BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs.
Andaman Timber Industries vs Commissioner of Central Excise 02-09-2026
BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination. Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable" Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs.
BACKGROUNDThe proceedings originated from audit objections concerning mismatch of Input Tax Credit (ITC) for the three financial years and short payment of tax for FY 2019-20. Communications were exchanged in relation to the audit observations and supporting documents were sought. An SCN was subsequently issued on 13.06.2025 under Section 74 of the CGST Act.The SCN was thereafter transferred to the “call book”, meaning that it was kept in abeyance, and the Department had contested the audit objection before the Public Accounts Committee. A fresh notice was subsequently issued on 01.07.2025, reviving the earlier notice and proposing a protective demand on the ground that the GST proceedings were time-bound.COURT OBSERVATIONSProceedings under Sections 73/74 can be initiated only upon the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Even where an audit raises objections, the Assessing Officer must independently record satisfaction before issuing the notice. For Section 74, the satisfaction must extend to the existence of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression of facts leading to the mismatch or short payment.The Court rejected the Department's reliance on Explanation 2 to Section 74, noting that even according to the Department it had been omitted with effect from 01.11.2024. The Court also rejected the argument that the proceedings had been initiated before expiry of the Section 73 limitation period.The fact that the Department itself had contested the audit objections before the Public Accounts Committee indicated that there was no satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer regarding the mismatch or short payment, much less regarding suppression. The SCN contained only a bland statement alleging suppression and did not provide the foundational facts necessary to substantiate that allegation.The Court held that the extended limitation under Section 74 cannot be invoked merely by mechanically using expressions such as “fraud”, “wilful misrepresentation” or “suppression”. The foundational facts leading to such an inference must be apparent from the SCN itself.In the present case, the SCN did not disclose factual circumstances demonstrating any deliberate device to evade tax or avail excess ITC. The mere allegation of suppression, made to invoke the extended limitation, was insufficient to sustain proceedings under Section 74.FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court set aside the SCN as well as the consequential Order-in-Original dated 26.12.2025. The appeal was accordingly allowed.However, the Court granted liberty to the Department to initiate an appropriate proceeding under Section 74, if considered necessary, provided the foundational facts are set out in the notice itself and the order is passed before 28.02.2027.CASES REFERRED BY COURTIn Re: Cognizance for Extension of LimitationCourt: Supreme Court of IndiaOrder Date: 01 January 2022The Court relied upon the suo motu proceedings to take into account the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation purposes, which affected the computation of the Section 73 limitation period for the relevant financial years.
Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance & Ors. 25-08-2026
BACKGROUNDThe proceedings originated from audit objections concerning mismatch of Input Tax Credit (ITC) for the three financial years and short payment of tax for FY 2019-20. Communications were exchanged in relation to the audit observations and supporting documents were sought. An SCN was subsequently issued on 13.06.2025 under Section 74 of the CGST Act.The SCN was thereafter transferred to the “call book”, meaning that it was kept in abeyance, and the Department had contested the audit objection before the Public Accounts Committee. A fresh notice was subsequently issued on 01.07.2025, reviving the earlier notice and proposing a protective demand on the ground that the GST proceedings were time-bound.COURT OBSERVATIONSProceedings under Sections 73/74 can be initiated only upon the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Even where an audit raises objections, the Assessing Officer must independently record satisfaction before issuing the notice. For Section 74, the satisfaction must extend to the existence of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression of facts leading to the mismatch or short payment.The Court rejected the Department's reliance on Explanation 2 to Section 74, noting that even according to the Department it had been omitted with effect from 01.11.2024. The Court also rejected the argument that the proceedings had been initiated before expiry of the Section 73 limitation period.The fact that the Department itself had contested the audit objections before the Public Accounts Committee indicated that there was no satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer regarding the mismatch or short payment, much less regarding suppression. The SCN contained only a bland statement alleging suppression and did not provide the foundational facts necessary to substantiate that allegation.The Court held that the extended limitation under Section 74 cannot be invoked merely by mechanically using expressions such as “fraud”, “wilful misrepresentation” or “suppression”. The foundational facts leading to such an inference must be apparent from the SCN itself.In the present case, the SCN did not disclose factual circumstances demonstrating any deliberate device to evade tax or avail excess ITC. The mere allegation of suppression, made to invoke the extended limitation, was insufficient to sustain proceedings under Section 74.FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court set aside the SCN as well as the consequential Order-in-Original dated 26.12.2025. The appeal was accordingly allowed.However, the Court granted liberty to the Department to initiate an appropriate proceeding under Section 74, if considered necessary, provided the foundational facts are set out in the notice itself and the order is passed before 28.02.2027.CASES REFERRED BY COURTIn Re: Cognizance for Extension of LimitationCourt: Supreme Court of IndiaOrder Date: 01 January 2022The Court relied upon the suo motu proceedings to take into account the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation purposes, which affected the computation of the Section 73 limitation period for the relevant financial years.
