BACKGROUNDThe petitioners are partners of M/s Quantum Infratech, a partnership firm engaged in construction of residential buildings, which is the "taxable person." Following an investigation alleging GST evasion (on construction services to landowners, reverse charge on transfer of development rights, and ineligible ITC for July 2017 to March 2023), penalty equivalent to the tax evaded was imposed on each partner under Section 122(1A). The partners challenged this on two jurisdictional grounds — that 122(1A) penalty can only fall on the taxable person, and that it cannot apply retrospectively for the pre-01.01.2021 period. FACTSA Show Cause Notice was issued on 03.08.2024 to the firm, both petitioners, and the accountant under Section 74(1) read with Sections 122(1A) and 122(3)(a). Specific allegations against each partner were made at paragraphs 9.6 and 9.7 of the SCN — that they retained the benefit of transactions and at their instance such transactions (suppression of turnover, supply without invoices, collection of undisclosed cash) were conducted. The petitioners did not submit any reply to these specific allegations, though they appeared for personal hearing. The Order-in-Original dated 04.02.2025 found both partners liable under Section 122(1A) to the extent of the evaded tax, and the Order-in-Appeal dated 26.08.2025 dismissed all appeals. Two points were framed for determination: (i) whether the partners of the taxable firm can be imposed penalty under Section 122(1A); and (ii) if (i) is decided against them, whether Section 122(1A) can apply for the period prior to 01.01.2021. The petitioners relied on the Bombay High Court rulings in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari and Amit Manilal Haria (penalty only on taxable person; no retrospective application), while the Revenue relied on the distinct statutory use of "taxable person," "any person," and "registered person," and on the Delhi High Court rulings in Gurudas Mallik Thakur and Bhupender Kumar. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On who can be penalised under Section 122(1A):"True, if the taxable person is the sole proprietor or an individual who solely is responsible for the commission of the violations contained in Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017, then the taxable person would be the person as mentioned in Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017. But let this Court take the example of a Company, LLP, Partnership Firm, or any juridical person which is the taxable person. Can the Company, LLP, Partnership Firm or any juridical person on its own without the involvement of a natural person commit the violations as mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The answer would be a simple 'No'." (Para 36)"Therefore with great respect, this Court cannot agree with the proposition of law laid down by the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (supra) and Amit Manilal Haria (supra)... if accepted, it would render the provision of Sub-Section (1A) of Section 122 of the Act of 2017 otiose and nugatory." (Paras 37–38)On retrospective application:"Therefore Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 do not create any independent violation nor does it enlarges the violations contemplated under Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. The legislative intent behind Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is solely to identify the person at whose instance the violations took place and if the person had retained the benefits, the person would be liable to a penalty as mentioned therein." (Para 50)"...there being no new violations created by Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, there is no question of the said Sub-Section to be applied retrospectively." (Para 51)"...the learned Division Bench of the Bombay High Court failed to take note of the difference between an offence and penalty in respect to a civil adjudication while applying Article 20(1) of the Constitution." (Para 52)"Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is complementary to Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017. Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 would not spring into action and until violations of Clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1) of the Act of 2017 by the taxable person is adjudicated upon. Under such circumstances, the question of applying Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 retrospectively or not does not arise." (Para 53) FINAL VERDICT 👎Both jurisdictional issues decided against the petitioners — penalty under Section 122(1A) can be imposed on partners (not only the taxable firm), and it applies even for transactions prior to 01.01.2021. Writ petitions disposed of with liberty to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days, interim protection continued, and the question of quantum/findings of fact left open. CASES REFERREDBy the Petitioners:Amit Manilal Haria & Ors. v. Joint Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise & Anr. — 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 1510 (disagreed with)Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari v. Union of India & Ors. — 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 929 (disagreed with)Union of India v. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (SLP dismissed by SC) — 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1358By the Revenue:Gurudas Mallik Thakur & Anr. v. Commissioner of GST & Anr. — 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3108 (relied on by Court)Bhupender Kumar v. Additional Commissioner Adjudication, CGST Delhi North & Ors. — 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4848 (agreed with by Court)Also Noted/Relied on by the Court:Mukesh Kumar Garg v. Union of India & Ors. — 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3324 (SLP (Civil) No.18178/2025 pending; SC stayed recovery on 04.08.2025 subject to 25% deposit)Jawala Ram & Ors. v. State of Pepsu (Constitution Bench, on the offence-vs-penalty distinction under Article 20(1)) — 1961 SCC OnLine SC 47  

