of law'... It is too obvious that the expressions 'actionable claim' and 'enforceable right in a court of law' are not synonymous. While actionable claims may be enforceable rights, the vice versa may not hold good... The Government had gone over and above what was recommended by the GST Council... We are of the view that the additions lack the foundation of recommendation and it is not 'on the recommendation' of the GST Council. Thus, the impugned notifications by the Central Government as well as the State Government have to be declared as ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression 'enforceable right in a court of law'. Minus this expression, the notifications are intra vires."Para 16: "The power of GST Council is traceable to Article 279A of the Constitution of India. Article 279A empowers the GST Council to make recommendation with respect to the matters set out in Article 279A(4). The power to ratify has no where been conferred."Para 17 (quoting Marathwada University): "These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified."Para 19–20: "...the power to ratify should also be conferred explicitly or by necessary implication. Neither the Constitution nor any statute has invested the GST Council with the power of ratification. We, therefore, hold that ratification made by the GST Council in 22nd meeting is without jurisdiction... Since the impugned show cause notices are a fallout of the impugned notifications, they are liable to be set aside and stand set aside. Liberty is given to the department to issue fresh show cause notices if they can be issued in terms of the impugned notifications to the extent they have been held valid."VerdictThe writ petitions were allowed. The impugned notifications of the Central and State Governments were declared ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression "enforceable right in a court of law"; minus that expression, the notifications are intra vires. The ratification made by the GST Council in its 22nd meeting was held to be without jurisdiction. The impugned show cause notices, being a fallout of the impugned notifications, were set aside, with liberty to the department to issue fresh SCNs in terms of the notifications to the extent held valid.Cases Referred by the CourtRelied upon / applied by the Court:Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited — (2022) 10 SCC 700 (relied on by both sides; ratio that the Government is bound by GST Council recommendations in rule-making extended to notifications under Sections 9 and 11)State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. Krishnamurthy — (2006) 4 SCC 517 (parameters for striking down subordinate legislation)Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan — (1989) 3 SCC 132 (ratification is alien to exercise of statutory power)Brunda Infra (P) Ltd. vs. Commr. of Central Tax — (2025) 139 GSTR 657 (Telangana HC) (ratification cannot be equated to recommendation; post-issuance ratification gives no life to a notification)Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. vs. Sunil — (2006) 5 SCC 96 (ratification assumes an invalid act retrospectively validated)Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji — (1971) 3 SCC 844 (authorities have no inherent power; power must be conferred)Hartman vs. Hornsby — 142 Mo 368, 44 SW 242, 244 (meaning of "ratification") | ||||
| 5 | Tvl. Fathima Traders vs. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, | 12-06-2026 | Whether Input Tax Credit can be rejected solely on the ground that the supplier's GST registration was cancelled with retrospective effect, without examining whether the purchaser had established genuine receipt of goods. | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioner challenged three assessment orders dated 05.06.2023 covering three distinct assessment periods (2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22), primarily on the ground that the supplier was a registered person on the date when the relevant transactions took place. ITC had been denied to the petitioner solely because the supplier's GST registration was subsequently cancelled with retrospective effect.FactsThe petitioner assailed the orders dated 05.06.2023 contending that ITC was denied solely on the ground of retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration. The petitioner relied on an earlier order of the same Court dated 15.02.2024 in W.P. No. 3505 of 2024 (M/s. Engineering Tools Corporation v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Vepery), where orders were set aside in substantially similar facts. The Government Counsel responded that some of the invoices from the supplier were issued after the actual cancellation date and that the petitioner had not submitted documents to establish that the supplies were genuinely received. The Court noted that the respondent had admitted, at paragraph 8 of the counter, that the supplier's registration was cancelled by order dated 06.12.2022, that the impugned orders record the date of supply, and that most of the transactions were prior to the cancellation. The impugned orders rejected