BACKGROUNDThe dispute concerned a show-cause notice dated 13.06.2025 for AY 2018-19. The assessee contended that the notice was beyond Section 73 limitation. The State sought to justify the proceedings under Section 74 by relying on allegations of fraud and suppression elaborated in its counter affidavit.COURT OBSERVATIONSThe Supreme Court held that the Section 73 limitation expired on 28.02.2025 after applying the statutory extensions and the COVID-19 exclusion. The SCN dated 13.06.2025 was therefore beyond Section 73 limitation. The Court further held that Section 74 cannot be invoked merely by mechanically using the words fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression; the factual basis must emanate from the SCN itself.FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal, set aside the High Court's order and quashed the impugned Section 74 show-cause notice.Cases Referred by Court:• Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 — Supreme Court of India — relied upon for exclusion of the COVID-19 period while computing statutory limitation, including the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022.
G.R. Infra Projects Limited, Ratlam v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 19-08-2026
BACKGROUNDThe dispute concerned a show-cause notice dated 13.06.2025 for AY 2018-19. The assessee contended that the notice was beyond Section 73 limitation. The State sought to justify the proceedings under Section 74 by relying on allegations of fraud and suppression elaborated in its counter affidavit.COURT OBSERVATIONSThe Supreme Court held that the Section 73 limitation expired on 28.02.2025 after applying the statutory extensions and the COVID-19 exclusion. The SCN dated 13.06.2025 was therefore beyond Section 73 limitation. The Court further held that Section 74 cannot be invoked merely by mechanically using the words fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression; the factual basis must emanate from the SCN itself.FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal, set aside the High Court's order and quashed the impugned Section 74 show-cause notice.Cases Referred by Court:• Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 — Supreme Court of India — relied upon for exclusion of the COVID-19 period while computing statutory limitation, including the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022.
BackgroundThe matter arose from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 749/2025, which considered the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act in the context of ITC where the supplier fails to pay the requisite tax. The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of the differences between the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the CGST Act, 2017, including the scheme governing availment of ITC under GST.The High Court also considered Section 41 and Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, observing that under the GST regime, reversed ITC could be re-availed after the supplier-dealer discharges the tax liability. The Gujarat High Court consequently found no ground to declare Section 16(2)(c) unconstitutional or to read down its provisions.Court ObservationThe Supreme Court noted that although a special leave petition had been entertained in relation to the Tripura High Court's decision in Sahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors., the exercise undertaken by the Gujarat High Court was materially different. The Supreme Court specifically accepted the Gujarat High Court's detailed distinction between the Delhi VAT Act and the CGST Act and held that there was no possibility of drawing parity between the two enactments for treating a purchasing dealer under the CGST Act on the same footing as a bona fide purchasing dealer under the Delhi VAT Act when the supplier fails to pay tax.The Court further agreed with the Gujarat High Court's consideration of Sections 41, 73 and 74 of the CGST Act regarding re-availment of reversed ITC upon discharge of the supplier's tax liability.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court was fully justified in concluding that no grounds existed to declare Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act unconstitutional or to read down the provision. The Supreme Court expressed its complete and respectful agreement with the Gujarat High Court's view and affirmed and upheld the impugned judgment.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.Case Referred by CourtSahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors. — Tripura High Court, decision referred to as (2026) 154 GSTR 108 (Tri.). The Supreme Court considered the distinction between the Tripura High Court decision and the Gujarat High Court's analysis in the present matter.
Bhandari Scrap Traders v. Union of India & Ors. 24-07-2026
BackgroundThe matter arose from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 749/2025, which considered the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act in the context of ITC where the supplier fails to pay the requisite tax. The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of the differences between the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the CGST Act, 2017, including the scheme governing availment of ITC under GST.The High Court also considered Section 41 and Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, observing that under the GST regime, reversed ITC could be re-availed after the supplier-dealer discharges the tax liability. The Gujarat High Court consequently found no ground to declare Section 16(2)(c) unconstitutional or to read down its provisions.Court ObservationThe Supreme Court noted that although a special leave petition had been entertained in relation to the Tripura High Court's decision in Sahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors., the exercise undertaken by the Gujarat High Court was materially different. The Supreme Court specifically accepted the Gujarat High Court's detailed distinction between the Delhi VAT Act and the CGST Act and held that there was no possibility of drawing parity between the two enactments for treating a purchasing dealer under the CGST Act on the same footing as a bona fide purchasing dealer under the Delhi VAT Act when the supplier fails to pay tax.The Court further agreed with the Gujarat High Court's consideration of Sections 41, 73 and 74 of the CGST Act regarding re-availment of reversed ITC upon discharge of the supplier's tax liability.Final VerdictThe Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court was fully justified in concluding that no grounds existed to declare Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act unconstitutional or to read down the provision. The Supreme Court expressed its complete and respectful agreement with the Gujarat High Court's view and affirmed and upheld the impugned judgment.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.Case Referred by CourtSahil Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors. — Tripura High Court, decision referred to as (2026) 154 GSTR 108 (Tri.). The Supreme Court considered the distinction between the Tripura High Court decision and the Gujarat High Court's analysis in the present matter.
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant’s son (the detenu) was detained at the airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular issued against him on 13.12.2024. The circular arose out of FIR registered at Punjab, for offences punishable under Sections 66, 72 and 84-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 78(1)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the release of his son.While disposing of that writ petition by order dated 19.12.2024, the High Court observed that, ex-facie, Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act. Aggrieved by this observation alone, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which issued a limited notice confined to the legal issue concerning Section 66 of the IT Act — the provision the High Court had treated as non-bailable. After hearing counsel for both parties, the Court took up that single question for consideration.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S “In our considered view, the High Court did not take into consideration Section 77B of the IT Act, which has to be read to ascertain the nature of offence provided under Section 66 of the IT Act.”“In such view of the matter, the view expressed by High Court that Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act, stands set aside.”F I N A L V E R D I C TThe Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s observation that Section 66 of the IT Act is not a bailable offence, holding that Section 77B of the IT Act must be read to ascertain the nature of the offence under Section 66. The appeal was disposed of with this clarification.Sections 66 & 77B, IT Act, 2000 – Strictly on the order, the Court held that whether the offence under Section 66 is bailable cannot be determined without reading Section 77B.