BACKGROUNDThe Petitioners challenged an Order in Original dated 30th March, 2026, passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudication), CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, primarily on the ground that the Central GST proceedings are barred under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, 2017. The State GST Authorities, exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act, had previously closed proceedings against the Petitioners on the very same set of documents. Thereafter, the Central GST Authorities initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the Act based on the very same evidence and passed an adverse Order in Original.RELEVANT FACTSThe Petitioners contended that the documents submitted in response to the Show Cause Notice were the identical set of documents which had formed the basis for closure of proceedings by the State GST Authorities under Section 73; however, the Central GST Authorities refused to accept the same. It was further urged that no notice was issued to the Petitioners for producing additional documents which the respondents intended to obtain. Out of four dates for personal hearing as noted in the impugned order, hearing was effectively granted only on two days. The Petitioners also contended the impugned order is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution as the Central GST Authorities passed an indifferent order on the same set of documents on which the State GST Authorities had granted closure. The Petitioners further contended that material found sufficient by the State GST Authorities was binding on the Central GST Authorities for closure of proceedings under Section 74.The Respondents raised a preliminary objection on maintainability, urging that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available. It was further contended by the Respondents that Section 73 and Section 74 operate in entirely different arenas, that appreciation of evidence is the domain of the Appellate Authority, and that a speaking order was duly passed after grant of hearing. In rejoinder, the Petitioners urged that relegation to alternate remedy would burden them with the obligation of statutory pre-deposit. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 9: "It is apparent that Section 73 and Section 74 of the Act operates in different arenas. The language of said sections, recourse to be taken in regard to said sections, can very well be looked into by its face value."Para 10: "Just because the petitioner was exonerated in the proceedings under Section 73, by itself, cannot lead to the petitioner being proceeded against by the Central GST Authorities under Section 74 of the Act. Both these sections operate on altogether different considerations."Para 11: "Apart from above, the material that was placed on record by petitioner in response to Show Cause Notice is very much independently available for scrutiny and appreciation."Para 13: "Appreciation, re-appreciation of evidence in regard to same are vested with the competent authorities. It is not in dispute that jurisdiction of Appellate Authority is restricted, rather it can be inferred from the very language of the jurisdiction vested in the Appellate Authority that it can reappreciate the entire evidence and if so required, may permit the petitioner to produce additional evidence."Para 14: "Merely because the petitioner shall be burdened with the satisfaction of condition of statutory pre-deposit, that by itself, cannot give leverage to the petitioner to claim before this Court that inappropriate appreciation of evidence or non-grant of sufficient opportunity to produce additional evidence to the satisfaction, amounts to denial of personal hearing. Re-appreciation and production of additional evidence can be very well looked into by the Appellate Authority."Para 15: "In that eventuality, we see no reason to exercise writ jurisdiction in the present matter, particularly, when the proceedings are barred by statutory remedy of appeal."FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition stands dismissed. The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction holding that an efficacious alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available, the Appellate Authority is fully empowered to re-appreciate evidence and permit production of additional evidence, and the burden of statutory pre-deposit alone is not a ground to bypass the appeal mechanism. 👎 

