Background:Para 1–2, 3.1–3.14: The Himachal Pradesh Town & Country Planning Act, 1977 (TCP Act) governs planning for the Shimla Planning Area (SPA). Respondent No.1 filed OA No. 121 of 2014 before NGT seeking protection of "Green Belt"/forest areas from non-forest activity. NGT (16.11.2017 order — "first order of NGT") went beyond the prayers and issued sweeping construction restrictions across the entire SPA (e.g., capping construction at "2 storeys + attic" in core/green areas) and directed the State to finalize the development plan within 3 months incorporating its directions. The State's review was dismissed (16.7.2018), leading to Civil Appeal Nos. 5348-5349 of 2019.Para 2, 4–4.1: Subsequently the State published a draft development plan (8.2.2022). Respondent No.1 filed a fresh OA (No. 297 of 2022); NGT stayed the draft plan (interim order 12.5.2022). The State challenged this before the Himachal Pradesh High Court (CWP No. 5960 of 2022). Despite the pendency of that writ petition, NGT passed a final order (14.10.2022 — "second order of NGT") declaring the draft plan illegal for conflicting with its first order. The Supreme Court transferred CWP No. 5960 of 2022 to itself (order dated 14.11.2022), renumbered as Transferred Case (C) No. 2 of 2023.Facts :Para 12–19: The State argued: (a) NGT's jurisdiction under the NGT Act, 2010 is confined to Schedule I enactments, which do not include town & country planning; (b) finalizing a development plan is a quasi-legislative function, and NGT cannot direct how a legislative body exercises that power; (c) NGT could not have suo motu enlarged the scope of the original OA; (d) NGT could not proceed once the High Court was already seized of the same issue in CWP No. 5960 of 2022.Para 20–28: Respondents argued the first NGT order was based on a High-Powered Committee report addressing genuine ecological risks (landslides, cloudbursts, fragile Himalayan ecology), that NGT has overriding power under the NGT Act, and relied on Mantri Techzone Private Limited v. Forward Foundation, (2019) 18 SCC 494 : 2019 INSC 315, to argue NGT could vary buffer zones/planning norms.Para 30–61: The Court analyzed Sections 13–20 of the TCP Act (Chapter IV) — preparation of draft development plan (Sec. 18), publication and objections (Sec. 19), and State Government's sanction (Sec. 20) — holding these constitute a complete delegated-legislation scheme with in-built safeguards (public notice, objections, hearings at two stages).Court Observations :Para 45: "Chapter-IV of the TCP Act is a complete code, providing for preparation of draft development plan, publication of draft development plan with a publication of its notice, inviting objections and suggestions, giving reasonable opportunity to all persons affected of being heard, making modifications in the draft development plan as may be considered necessary by the Director and thereafter submitting it to the State Government."Para 51: "...it will be amply clear that the preparation of draft development plan under Section 18 of the TCP Act, finalization of the same under Section 19 of the TCP Act by the Director and grant of approval by the State under Section 20 of the TCP Act are all legislative functions."Para 61 (citing Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 : 1987 INSC 100; Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd., (1980) 2 SCC 295 : 1980 INSC 38; Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija, (1989) 3 SCC 396 : 1989 INSC 202; Pune Municipal Corporation, (2004) 10 SCC 796 : 2004 INSC 348; Bangalore Development Authority, (2012) 3 SCC 442; Rajeev Suri, (2022) 11 SCC 1 : 2021 INSC 446): "...it is a settled position of law that the exercise of power for the preparation, finalization and approval of development plan is a power exercised by the delegatee for enacting a subordinate piece of legislation."Para 64 (citing V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 2 SCC 542 : 2012 INSC 10): "The courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its law-making power in any manner." and "Neither the court can legislate, nor has it any competence to issue directions to the legislature to enact the law in a particular manner."Para 69: "...neither the High Courts while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution nor this Court while exercising powers under Article 32 of the Constitution can direct the legislature or its delegate to enact a law or subordinate legislation in a particular manner. If the High Courts and this Court... cannot do so, the answer to the question as to whether a Tribunal constituted under a statute, having a limited jurisdiction, can do so or not, would be obviously 'No'."Para 70: "...the first order of NGT is liable to be set aside on the short ground that it has transgressed its limitations and attempted to encroach upon the field reserved for the delegate to enact a piece of delegated legislation."Para 76: On Mantri Techzone Private Limited (relied on by respondents) — "we are... of the considered view that the observations found in para 47 of the Mantri Techzone Private Limited (supra) could not be construed to be a precedent or a ratio decidendi," since the point was conceded by counsel there, not adjudicated.Para 108 (citing Priya Gupta and Another v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Others, (2013) 11 SCC 404 : 2012 INSC 601):"It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal terms held that no Court or Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore the law stated by this Court. It held that such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law would irretrievably suffer. It has been held that the law declared by the higher court in the State is binding on authorities and tribunals under its superintendence and they cannot ignore it. This Court expressed a caution that it had become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. This Court further held that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system."