Maharaj Saran v. State of Punjab & Ors. 16-07-2026
B A C K G R O U N DThe appellant’s son (the detenu) was detained at the airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular issued against him on 13.12.2024. The circular arose out of FIR registered at Punjab, for offences punishable under Sections 66, 72 and 84-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 78(1)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the release of his son.While disposing of that writ petition by order dated 19.12.2024, the High Court observed that, ex-facie, Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act. Aggrieved by this observation alone, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which issued a limited notice confined to the legal issue concerning Section 66 of the IT Act — the provision the High Court had treated as non-bailable. After hearing counsel for both parties, the Court took up that single question for consideration.C O U R T O B S E R V A T I O N S “In our considered view, the High Court did not take into consideration Section 77B of the IT Act, which has to be read to ascertain the nature of offence provided under Section 66 of the IT Act.”“In such view of the matter, the view expressed by High Court that Section 66 of the IT Act has not been defined as a bailable offence under the IT Act, stands set aside.”F I N A L V E R D I C TThe Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s observation that Section 66 of the IT Act is not a bailable offence, holding that Section 77B of the IT Act must be read to ascertain the nature of the offence under Section 66. The appeal was disposed of with this clarification.Sections 66 & 77B, IT Act, 2000 – Strictly on the order, the Court held that whether the offence under Section 66 is bailable cannot be determined without reading Section 77B.
BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vS Bambino Agro Industries Ltd & Anr. 29-05-2026
BACKGROUNDThe Allahabad High Court passed a final judgment dated 19-12-2025. The case-type ("WT") indicates a tax-related writ; the substantive tax issue decided by the High Court is not set out in this order. As the State of Uttar Pradesh is the petitioner before the Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was evidently adverse to the State / in favour of the assessee, prompting this challenge.FACTSThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed this Special Leave Petition against the Allahabad High Court order dated 19-12-2025. The petition came with applications for condonation of delay in refiling / curing defects and for exemption from filing the official translation. The matter was listed for admission on 29-05-2026. No appearance was recorded for the respondents (the assessee). The Court disposed of the admission-stage applications and passed interim directions; no issue was decided on merits.COURT OBSERVATIONS (verbatim)"1. Delay condoned.2. Issue notice, returnable after ten weeks.3. There shall be stay of the impugned order till the next date of hearing."FINAL VERDICTDelay condoned; notice issued returnable after ten weeks; and stay granted on the operation of the impugned Allahabad High Court order until the next date of hearing. The matter remains pending and no finding has been rendered on the merits.
BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding
Pune Bar Association vs. Union of India and Others 22-05-2026
BackgroundSection 65B of the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governed admissibility of electronic records. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced it with Section 63(4), which introduced an enhanced certification requirement — Part A requiring disclosure of the hash value of the electronic/digital record, and Part B requiring a declaration signed by an expert. The Pune Bar Association filed this writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging Section 63(4) read with the Schedule as unconstitutional, contending it imposes an onerous and impossible obligation on ordinary litigants. The Madras High Court in R. v. B & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 had additionally held that the "expert" signing Part B must exclusively be an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which the petitioner contended made the provision even more unworkable as only a handful of such entities are notified by the government. Crucial FactsThe petitioner contended that the requirement of disclosing the hash value of digital records in Part A and obtaining a declaration from a notified expert under Section 79A of the IT Act in Part B renders Section 63(4) manifestly arbitrary and unjust, making admissibility of electronic records illusory in practice for ordinary litigants. The Court examined the rationale behind the hash value requirement and the expert certification requirement. The Court also examined the interplay between Section 39(1) and Section 39(2) of the BSA — Section 39(1) dealing with opinions of persons with special skill in any field, and Section 39(2) specifically dealing with Examiners of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act. The Court noted that Section 39(2), unlike Sections 63(4) and the erstwhile 65B, is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause, meaning Section 39(1) is not excluded from the domain of electronic records — thereby allowing courts to accept opinions of other suitably qualified persons as expert opinion even if not notified under Section 79A. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial)Para 4: "Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness."Para 7: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert.""We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.""Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent." inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open." Final VerdictWrit petition disposed of without admission. Section 63(4) of BSA upheld as constitutionally valid — not manifestly arbitrary. The Madras HC finding that Part B must be signed exclusively by a Section 79A notified expert declared not a binding precedent. Question of law kept open. Petition dismissed at threshold — against the petitioner. 👎Cases Referred by Court# Case Name Citation1 R. v. B & Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084 (Madras HC) — finding declared not binding
