BackgroundThe petitioner sought quashing of the Order-in-Original dated 31.01.2025 (alleged to be non-speaking and in breach of natural justice) and of the SCN dated 26.07.2024, a declaration that the amended pre-deposit provisions under Sections 107(6) and 112(8) effective from 01.10.2025 cannot apply to proceedings arising from earlier SCNs, and alternatively waiver of pre-deposit. He was alleged to have created and controlled 13 firms through which ITC of Rs.30,50,13,190/- was passed on; a common order running into over 300 pages was passed against 81 noticees, and qua the petitioner it imposed penalty only, without any tax demand.Final VerdictThe Court declined to examine in writ jurisdiction whether the impugned order adequately dealt with the petitioner’s contentions, as that requires examination of facts and merits and a statutory appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act is available. On pre-deposit, however, the Court held the issue covered by Gaurav Jain (Delhi HC): since the SCN was issued on 26.07.2024 (prior to 01.10.2025) and the order is penalty-only qua the petitioner, the appellate remedy is governed by Section 107(6) as it stood on the date of the SCN. Accordingly, if the appeal is filed within two weeks, the Appellate Authority shall consider it in accordance with law without insisting on deposit of 10% of the disputed penalty under the substituted proviso. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations (challenge on merits not entertained; pre-deposit relief granted).  

BACKGROUNDThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had allowed the assessee's appeals for various assessment years and the Assessing Officer subsequently passed appeal-effect orders determining substantial amounts refundable. Despite these orders, the refunds were not released. The Department insisted upon Form 26B, and the forms were rejected by referring to outstanding demands relating to the assessee and sister TANs.The Department defended its action by relying upon its practice and an SOP issued by the Centralized Processing Cell (TDS), contending that outstanding demands against associated TANs prevented processing of the refund. The assessee contended that Sections 200A and 201 operated in different fields and that Form 26B was not applicable once refund had arisen pursuant to an assessment or appellate order.COURT OBSERVATIONSThe Court examined Sections 200A and 201, Rule 31A and Form 26B and held that Section 201 deals with assessment of TDS, whereas Section 200A concerns adjustment of TDS before assessment at the CPC level. Rule 31A and Form 26B relate to that adjustment mechanism.The Court held that once a competent Assessing Officer has made an assessment under Section 201, or an appellate authority has passed an order giving rise to a refund, the refund becomes a vested and crystallised right of the assessee, subject to the Department's right to challenge the order in accordance with law. Such refund does not become subordinate to Section 200A or Rule 31A.The Court further held that the Assessing Officer or CPC cannot compel the assessee to furnish Form 26B once the refund arises pursuant to an assessment under Section 201 or an appellate order. Any withholding or adjustment has to be supported by a legally passed order under Section 245.Since the Department could not produce any order under Section 245 authorising withholding or adjustment, the Court held that reliance on outstanding demands against the assessee's PAN or sister TANs was legally untenable. The action was held to be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution.FINAL VERDICTThe writ petitions were allowed. The respondents were directed to pay ₹53,09,56,470/- along with applicable interest under Sections 244A and 244A(1A) on or before 30.09.2026. If the amount was not credited by that date, the entire amount would carry additional interest at 1% per month over and above the statutory interest. 

BackgroundAn SCN dated 25.06.2025 under Section 122(1A) proposed penalties on the petitioners as alleged key persons behind fictitious entities passing on ITC. The Order-in-Original dated 16.12.2025 imposed penalties aggregating Rs.346,55,18,856/- on each petitioner with no tax demand, so the substituted proviso would require about Rs.34.66 crore each as pre-deposit. The Appellate Authority (09.03.2026) declined waiver for want of power. The petitioners contended that the right of appeal vests on commencement of the lis (the SCN date), when no percentage-based pre-deposit existed for such orders (the earlier proviso covered only Section 129(3) orders at 25%). The Department argued that the right arose only on the adjudication order and that the words “no appeal shall be filed” make the filing date decisive.Final VerdictRelying on Hoosein Kasam Dada, Garikapati Veeraya and Videocon International, the Court held that the right of appeal is substantive, attaches to the lis at its commencement, and cannot be subjected to a more onerous condition except by express enactment or necessary intendment; here the lis commenced no later than 25.06.2025 and the substituted proviso diminishes the appellate package. Section 129 of the Finance Act, 2025 contains no such intention or transitional clause, the prohibitory words only fix the stage of compliance, and Hardeodas Jagannath, Surinder Singh Deswal and Chandra Sekhar Jha were distinguished. The Court agreed that the Appellate Authority has no power to waive an applicable pre-deposit, but that question did not arise.Held: the substituted proviso does not govern appeals arising from proceedings initiated by the SCN dated 25.06.2025; the appellate remedy is governed by Section 107(6) as it stood on that date, and no 10% penalty pre-deposit is required (subject to Section 107(6)(a) for admitted amounts). The period from 20.03.2026 to the judgment was excluded for limitation, appeals were to be filed within four weeks with no coercive steps meanwhile, and the constitutional challenge was left open. The writ petition was allowed.  

