Case Facts:The petitioner challenged two GST orders and corresponding DRC-07 forms issued in 2025. For one order, the issue related to consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years. For the second order, the petitioner argued limitation as DRC-07 was uploaded after the order date. The department contended that the order had already been communicated through email prior to DRC-07 upload.Court Decision:Held that consolidated notices for multiple financial years are permissible under Sections 73 and 74 using the expression “period”.Held that communication of order through email constitutes valid service under Section 169.Observed that delay in uploading DRC-07 does not render the order time-barred if order is otherwise communicated.Noted that gap between order and DRC-07 upload can occur, especially in cases involving multiple noticees.Permitted petitioner to file appeal under Section 107 and raise limitation issue therein.Directed that if appeal is filed within stipulated time (by 30.09.2025), it shall not be dismissed on limitation and be decided on merits.Cases Referred by Court:Ambika Traders through Proprietor Gaurav Gupta v. Additional Commissioner, Adjudication DGGSTI, CGST Delhi North, 2025:DHC:6181-DBRaj International v. Additional Commissioner CGST Delhi West & Ors., W.P.(C) 4096/2025Udumalpet Sarvodaya Sangham v. Authority under Shop and Establishment Act (Madras High Court)

Background.  By an order in FORM GST DRC-07 dated 25.02.2025 under Section 74, a demand of Rs. 13,63,646 comprising tax of Rs. 4,82,531, interest of Rs. 3,98,584 and penalty of Rs. 4,82,531 was raised for the tax periods April 2019 to March 2020, on disallowance of input tax credit availed on transactions with M/s KVR Industries Limited, that supplier not having discharged its tax liability, Section 16(2)(c) being invoked. An earlier proceeding under Section 73 had been dropped as proceedings under Section 74 had already been initiated.Observations of the Court.  The petitioner contended that the credit was on tax actually paid to the supplier and reflected in FORM GSTR-2A, and that fastening the supplier’s default on the recipient merely because the supplier had not filed returns for August to November 2019 amounts to requiring the recipient to discharge the supplier’s liability, resulting in double taxation prohibited in law.The department pointed to a reasoned order passed after opportunity of hearing and after examination and verification of the purchase register, waybill details, payment details, goods transport details and the credit register against proof of deposit by the supplier, and to the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, the vires of no provision being in question.Final verdict.  The Court declined to entertain the writ petition and dismissed it, leaving the petitioner at liberty to avail the alternative remedy available under the GST Act, and making it clear that the facts narrated were not to be treated as an expression of opinion touching the merits of the matter.

BackgroundThe Respondent-assessee was subjected to proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act. A tax and penalty of more than Rs. 9.40 Crores was imposed upon him. During the enquiry, the proper officer recorded statements of third parties and entirely based his opinion of guilt on those statements, which were subsequently relied upon while passing the impugned order. The assessee requested an opportunity to cross-examine those persons — a request that was denied. Despite the availability of an appellate remedy, the assessee filed a Writ Petition before the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court alleging a serious infraction of the principles of natural justice. The Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the impugned order, relying on Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II [(2016) 15 SCC 785]. The Revenue preferred the present Writ Appeal challenging that judgment.Relevant FactsThe Revenue contended that Section 74 of the CGST Act contains no express provision for cross-examination of witnesses, and therefore no such right can be insisted upon as a matter of law. The Revenue further argued that the Single Judge wrongly relied on Andaman Timber Industries, which was rendered without considering the binding three-Judge Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in Kanungo & Co. v. Collector of Customs [1983 (13) ELT 1486 (SC)] and Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India [1997 (89) ELT 646 (SC)]. The assessee countered that the principles of natural justice must be read into the statute regardless of express provision, and that denial of cross-examination — when statements of third parties formed the entire evidentiary foundation against him — rendered the proceedings void. The Division Bench also considered, suo motu, that certain persons were arrayed as co-noticees in the same proceedings and distinguished the right of cross-examination in respect of independent witnesses from co-noticees.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The question of maintainability of the writ petition, despite the existence of an alternate remedy, is no longer res integra...when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation." — However, since the challenge was on the ground of violation of natural justice, the writ petition was held to be perfectly maintainable.