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a Goods Transport Agency, filed an application under Section 97 of the RGST Act, 2017 before the Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) seeking a ruling on whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport services. The jurisdictional SGST officer participated in the AAR proceedings and categorically supported the petitioner's stand that GST is not leviable on FOC diesel. The AAR vide ruling dated 16.06.2022 held in favour of the petitioner that FOC diesel is not includable in the taxable value of GTA services. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against this ruling — one by the CGST authority and one by the very same SGST officer who had earlier supported the petitioner — both beyond the prescribed limitation period and without proper condonation applications. The petitioner raised detailed preliminary objections before the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling (AAAR). The AAAR rejected all preliminary objections vide impugned order dated 01.07.2024 and directed the matter to be heard on merits. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition — notably, its second approach to the High Court, the first having been disposed of in 2022 directing preliminary objections to be decided first. CRUCIAL FACTSThe AAR ruling dated 16.06.2022 was uploaded on the GST portal on 17.06.2022. The CGST authority claimed receipt on 29.06.2022 and filed its appeal on 12.08.2022 (56 days — within the maximum 60-day permissible period). The SGST officer claimed receipt on 15.09.2022 and filed its appeal on 14.10.2022 (within 30 days of claimed receipt). The petitioner contended that both appeals were time-barred, as the ruling was duly communicated via Speed Post and portal upload in June 2022 itself, supported by India Post tracking data and a letter dated 15.09.2022 from AAR confirming Speed Post dispatch on 21.06.2022. The AAAR, however, accepted the dates of actual receipt as claimed by the departmental appellants, condoned the marginal delay of 21 days in CGST's case, and rejected all five preliminary objections — on 90-day adjudication limit, limitation for filing, hard copy filing, locus of CGST authority, and estoppel against the department for reversing its earlier stand. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)On 90-day mandatory vs. directory — Section 101(2):"There is no provision in the CGST or RGST Act that provides for automatic lapsing of an appeal upon expiry of the 90-day period, nor does the Act prescribe any consequence for non-compliance with this timeline. The absence of a penal consequence for delay is itself a strong indicator that the provision is directory. The petitioner's reliance on mere passage of time, without any prejudice demonstrated, cannot be a ground to shut out a legitimate appeal on merits.""A provision whose strict construction destroys the very right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90-day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of appellate power.""The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not by itself render a provision mandatory in every case... whether 'shall' is mandatory or directory depends upon the context, the object of the provision, the scheme of the statute, and the consequences that would flow from the interpretation thereof."On Limitation:"Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual receipt where such date is specifically established.""No further elaborate reasons are required to be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State. There is no infirmity in this finding."On Locus Standi of CGST Authority:"The Act does not restrict the right of appeal to whichever of the two happened to participate in the advance ruling proceedings. The statute confers the right of appeal on both, and this right cannot be extinguished on the ground that one of them did not appear or represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the proceedings below."On Estoppel:"It is a settled and fundamental principle of constitutional and administrative law that there is no estoppel against the State in matters of taxation and statutory duty. A representation or stand taken by a subordinate officer without due authority and without proper application of mind by the competent authority cannot bind the State or the department... The department's right to correct such an error through the statutory remedy of appeal cannot be defeated by the doctrine of estoppel."On Hard Copy Filing:"Rule 107A of the CGST Rules expressly permits manual filing of documents notwithstanding any provision that prescribes electronic filing... A procedural prescription cannot be elevated into a jurisdictional bar, and the appeals cannot be thrown out on this purely technical ground."On Petitioner's Conduct:"This conduct reveals a clear attempt to indefinitely delay the final adjudication on merits. The petitioner cannot be permitted to use the writ jurisdiction of this Court as an instrument of delay." FINAL VERDICTThe writ petition is dismissed as bereft of merit. The petitioner is directed to join proceedings before the Appellate Authority. All preliminary objections against maintainability of departmental appeals stand rejected.👎 THUMBS DOWN (Against Assessee)

BackgroundAn impugned order dated 30th December 2025 was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee, an officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner. The personal hearing in the matter, however, had been conducted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, another Additional Commissioner who had earlier been manning the same post. Upon Mr. Jha's transfer, Mr. Banerjee assumed charge and passed the final order. The Petitioners challenged the impugned order before the Delhi High Court by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All three petitions raised identical issues and were decided by a common order, with the facts in W.P.