Facts:An FIR was registered alleging an organised racket involving forged LL.B. degrees and fake academic certificates used to impersonate advocates. Respondent No. 2 allegedly procured and used a forged law degree to practice as an advocate and facilitate similar fraud for others. The Sessions Court rejected bail, but the High Court granted bail relying on disputed documents and claims of innocence. The appellant challenged the bail order citing suppression of multiple FIRs, serious criminal antecedents, and reliance on forged material. Court Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. It held that the High Court relied on disputed and prima facie forged documents, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider criminal antecedents and gravity of offences. The Court emphasized that suppression of material facts, including multiple FIRs, vitiates the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail. It clarified that appellate courts can annul bail where the order suffers from illegality, perversity, or non-consideration of relevant factors, irrespective of post-bail conduct. The prayer for transfer of investigation to a special agency was rejected as investigation was complete and no exceptional circumstances were shown. Cases Referred by Court:•    State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan •    Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh •    Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher •    Ajwar v. Waseem •    Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar •    P v. State of Madhya Pradesh •    Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana •    Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee •    Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh •    Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh •    Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar •    Disha v. State of Gujarat •    K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police •    Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha  

BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in  registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.

BackgroundThis was a non-tax, criminal matter arising from a matrimonial dispute. The case reached the Court against the backdrop of rampant misuse of Section 498-A IPC (a cognizable, non-bailable offence carrying up to three years' imprisonment), which had acquired "a dubious place of pride" as a weapon to harass husbands and their relatives. NCRB data cited showed nearly 1.98 lakh persons arrested under the provision in 2012 — a quarter of them women (mothers and sisters of husbands) — with a 93.6% charge-sheeting rate but only 15% conviction, the lowest across all heads. The Court took up the matter to curb the "arrest first, proceed with the rest" attitude of the police.FactsThe appellant, husband of respondent no. 2 (married on 01.07.2007), apprehended arrest in a case under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The wife alleged that a demand for Rs. 8 lakhs, a Maruti car, an air-conditioner, a television set and other items was made by her in-laws; that when informed, the appellant supported his mother and threatened to marry another woman; and that she was driven out of the matrimonial home for non-fulfilment of the dowry demand. The appellant denied the allegations and sought anticipatory bail, which was rejected first by the Sessions Judge and then by the High Court, bringing him to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition.Court's Observations (verbatim)"The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.""No arrest should be made only because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another… No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person.""In pith and core, the police office before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve?""Before a Magistrate authorises detention under Section 167, Cr.PC, he has to be first satisfied that the arrest made is legal and in accordance with law and all the constitutional rights of the person arrested is satisfied. If the arrest effected by the police officer does not satisfy the requirements of Section 41 of the Code, Magistrate is duty bound not to authorise his further detention and release the accused.""The Magistrate before authorising detention will record its own satisfaction, may be in brief but the said satisfaction must reflect from its order. It shall never be based upon the ipse dixit of the police officer…"Directions Issued (binding safeguards)The Court directed, inter alia, that police shall not automatically arrest in Section 498-A cases but satisfy themselves of necessity under Section 41 Cr.PC parameters; officers be given a check-list under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) and forward it with reasons while producing the accused; the Magistrate authorise detention only after recording satisfaction on that report; notice under Section 41A be served within two weeks; and that failure to comply would invite departmental action and contempt proceedings. These directions were extended to all offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, not just Section 498-A.Final VerdictThe appeal was allowed. The Court made absolute its earlier order dated 31.10.2013 granting the appellant provisional bail, subject to the directions framed to prevent unnecessary arrests and mechanical authorisation of detention. Cases / Authorities Referred by the CourtThe judgment did not turn on prior case-law citations; the Court relied on statutory provisions and official reports, namely:Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961Sections 41, 41A, 57 & 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Article 22(2), Constitution of India177th Report of the Law Commission of India (2001); 152nd & 154th Reports (1994)"Crime in India 2012 Statistics," National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs