Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Genpact India Pvt. Ltd., is a BPO service provider registered under Haryana GST, employing approximately 50,000 employees. It is engaged in providing a host of BPO and IT-enabled services including maintaining vendor/customer master data, processing vendor invoices, book-keeping, software development, technical IT support, data analysis, supply chain management support etc. — all rendered from India remotely through telecommunication/internet links using its own infrastructure.The petitioner entered into a Master Services Sub-Contracting Agreement (MSA) dated 01.01.2013 with Genpact International Inc. (GI), a US entity. Under the MSA, the petitioner was sub-contracted by GI to actually perform and deliver BPO/IT services directly to GI's overseas customers, on a principal-to-principal basis. The petitioner raised invoices on GI and received payment in convertible foreign exchange. There was no separate agreement between the petitioner and GI's customers.For the period July 2017 to March 2018, the petitioner filed a refund application on 18.10.2018 claiming refund of unutilised ITC of Rs. 27,26,27,276/- under Section 16 of the IGST Act read with Section 54 of the CGST Act. The Deputy Commissioner by Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 sanctioned Rs. 26,34,61,625/- accepting the services as export of services.However, the Principal Commissioner exercised revision powers under Section 107(2) of the CGST Act and filed an appeal contending that the petitioner's services were "intermediary services" — relying on a Circular dated 18.07.2019 which was subsequently withdrawn on 04.12.2019. The Joint Commissioner (Appeals) by order dated 27.05.2020 held the services to be intermediary services and ordered recovery of the entire refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/-.In an earlier round of litigation (CWP No. 10302/2020), this Court set aside the order dated 27.05.2020 and remanded the matter for fresh decision. The Appellate Authority on remand again passed order dated 15.02.2021 holding the petitioner to be an intermediary and denying the refund, additionally denying a further claim of Rs. 82,15,102/-. Refund applications for subsequent periods (April 2018–March 2019) were also rejected on identical grounds. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2021, the present writ petition was filed. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A bare perusal of the recitals and relevant clauses of the MSA...do not in any manner indicate that petitioner is acting as an 'intermediary' so as to fall within the scope and ambit of the definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. Such clauses cannot also be interpreted to conclude that the petitioner has facilitated the services. The said clauses are in relation to the modalities of how the actual work would be carried out and do not in any manner establish that the petitioner was required to arrange/facilitate a 3rd party to render the main service which has actually been rendered by the petitioner.""As per definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act the following three conditions must be satisfied for a person to qualify as an 'intermediary'; First, the relationship between the parties must be that of a principal-agency relationship. Second, the person must be involved in arrangement or facilitation of provisions of the service provided to the principal by a 3rd party. Third, the person must not actually perform the main service intended to be received by the service recipient itself.""There is no change in the legal position i.e. with regard to the scope and ambit of 'intermediary' services under the service tax regime vis-a-vis the GST regime and there being no change of facts as it is the MSA of 2013 (Annexure P-1) which continues to operate, the department cannot take a different view for different periods.""The finding recorded by the respondents-department to hold the petitioner to be in a principal agent relationship with the GI to be without any basis and to be clearly erroneous. The impugned order proceeds oblivious of Clause 21.6 of the MSA... Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute or be deemed to constitute a relationship of employer and employee, agency, joint venture or partnership between the parties hereto...""Even as per the afore-noticed circular dated 20.09.2021 and in reference to para 3.5 it stands clarified that sub-contracting for a service is not an 'intermediary' service.""The written statement seeks to justify the impugned order on grounds which are not even part of the impugned order and which is clearly impermissible in law." [Relying on Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner]"The principle of consistency as such ought to apply in the present matter as well and we find merit in the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner that the view taken in the order in original dated 25.01.2018...holding the petitioner to be not an 'intermediary' under the MSA, should prevail even under the GST regime."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. Impugned order dated 15.02.2021 quashed. Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 granting refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/- restored. Directed that the benefit of this order shall enure to the petitioner for subsequent refunds as well. 👍 In favour of Assessee.   

Case Facts:The petitioner challenged an order dated 26.12.2025 confirming tax liability for FY 2018–19. The show cause notice proposed a demand of Rs.1.37 crore, whereas the final order confirmed Rs.2.41 crore. The petitioner contended that the order exceeded the scope of the show cause notice. The writ petition was filed seeking quashing of both the show cause notice and consequential order. Court Decision:The Court held that the impugned order was contrary to Section 75(7) as it confirmed demand beyond what was proposed in the show cause notice. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner was directed to file a reply within 30 days and the authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting opportunity. The authority was permitted to proceed in accordance with law in case of non-compliance by the petitioner.

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner's husband was the proprietor of a chemicals firm supplying industrial soaps and polishes. He died on 05.03.2019, after which the business was discontinued and closed, and the registration was cancelled w.e.f. 31.12.2019. Despite this, the Revenue initiated proceedings for FY 2018-19 against the legal heir (wife), leading to this writ challenging the demand on the ground that no proceeding had ever commenced while the proprietor was alive. FACTSAfter cancellation of registration, the petitioner received a communication dated 10.03.2025, followed by a notice in Form DRC-01A dated 20.05.2025, alleging that the firm had failed to file returns for certain e-way bills generated during FY 2018-19. The petitioner replied that, following her husband's death on 05.03.2019, the business had been discontinued and closed, and that she was neither involved in nor aware of the business dealings. A show cause notice in Form DRC-01 was thereafter issued on 26.06.2025, to which the petitioner again replied on 24.10.2025 reiterating her stand. Rejecting her explanation, the respondent passed the impugned order dated 11.12.2025 under Section 74, determining a tax liability of Rs.3,42,355/- with interest and penalty. The core legal issue was whether the words "determined after his death" in Section 93 permit initiation of fresh proceedings against the legal heir, or whether they apply only where proceedings were already pending at the time of death. The petitioner argued that "person chargeable with tax" in Section 74 means only the person on whom the incidence of levy falls, and that Section 93 read with Sections 9 and 2(107) cannot bring in a legal heir who did not continue the business. The Revenue contended that Section 93 expressly creates a statutory liability on the legal heir, covering both liability determined before death and liability "determined after his death," and that Income Tax principles cannot be mechanically imported into the CGST scheme. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Section 74 of the CGST Act does not employ the expression 'taxable person' but uses the wider expression 'person chargeable with tax'. The said expression cannot be confined only to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. It would encompass not only registered taxable persons and persons liable for registration, but also the legal heirs from whom the tax is recoverable, and persons such as recipients liable to pay tax under the reverse charge mechanism, electronic commerce operators, etc., in cases where the statute fastens the liability upon them." (Para 4.4)"Once the statute authorises determination of liability after the death of the taxable person, the expression 'determined after his death' must necessarily include the entire adjudicatory process contemplated under Sections 73, 74 or 74A of the CGST Act, as the case may be. Such process would include not merely the passing of the final order, but also the issuance of notices and all other procedural steps preceding determination. Any other interpretation would have the effect of altering the plain, simple and clear meaning of the express words employed in Section 93 of the CGST Act." (Para 4.7)"A taxing statute creating a liability must ordinarily be construed in accordance with its plain language, and the Court cannot read into the provision limitations which the Legislature has consciously omitted." (Para 4.8)"...even in a case where the business of the deceased taxable person has been discontinued and no show cause notice or assessment proceedings had been initiated during his lifetime, fresh proceedings may nevertheless be initiated against the legal heir under Section 73, 74 or 74-A of the CGST Act, 2017 in view of section 93 of the CGST Act. However, in cases of discontinued businesses, the liability of the legal heir shall be limited to the extent to which the estate inherited by him is capable of meeting the charge." (Para 4.10) FINAL VERDICT 👎Writ Petition dismissed. Fresh proceedings can be initiated against the legal heir even where no proceedings were started during the deceased's lifetime, the liability being capped at the value of the inherited estate. CASES REFERREDBy the Petitioner:Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner — (2007) 4 SCC 30Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Bihar — (2004) 7 SCC 642Laghu Udyog Bharati v. Union of India — (1999) 6 SCC 418Rishi Shangari v. Union of India — 2025:JHHC:11331-DBS. Gowthaman v. The Income Tax Officer — W.A.No.529 of 2026, dated 23.03.2026Relied on by the Court:Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. — 2024 INSC 756  

BackgroundThe petitioners are suppliers of pulses (Moong Dhal, Thoor Dhal) selling under brand names not registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Copyright Act, 1957. Under the original 2017 rate notifications, GST attached only to goods "put up in unit container and bearing a registered brand name," so the petitioners' unregistered-brand goods fell outside the tax net, and many traders de-registered brands to escape liability. To plug this, the Government issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and 28/2017 dated 22.09.2017 (and the State issued GO(MS) No. 114), expanding the levy to brands bearing an "actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law." Show cause notices followed, and the petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A and sought to quash the SCNs.FactsThe writ petitioners are suppliers of pulses selling under unregistered brand names. Notification No. 1/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 levied 2.5% Central Tax on dried leguminous vegetables put up in a unit container and bearing a registered brand name, and Notification No. 2/2017 exempted such goods other than those bearing a registered brand name. As the petitioners' goods carried no registered brand name, they were not liable to GST, and a substantial volume of trade in pulses fell outside the tax net.To remedy