Facts of the CaseThe matter arose from a Special Leave Petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. During the hearing, an important legal question emerged regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence and the necessity of videography at crime scenes. The Court also considered whether the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic records.In earlier proceedings, the Court had recorded submissions from the Additional Solicitor General regarding the usefulness of videography in crime scene investigation. It was noted that videography and digital photography could enhance transparency and accuracy in investigation. The Union Government had also constituted a Committee of Experts to prepare a roadmap and Standard Operating Procedure for videography at crime scenes.Simultaneously, a legal issue arose in connected matters concerning the interpretation of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The apprehension expressed was that if the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) was treated as mandatory in all circumstances, electronic evidence produced by a person not in control of the device would be excluded, resulting in denial of justice.The questions decided by the Court were:Whether electronic evidence is admissible only in compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act.Whether the certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory in all cases.Whether procedural requirements under Section 65B can be relaxed in appropriate cases.Court Observations and DecisionThe Court examined earlier decisions dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence. It noted that electronic evidence is admissible subject to safeguards regarding authenticity and reliability. The Court observed that Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions intended to supplement the law on admissibility of electronic records.The Court clarified that primary electronic evidence is admissible under Section 62 of the Evidence Act and is not governed by Section 65B. Section 65B applies to secondary electronic evidence.Importantly, the Court held that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory. The requirement applies when electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in possession and control of the device from which the electronic record is generated and is capable of producing such certificate.Where electronic evidence is produced by a person who is not in possession of the device, Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act can be invoked. In such cases, insisting on a certificate under Section 65B(4) would result in denial of justice.The Court clarified the legal position that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is procedural and can be relaxed by the Court in the interest of justice. Electronic evidence cannot be excluded merely on technical grounds if it is otherwise relevant and authentic.Case ReferredRam Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, Supreme Court of India.R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, Court of Criminal Appeal (UK).R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699, Court of Appeal (UK).Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, Supreme Court of India.Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Supreme Court of India.Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, Supreme Court of India.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, Supreme Court of India.

Facts :A search and seizure operation was conducted on the assessee, followed by block assessment determining undisclosed income. The Assessing Officer later sought to levy surcharge through rectification and revision proceedings. The assessee challenged the levy, contending that the proviso to Section 113 (inserted in 2002) could not apply to earlier block periods. The Tribunal and High Court held the proviso to be prospective, leading to appeal before the Supreme Court.Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 113 is prospective and not clarificatory. It ruled that prior to insertion of the proviso, levy of surcharge on block assessment was ambiguous and uncertain, particularly regarding the applicable Finance Act and rate. Since the proviso imposed an additional tax burden, it could not be applied retrospectively in absence of clear legislative intent. The Court also emphasized the principle that taxing statutes are presumed to be prospective unless expressly stated otherwise, and rejected the earlier view in Suresh N. Gupta treating the proviso as clarificatory.Cases Referred:Commissioner of Income Tax v. Suresh N. GuptaCommissioner of Income Tax v. Sanjiv BhataraGovinddas v. Income Tax OfficerController of Estate Duty v. M.A. MerchantCIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.Govindasaran Gangasaran v. Commissioner of Income TaxKeshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal BhagwandasGovernment of India v. Indian Tobacco AssociationVijay v. State of MaharashtraPhillips v. EyreL’Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.