the ITC claim solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 4 (quoting the earlier order dated 15.02.2024 in Engineering Tools Corporation): "The petitioner purchased goods in 2017-2018 and, at the highest, the petitioner may be called upon to produce evidence of the existence of the supplier at the relevant point of time. In addition, the petitioner may be called upon to prove that the transaction was genuine by providing relevant documents such as tax invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts, delivery challans, proof for payment and the like. In the case at hand, it appears that the petitioner submitted such documents but these documents were disregarded. The impugned assessment order is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances... The ITC claim shall not be rejected upon such reconsideration solely on the ground that the supplier's GST registration was cancelled with retrospective effect..."Para 5: "The orders impugned herein record the date of supply. Most of the transactions are prior thereto. The impugned orders also reject the Input Tax Credit claim of the petitioner solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the petitioner's supplier's registration. For reasons set out in the earlier order dated 15.02.2024, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. In other words, without examining as to whether the petitioner had established supply of goods by submitting invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts and the like, the petitioner's claim should not have been rejected solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the suppliers registration."Para 6: "Hence, orders impugned herein are set aside and the matter is remanded for re-consideration. After providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, fresh order shall be issued within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order."VerdictThe impugned orders dated 05.06.2023 were set aside and the matter remanded for reconsideration. The ITC claim could not be rejected solely on the ground of retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration without examining whether the petitioner had established genuine supply through invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts and the like. A fresh order is to be passed within three months after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity.Cases Referred by the CourtEngineering Tools Corporation v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Vepery, Chennai 600 003 — W.P. No. 3505 of 2024, order dated 15.02.2024 (Madras High Court) — relied upon and followed (no neutral citation furnished in the uploaded copy). | ||||
| Tvl. Fathima Traders vs. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, 12-06-2026 Whether Input Tax Credit can be rejected solely on the ground that the supplier's GST registration was cancelled with retrospective effect, without examining whether the purchaser had established genuine receipt of goods.BackgroundThe petitioner challenged three assessment orders dated 05.06.2023 covering three distinct assessment periods (2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22), primarily on the ground that the supplier was a registered person on the date when the relevant transactions took place. ITC had been denied to the petitioner solely because the supplier's GST registration was subsequently cancelled with retrospective effect.FactsThe petitioner assailed the orders dated 05.06.2023 contending that ITC was denied solely on the ground of retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration. The petitioner relied on an earlier order of the same Court dated 15.02.2024 in W.P. No. 3505 of 2024 (M/s. Engineering Tools Corporation v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Vepery), where orders were set aside in substantially similar facts. The Government Counsel responded that some of the invoices from the supplier were issued after the actual cancellation date and that the petitioner had not submitted documents to establish that the supplies were genuinely received. The Court noted that the respondent had admitted, at paragraph 8 of the counter, that the supplier's registration was cancelled by order dated 06.12.2022, that the impugned orders record the date of supply, and that most of the transactions were prior to the cancellation. The impugned orders rejected the ITC claim solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 4 (quoting the earlier order dated 15.02.2024 in Engineering Tools Corporation): "The petitioner purchased goods in 2017-2018 and, at the highest, the petitioner may be called upon to produce evidence of the existence of the supplier at the relevant point of time. In addition, the petitioner may be called upon to prove that the transaction was genuine by providing relevant documents such as tax invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts, delivery challans, proof for payment and the like. In the case at hand, it appears that the petitioner submitted such documents but these documents were disregarded. The impugned assessment order