BackgroundAn impugned order dated 30th December 2025 was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee, an officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner. The personal hearing in the matter, however, had been conducted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, another Additional Commissioner who had earlier been manning the same post. Upon Mr. Jha's transfer, Mr. Banerjee assumed charge and passed the final order. The Petitioners challenged the impugned order before the Delhi High Court by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All three petitions raised identical issues and were decided by a common order, with the facts in W.P.(C) 2630/2026 taken as the lead matter.Relevant FactsThe Petitioners contended that the personal hearing was granted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, but the final order was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee who had not conducted that hearing — a clear violation of the principle that the deciding authority must itself hear the parties. The Revenue contended that there was no statutory embargo preventing the successor officer from passing the order based on the notes of the final hearing prepared by Mr. Jha. When confronted on this point, the Court was unable to satisfy itself that any such notes by Mr. Jha were actually available to or considered by Mr. Banerjee before passing the impugned order. The Revenue further raised a preliminary objection that the Petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable. The Petitioners also raised an additional grievance that the documents relied upon in the proceedings were not supplied to them, which itself amounted to a denial of opportunity of hearing.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and order impugned as such goes contrary to the constitutional protections guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."— Para 6 (Court's own observation)"In the aforesaid background, we have no hesitation to entertain the present petition, even if, there exits an alternate remedy as the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice."— Para 9 (Court's own observation)From Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority & Ors. — relied upon by Court (Para 7):"if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality."— Para 83, as quoted in Para 7"In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly."— Para 84, as quoted in Para 7From Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others — (1998) 8 SCC 1 — relied upon by Court (Para 8):"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged…"— Para 15, as quoted in Para 8Final VerdictAll three writ petitions allowed. Impugned order dated 30th December 2025 set aside as being passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner permitted to appear before the Additional Commissioner with written submissions on 25th May 2026. The Respondent directed to supply the documents sought by the Petitioner and to deal with the matter afresh. All rights and contentions of the Petitioner kept open.Cases Referred by CourtAutomotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority and Ors.Supreme Court of India  |  Citation not specified in the order  |  Paras 83 & 84 relied upon — held that when one officer hears and another decides, personal hearing becomes an empty formality and the final order offends the basic principle of natural justice.Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and OthersSupreme Court of India    

BackgroundThe Petitioner, engaged in trading and export of branded mobile phones, was subjected to a Special Audit for Financial Year 2021-22 appointed under Section 66 of the CGST/DGST Act, 2017 vide email dated 06.12.2024. Upon completion of the audit, observations were communicated on 03.03.2025, to which the Petitioner filed a detailed response on 02.04.2025. Thereafter, a demand notice dated 11.09.2025, based on the special audit report dated 27.03.2025, raised a demand of Rs. 33,54,21,609/- requiring discharge within 7 days. A Show Cause Notice dated 24.09.2025 was subsequently issued proposing a demand of Rs. 58,02,79,384/-, with a reply deadline and personal hearing fixed for 28.10.2025. The Petitioner filed a detailed reply along with supporting documents on 24.10.2025, having sought a short adjournment of the hearing. Then, on 27.12.2025 at 05:20 PM, a communication styled as "Reminder-1" was issued calling for additional documents by 29.12.2025 and fixing a personal hearing for 30.12.2025 — the intervening 28.12.2025 being a Sunday. Despite a request for a 7-day extension made on 29.12.2025, the Order-in-Original was passed on 31.12.2025 confirming a demand of Rs. 26,72,64,497/- (including tax, interest and penalty) — on the very same day as the last personal hearing.Critical Timeline27.12.2025 — 05:20 PMReminder-1 issued demanding voluminous documents including certified bank statements by 29.12.2025; personal hearing fixed for 30.12.202528.12.2025Sunday — no working day