— Para 9 & 10 (relying on CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal)"It is now settled law that in every quasi-judicial proceedings, the rule of natural justice has to be followed. The rule of natural justice is the tenet of every adjudication proceedings, a violation of which renders the proceedings void. When courts are called upon to decide the validity of quasi-judicial proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, it cannot shut its eyes and adopt a pedantic approach and hold that unless the said principle is specifically extended under plenary legislation or the rules framed under it, the insistence of the principles is not mandatory."— Para 15"The entire basis for the formation of an opinion of guilt against the petitioner was the statements of third parties recorded by the proper officer. If the writ petitioner was to prefer an effective representation against the proposals in the notice, he had to know the basis of the allegations against him and test the evidence used against him. It was therefore imperative for the proper officer to have granted the opportunity of cross-examination to the petitioner."— Para 14"A breach of the principles of natural justice strikes at the fundamental core of procedural fairness, rendering the decision invalid unless exceptional circumstances justify such deviation...the denial of natural justice at the initial stage cannot be cured at the appellate stage...the principles of natural justice are the cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no person is condemned unheard."— Para 16 (relying on Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC Online 179)"Principles of natural justice that are reflected in Article 311, are not an empty incantation. They form the very bedrock of Article 14 and any violation of these principles tantamounts to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution...principles of natural justice guaranteed under Article 14, prohibit a decision-making adjudicatory authority from taking any arbitrary action, be it substantive or procedural in nature."— Para 22 (relying on Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa [(2024) 1 SCC 632], Para 35-36)"We hold that in appropriate cases, extending an opportunity of cross-examination in a proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act 2017 is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, a violation of which will render the proceedings void."— Para 25 (Court's final conclusion)Important Limitation (Para 24): The right to cross-examine does NOT extend to co-noticees. The assessee can only request the proper officer to supply copies of replies submitted by co-noticees — not seek their cross-examination.Final VerdictWrit Appeal filed by Revenue dismissed. Single Judge's order setting aside the impugned GST order confirmed and upheld. Division Bench held that in proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act, the right to cross-examine independent witnesses whose statements form the basis of the impugned order is an integral part of the principles of natural justice — denial thereof renders the order void. No costs.Cases Referred by CourtAndaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-IIRelied upon(2016) 15 SCC 785 — Supreme Court — Single Judge's basis for allowing writ petition; upheld by Division BenchKanungo & Co. v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and OthersDistinguished1983 (13) ELT 1486 (SC) — Supreme Court — Rendered under Sea Customs Act, 1878 (repealed); held inapplicable; cannot have universal applicationSurjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of IndiaDistinguished1997 (89) ELT 646 (SC) — Supreme Court — Relied upon by Revenue; not accepted by Division BenchCommissioner of Income Tax & Ors. v. Chhabil Dass AgarwalRelied upon(2014) 1 SCC 603 — Supreme Court — Four exceptional circumstances where writ lies despite alternate remedy, including violation of natural justiceKrishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. and OthersRelied upon3-Judge Bench2025 SCC Online 179 — Supreme Court — Breach of natural justice strikes at fundamental core of procedural fairness; denial at initial stage cannot be cured at appellate stageAyaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of MaharashtraRelied upon(2013) 4 SCC 465 — Supreme Court — Non-extension of cross-examination opportunity vitiates decision; part of principles of natural justiceAjay Saraogi v. Union of IndiaRelied upon2024 (136) GSTR 330 — Calcutta High Court (Division Bench) — Right of cross-examination imbued under Customs Act; principles of natural justice not excludedUnion of India & Another v. Tulsiram PatelRelied uponConstitution Bench(1985) 3 SCC 398 — Supreme Court — Principles of natural justice cannot be altogether excluded even by plenary/subordinate legislation; if excluded, such rule is ultra viresKothari Filaments and Another v. Commissioner of Customs (Port) Kolkata and OthersRelied upon(2009) 2 SCC 192 — Supreme Court — Customs Act does not specifically exclude natural justice; denial of cross-examination of relied-upon witnesses renders confiscation order invalidAureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa and OthersRelied upon(2024) 1 SCC 632 — Supreme Court — Natural justice is not empty incantation; forms bedrock of Article 14; violation tantamounts to violation of Article 14; Audi Alteram Partem is a twin anchor of natural justiceManeka Gandhi v. Union of IndiaRelied upon7-Judge Bench(1978) 1 SCC 248 — Supreme Court — Referenced within Aureliano Fernandes; life and liberty cannot be restricted except by procedure that is just, fair and reasonable

