Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited 13-03-2026
Facts:The respondent purchasing dealers claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases made from various sellers. The Assessing Officer disallowed ITC on the ground that several selling dealers were deregistered, had not filed returns, or denied transactions, raising doubts about genuineness. The first Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance. However, the Tribunal and High Court allowed ITC primarily on the basis of invoices and payments through cheques. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the burden under Section 70 lies on the purchasing dealer to prove the genuineness of transactions. Mere production of invoices or payment through banking channels is not sufficient. The dealer must establish actual physical movement of goods and provide supporting evidence such as transport details, delivery acknowledgment, and seller details. Since the purchasing dealers failed to discharge this burden, the Court set aside the High Court and Tribunal orders and restored the disallowance of ITC by the Assessing Officer. Cases Referred by Court:• Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala (2009) 19 VST 84 (SC) • Bhagadia Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Karnataka High Court) • Madhav Steel Corporation v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • Shreeji Impex v. State of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court) • On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 28-02-2026
Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:• State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan • Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh • Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher • Ajwar v. Waseem • Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar • P v. State of Madhya Pradesh • Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana • Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee • Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh • Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh • Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar • Disha v. State of Gujarat • K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police • Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha
BACKGROUND The assessee had made a statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Jharkhand GST Act, 2017 for maintaining an appeal before the appellate authority, in which it thereafter succeeded. The assessee then sought refund of the pre-deposit amount. The High Court of Jharkhand, while granting relief, interpreted and applied Section 54 of the Jharkhand GST Act to order the refund. The State of Jharkhand challenged this before the Supreme Court, contending that the refund of statutory pre-deposit in such a case is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and that Section 54 had no application in this context. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel that the subject refund was relatable to Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and to that extent, the exercise undertaken by the High Court with regard to Section 54 thereof was unnecessary." FINAL VERDICT The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interpretation of Section 54 as unnecessary in this context, clarified that refund of statutory pre-deposit on success in appeal is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and directed refund of the amount with interest within four weeks. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. ↔️
State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. BLA Infrastructure Private Limited 09-01-2026
BACKGROUND The assessee had made a statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Jharkhand GST Act, 2017 for maintaining an appeal before the appellate authority, in which it thereafter succeeded. The assessee then sought refund of the pre-deposit amount. The High Court of Jharkhand, while granting relief, interpreted and applied Section 54 of the Jharkhand GST Act to order the refund. The State of Jharkhand challenged this before the Supreme Court, contending that the refund of statutory pre-deposit in such a case is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and that Section 54 had no application in this context. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel that the subject refund was relatable to Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and to that extent, the exercise undertaken by the High Court with regard to Section 54 thereof was unnecessary." FINAL VERDICT The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interpretation of Section 54 as unnecessary in this context, clarified that refund of statutory pre-deposit on success in appeal is governed by Section 107(6) read with Section 115 of the Jharkhand GST Act, and directed refund of the amount with interest within four weeks. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. ↔️
Facts:An FIR was registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police alleging that the accused induced a large number of investors by falsely claiming divine powers to triple their money. Around 1,852 victims were cheated of approximately ₹46.40 crores. The police registered a single FIR and treated complaints of other victims as statements during investigation. The Delhi High Court held that each deposit constituted a separate transaction requiring separate FIRs. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court was premature as the investigation had not concluded. The Court observed that whether multiple acts constitute the “same transaction” must be determined based on the facts emerging from the investigation.The Court noted that when offences arise from a common conspiracy and may form part of the same transaction, it is permissible to register one FIR and treat subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC. The police were justified in registering a single FIR alleging criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and treating complaints of other victims as statements.The Court clarified that the Magistrate will determine at the stage of framing of charges whether the acts constitute the same transaction under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, enabling joint trial. If the acts are distinct transactions, separate trials may be conducted subject to Section 219 CrPC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s answers which mandated separate FIRs for each transaction and allowed the appeal filed by the State.Cases Referred by Court:• S. Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras• Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India• State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao• State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav• Amish Devgan vs. Union of India• T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala• Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India• Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India• Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka• Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab• Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar• Satinder Singh Bhasin vs. State of Uttar Pradesh• Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana• Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi• Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India
The State (NCT) of Delhi vs. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 06-01-2026