is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances... The ITC claim shall not be rejected upon such reconsideration solely on the ground that the supplier's GST registration was cancelled with retrospective effect..."Para 5: "The orders impugned herein record the date of supply. Most of the transactions are prior thereto. The impugned orders also reject the Input Tax Credit claim of the petitioner solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the petitioner's supplier's registration. For reasons set out in the earlier order dated 15.02.2024, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. In other words, without examining as to whether the petitioner had established supply of goods by submitting invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts and the like, the petitioner's claim should not have been rejected solely on the ground of the retrospective cancellation of the suppliers registration."Para 6: "Hence, orders impugned herein are set aside and the matter is remanded for re-consideration. After providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, fresh order shall be issued within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order."VerdictThe impugned orders dated 05.06.2023 were set aside and the matter remanded for reconsideration. The ITC claim could not be rejected solely on the ground of retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration without examining whether the petitioner had established genuine supply through invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts and the like. A fresh order is to be passed within three months after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity.Cases Referred by the CourtEngineering Tools Corporation v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Vepery, Chennai 600 003 — W.P. No. 3505 of 2024, order dated 15.02.2024 (Madras High Court) — relied upon and followed (no neutral citation furnished in the uploaded copy). | ||||
| 6 | Noordeen Enterprises & MNS Enterprises vs. Additional Director General, DGGI & Additional Commissioner of CGST, South Commissionerate | 03-06-2026 | Validity of letters issued by DGGI to customers of the petitioner-taxpayers, directing those customers to remit amounts payable to the petitioners directly to the GST authorities — issued at a stage when no order-in-original determining tax liability ha | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioners are suppliers of goods. During the course of investigation by the Directorate of GST Intelligence (DGGI), Chennai Zonal Unit, letters were issued by the respondents directly to the customers of the petitioners, who were liable to make payment to the petitioners in respect of goods supplied. One such customer, upon receipt of such a letter, remitted a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs directly to the GST authorities. This had earlier been the subject matter of W.P. No. 20067 of 2021, wherein the same petitioner (MNS Enterprises) had sought refund of amounts recovered from its customers. That writ petition was disposed of on 04.03.2022 with express findings that such recovery could not have been made either under Section 79(1)(c) or Section 83 of the applicable GST enactments, and the petitioner was granted liberty to apply for refund under Section 54. However, the petitioner did not avail of that remedy. Subsequently, orders-in-original determining tax liability were passed on 28.03.2023, and those orders are subject matter of separate writ petitions. In the present petitions, the petitioners sought a Mandamus directing the respondents to issue a "No Objection Certificate" enabling the petitioners to receive payments from their customers without interference.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the invalidity of letters issued before crystallization of tax liability (Para 4):"From the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is clear that a communication was addressed by DGGI Chennai Zonal Unit to Sumangala Steel. At that time the said communication was issued, a tax proposal had been made, but the same had not crystallised into a tax liability. In those circumstances, by order dated 04.03.2022, this Court recorded findings that neither Section 79(1)(c) nor Section 83 could have been pressed into service."On the petitioner not availing refund remedy (Para 4):"For reasons difficult to discern, said petitioner did not adopt this course of action."Final disposal terms (Para 7):"(i) Any letters issued by the respondents to customers of the respective petitioner, prior to the issuance of the order-in-original determining the tax liability of said petitioner, are invalid and cannot be the basis for further action;""(ii) This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to initiate appropriate action for recovery, including by recourse to Section 79(1)(c) of applicable GST enactments pursuant to the orders-in-original; and""(iii) There shall be no order as to costs."FINAL VERDICTThe High Court declared that all letters issued by DGGI to the petitioners' customers prior to the passing of the order-in-original are invalid and cannot be the basis for any further action. However, the department's right to initiate recovery proceedings including under Section 79(1)(c) after passing of the order-in-original is expressly preserved. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. 👐 | ||||