BACKGROUNDTata Steel Limited filed a Writ Petition (WPT No. 2485/2026) before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, which was decided against it vide order dated 23-04-2026. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The core issue revolves around the question of alternative remedy in the context of proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — a provision dealing with determination of tax not paid or short paid on account of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner's senior counsel submitted before the Supreme Court that the identical question of law — i.e., whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — is already pending consideration before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025. Given this, the petitioner sought a stay on further proceedings before the lower forum and prayed that this matter be tagged along with the earlier SLP. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Mr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that identical issue about alternative remedy arising out of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 is pending consideration before this Court.""Till next date of hearing, the further proceedings shall remain stayed. The interim order is subject to the Court hearing SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025 being satisfied that the issues in this case are similar to SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025." FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court issued notice, directed the matter to be listed along with SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025, and stayed further proceedings till the next date of hearing — subject to the Court being satisfied that the issues in the present case are similar to those in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025.👐 FLAT (Interim stay granted — conditional; neither a final victory nor a loss for the assessee)
Tata Steel Limited vs. Union of India & Ors. 23-04-2026
BACKGROUNDTata Steel Limited filed a Writ Petition (WPT No. 2485/2026) before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, which was decided against it vide order dated 23-04-2026. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. The core issue revolves around the question of alternative remedy in the context of proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — a provision dealing with determination of tax not paid or short paid on account of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner's senior counsel submitted before the Supreme Court that the identical question of law — i.e., whether a writ petition is maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 — is already pending consideration before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025. Given this, the petitioner sought a stay on further proceedings before the lower forum and prayed that this matter be tagged along with the earlier SLP. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Mr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that identical issue about alternative remedy arising out of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 is pending consideration before this Court.""Till next date of hearing, the further proceedings shall remain stayed. The interim order is subject to the Court hearing SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025 being satisfied that the issues in this case are similar to SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025." FINAL VERDICTThe Supreme Court issued notice, directed the matter to be listed along with SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025, and stayed further proceedings till the next date of hearing — subject to the Court being satisfied that the issues in the present case are similar to those in SLP (C) No. 33594 of 2025.👐 FLAT (Interim stay granted — conditional; neither a final victory nor a loss for the assessee)
Case Facts:The department issued two show cause notices raising substantial tax, interest, and penalty demands against the petitioner. The petitioner sought documents relied upon in the notices, but claimed inability to access them as they were uploaded on a different portal. Due to this, no reply was filed and ex parte assessment orders were passed creating liability of about Rs. 159 crore. The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition citing availability of alternative remedy under Section 107 requiring pre-deposit. Court Decision:The Court noted the petitioner’s grievance regarding lack of opportunity and financial difficulty in complying with the statutory pre-deposit. It directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 3.50 crore within two weeks as a condition for further consideration of the matter. Upon such deposit, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents. The Court further ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken pursuant to the assessment orders subject to deposit.
Simla Gomti Pan Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax U.P. & Ors. 20-03-2026
Case Facts:The department issued two show cause notices raising substantial tax, interest, and penalty demands against the petitioner. The petitioner sought documents relied upon in the notices, but claimed inability to access them as they were uploaded on a different portal. Due to this, no reply was filed and ex parte assessment orders were passed creating liability of about Rs. 159 crore. The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition citing availability of alternative remedy under Section 107 requiring pre-deposit. Court Decision:The Court noted the petitioner’s grievance regarding lack of opportunity and financial difficulty in complying with the statutory pre-deposit. It directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 3.50 crore within two weeks as a condition for further consideration of the matter. Upon such deposit, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents. The Court further ordered that no coercive steps shall be taken pursuant to the assessment orders subject to deposit.
Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited 13-03-2026
Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
