Facts :The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 10.12.2021 passed under Section 73(9) of the BGST Act determining excess input tax credit. Notices were issued through the GST portal and reminders were sent, but the petitioner did not respond. The petitioner later filed an appeal with delay, which was rejected as time-barred, and thereafter approached the High Court.Court Decision:The Court held that the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 must be filed within three months with a further condonable period of one month. Even considering the extension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, the appeal should have been filed by 28.06.2022, but it was filed only on 10.07.2022.The Court held that when the statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay, neither the appellate authority nor the High Court under Article 226 can extend the limitation further. As the petitioner failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed period and no jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice was established, the writ petition was dismissed.Cases Referred by Court: In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (Supreme Court of India ; State of H.P. & Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 499

Facts The appellant availed Input Tax Credit on purchases made from a supplier and paid the tax amount along with the value of goods/services. The department issued notices alleging mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B and non-reflection of supplier invoices in GSTR-1. A demand order under Section 73(10) was passed reversing ITC along with interest and penalty. The writ petition was disposed of directing the appellant to file a statutory appeal, which led to the present intra-court appeal. Court Decision:The High Court set aside the demand order and held that reversal of ITC was not justified without first taking action against the selling dealer. The Court held that when the purchasing dealer has fulfilled conditions under Section 16(2), including possession of invoice, receipt of goods/services, and payment of tax, ITC cannot be denied merely due to non-reflection in GSTR forms. It was further held that proceedings against the purchaser can arise only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud, collusion, or where the supplier is non-existent or without assets. Cases Referred by Court:•    Union of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. •    Arise India Limited v. Commissioner of Trade and Taxes, Delhi •    Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Limited (SLP dismissed)   

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a sole proprietor trading in steel/iron bars, purchased a consignment of steel and sold it onward. An e-way bill was generated for transporting the goods directly from the seller's premises to the buyer's premises. The e-way bill reflected the petitioner's GSTIN, while the address mentioned was that of the buyer, since the goods had already been sold. RELEVANT FACTSThe truck carrying the goods was intercepted by GST authorities on 19-10-2020 at 11:00 p.m. and detained on the ground that the documents accompanying the goods were found defective. A detention order dated 23-10-2020 was passed, followed on the same date by a show-cause notice under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act stating the reason as "prima facie, the documents tendered are found to be defective" — without specifying any particular defect. Simultaneously, an order of demand of tax and penalty of Rs. 2,78,129 each was raised. Since the petitioner urgently required the goods, he paid the demanded tax and penalty to secure release of the goods. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 31-12-2021, which also failed to disclose the specific discrepancy alleged between the e-way bill and the goods. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging both orders. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)Para 20: "We are unable to accept that the order of demand and penalty is a consent order and the petitioner was precluded from challenging the same. The goods had been detained and it is not disputed that the same would not have been released unless the tax and penalty was paid. We are persuaded to accept that the petitioner had paid the tax and penalty for release of the goods and the said payment was not voluntary."Para 21: "As stated above, it is apparent that neither the show-cause notice nor the order of demand clearly sets out the reason for imposing the tax liability as well as penalty."Para 22: "In the given facts, we are of the view that it would be apposite to remand the matter to the GST officer concerned to decide afresh after giving the petitioner full opportunity to address the allegation against him." FINAL VERDICT 👍Both the order dated 23-10-2020 raising demand of tax and penalty, and the appellate order dated 31-12-2021, were set aside. The matter was remanded to the GST officer concerned, who was directed to issue a fresh show-cause notice within two weeks and pass a fresh order after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. 