| Noordeen Enterprises & MNS Enterprises vs. Additional Director General, DGGI & Additional Commissioner of CGST, South Commissionerate 03-06-2026 Validity of letters issued by DGGI to customers of the petitioner-taxpayers, directing those customers to remit amounts payable to the petitioners directly to the GST authorities — issued at a stage when no order-in-original determining tax liability haBACKGROUNDThe petitioners are suppliers of goods. During the course of investigation by the Directorate of GST Intelligence (DGGI), Chennai Zonal Unit, letters were issued by the respondents directly to the customers of the petitioners, who were liable to make payment to the petitioners in respect of goods supplied. One such customer, upon receipt of such a letter, remitted a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs directly to the GST authorities. This had earlier been the subject matter of W.P. No. 20067 of 2021, wherein the same petitioner (MNS Enterprises) had sought refund of amounts recovered from its customers. That writ petition was disposed of on 04.03.2022 with express findings that such recovery could not have been made either under Section 79(1)(c) or Section 83 of the applicable GST enactments, and the petitioner was granted liberty to apply for refund under Section 54. However, the petitioner did not avail of that remedy. Subsequently, orders-in-original determining tax liability were passed on 28.03.2023, and those orders are subject matter of separate writ petitions. In the present petitions, the petitioners sought a Mandamus directing the respondents to issue a "No Objection Certificate" enabling the petitioners to receive payments from their customers without interference.COURT OBSERVATIONS (VERBATIM)On the invalidity of letters issued before crystallization of tax liability (Para 4):"From the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is clear that a communication was addressed by DGGI Chennai Zonal Unit to Sumangala Steel. At that time the said communication was issued, a tax proposal had been made, but the same had not crystallised into a tax liability. In those circumstances, by order dated 04.03.2022, this Court recorded findings that neither Section 79(1)(c) nor Section 83 could have been pressed into service."On the petitioner not availing refund remedy (Para 4):"For reasons difficult to discern, said petitioner did not adopt this course of action."Final disposal terms (Para 7):"(i) Any letters issued by the respondents to customers of the respective petitioner, prior to the issuance of the order-in-original determining the tax liability of said petitioner, are invalid and cannot be the basis for further action;""(ii) This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to initiate appropriate action for recovery, including by recourse to Section 79(1)(c) of applicable GST enactments pursuant to the orders-in-original; and""(iii) There shall be no order as to costs."FINAL VERDICTThe High Court declared that all letters issued by DGGI to the petitioners' customers prior to the passing of the order-in-original are invalid and cannot be the basis for any further action. However, the department's right to initiate recovery proceedings including under Section 79(1)(c) after passing of the order-in-original is expressly preserved. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. 👐 | ||||
| 7 | Tirumala Milk Products Private Limited v. State Tax Officer | 05-03-2026 | Validity of assessment order under Section 74 read with Section 75(7) of the CGST Act, 2017 where demand exceeds show cause notice. Scope of adjudication and limitation on confirming demand beyond proposal in show cause notice | View Download |
Case Facts:The petitioner challenged an order dated 26.12.2025 confirming tax liability for FY 2018–19. The show cause notice proposed a demand of Rs.1.37 crore, whereas the final order confirmed Rs.2.41 crore. The petitioner contended that the order exceeded the scope of the show cause notice. The writ petition was filed seeking quashing of both the show cause notice and consequential order. Court Decision:The Court held that the impugned order was contrary to Section 75(7) as it confirmed demand beyond what was proposed in the show cause notice. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner was directed to file a reply within 30 days and the authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting opportunity. The authority was permitted to proceed in accordance with law in case of non-compliance by the petitioner. | ||||
