Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:•    State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan •    Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh •    Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher •    Ajwar v. Waseem •    Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar •    P v. State of Madhya Pradesh •    Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana •    Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee •    Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh •    Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh •    Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar •    Disha v. State of Gujarat •    K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police •    Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha  

Facts:An FIR was registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police alleging that the accused induced a large number of investors by falsely claiming divine powers to triple their money. Around 1,852 victims were cheated of approximately ₹46.40 crores. The police registered a single FIR and treated complaints of other victims as statements during investigation. The Delhi High Court held that each deposit constituted a separate transaction requiring separate FIRs. Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court was premature as the investigation had not concluded. The Court observed that whether multiple acts constitute the “same transaction” must be determined based on the facts emerging from the investigation.The Court noted that when offences arise from a common conspiracy and may form part of the same transaction, it is permissible to register one FIR and treat subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC. The police were justified in registering a single FIR alleging criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and treating complaints of other victims as statements.The Court clarified that the Magistrate will determine at the stage of framing of charges whether the acts constitute the same transaction under Sections 220(1) and 223 CrPC, enabling joint trial. If the acts are distinct transactions, separate trials may be conducted subject to Section 219 CrPC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s answers which mandated separate FIRs for each transaction and allowed the appeal filed by the State.Cases Referred by Court:•    S. Swamirathnam vs. State of Madras•    Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala vs. Union of India•    State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao•    State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav•    Amish Devgan vs. Union of India•    T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala•    Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India•    Abhishek Singh Chauhan vs. Union of India•    Amanat Ali vs. State of Karnataka•    Ravinder Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab•    Alok Kumar vs. State of Bihar•    Satinder Singh Bhasin vs. State of Uttar Pradesh•    Radhey Shyam vs. State of Haryana•    Amandeep Singh Saran vs. State of Delhi•    Narinderjit Singh Sahni vs. Union of India 

BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in  registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.

Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.

Case Facts:The respondent constructed a shopping mall for leasing purposes and paid GST on inputs like materials and services used in construction, accumulating substantial ITC. The department denied ITC relying on Section 17(5)(d), which blocks credit for construction of immovable property. The Orissa High Court read down the provision and allowed ITC, holding denial would defeat GST objectives. The Revenue challenged this before the Supreme Court along with similar matters questioning the constitutional validity of Section 17(5)(c) and (d).Court Decision:The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the CGST Act and held that ITC is a statutory right subject to conditions and restrictions under the Act. Section 17(5)(c) and (d) clearly restrict ITC on construction of immovable property (other than plant and machinery), and such restriction must be interpreted strictly.The Court upheld the validity of the provisions and rejected the interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that:A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly based on plain language.ITC cannot be claimed contrary to express statutory restrictions.The legislature is competent to restrict ITC and such restriction does not violate constitutional provisions.The expression “plant or machinery” cannot be expansively interpreted to include buildings like malls merely to claim ITC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that ITC is not available on construction of immovable property used for renting under Section 17(5)(d).Cases Referred by Court:Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Union of IndiaBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of IndiaShreya Singhal v. Union of IndiaUnion of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of IndiaR.K. Garg v. Union of IndiaTwyford Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of KeralaNitdip Textile Processors Pvt. Ltd.P. Laxmi Devi v. State of Andhra PradeshIndore Development Authority v. ManoharlalALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax OfficerHari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of IndiaJoseph Shine v. Union of IndiaCommissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of CustomsVegetable Products Ltd.R.S. Raghunath v. State of KarnatakaUnion of India v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.