Facts:An FIR was registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police alleging that the accused induced a large number of investors by falsely claiming divine powers to triple their money. Around 1,852 victims were cheated of approximately ₹46.40 crores. The police registered a single FIR and treated complaints of other victims as statements during investigation. The Delhi High Court held that each deposit constituted a separate transaction requiring separate FIRs. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court was premature as the investigation had not concluded. The Court observed that whether multiple acts constitute the “same transaction” must be determined based on the facts emerging from the investigation.The Court noted that when offences arise from a common conspiracy and may form part of the same transaction, it is permissible to register one FIR and treat subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC. The police were justified in registering a single FIR alleging criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and treating complaints of other victims as statements.The Court clarified that the Magistrate will determine at the stage of framing of charges whether the acts constitute the same transaction under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, enabling joint trial. If the acts are distinct transactions, separate trials may be conducted subject to Section 219 CrPC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s answers which mandated separate FIRs for each transaction and allowed the appeal filed by the State.Cases Referred by Court:• S. Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras• Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India• State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao• State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav• Amish Devgan vs. Union of India• T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala• Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India• Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India• Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka• Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab• Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar• Satinder Singh Bhasin vs. State of Uttar Pradesh• Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana• Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi• Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India
Facts The issue before the Court was whether purchasing dealers who paid tax to registered selling dealers are entitled to Input Tax Credit even if the selling dealers failed to deposit the tax with the Government. The selling dealers were registered at the time of transactions but later defaulted and their registrations were cancelled. The Delhi High Court held that the purchasing dealers were bona fide and entitled to ITC. The Revenue challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision. It held that where transactions and invoices are genuine and the selling dealer was registered at the time of transaction, ITC cannot be denied to bona fide purchasing dealers. The Court found no reason to interfere with the grant of ITC after due verification. Cases Referred by Court:• On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Ltd.
Commissioner of Trade and Tax, Delhi v. Shanti Kiran India (P) Ltd. 09-10-2025
Facts The issue before the Court was whether purchasing dealers who paid tax to registered selling dealers are entitled to Input Tax Credit even if the selling dealers failed to deposit the tax with the Government. The selling dealers were registered at the time of transactions but later defaulted and their registrations were cancelled. The Delhi High Court held that the purchasing dealers were bona fide and entitled to ITC. The Revenue challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Court Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision. It held that where transactions and invoices are genuine and the selling dealer was registered at the time of transaction, ITC cannot be denied to bona fide purchasing dealers. The Court found no reason to interfere with the grant of ITC after due verification. Cases Referred by Court:• On Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Ltd.
BackgroundThe appellant’s bank accounts were provisionally attached by orders dated 17.10.2023 and 26.10.2023. Its objection dated 01.05.2024 under Rule 159(5) was never decided. When the attachments lapsed by efflux of one year, the respondent issued fresh attachment orders dated 13.11.2024 and 18.12.2024 describing them as a ‘renewal’, alleging large-scale fraud and apprehension of non-recovery. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the law places no embargo on a second attachment after the first lapses.Final VerdictEndorsing Radha Krishan Industries on Section 83(1), the Supreme Court held that an authority exercising this draconian power must be empowered by statute or by executive instructions; absence of a prohibition is no source of power. Unlike Section 11DDA of the Central Excise Act and Section 28BA of the Customs Act, Section 83 contains no provision for extension, and permitting a fresh order after lapse would render Section 83(2) otiose; a fresh order on substantially the same grounds would do indirectly what cannot be done directly – “old wine in a new bottle”. Provisional attachment is a pre-emptive measure, not a recovery tool, and one year is enough for the revenue to conclude its investigation. The Court held that when a statute does not provide for an extension, renewal, re-issuance, revival – whatever be the nomenclature – the executive cannot overreach the statute, approved the Kerala High Court in Ali K., and noted with concern that debit freezes continue after the statutory lapse, as also flagged in the GST Council’s 53rd meeting agenda. The impugned attachment orders were set aside and the bank accounts directed to be de-freezed forthwith; the investigation may continue in accordance with law.
Kesari Nandan Mobile v. Office of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax (2), Enforcement Division – 5 14-08-2025
BackgroundThe appellant’s bank accounts were provisionally attached by orders dated 17.10.2023 and 26.10.2023. Its objection dated 01.05.2024 under Rule 159(5) was never decided. When the attachments lapsed by efflux of one year, the respondent issued fresh attachment orders dated 13.11.2024 and 18.12.2024 describing them as a ‘renewal’, alleging large-scale fraud and apprehension of non-recovery. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the law places no embargo on a second attachment after the first lapses.Final VerdictEndorsing Radha Krishan Industries on Section 83(1), the Supreme Court held that an authority exercising this draconian power must be empowered by statute or by executive instructions; absence of a prohibition is no source of power. Unlike Section 11DDA of the Central Excise Act and Section 28BA of the Customs Act, Section 83 contains no provision for extension, and permitting a fresh order after lapse would render Section 83(2) otiose; a fresh order on substantially the same grounds would do indirectly what cannot be done directly – “old wine in a new bottle”. Provisional attachment is a pre-emptive measure, not a recovery tool, and one year is enough for the revenue to conclude its investigation. The Court held that when a statute does not provide for an extension, renewal, re-issuance, revival – whatever be the nomenclature – the executive cannot overreach the statute, approved the Kerala High Court in Ali K., and noted with concern that debit freezes continue after the statutory lapse, as also flagged in the GST Council’s 53rd meeting agenda. The impugned attachment orders were set aside and the bank accounts directed to be de-freezed forthwith; the investigation may continue in accordance with law.
BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.
Gajanan Dattatray Gore v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 28-07-2025
BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.
Facts :The petitioner company received a show cause notice under Section 73 CGST Act from State GST authorities for alleged tax shortfall and excess ITC.Subsequently, Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued summons under Section 70 requiring production of documents.The petitioner challenged the summons before Delhi High Court, contending that parallel proceedings on the same subject matter were barred under Section 6(2)(b).The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that summons and investigation are not “proceedings”.Court Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the SLP.It held that issuance of summons under Section 70 is part of inquiry/investigation and cannot be equated with “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b).“Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74.Summons is only a step to collect evidence and precedes formal proceedings; hence, no bar on parallel inquiry by another authority.The Court interpreted Section 6 within the framework of “single interface” and “cross-empowerment”, holding that intelligence-based enforcement actions can be initiated by both Central and State authorities.Cases Referred:G.K. Trading v. Union of IndiaKuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST IntelligenceAnurag Suri v. Director General of GST IntelligenceIndo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek PrasadK.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax OfficerRais Khan v. Addl. CommissionerM/s R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGSTTvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. GST Council SecretariatVivek Narsaria v. State of JharkhandStalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaKundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P.Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd.K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT
Armour Security (India) Ltd. vs Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr. 06-03-2025
Facts :The petitioner company received a show cause notice under Section 73 CGST Act from State GST authorities for alleged tax shortfall and excess ITC.Subsequently, Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued summons under Section 70 requiring production of documents.The petitioner challenged the summons before Delhi High Court, contending that parallel proceedings on the same subject matter were barred under Section 6(2)(b).The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that summons and investigation are not “proceedings”.Court Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the SLP.It held that issuance of summons under Section 70 is part of inquiry/investigation and cannot be equated with “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b).“Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74.Summons is only a step to collect evidence and precedes formal proceedings; hence, no bar on parallel inquiry by another authority.The Court interpreted Section 6 within the framework of “single interface” and “cross-empowerment”, holding that intelligence-based enforcement actions can be initiated by both Central and State authorities.Cases Referred:G.K. Trading v. Union of IndiaKuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST IntelligenceAnurag Suri v. Director General of GST IntelligenceIndo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek PrasadK.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax OfficerRais Khan v. Addl. CommissionerM/s R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGSTTvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. GST Council SecretariatVivek Narsaria v. State of JharkhandStalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaKundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P.Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd.K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT
Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.
Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.
Court DecisionThe Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Bombay High Court.The Court noted that the High Court had quashed the show cause notices seeking recovery of ₹3731 crores from the respondent, holding that:The basic jurisdictional requirements were not attracted for invoking Section 122(1A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act.No principle of vicarious liability could be read into Sections 122 and 137.The respondent was merely an employee and could not be fastened with the liability alleged against the company.The Supreme Court held that it saw no good reason to interfere with the common impugned orders passed by the High Court.However, the Court clarified that the question of law regarding the interpretation of Sections 122(1A) and 137 of the CGST Act was kept open.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed and pending applications were disposed of. Cases Referred by the CourtShantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India & Ors., WPL Nos. 30198/2023, 30199/2023, 30200/2023 & 30241/2023 (Bombay High Court, judgment dated 28 March 2024)
Union of India & Ors. vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari & Anr. Etc. 24-01-2025
Court DecisionThe Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Bombay High Court.The Court noted that the High Court had quashed the show cause notices seeking recovery of ₹3731 crores from the respondent, holding that:The basic jurisdictional requirements were not attracted for invoking Section 122(1A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act.No principle of vicarious liability could be read into Sections 122 and 137.The respondent was merely an employee and could not be fastened with the liability alleged against the company.The Supreme Court held that it saw no good reason to interfere with the common impugned orders passed by the High Court.However, the Court clarified that the question of law regarding the interpretation of Sections 122(1A) and 137 of the CGST Act was kept open.Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed and pending applications were disposed of. Cases Referred by the CourtShantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India & Ors., WPL Nos. 30198/2023, 30199/2023, 30200/2023 & 30241/2023 (Bombay High Court, judgment dated 28 March 2024)