(This paragraph establishes that Supreme Court orders bind all courts/tribunals under Article 141; that a tribunal under a High Court's supervisory jurisdiction — such as the NGT vis-à-vis the Himachal Pradesh High Court — cannot ignore issues already before that High Court; and that disregarding this discipline undermines judicial credibility and encourages "chance litigation." It directly supports the Court's conclusion in Para 109 that the NGT breached judicial propriety by proceeding despite the High Court being seized of the same matter.)Para 109–112 (citing L. Chandra Kumar, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 INSC 288; Raghu Ramakrishna Raju Kanumuru, (2022) 8 SCC 156 : 2022 INSC 632): "...the continuation of the proceedings by the NGT during the pendency of the writ petitions before the High Court was not in conformity with the principles of judicial propriety." and "...the second order of NGT... is liable to be set aside... [also] on the ground of judicial propriety, the NGT ought not to have continued with the proceedings after the High Court was in seisin of the matter."Para 124: "...there are sufficient safeguards to balance the need for development while taking care of and addressing the environmental and ecological concerns... the development plan... cannot be stalled in entirety thereby putting the entire developmental activities to a standstill."Final Verdict (Para 126):Appeals and Transferred Case allowed; NGT's orders dated 16.11.2017, 16.7.2018, 12.5.2022 and 14.10.2022 quashed and set aside; State of Himachal Pradesh permitted to implement the development plan published on 20.6.2023, subject to the Court's observations. No order as to costs.👍 Thumbs Up — Decision in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh (Appellant); NGT's orders restraining/directing the development plan were set aside as exceeding jurisdiction.Key Cases Referred :Himachal Pradesh Bus Stand Management and Development Authority v. Central Empowered Committee, (2021) 4 SCC 309 : 2021 INSC 18State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020 INSC 516Director General (Road Development), NHAI v. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, (2021) 11 SCC 566 : 2020 INSC 452Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., (2019) 19 SCC 479 : 2019 INSC 220Techi Tagi Tara v. Rajendra Singh Bhandari, (2018) 11 SCC 734 : 2017 INSC 986State of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini, (2017) 11 SCC 42Ambesh Kumar (Dr.) v. Principal, L.L.R.M. Medical College, 1986 Supp SCC 543 : 1986 INSC 275Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 39 : 1981 INSC 189State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raghu Ramakrishna Raju Kanumuru, (2022) 8 SCC 156 : 2022 INSC 632T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267 : 1997 INSC 226; later orders (2023 INSC 430)Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004, In Re, (2017) 1 SCC 121 : 2016 INSC 1018State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696 : 2014 INSC 373Mantri Techzone Private Limited v. Forward Foundation, (2019) 18 SCC 494 : 2019 INSC 315Pragnesh Shah v. Dr. Arun Kumar Sharma, (2022) 11 SCC 493 : 2022 INSC 47Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, (1997) 11 SCC 605Resident's Welfare Association v. UT of Chandigarh, (2023) 8 SCC 643 : 2023 INSC 22Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 : 1987 INSC 100Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, (1980) 2 SCC 295 : 1980 INSC 38Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396 : 1989 INSC 202Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association, (2004) 10 SCC 796 : 2004 INSC 348Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 442Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority, (2022) 11 SCC 1 : 2021 INSC 446V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 2 SCC 542 : 2012 INSC 10Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1 : 2014 INSC 568Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 : 1996 INSC 911L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 INSC 288Priya Gupta v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health, (2013) 11 SCC 404 : 2012 INSC 601Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 281 : 1996 INSC 237Essar Oil Limited v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti, (2004) 2 SCC 392 : 2004 INSC 40N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362 : 2003 INSC 438State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uday Education and Welfare Trust, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1469 : 2022 INSC 465 

1. BackgroundThe proceedings before the Supreme Court arose from the final judgment and order dated 02 August 2023 passed by the High Court at Calcutta in MAT No. 1218/2023 and CAN No. 1/2023. The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and other authorities challenged that order before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions.The Supreme Court heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and considered the facts and circumstances of the cases, including the extent of the demand involved. The record supplied does not set out the underlying GST dispute or the detailed reasoning of the Calcutta High Court.2. Court ObservationThe Supreme Court observed that, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cases and the extent of demand being on the lower side, it was not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.3. Final VerdictThe Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions and accordingly declined to interfere with the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court. The delay in refiling/curing defects was also condoned. 

BackgroundThe assessee provided back-office and operational support to its overseas group companies (USA, UK, Ireland, Singapore and others). Employees of those companies were seconded to it and worked under its control, but remained on the overseas payroll for social security; the overseas entity paid their salaries and recovered them from the assessee through debit notes without mark-up, while the assessee issued them employment letters and deducted TDS. Four show cause notices covering October 2006 to September 2014 demanded service tax under reverse charge. The Commissioner confirmed two and dropped the later two, and CESTAT ruled in the assessee’s favour. The Revenue appealed.Final VerdictApplying substance over form, and holding that the nomenclature of a contract is not decisive and no single test governs, the Supreme Court read the agreements together. Though the assessee had operational control, the secondees stayed on the overseas payroll, were paid in foreign currency with a hardship allowance under the overseas employer’s policy, served for a fixed tenure and were repatriated under its global mobility policy; the overseas group’s business was to deploy its skilled personnel. Consideration was implicit in the reimbursement and the economic benefit derived, and revenue neutrality was held irrelevant to the incidence of tax. The Court held that the assessee was, for the relevant period, service recipient of the overseas group company concerned, which can be said to have provided manpower supply service. However, since the assessee’s view was bona fide, being supported by CESTAT rulings and by the Revenue itself dropping the later notices, the invocation of the extended period of limitation was unjustified. The appeals were partly allowed and the demand was confined to the normal period.

BACKGROUNDThe National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directed the appellant to pay Rs.265.01 Crores with interest at 10% p.a. from 19.09.2016. The complainant had obtained two insurance policies from the appellant by paying a premium of Rs.10,38,03,912/-, obtained for a construction contract awarded by the Government of Basra, Iraq. When the contract was withdrawn due to internal conflict and payments were suspended, the appellant rejected the insurance claim. The complaint was filed and decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, depositing Rs.50,000/- as pre-deposit in accordance with the 1986 Act. However, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had come into force on 20.07.2020, and under Section 67 of the 2019 Act, the condition for filing an appeal is deposit of 50% of the entire awarded amount — with no upper ceiling — which would mean depositing approximately Rs.132 Crores. FACTSThe pre-deposit condition under the two Acts is starkly different. Under the 1986 Act, the condition was 50% of the awarded amount or Rs.50,000, whichever is less. Under the 2019 Act, it is a flat 50% of the awarded amount with no ceiling whatsoever. The appellant filed an Interlocutory Application praying that the appeal be entertained under the conditions prescribed by the 1986 Act, i.e., the law applicable at the time the complaint was filed and proceedings were initiated. The respondent contended that the 2019 Act applies as it was in force at the time of filing of the appeal and that pre-deposit is a mere procedural requirement, hence retrospective. The Court examined a long line of Constitution Bench judgments on the doctrine of vested right of appeal and whether imposition of a more onerous pre-deposit condition amounts to curtailing a substantive right that had already accrued. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)(From Hoosein Kasam Dada — approved and relied upon by the Court): "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right."(From Garikapati Veeraya — Constitution Bench principles approved and applied): "(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."(From State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange — applied by the Court): "it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment."(Court's own final conclusion — Para 34): "In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Interlocutory Application was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will not apply to appeals arising from complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The right of appeal is a vested substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of the proceedings, and it cannot be curtailed by the new law unless the new law expressly or by necessary intendment says so.👍 IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT KEY CASES REFERRED AND RELIED UPON BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.AIR 1931 Cal. 100 (Calcutta HC — approved by SC)2Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court)3Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.AIR 1957 SC 540 (Constitution Bench)4State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.AIR 1960 SC 980 (Three-Judge Bench)5Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., NagpurAIR 1967 SC 344 (Constitution Bench)6M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court)7K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.(2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court)8Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1975) 2 SCC 175 (Four-Judge Bench)9Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors.(1996) 3 SCC 142 (Supreme Court)10M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 428 (Supreme Court)11Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.(2011) 6 SCC 739 (Supreme Court)12Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.2021 SCC OnLine SC 225 (Supreme Court)13Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (Three-Judge Bench)14New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra(1975) 2 SCC 840 (Supreme Court)15M/s. Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 decided on 18.04.2016 (Madras HC, Division Bench) 

Facts:The dispute arose from demands of sales tax on supply of food and drinks by clubs to their permanent members. The clubs contended that such supplies were governed by the doctrine of mutuality and did not constitute “sale”. The Tribunal and High Court held that no taxable sale occurred as members and the club were not distinct persons. The matter was referred to a larger Bench to examine the impact of the 46th Constitutional Amendment on the doctrine of mutuality. Court Decision:The Court held that the doctrine of mutuality continues to apply even after the 46th Constitutional Amendment. It ruled that Article 366(29-A)(e) applies only to unincorporated associations and does not cover incorporated clubs. The Court held that in members’ clubs, there is no transfer of property from one person to another, as members and the club are not distinct. Accordingly, supply of food and beverages by clubs to their members does not constitute a “sale” and is not liable to sales tax/VAT. Cases Referred by Court:•    C.T.O. v. Young Men’s Indian Association •    State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. •    Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi •    State of Punjab v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. •    Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Enfield India Ltd. •    Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax •    Graff v. Evans •    Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald•    BSNL v. Union of India