this, the Ministry of Finance issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and No. 28/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) and Integrated Tax (Rate), all dated 22.09.2017, and the State Government issued GO(MS) No. 114 dated 22.09.2017 (verbatim reproducing the Central notifications), bringing within the levy products bearing a brand name "on which an actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law is available" (other than where such claim or right was voluntarily foregone, subject to the conditions in Annexure I). The impugned show cause notices were issued to the petitioners as a consequence. The petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A to the extent they affected them and sought to quash the SCNs as null and void.The petitioners primarily relied on Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited. The respondents, through the Additional Solicitor General, contended that GST Council recommendations are not binding in the sense that the Government need not reproduce a mirror image, also relying on Mohit Minerals; they submitted that drafting mistakes in the recommendation of the 21st GST Council meeting (09.09.2017) were rectified through Notifications 27/2017 and 28/2017, and that these were duly ratified in the 22nd GST Council meeting held on 06.10.2017. Two issues thus arose: whether notifications under Sections 9 and 11 could go beyond the Council's recommendations, and whether the GST Council had the power to ratify such notifications.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 1: "Taxation is often a cat and mouse game between the authority and the assessee. The authority spreads the net and seeks to ensnare the assessee who makes every effort to slip away. The game may witness more than one round with fluctuating fortunes."Para 10 (applying Mohit Minerals): "While the GST Council's function is to make recommendations, the Central Government has the power to issue notifications. From the language of Sections 9 and 11 of the Act, it is seen that the notification by the Government will have to be 'on the recommendations' of the Council. In other words, the notification should be preceded by the recommendations... applying the very same yardstick, the recommendations of the GST Council will bind the Government when it issues statutory notifications under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act."Para 14: "A bare comparison of the notifications with the Council recommendations would show that there has been an addition of the words 'enforceable right in a court of law'... It is too obvious that the expressions 'actionable claim' and 'enforceable right in a court of law' are not synonymous. While actionable claims may be enforceable rights, the vice versa may not hold good... The Government had gone over and above what was recommended by the GST Council... We are of the view that the additions lack the foundation of recommendation and it is not 'on the recommendation' of the GST Council. Thus, the impugned notifications by the Central Government as well as the State Government have to be declared as ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression 'enforceable right in a court of law'. Minus this expression, the notifications are intra vires."Para 16: "The power of GST Council is traceable to Article 279A of the Constitution of India. Article 279A empowers the GST Council to make recommendation with respect to the matters set out in Article 279A(4). The power to ratify has no where been conferred."Para 17 (quoting Marathwada University): "These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified."Para 19–20: "...the power to ratify should also be conferred explicitly or by necessary implication. Neither the Constitution nor any statute has invested the GST Council with the power of ratification. We, therefore, hold that ratification made by the GST Council in 22nd meeting is without jurisdiction... Since the impugned show cause notices are a fallout of the impugned notifications, they are liable to be set aside and stand set aside. Liberty is given to the department to issue fresh show cause notices if they can be issued in terms of the impugned notifications to the extent they have been held valid."VerdictThe writ petitions were allowed. The impugned notifications of the Central and State Governments were declared ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression "enforceable right in a court of law"; minus that expression, the notifications are intra vires. The ratification made by the GST Council in its 22nd meeting was held to be without jurisdiction. The impugned show cause notices, being a fallout of the impugned notifications, were set aside, with liberty to the department to issue fresh SCNs in terms of the notifications to the extent held valid. Cases Referred by the CourtRelied upon / applied by the Court:Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited — (2022) 10 SCC 700 (relied on by both sides; ratio that the Government is bound by GST Council recommendations in rule-making extended to notifications under Sections 9 and 11)State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. Krishnamurthy — (2006) 4 SCC 517 (parameters for striking down subordinate legislation)Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan — (1989) 3 SCC 132 (ratification is alien to exercise of statutory power)Brunda Infra (P) Ltd. vs. Commr. of Central Tax — (2025) 139 GSTR 657 (Telangana HC) (ratification cannot be equated to recommendation; post-issuance ratification gives no life to a notification)Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. vs. Sunil — (2006) 5 SCC 96 (ratification assumes an invalid act retrospectively validated)Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji — (1971) 3 SCC 844 (authorities have no inherent power; power must be conferred)Hartman vs. Hornsby — 142 Mo 368, 44 SW 242, 244 (meaning of "ratification")Referred and distinguished (Section 168A context):M/s. Tata Play Limited vs. Union of India — WP No. 17184 of 2024 & batch, dated 12.06.2025 (Madras HC, Single Judge) — its reasoning that the "Government may decline to act on the recommendation but cannot act without it" was found appositeOasys Cybernetics Pvt Ltd vs. STO, Veppery Assessment Circle — (2025) 36 Centax 228 (Mad.) (Division Bench confirmation of Tata Play)The Court noted divergent High Court views on Section 168A and that the issue is pending before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 4240 of 2025 