| Tirumala Milk Products Private Limited v. State Tax Officer 05-03-2026 Validity of assessment order under Section 74 read with Section 75(7) of the CGST Act, 2017 where demand exceeds show cause notice. Scope of adjudication and limitation on confirming demand beyond proposal in show cause noticeCase Facts:The petitioner challenged an order dated 26.12.2025 confirming tax liability for FY 2018–19. The show cause notice proposed a demand of Rs.1.37 crore, whereas the final order confirmed Rs.2.41 crore. The petitioner contended that the order exceeded the scope of the show cause notice. The writ petition was filed seeking quashing of both the show cause notice and consequential order. Court Decision:The Court held that the impugned order was contrary to Section 75(7) as it confirmed demand beyond what was proposed in the show cause notice. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner was directed to file a reply within 30 days and the authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting opportunity. The authority was permitted to proceed in accordance with law in case of non-compliance by the petitioner. | ||||
| 8 | Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. vs Union of India & Others | 05-03-2026 | Validity of Rule 39(1)(a) CGST Rules mandating same-month distribution of ITC by Input Service Distributor (ISD). | View Download |
Facts :The petitioner, a telecom service provider with multiple GST registrations, operated as an Input Service Distributor (ISD) for distribution of common input tax credit across its units. It challenged Rule 39(1)(a) requiring distribution of ITC in the same month as the invoice, both prior to and after amendment to Section 20 w.e.f. 01.04.2025. The petitioner contended that prior to amendment, there was no statutory power to prescribe such time limit and that the requirement was arbitrary and impossible to comply with. Show cause notices were issued alleging improper distribution of ITC not done in the same month as receipt of invoices.Court Decision:The Court upheld the validity of Rule 39(1)(a) of the CGST Rules. It held that prescription of time limit for distribution of ITC is within rule-making power and is a procedural requirement governing distribution mechanism. The requirement of distribution in the same month was held not arbitrary and having nexus with proper administration of GST and prevention of misuse. The Court rejected the contention that such requirement is impossible to comply with and held that ITC is a statutory benefit subject to conditions. The challenge to show cause notices was declined, holding that the petitioner can raise all contentions in adjudication proceedings.Cases Referred:Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam vs K.I. AbrahamJayam & Co. vs Assistant CommissionerUnion of India vs VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.ALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. vs Commercial Tax Officer | ||||
| Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. vs Union of India & Others 05-03-2026 Validity of Rule 39(1)(a) CGST Rules mandating same-month distribution of ITC by Input Service Distributor (ISD).Facts :The petitioner, a telecom service provider with multiple GST registrations, operated as an Input Service Distributor (ISD) for distribution of common input tax credit across its units. It challenged Rule 39(1)(a) requiring distribution of ITC in the same month as the invoice, both prior to and after amendment to Section 20 w.e.f. 01.04.2025. The petitioner contended that prior to amendment, there was no statutory power to prescribe such time limit and that the requirement was arbitrary and impossible to comply with. Show cause notices were issued alleging improper distribution of ITC not done in the same month as receipt of invoices.Court Decision:The Court upheld the validity of Rule 39(1)(a) of the CGST Rules. It held that prescription of time limit for distribution of ITC is within rule-making power and is a procedural requirement governing distribution mechanism. The requirement of distribution in the same month was held not arbitrary and having nexus with proper administration of GST and prevention of misuse. The Court rejected the contention that such requirement is impossible to comply with and held that ITC is a statutory benefit subject to conditions. The challenge to show cause notices was declined, holding that the petitioner can raise all contentions in adjudication proceedings.Cases Referred:Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam vs K.I. AbrahamJayam & Co. vs Assistant CommissionerUnion of India vs VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.ALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. vs Commercial Tax Officer | ||||
