Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Genpact India Pvt. Ltd., is a BPO service provider registered under Haryana GST, employing approximately 50,000 employees. It is engaged in providing a host of BPO and IT-enabled services including maintaining vendor/customer master data, processing vendor invoices, book-keeping, software development, technical IT support, data analysis, supply chain management support etc. — all rendered from India remotely through telecommunication/internet links using its own infrastructure.The petitioner entered into a Master Services Sub-Contracting Agreement (MSA) dated 01.01.2013 with Genpact International Inc. (GI), a US entity. Under the MSA, the petitioner was sub-contracted by GI to actually perform and deliver BPO/IT services directly to GI's overseas customers, on a principal-to-principal basis. The petitioner raised invoices on GI and received payment in convertible foreign exchange. There was no separate agreement between the petitioner and GI's customers.For the period July 2017 to March 2018, the petitioner filed a refund application on 18.10.2018 claiming refund of unutilised ITC of Rs. 27,26,27,276/- under Section 16 of the IGST Act read with Section 54 of the CGST Act. The Deputy Commissioner by Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 sanctioned Rs. 26,34,61,625/- accepting the services as export of services.However, the Principal Commissioner exercised revision powers under Section 107(2) of the CGST Act and filed an appeal contending that the petitioner's services were "intermediary services" — relying on a Circular dated 18.07.2019 which was subsequently withdrawn on 04.12.2019. The Joint Commissioner (Appeals) by order dated 27.05.2020 held the services to be intermediary services and ordered recovery of the entire refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/-.In an earlier round of litigation (CWP No. 10302/2020), this Court set aside the order dated 27.05.2020 and remanded the matter for fresh decision. The Appellate Authority on remand again passed order dated 15.02.2021 holding the petitioner to be an intermediary and denying the refund, additionally denying a further claim of Rs. 82,15,102/-. Refund applications for subsequent periods (April 2018–March 2019) were also rejected on identical grounds. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2021, the present writ petition was filed. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A bare perusal of the recitals and relevant clauses of the MSA...do not in any manner indicate that petitioner is acting as an 'intermediary' so as to fall within the scope and ambit of the definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. Such clauses cannot also be interpreted to conclude that the petitioner has facilitated the services. The said clauses are in relation to the modalities of how the actual work would be carried out and do not in any manner establish that the petitioner was required to arrange/facilitate a 3rd party to render the main service which has actually been rendered by the petitioner.""As per definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act the following three conditions must be satisfied for a person to qualify as an 'intermediary'; First, the relationship between the parties must be that of a principal-agency relationship. Second, the person must be involved in arrangement or facilitation of provisions of the service provided to the principal by a 3rd party. Third, the person must not actually perform the main service intended to be received by the service recipient itself.""There is no change in the legal position i.e. with regard to the scope and ambit of 'intermediary' services under the service tax regime vis-a-vis the GST regime and there being no change of facts as it is the MSA of 2013 (Annexure P-1) which continues to operate, the department cannot take a different view for different periods.""The finding recorded by the respondents-department to hold the petitioner to be in a principal agent relationship with the GI to be without any basis and to be clearly erroneous. The impugned order proceeds oblivious of Clause 21.6 of the MSA... Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute or be deemed to constitute a relationship of employer and employee, agency, joint venture or partnership between the parties hereto...""Even as per the afore-noticed circular dated 20.09.2021 and in reference to para 3.5 it stands clarified that sub-contracting for a service is not an 'intermediary' service.""The written statement seeks to justify the impugned order on grounds which are not even part of the impugned order and which is clearly impermissible in law." [Relying on Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner]"The principle of consistency as such ought to apply in the present matter as well and we find merit in the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner that the view taken in the order in original dated 25.01.2018...holding the petitioner to be not an 'intermediary' under the MSA, should prevail even under the GST regime."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. Impugned order dated 15.02.2021 quashed. Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 granting refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/- restored. Directed that the benefit of this order shall enure to the petitioner for subsequent refunds as well. 👍 In favour of Assessee.   

BACKGROUNDA batch of 27 Writ Petitions was filed by various small traders and businesspersons whose GST registrations were cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the CGST/TNGST Acts for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months. Show Cause Notices in prescribed form were issued to all petitioners and cancellation orders were passed after personal hearing opportunities. The cancellation orders ranged from the year 2018 to 2019. Some petitioners directly challenged the cancellation orders, while others challenged orders of Appellate Commissioners rejecting their appeals as time-barred, and a few challenged rejection of revocation applications. The Government had provided multiple amnesty opportunities through Order No.01/2020-Central Tax dated 25.06.2020 (for cancellations up to 12.06.2020) and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021 (extending deadline to 30.09.2021), but none of the petitioners availed these in time. The Appellate Commissioners correctly rejected all belated appeals as beyond the condonable period under Section 107 of the respective GST Acts. FACTSAll the petitioners had failed to file their GST returns for a continuous period of six months, resulting in cancellation of their registrations. After cancellation, they neither filed applications for revocation under Section 30 of the Act within 30 days, nor did they avail the extended amnesty opportunities granted by the Government on the recommendations of the GST Council to revive their registrations. When some of them filed appeals before Appellate Commissioners under Section 107 of the CGST/TNGST Acts, those appeals were rejected as beyond the condonable period of limitation — the delays ranging from 11 months to over 2 years. The Appellate Commissioners, being statutory authorities, had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107. Several petitioners also pointed to the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation extension orders, CBIC Circular No.157/13/2021-GST dated 20.07.2021, Circular No.158/14/2021-GST dated 06.09.2021, and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021. One petitioner specifically raised an issue about the GST portal architecture not permitting filing of revocation applications despite dues being paid. The Court noted that while the Appellate Authorities rightly rejected the petitions under the statute, there was an overwhelming case for restoring the registrations in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"The law on the limitation has been well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this connection, a reference is invited to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 70, wherein, it has been held that statutory appeal filed beyond the statutory period for condonation of delay under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be condoned. This position of law applies to the facts of these cases.""As original or as appellate authority exercising power under the respective enactments, quasi judicial officers were bound by the provisions of the Act and the limitation under it, they have acted in accordance with law. They cannot look beyond the limitations prescribed under provisions of the Act. Therefore, no fault can be attributed to their action.""the provisions of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 cannot be interpreted in such a manner, so as to debar an assessee, either from obtaining registration or reviving the lapsed/cancelled registration as such an interpretation would be not only contrary to the Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India but also in violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""In my view, no useful purpose will be served by keeping these petitioners out of the bounds of GST regime under the respective GST enactments other than to allow further leakage of the revenue and to isolate these petitioners from the main stream contrary to the objects of the respective GST enactments.""The purpose of GST registration is only to ensure just tax gets collected on supplies of goods or service or both and is paid to the exchequer. Keeping these petitioners outside the bounds of the GST regime is a self defeating move as no tax will get paid on the supplies of these petitioners.""The provisions of the GST enactments cannot be interpreted so as to deny the right to carry on Trade and Commerce to a citizen and subjects. The constitutional guarantee is unconditional and unequivocal and must be enforced regardless of the defect in the scheme of the GST enactments. The right to carry on trade or profession also cannot be curtailed. Only reasonable restriction can be imposed. To deny such rights would militate against their rights under Article 14, read with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""This is a fit case for exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners by quashing the impugned orders and to grant consequential relief to the petitioners. By doing so, the Court is effectuating the object under the GST enactment of levying and collecting just tax from every assessee who either supplies goods or service. Legitimate Trade and Commerce by every supplier should be allowed to be carried on subject to payment of tax and statutory compliance.""These petitioners deserve a chance and therefore should be allowed to revive their registration so that they can proceed to regularize the defaults."  FINAL VERDICTAll 27 Writ Petitions were allowed subject to conditions. The petitioners were directed to file all pending returns and pay the defaulted tax, interest, fine and fee within 45 days from receipt of the order, without adjusting from ITC. On compliance, the GST registrations shall stand revived forthwith. The respondents were directed to instruct GSTN to make necessary changes in the portal architecture within 30 days to enable filings. ITC, if any, to be utilized only after scrutiny and approval by competent authorities.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1M/s. Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Others(2008) 3 SCC 70 (Supreme Court)2P.R. Mani Electronics vs. Union of India and Others2020 SCC OnLine Mad 8053 (Madras HC, Division Bench)3Tvl. Sunpenta Mining Service Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commissioner (ST), SalemW.P.Nos.20083 & 20086 of 2021 dated 22.09.2021 (Madras HC)4Suresh Trading Corporation vs. Asst. Commissioner (Circle) of SGST, Coimbatore IIW.P.No.21109 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021 (Madras HC)5Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India(1997) 5 SCC 536 (Supreme Court)6In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation2021 SCC OnLine SC 947 (Supreme Court) — M.A. No.665/2021 in SMW(C) No.3/2020  