Facts of the CaseThe complainant department filed Complaint No. GST/01/2018 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, alleging commission of offences under Section 69 read with Section 132 of the HPGST/CGST Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017 against the petitioners, who were partners of M/s G.M. Powertech.It was alleged that the firm had availed fraudulent input tax credit (ITC) during the financial years 2017–18 and 2018–19 by declaring inward supplies from fictitious and non-existent firms based in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. The GST portal verification revealed that goods were purportedly transported in fake or non-existent vehicles, including two-wheelers and cars incapable of carrying heavy consignments. Investigation showed that suppliers mentioned in invoices did not exist at the given addresses. Fraudulent ITC amounting to substantial sums was alleged.The learned Trial Court, upon finding sufficient material, summoned the accused and fixed the matter for recording pre-charge evidence.Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint and subsequent proceedings. They contended that the GST Acts were silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint, that departmental officers exercised unbridled powers, that Sections 69 and 132 were arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, and that the trial court erred in proceeding as a warrant case and ordering pre-charge evidence.The principal questions before the High Court were:Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to investigation and trial under the GST Acts.Whether the complaint and proceedings were liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.Whether the trial court erred in treating the matter as a warrant case and directing pre-charge evidence.Court Observations and DecisionThe High Court examined the law relating to quashing of criminal proceedings and reiterated the principles governing exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as laid down by the Supreme Court. It observed that quashing is permissible only in limited circumstances such as absence of prima facie offence, legal bar to proceedings, or manifest abuse of process.On applicability of Cr.P.C., the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, holding that by virtue of Sections 4(2) and 5 Cr.P.C., the provisions of the Code apply to offences under special statutes unless expressly excluded. It further noted that GST Acts are not a complete code in respect of search, seizure, arrest and procedure, and therefore Cr.P.C. provisions apply in the absence of any contrary provision.The Court rejected the contention that the Act was silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint. It held that Cr.P.C. governs such procedure unless excluded.Regarding the trial as a warrant case, the Court observed that Section 132 provides punishment up to five years’ imprisonment. Since a warrant case under Section 2(x) Cr.P.C. includes offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years, the trial court was correct in proceeding as a warrant case. Under Section 244 Cr.P.C., in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, the Magistrate is required to record prosecution evidence after appearance of the accused. Therefore, ordering pre-charge evidence was legally justified.On the contention that investigation was improperly conducted, the Court held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction, it only examines whether a prima facie case exists and does not evaluate the sufficiency or credibility of evidence. The verification conducted by officials, who found that suppliers did not exist at the given addresses, was sufficient at the prima facie stage. Issues relating to quality of investigation are matters for trial.The Court also held that the decision in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) did not assist the petitioners, as it does not render departmental investigation invalid per se.Finding no ground falling within the parameters for quashing, the High Court dismissed the petition. It clarified that its observations were confined to disposal of the petition and would not affect the merits of the trial.Cases ReferredB.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, Supreme Court of India.State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Supreme Court of India.Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, Supreme Court of India.Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 150 GSTR 121, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 4794, Supreme Court of India. 

Facts :The petitioner challenged an order passed under Section 73 of the CGST/SGST Act on the ground that proper notice was not served. It was contended that although the show cause notice was uploaded on the GST portal, it was not served through other modes under Section 169(1)(a) to (c). The petitioner argued that mere portal upload does not constitute valid service and the order violated principles of natural justice.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 169 permits service of notice through any one of the prescribed modes, including making it available on the common portal under Section 169(1)(d). It ruled that service through the portal constitutes valid service and is sufficient compliance under the statute. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Sunil Kumar K., the Court found no infirmity in the proceedings and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to pursue statutory remedies.Cases Referred:Sunil Kumar K. v. State Tax Officer-I, Kottarakkara