| 9 | Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited vs. The Commercial Tax Officer | 26-02-2026 | Challenge to blocking of Input Tax Credit (ITC) under Rule 86A of the GST Rules in the Electronic Credit Ledger of the Petitioner, where the petitioner's own Managing Director's statement indicated availment of ITC on bogus invoices. | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioner, Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited (GSTIN: 33AAGCK4135K1ZK), had its ITC blocked vide Reference No. BL3312250000204 dated 05.12.2025 for the tax period 01.10.2025 to 31.12.2025 under Rule 86A of the GST Rules by the Commercial Tax Officer, Virudhachalam Assessment Circle, Cuddalore.Crucially, on the previous day i.e., 04.12.2025, an inspection was conducted by the authorities, wherein statements were recorded from the petitioner's Managing Director, Ms. R. Kavitha Ramesh, from which it was apparent that the petitioner had been availing ITC on the basis of bogus/block invoices. It was in this background that the ITC was blocked on 05.12.2025.The petitioner raised two grounds before the Court: (i) that there was no valid basis for blocking ITC under Rule 86A; and (ii) that only an Assistant Commissioner or a Senior Officer is competent to block ITC under Rule 86A, and therefore the blocking by the Commercial Tax Officer was without jurisdiction.Court Observations (Verbatim)On the first ground of challenge to blocking:"It is in this background, the Input Tax Credit was blocked on 05.12.2025 vide impugned proceedings. Therefore, the challenge to the blocking of the Input Tax Credit under Rule 86A of the respective GST Rules on this count cannot be countenanced."On the second ground regarding competency/jurisdiction, the Court relied upon the Madurai Bench decision in W.P.(MD).No.21670 of 2025 and quoted the following observations therefrom:"18. Rules 86A(2) contemplates that the Commissioner or the Officer authorised by him under Sub Rule 1, may, upon being satisfied that the condition disallowing the debit of electronic credit no longer existed and allow such credit.19. However, considering the fact that notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01, it is unlikely that the power will be exercised under Rule 86A(2) of the respective GST Rules. The question as to whether the proceedings were within the power of the State Tax Officer and contrary to the requirements of the circular dated 02.11.2021 bearing reference CBEC-20/16/05/2021-GST is concerned, it has to be construed that the senior official would have authorised the blocking of the credit.20. There is a clear embargo under Rule 86A, officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner not to block where credit has been availed fraudulently or the credit is ineligible. However, the blocking would have been made with the permission of the senior in the hierarchy. That apart, it is the internal matter and particularly in the light of the fact that the notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01 dated 07.07.2025 by State Tax Officer. The State Tax Officer is a proper officer for issuance of show cause notice also proper officer under Rule 74. Therefore, the objection on the jurisdiction cannot be countenanced."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the blocking of ITC in view of the Managing Director's own admission during inspection. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a representation before the concerned officer, who shall pass appropriate orders within 30 days of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall be heard before final orders are passed. | ||||
| Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited vs. The Commercial Tax Officer 26-02-2026 Challenge to blocking of Input Tax Credit (ITC) under Rule 86A of the GST Rules in the Electronic Credit Ledger of the Petitioner, where the petitioner's own Managing Director's statement indicated availment of ITC on bogus invoices.BackgroundThe petitioner, Kalaimahal Cements Private Limited (GSTIN: 33AAGCK4135K1ZK), had its ITC blocked vide Reference No. BL3312250000204 dated 05.12.2025 for the tax period 01.10.2025 to 31.12.2025 under Rule 86A of the GST Rules by the Commercial Tax Officer, Virudhachalam Assessment Circle, Cuddalore.Crucially, on the previous day i.e., 04.12.2025, an inspection was conducted by the authorities, wherein statements were recorded from the petitioner's Managing Director, Ms. R. Kavitha Ramesh, from which it was apparent that the petitioner had been availing ITC on the basis of bogus/block invoices. It was in this background that the ITC was blocked on 05.12.2025.The petitioner raised two grounds before the Court: (i) that there was no valid basis for blocking ITC under Rule 86A; and (ii) that only an Assistant Commissioner or a Senior Officer is competent to block ITC under Rule 86A, and therefore the blocking by the Commercial Tax Officer was without jurisdiction.Court Observations (Verbatim)On the first ground of challenge to blocking:"It is in this background, the Input Tax Credit was blocked on 05.12.2025 vide impugned proceedings. Therefore, the challenge to the blocking of the Input Tax Credit under Rule 86A of the respective GST Rules on this count cannot be countenanced."On the second ground regarding competency/jurisdiction, the Court relied upon the Madurai Bench decision in W.P.