(C) 2630/2026 taken as the lead matter.Relevant FactsThe Petitioners contended that the personal hearing was granted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, but the final order was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee who had not conducted that hearing — a clear violation of the principle that the deciding authority must itself hear the parties. The Revenue contended that there was no statutory embargo preventing the successor officer from passing the order based on the notes of the final hearing prepared by Mr. Jha. When confronted on this point, the Court was unable to satisfy itself that any such notes by Mr. Jha were actually available to or considered by Mr. Banerjee before passing the impugned order. The Revenue further raised a preliminary objection that the Petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable. The Petitioners also raised an additional grievance that the documents relied upon in the proceedings were not supplied to them, which itself amounted to a denial of opportunity of hearing.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and order impugned as such goes contrary to the constitutional protections guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."— Para 6 (Court's own observation)"In the aforesaid background, we have no hesitation to entertain the present petition, even if, there exits an alternate remedy as the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice."— Para 9 (Court's own observation)From Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority & Ors. — relied upon by Court (Para 7):"if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality."— Para 83, as quoted in Para 7"In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly."— Para 84, as quoted in Para 7From Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others — (1998) 8 SCC 1 — relied upon by Court (Para 8):"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged…"— Para 15, as quoted in Para 8Final VerdictAll three writ petitions allowed. Impugned order dated 30th December 2025 set aside as being passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner permitted to appear before the Additional Commissioner with written submissions on 25th May 2026. The Respondent directed to supply the documents sought by the Petitioner and to deal with the matter afresh. All rights and contentions of the Petitioner kept open.Cases Referred by CourtAutomotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority and Ors.Supreme Court of India  |  Citation not specified in the order  |  Paras 83 & 84 relied upon — held that when one officer hears and another decides, personal hearing becomes an empty formality and the final order offends the basic principle of natural justice.Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and OthersSupreme Court of India  |  (1998) 8 SCC 1  |  Para 15 relied upon — held that existence of alternative remedy is not a bar to a writ petition in cases involving violation of natural justice, fundamental rights, or orders without jurisdiction.  

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner challenged an order in original passed under GST on the ground that the same was never validly served upon him. The respondents (Union of India and others) contended in their counter affidavit that the order was duly served — first, by uploading it on the GST common portal on 08.06.2023, and second, by dispatching it through Speed Post on 01.06.2023 to the address registered in the GST records. FACTSThe respondents, in support of their claim of valid service by Speed Post, produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch. However, they failed to produce the Acknowledgement card, which is the document returned to the sender after the article is received by the addressee bearing the signature of the addressee or his representative. Further, the Department of Posts, Government of India, vide its communication dated 07.04.2026, informed the petitioner that there is no evidence of service of the said article upon the petitioner after it was dispatched by the respondents. The court also noted the earlier interim order dated 17.12.2025 already granted in favour of the petitioner. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"mere uploading of the order in the GST Portal would not suffice, and that the respondents ought to choose other modes of service also, which would be a proper exercise of the power of the respondents when there are other choices also made available under Section 169 of the Act.""what sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 169 of the Act requires is that the order in original should be sent by Speed Post with 'Acknowledgement due'.""Though the respondents have produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch by Speed Post, they have not produced the 'Acknowledgment' card which would have been returned to the respondent after the article sent by speed post is received by the petitioner with signature of petitioner's representative.""Therefore, prima facie it cannot be said that there is compliance of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the CGST Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was admitted and the interim order dated 17.12.2025 already in favour of the petitioner was made absolute. The Court held, prima facie, that neither uploading the order on the GST portal alone nor dispatch by Speed Post without producing the Acknowledgement card satisfies the requirement of valid service under Section 169(1)(b) of the CGST Act.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationSharp Tanks and Structurals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner (GST) (Appeals), Tirunelveli(2025) 34 CENTEX 426 (Madras High Court)