available29.12.2025Petitioner sought 7-day adjournment — request not considered30.12.2025 & 31.12.2025Personal hearings held; petitioner's authorised representative participated; additional reply filed on 31.12.202531.12.2025 — same dayOIO passed confirming demand of Rs. 26,72,64,497/- on the very day the hearing concluded — the last date under Section 73(10) limitationSeparate SCN dated 04.07.2025 for the same FY 2021-22, also adjudicated on 31.12.2025, resulted in the Petitioner being discharged on all counts — including the very same ITC issues — creating a directly contradictory finding in the impugned OIO.Relevant FactsThe Petitioner raised three distinct grounds: first, that the opportunity of hearing was illusory and not real — Reminder-1 was issued at 05:20 PM on 27.12.2025, with 28.12.2025 being a Sunday, leaving less than one effective working day to collate voluminous documents including certified bank statements and records running into several hundred pages; second, that the OIO was passed with undue haste — the personal hearing concluded and the OIO was signed on the very same date (31.12.2025), the last date permissible under Section 73(10), raising a legitimate apprehension that material placed on record was not adequately considered; and third, that parallel proceedings were run on the same subject matter for the same FY, with a separate SCN dated 04.07.2025 having been adjudicated on the same date resulting in complete discharge of the Petitioner, rendering the impugned OIO internally contradictory. Additionally, a complete copy of the OIO was not furnished, only a partial copy having been placed on record. The Revenue contended that the petition was not maintainable given an appeal remedy under Section 107, that the petitioner had appeared and filed an additional reply, that the two SCNs pertained to distinct transactions, and that the order was reasoned.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Reminder-1 was issued on 27.12.2025 at 05:20 PM, calling upon the petitioner to furnish additional documents by 29.12.2025 and to appear for personal hearing on 30.12.2025. Admittedly, 28.12.2025 was a Sunday. The petitioner, therefore, had less than one effective working day to collate the material and respond."— Para 28"The nature of documents sought, including certified bank statements and voluminous records running into several hundred pages, could not have been reasonably procured and furnished within such a truncated timeline. The petitioner, in fact, sought a short adjournment of seven days on 29.12.2025. The record does not indicate that the said request was duly considered."— Para 29"Though it is the stand of the respondent that the petitioner participated in the personal hearing on 30.12.2025 and 31.12.2025, mere participation cannot be constructed as compliance with the requirement of affording a fair and effective opportunity. The opportunity contemplated under Sections 66(4) and 75(4) of the CGST/DGST Act is not a mere formality but must be real, reasonable and effective."— Para 30"The timeline, as notice hereinabove, clearly demonstrates that the opportunity afforded to the petitioner was illusory. The petitioner was neither granted adequate time to place the requisite material on record nor to effectively respond to the issues raised in the special audit and the SCN."— Para 31"The submission of the respondent that the petitioner had earlier filed a reply to the SCN does not dilute the requirement of granting a reasonable opportunity when additional material is sought to be relied upon. Once further documents were called for and a hearing was fixed, the respondent was under an obligation to ensure that sufficient time was afforded."— Para 32"This Court also finds merit in the contention of the petitioner that the OIO has been passed with undue haste. The personal hearing concluded on 31.12.2025 and the OIO has been passed on the very same date, confirming a substantial liability. In the facts of the present case, such haste raises a legitimate apprehension that the material placed on record may not have been adequately considered by the Adjudicating Authority."— Para 33"The contention of the respondent regarding availability of an alternate remedy under Section 107 of the Act does not merit acceptance in the present case. It is well settled that where an order is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice the existence of an alternate remedy would not operate as a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction."— Para 34Final VerdictPetition allowed. OIO dated 31.12.2025 confirming demand of Rs. 26,72,64,497/- quashed and set aside. Matter remanded for fresh adjudication as a "last chance" — Petitioner to appear before the Adjudicating Authority on 06.04.2026 with written submissions and required documents. Authority directed to grant real opportunity of hearing, consider all contentions, and pass an expeditious reasoned order. Court has not gone into the merits; all rights and remedies of both parties kept open.