(MD).No.21670 of 2025 and quoted the following observations therefrom:"18. Rules 86A(2) contemplates that the Commissioner or the Officer authorised by him under Sub Rule 1, may, upon being satisfied that the condition disallowing the debit of electronic credit no longer existed and allow such credit.19. However, considering the fact that notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01, it is unlikely that the power will be exercised under Rule 86A(2) of the respective GST Rules. The question as to whether the proceedings were within the power of the State Tax Officer and contrary to the requirements of the circular dated 02.11.2021 bearing reference CBEC-20/16/05/2021-GST is concerned, it has to be construed that the senior official would have authorised the blocking of the credit.20. There is a clear embargo under Rule 86A, officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner not to block where credit has been availed fraudulently or the credit is ineligible. However, the blocking would have been made with the permission of the senior in the hierarchy. That apart, it is the internal matter and particularly in the light of the fact that the notice has been issued in Form GST DRC 01 dated 07.07.2025 by State Tax Officer. The State Tax Officer is a proper officer for issuance of show cause notice also proper officer under Rule 74. Therefore, the objection on the jurisdiction cannot be countenanced."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the blocking of ITC in view of the Managing Director's own admission during inspection. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a representation before the concerned officer, who shall pass appropriate orders within 30 days of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall be heard before final orders are passed. | ||||
| 10 | Khalid Buhari vs Assistant Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise & Another | 13-02-2026 | Attachment of director’s bank account for company’s GST liability under Section 89 of the CGST Act without giving opportunity to discharge burden of proof. | View Download |
Court Decision:The writ petition challenged the recovery notice dated 25.11.2025 issued in Form GST DRC-13 by which the petitioner’s bank account was attached for the tax liability of M/s. Trans Car India Private Limited, where the petitioner was a Director.The company had earlier suffered an adverse Order-in-Original dated 31.05.2023. The writ petition filed against that order was dismissed with liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Instead of filing the appeal, the company filed a writ appeal which was also dismissed. Since no relief was obtained against the Order-in-Original, the department proceeded to attach the petitioner’s bank account for recovery.The Court examined Section 89 of the CGST Act relating to liability of directors of a private company. The Court held that under Section 89(1), directors can be held jointly and severally liable for unpaid tax of the company if the tax cannot be recovered from the company, unless the director proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty on his part. The burden of proof lies on the director to establish this.The Court held that the petitioner must be given an opportunity to discharge this burden. Therefore, the impugned recovery notice attaching the petitioner’s bank account was quashed and the matter was remitted to the first respondent to pass a fresh order on merits after giving notice and opportunity to the petitioner to file a proper reply explaining why recovery should not be made from him. The authority was directed to complete the process within two weeks from receipt of the order. | ||||
| Khalid Buhari vs Assistant Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise & Another 13-02-2026 Attachment of director’s bank account for company’s GST liability under Section 89 of the CGST Act without giving opportunity to discharge burden of proof.Court Decision:The writ petition challenged the recovery notice dated 25.11.2025 issued in Form GST DRC-13 by which the petitioner’s bank account was attached for the tax liability of M/s. Trans Car India Private Limited, where the petitioner was a Director.The company had earlier suffered an adverse Order-in-Original dated 31.05.2023. The writ petition filed against that order was dismissed with liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Instead of filing the appeal, the company filed a writ appeal which was also dismissed. Since no relief was obtained against the Order-in-Original, the department proceeded to attach the petitioner’s bank account for recovery.The Court examined Section 89 of the CGST Act relating to liability of directors of a private company. The Court held that under Section 89(1), directors can be held jointly and severally liable for unpaid tax of the company if the tax cannot be recovered from the company, unless the director proves that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty on his part. The burden of proof lies on the director to establish this.The Court held that the petitioner must be given an opportunity to discharge this burden. Therefore, the impugned recovery notice attaching the petitioner’s bank account was quashed and the matter was remitted to the first respondent to pass a fresh order on merits after giving notice and opportunity to the petitioner to file a proper reply explaining why recovery should not be made from him. The authority was directed to complete the process within two weeks from receipt of the order. | ||||