BackgroundThe writ applicant, a practicing advocate, entered into an agreement dated 29th September 2020 with Navratna Organisers & Developers Pvt. Ltd. for purchase of a plot of land admeasuring 1021 sq. mtrs. at "Kalhar Blues and Greens", Ahmedabad, along with construction of a bungalow thereon. Separate and distinct consideration was fixed for (i) sale of land and (ii) construction of bungalow. The developer, relying on Entry 3(if) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read with Paragraph 2 thereof, demanded GST @ 9% CGST + 9% SGST on the entire consideration (land + construction) after deducting only 1/3rd of total value towards land, instead of deducting the entire actual land consideration. Tax was collected from the petitioner under protest. In the companion writ applications, developers had filed advance ruling applications; the authority held only 1/3rd deduction admissible. Those orders were affirmed by the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling. All three petitions were heard together, with SCA No. 1350 of 2021 treated as the lead matter.Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 87:"Thus the legislative intent is to impose tax on construction activity undertaken by a supplier at the behest of or pursuant to contract with the recipient. There is no intention to impose tax on supply of land in any form and it is for this reason that it is provided in the Schedule III to the GST Acts that the supply of land will be neither supply of goods nor supply of services."Para 88:"If the statutory provisions are interpreted from this perspective then the difference sought to be drawn by the learned A.S.G. between developed and undeveloped land pales into insignificance. As such, when the entry in the Schedule III says 'sale of land' then it can be land in any form."Para 90:"However, in the present case what is sought to be argued by the revenue is that the exclusion of sale of land will not be available since the land is a developed piece of land. It is difficult for us to accept such argument as at the point of time when the buyer entered into the picture, the land was already developed. Thus, even without going to Schedule III, the only service which is supplied by the supplier to the recipient is the construction undertaken for the buyer and it is such supply alone which can be taxed. Hence the fact that the land is not a plain parcel of land but a developed land cannot be a ground for imposing tax on the sale of such land."Para 96:"The answer has to be in the negative. When the statutory provision requires valuation in accordance with the actual price paid and payable for the service and where such actual price is available, then tax has to be imposed on such actual value. Deeming fiction can be applied only where actual value is not ascertainable."Para 100:"Thus, mandatory application of deeming fiction of 1/3rd of total agreement value towards land even though the actual value of land is ascertainable is clearly contrary to the provisions and scheme of the CGST Act and therefore ultra-vires the statutory provisions."Para 105:"Such deeming fiction which leads to arbitrary and discriminatory consequences could be clearly said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which guarantees equality to all and also frowns upon arbitrariness in law."Para 109:"Thus, the prescription under Section 15(5) of the CGST Act has to be by rules and not by notification. Be that as it may, wherever a delegated legislation is challenged as being ultra-vires the provisions of the CGST Act as well as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be defended merely on the ground that the Government had competence to issue such delegated piece of legislation. Even if it is presumed that the Government had the competence to fix a deemed value for supplies, if the deeming fiction is found to be arbitrary and contrary to the scheme of the statute, then it can be definitely held to be ultra-vires."Para 122:"In the result, the impugned Paragraph 2 of the Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.6.2017 and identical notification under the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which provide for a mandatory fixed rate of deduction of 1/3rd of total consideration towards the value of land is ultra-vires the provisions as well as the scheme of the GST Acts. Application of such mandatory uniform rate of deduction is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."Para 123–124:"While we so conclude, the question is whether the impugned paragraph 2 needs to be struck down or the same can be saved by reading it down. In our considered view, while maintaining the mandatory deduction of 1/3rd for value of land is not sustainable in cases where the value of land is clearly ascertainable or where the value of construction service can be derived with the aid of valuation rules, such deduction can be permitted at the option of a taxable person particularly in cases where the value of land or undivided share of land is not ascertainable. The impugned paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017 and the parallel State tax Notification is read down to the effect that the deeming fiction of 1/3rd will not be mandatory in nature. It will only be available at the option of the taxable person in cases where the actual value of land or undivided share in land is not ascertainable."Final VerdictParagraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read down — mandatory 1/3rd deemed deduction for land value held ultra-vires and violative of Article 14; it shall operate only as an option for the taxable person where actual land value is not ascertainable. Refund of excess tax directed to petitioner with 6% interest within 12 weeks. Advance ruling appellate orders in companion petitions quashed.  

BACKGROUNDThe National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directed the appellant to pay Rs.265.01 Crores with interest at 10% p.a. from 19.09.2016. The complainant had obtained two insurance policies from the appellant by paying a premium of Rs.10,38,03,912/-, obtained for a construction contract awarded by the Government of Basra, Iraq. When the contract was withdrawn due to internal conflict and payments were suspended, the appellant rejected the insurance claim. The complaint was filed and decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, depositing Rs.50,000/- as pre-deposit in accordance with the 1986 Act. However, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had come into force on 20.07.2020, and under Section 67 of the 2019 Act, the condition for filing an appeal is deposit of 50% of the entire awarded amount — with no upper ceiling — which would mean depositing approximately Rs.132 Crores. FACTSThe pre-deposit condition under the two Acts is starkly different. Under the 1986 Act, the condition was 50% of the awarded amount or Rs.50,000, whichever is less. Under the 2019 Act, it is a flat 50% of the awarded amount with no ceiling whatsoever. The appellant filed an Interlocutory Application praying that the appeal be entertained under the conditions prescribed by the 1986 Act, i.e., the law applicable at the time the complaint was filed and proceedings were initiated. The respondent contended that the 2019 Act applies as it was in force at the time of filing of the appeal and that pre-deposit is a mere procedural requirement, hence retrospective. The Court examined a long line of Constitution Bench judgments on the doctrine of vested right of appeal and whether imposition of a more onerous pre-deposit condition amounts to curtailing a substantive right that had already accrued. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)(From Hoosein Kasam Dada — approved and relied upon by the Court): "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right."(From Garikapati Veeraya — Constitution Bench principles approved and applied): "(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."(From State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange — applied by the Court): "it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment."(Court's own final conclusion — Para 34): "In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Interlocutory Application was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will not apply to appeals arising from complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The right of appeal is a vested substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of the proceedings, and it cannot be curtailed by the new law unless the new law expressly or by necessary intendment says so.👍 IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT KEY CASES REFERRED AND RELIED UPON BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.AIR 1931 Cal. 100 (Calcutta HC — approved by SC)2Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court)3Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.AIR 1957 SC 540 (Constitution Bench)4State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.AIR 1960 SC 980 (Three-Judge Bench)5Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., NagpurAIR 1967 SC 344 (Constitution Bench)6M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court)7K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.(2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court)8Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1975) 2 SCC 175 (Four-Judge Bench)9Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors.(1996) 3 SCC 142 (Supreme Court)10M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 428 (Supreme Court)11Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.(2011) 6 SCC 739 (Supreme Court)12Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.2021 SCC OnLine SC 225 (Supreme Court)13Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (Three-Judge Bench)14New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra(1975) 2 SCC 840 (Supreme Court)15M/s. Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 decided on 18.04.2016 (Madras HC, Division Bench)