BackgroundThe assessee is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, engaged in the business of sale of textiles and readymade garments. The assessee purchased goods from registered dealers within the State, paid tax through account payee cheques, and issued tax invoices to buyers as required under Section 29 of the KVAT Act. The Audit Authority, upon audit of the books of accounts, rejected the returns and by order dated December 26, 2014 under Section 39(1) of the Act, disallowed the Input Tax Credit claimed by the assessee for the tax period September 2012 to March 2013, on the ground that certain selling dealers — namely M/s. Taksons, M/s. Jasky Exporters Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Venus Printers — were suspected to be bogus dealers and had not remitted the tax to the Department. FactsThe assessee challenged the order of the Audit Authority before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal by order dated October 30, 2015, upholding the re-assessment and penalty order. The assessee thereafter appealed to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (KAT), which by judgment dated August 21, 2017 allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below, and restored the ITC claim of the assessee. The State of Karnataka filed the present revision petition before the High Court challenging the order of the KAT. The State contended that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that under the KVAT Act, only tax actually collected and discharged by the selling dealer is eligible to be availed as ITC by the purchasing dealer, and that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the transactions and that the selling dealers were not bogus. The assessee, on the other hand, maintained that it had made purchases supported by proper documentation including account payee cheques reflected in the invoices themselves, thereby fully discharging its burden under Section 71 of the Act, and that it cannot be made responsible for the failure of the selling dealer to remit tax. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Extracts)"From perusal of these documents, it can safely be concluded that the transaction is not a bogus transaction or make believe transaction. Since M/s. Tallam Apparels is not a bogus dealer, as is evident from the documents produced by the assessee, dis-allowing of input tax is incorrect. There cannot be any dispute, that burden is cast on the assessee to establish the transaction to lay a claim for deduction of input tax by production of necessary documents. This Court is of the considered opinion that the assessee has discharged this burden by placing necessary documents referred to supra. The details of the account payee cheques mentioned in the invoice itself demonstrates that the amount is transferred from the assessee to the dealer through the Bank which fact establishes that the transaction is not a bogus transaction." — Para 12"In the case on hand, if M/s. Tallam Apparels has not remitted the tax to the Department, for which assessee cannot be penalized." — Para 13"Under the scheme of the Act, there is no power vested in the authority to proceed against the assessee for non-remittance of tax by his purchaser. This aspect of the matter has been rightly considered by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in the right perspective." — Para 14 Final VerdictThe High Court of Karnataka dismissed the State's revision petition and upheld the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. It was held that once the assessee had established the genuineness of purchases through proper documentation including account payee cheques, ITC could not be denied merely on the ground that the selling dealer had not remitted tax to the Department, as the assessee cannot be penalized for the default of the selling dealer.  

BackgroundThe lead petitioner is a company engaged in import and sale of Ceramic Pigment Ink. It placed an order for a consignment from its principal in Spain, imported through Ahmedabad Airport. The company filed a bill of entry for home consumption and paid applicable customs duty as well as IGST before commencement of movement of goods. While the goods were being transported from Ahmedabad Airport to the company's warehouse in Vadodara, the truck was intercepted on the Ahmedabad-Vadodara Expressway by the GST Authorities. The transporter duly produced all documents including the bill of entry evidencing prior payment of IGST. The vehicle was detained solely on the ground that the e-way bill had not been generated — the clearing and forwarding agent had urgently dispatched the consignment given its perishable nature without waiting for the e-way bill. On learning of the detention, the company promptly generated the e-way bill. However, the authorities refused to release the goods and raised a demand for release which far exceeded the value of the goods themselves. The authorities proceeded to issue a Show Cause Notice directly under Section 130 of the CGST Act demanding payment of tax, 100% penalty and redemption fine equal to the value of goods in lieu of confiscation — without first following the procedure under Section 129 of the Act. Five writ applications raising identical issues were clubbed and disposed of by a common judgment.Relevant FactsIGST had been paid in full at the time of import — before movement commenced. Bill of entry for home consumption accompanying the goods evidenced prior payment of tax. The only lapse was non-generation of e-way bill at the time of transport — attributable to the C&F agent acting in urgency given the perishable nature of the goods and their limited shelf-life. Despite tax having already been paid, the authorities levied 100% penalty under Section 129 AND simultaneously invoked Section 130 for confiscation with redemption fine equal to the full value of goods. The Show Cause Notice under Section 130 was issued without first completing Section 129 proceedings — i.e., without issuing the Section 129(3) notice, granting hearing, and allowing the 14-day compliance window. The petitioners' central argument was that Section 130 is entirely dependent on non-compliance with Section 129(6) and cannot be independently invoked. The Revenue's case was that both sections carry non-obstante clauses making them independent of each other.Court Observations (Verbatim — Final Conclusions)"(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, Section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although, both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to Section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive."— Para 182(i) — Core ratio: Sections 129 & 130 are independent"(ii) The phrase 'with an intent to evade the payment of tax' in Section 130 of the Act assumes importance. When the law requires an intention to evade payment of tax, then it is not mere failure to pay tax. It must be something more. The word 'evade' in the context means defeating the provisions of law of paying tax. It is made more stringent by use of the word 'intent'. The assessee must deliberately avoid the payment of tax which is payable in accordance with law. However, the element of mens rea cannot be read into Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(ii) — On "intent to evade" in Section 130"(iii) For the purpose of issuing a notice of confiscation under Section 130 of the Act at the threshold, i.e., at the stage of detention and seizure of the goods and conveyance, the case has to be of such a nature that on the face of the entire transaction, the authority concerned should be convinced that the contravention was with a definite intent to evade payment of tax. The action, in such circumstances, should be in good faith and not be a mere pretence. In other words, the authorities need to make out a very strong case. Mere suspicion may not be sufficient to invoke Section 130 of the Act straightway."— Para 182(iii) — Strong case needed for invoking Section 130 at threshold"(iv) If the authorities are of the view that the case is one of invoking Section 130 of the Act at the very threshold, then they need to record their reasons for such belief in writing, and such reasons recorded in writing should, thereafter, be looked into by the superior authority so that the superior authority can take an appropriate decision whether the case is one of straightway invoking Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(iv) — Mandatory written reasons & superior authority approval"(vi) Section 130 of the Act is not dependent on clause (6) of Section 129 of the Act."— Para 182(vi) — Rejecting assessee's sequential argument"(xiv) The goods are not liable to be detained on the ground that the tax paid on the product was less. In such circumstances, the Inspecting Authority is expected to alert the Assessing Authority to initiate appropriate proceedings 'for assessment of any alleged sale at which the dealer will have his opportunities to put forward his pleas on law and on fact. The process of detention of the goods cannot be resorted to when the dispute is bona fide, especially concerning the exigibility of tax and, more particularly, the rate of that tax.'"— Para 182(xiv) — Inspecting authority has no jurisdiction on valuation"(xvi) The extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, directing for release of the vehicles or goods, during the pendency of the confiscation, can only be sparingly exercised under extraordinary situations and circumstances when injustice occurs because of non-fulfillment of the conditions for confiscation."— Para 182(xvi) — Restricted scope of writ interferenceSummary of Mixed OutcomesAgainst AssesseeSections 129 & 130 held independent — Section 130 can be invoked without first completing Section 129. Section 130 is NOT dependent on Section 129(6) non-compliance. Mens rea not required for Section 130.For AssesseeStrong evidence of "definite intent to evade" mandatory at threshold. Written reasons + superior authority approval mandated. Detention for valuation disputes not permissible. Goods directed to be released pending confiscation proceedings.Final VerdictThe Court laid down 16 general principles on the interpretation of Sections 129 and 130 of the CGST Act and directed all matters to be listed before the tax bench for deciding individual confiscation challenges on merits. The primary argument of the assessees — that Section 130 cannot be independently invoked and is subject to Section 129(6) — was rejected. However, the Court ordered interim release of goods and conveyances in all petitions pending confiscation proceedings, subject to final outcome. No final adjudication on the merits of individual petitions was undertaken. 

BackgroundCIDCO (City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.), incorporated on 17th March 1970, is designated as the New Town Development Authority under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act). In furtherance of its planning mandate, CIDCO allots residential-cum-commercial and hotel plots on 60-year leases through a tender process. Successful bidders pay a one-time lease premium (lump sum) plus annual lease rent. In April 2017, upon issuance of allotment letters, CIDCO demanded GST @ 18% on the total one-time lease premium via Demand Draft. Petitioners — an association of builders and a partnership firm — challenged this levy before the Bombay High Court after the GST Commissionerate failed to respond to their grievance correspondence. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 falling in this Chapter leaves us in no manner of doubt that the expression 'supply' includes all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business.""Once this law, in terms of the substantive provisions and the Schedule, treats the activity as supply of goods or supply of services, particularly in relation to land and building and includes a lease, then, the consideration therefor as a premium/one-time premium is a measure on which the tax is levied, assessed and recovered. We cannot then probe into the legislation any further.""It is entirely for the legislature, therefore, to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 7 of the GST Act and issue the requisite notification. Absent that notification, merely going by the status of the CIDCO, we cannot hold that the lease premium would not attract or invite the liability to pay tax in terms of the GST Act.""With respect, it cannot be said that the activities performed by sovereign or public authorities under the provisions of law, which are in the nature of statutory obligations are excluded from the purview of the present enactment.""Pertinently, the dividing line between governmental and non-governmental, sovereign and regal functions and otherwise is not very thin and post globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation."Final VerdictThe demand for GST on the one-time lease premium is held to be in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed and Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.