BackgroundThis is the Revenue's appeal against a Single Judge order dated 11.04.2023 (a common order in a batch led by Sri. Chandrashekaraiah v. State of Karnataka) which had allowed the writ petitioner's (Sadguru Infratech's) writ and issued directions to the tax authorities and contracting parties. The writ petitioner, a sub-contractor in a lift irrigation works contract, had challenged interest demands and recovery action for delayed GST payment, contending the rates were fixed pre-GST and did not include GST. The Revenue confined its appeal to the directions issued to the tax authorities.FactsThe writ petitioner, registered under KVAT and later under GST with effect from 01.07.2017, is a sub-contractor and constituent of the main contractor (a JV) awarded a lift irrigation and canal works contract by Karnataka Neeravari Nigam Limited (KNNL). The main contract dated 06.03.2017 and the sub-contract dated 24.06.2017 were both entered into at the Schedule of Rates prevailing under the VAT regime, which did not include the element of GST. With the GST Acts coming into force on 01.07.2017, the works contract became subject to GST at 18% (01.07.2017 to 21.08.2017) and 12% thereafter, increasing the writ petitioner's tax liability. The writ petitioner filed its returns for 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 belatedly, with delay in payment of self-assessed tax occurring on as many as twenty-six occasions, ranging from one day to 338 days.The GST authorities issued a notice dated 13.02.2020 in Form GST ASMT-10 demanding interest on delayed payment under Section 50, followed by a notice dated 19.02.2020, and initiated recovery by a notice dated 18.03.2020 in Form GST DRC-13 under Section 79(1)(c) to the writ petitioner's banker. The Single Judge allowed the writ and, among other directions, permitted petitioners to file returns/amended returns post-01.07.2017 by calculating differential tax in a prescribed manner without insisting on interest, penalty or limitation, directed the GST authorities not to take precipitative action for six months, and directed reimbursement of the differential tax by the concerned employer. The Revenue appealed only against the directions to the tax authorities, contending that interest under Section 50 is mandatory with no discretion to waive or reduce, and that there is no provision enabling filing or amendment of returns in the manner directed. The short question was whether the Single Judge could have issued such directions to the tax authorities.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 9: "The dispute as to whether the writ petitioner would be entitled to reimbursement of the incremental tax paid or payable by it on account of the levy of GST is strictly a matter between the contracting parties - writ petitioner and the main contractor - with whom it had entered into the contract. The contract between the said parties or the contract between the main contractor and KNNC would not alter the statutory scheme for the levy of GST... The question of the levy of GST, assessment, recovery, and enforcement is a matter of statutory prescription."Para 10: "It is well settled that the liability to pay interest on delayed payment of tax under a fiscal statute arises by operation of law, leaving no discretion in the authority to waive or reduce, if the statute makes no such provision (see Pratibha Processors v. Union of India, (1996) 11 SCC 101). The directions in the impugned order waiving interest, penalty, and limitation, and permitting the filing or amendment of returns in a manner not contemplated by the statute, therefore cannot be sustained."Para 11: "In view of the above, the directions issued permitting the filing of any revised returns contrary to the provisions of the statute are unsustainable. The blanket directions to waive the penalty, interest under the GST Acts or the limitation for filing returns/revised returns are also unsustainable."Para 12: "The controversy as to which party is required to bear the incremental tax burden arising on account of the change in the tax regime is, in essence, one between the contracting parties. In the context of such a dispute, no directions could be issued to the tax authorities regarding the levy, assessment, and collection of tax, penalty, or interest."Para 13: "In the aforesaid view, the direction issued to the respondents to reimburse the tax is required to be construed as a direction only to the concerned party with whom the writ petitioner had entered into the contract and not to the tax authorities."VerdictThe Revenue's appeal was allowed. The Division Bench held that interest under Section 50 arises by operation of law with no discretion to waive, and that directions waiving interest, penalty and limitation and permitting filing/amendment of returns contrary to the statute are unsustainable. The direction to reimburse tax was construed as binding only the contracting party (main contractor), not the tax authorities. The impugned Single Judge order, insofar as it relates to W.P. No. 10163/2020, was set aside.Cases Referred by the CourtPratibha Processors v. Union of India — (1996) 11 SCC 101 (relied upon: liability to pay interest on delayed tax under a fiscal statute arises by operation of law, leaving no discretion to waive or reduce absent statutory provision)Order under challenge (not a precedent):Sri. Chandrashekaraiah & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka — W.P. No. 9721/2019 and connected matters (including W.P. No. 10163/2020), decided 11.04.2023 (the impugned common Single Judge order)