Background: The issue before the Court was whether “soft serve” dispensed at McDonald’s outlets was classifiable as “ice-cream” under Heading 2105.00, attracting excise duty at 16%, or under Heading 04.04 or the residuary Heading 2108.91. For the period April 1997 to March 2000, the Revenue issued show-cause notices proposing classification under Heading 2105.00. The Tribunal instead classified the product under Heading 2108.91, relying on technical literature and the standards under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955, including the product’s lower milk-fat content. The Supreme Court held that neither the relevant tariff entries nor their notes prescribed a technical definition or specifications for “ice-cream”; therefore, classification had to be determined by the common-parlance or commercial-understanding test. The product’s marketing as “soft serve” and its technical composition were not decisive because an average consumer would understand and consume it as ice-cream or softy ice-cream. The Court emphasised that “mere semantics cannot change the nature of a product” as perceived in the market.Final Verdict: The Supreme Court allowed the Revenue’s appeals and set aside the Tribunal’s orders, holding that “soft serve” marketed by the assessee during the relevant period was classifiable under Heading 2105.00 as “ice-cream”. The Court held that the Tribunal had erred in law by placing the product under the residuary Heading 2108.91 instead of applying the common-parlance test. The assessee’s claim for exemption under Notification No. 16/2003-CE (NT) was not entertained as it had not been urged before the Tribunal; the Court further observed that the notification did not apply because duty was being levied in this case. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue and upheld the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal classifying the goods as jute carpets.The Court held that:The carpets manufactured by the respondent contained more than 50% jute by weight and had no separate base fabric, as established by reports of the Indian Jute Industries Research Association and the Department’s Chemical Examiner.Since the goods fell under Chapter 57 and consisted of more than one textile material, classification had to be determined in accordance with Section Note 2(A) and Section Note 14(A) of Section XI of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, which mandate classification based on the textile material predominating by weight. As jute predominated over each other single textile material, the carpets were classifiable as jute carpets.Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 57 only defines “carpets and other textile floor coverings” for the purpose of that Chapter and cannot override the predominance test for classification.The Revenue’s attempt to classify the goods under the residuary sub-heading was rejected. The Court reiterated that when goods reasonably fall under a specific heading, they cannot be classified under a residuary entry.The argument based on the “essential character” or “surface test” was rejected, as predominance by weight was the governing principle under the statutory notes.The plea based on Rule 3 of the Rules for Interpretation of the Schedule was rejected, as classification was clear from the Section and Chapter Notes, and Rule 3 applies only when classification cannot be determined otherwise. Further, a case not made out in the show cause notice cannot be argued subsequently.The Court found no perversity in the concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal and affirmed the classification as jute carpets.Cases Referred by Court:HPL Chemicals Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh (2006) 5 SCC 208Dunlop India Ltd. vs Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241Bharat Forge and Press Industries (P) Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise (1990) 1 SCC 532Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad vs Fenoplast (P) Ltd. (1994) 72 ELT 513 (SC)M/s Indo International Industries vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 528Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Simplex Mills Co. Ltd. (2005) 3 SCC 51Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs Toyo Engineering India Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 592Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 89Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716Novopan India Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606Hindustan Poles Corporation vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2006) 4 SCC 85Kemrock Industries & Exports Ltd. vs Commissioner of Central Excise (2007) 9 SCC 52

BackgroundThe appellant, a company with its registered office at Mumbai, had availed a loan from the Bhopal branch of State Bank of India. The respondent issued a notice for repayment of the loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). Questioning the constitutional validity of the said Act, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court challenging that dismissal. Crucial FactsThe sole submission of the appellant, both before the High Court and the Supreme Court, was that since the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act was under challenge, the Delhi High Court had requisite jurisdiction as Parliament sits in Delhi. No part of the cause of action — neither the loan, nor the notice of demand, nor any executive action — arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The registered office of the appellant was in Mumbai and the demand notice was issued from Bhopal. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner."— S.B. Sinha, J."A writ petition, however, questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act shall not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi only because the seat of the Union of India is in Delhi."— S.B. Sinha, J. (Citing Abdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354)"Situs of office of the Parliament, Legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof."— S.B. Sinha, J."The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court."— S.B. Sinha, J."When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place."— S.B. Sinha, J."Even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens."— S.B. Sinha, J. (On Forum Conveniens) Note — Overruled DecisionThe view in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. (1995) 4 SCC 738 — that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government confers jurisdiction on the High Court — was expressly overruled to the extent it held otherwise. Final Verdict👎 Appeal dismissed. The Delhi High Court rightly declined jurisdiction as no cause of action — neither wholly nor in part — arose within its territorial limits. Mere location of Parliament in Delhi does not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging a Parliamentary enactment. No costs. Cases Referred by the CourtMussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh — 15 IA 156 — Definition and scope of cause of actionOil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. — (1994) 4 SCC 711 — Territorial jurisdiction; integral facts testState of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr. — (1985) 3 SCC 217 — Mere service of notice not integral cause of actionAligarh Muslim University & Anr. vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. — (1994) 4 SCC 710 — Abuse of jurisdictionUnion of India & Ors. vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr. — (2002) 1 SCC 567 — Integral facts must form cause of action for High Court jurisdictionNational Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s. Haribox Swalram & Ors. — JT 2004 (4) SC 508 — Mere carrying on of business at a place not integral cause of actionAbdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India & Ors. — AIR 1979 Cal 354 — Delhi HC not automatically having jurisdiction over Parliament seatNasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal — AIR 1976 SC 331 — Cause of action; appellate order situs (distinguished)U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. & Ors. — (1995) 4 SCC 738 — Overruled to the extent of holding situs of notification issuance as conferring jurisdictionLt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. The Union of India & Anr. — (1961) 2 SCR 828 — Pre-Art.226(2) amendment; distinguished on facts