| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 181 | Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs Union Of India And Anr, | 28-04-2004 | Whether the seat of Parliament or a State Legislature constitutes a relevant factor for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutionality | View Download |
BackgroundThe appellant, a company with its registered office at Mumbai, had availed a loan from the Bhopal branch of State Bank of India. The respondent issued a notice for repayment of the loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). Questioning the constitutional validity of the said Act, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court challenging that dismissal. Crucial FactsThe sole submission of the appellant, both before the High Court and the Supreme Court, was that since the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act was under challenge, the Delhi High Court had requisite jurisdiction as Parliament sits in Delhi. No part of the cause of action — neither the loan, nor the notice of demand, nor any executive action — arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The registered office of the appellant was in Mumbai and the demand notice was issued from Bhopal. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner."— S.B. Sinha, J."A writ petition, however, questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act shall not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi only because the seat of the Union of India is in Delhi."— S.B. Sinha, J. (Citing Abdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354)"Situs of office of the Parliament, Legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof."— S.B. Sinha, J."The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court."— S.B. Sinha, J."When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place."— S.B. Sinha, J."Even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens."— S.B. Sinha, J. (On Forum Conveniens) Note — Overruled DecisionThe view in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. (1995) 4 SCC 738 — that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government confers jurisdiction on the High Court — was expressly overruled to the extent it held otherwise. Final Verdict👎 Appeal dismissed. The Delhi High Court rightly declined jurisdiction as no cause of action — neither wholly nor in part — arose within its territorial limits. Mere location of Parliament in Delhi does not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging a Parliamentary enactment. No costs. Cases Referred by the CourtMussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh — 15 IA 156 — Definition and scope of cause of actionOil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. — (1994) 4 SCC 711 — Territorial jurisdiction; integral facts testState of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr. — (1985) 3 SCC 217 — Mere service of notice not integral cause of actionAligarh Muslim University & Anr. vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. — (1994) 4 SCC 710 — Abuse of jurisdictionUnion of India & Ors. vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr. — (2002) 1 SCC 567 — Integral facts must form cause of action for High Court jurisdictionNational Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s. Haribox Swalram & Ors. — JT 2004 (4) SC 508 — Mere carrying on of business at a place not integral cause of actionAbdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India & Ors. — AIR 1979 Cal 354 — Delhi HC not automatically having jurisdiction over Parliament seatNasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal — AIR 1976 SC 331 — Cause of action; appellate order situs (distinguished)U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. & Ors. — (1995) 4 SCC 738 — Overruled to the extent of holding situs of notification issuance as conferring jurisdictionLt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. The Union of India & Anr. — (1961) 2 SCR 828 — Pre-Art.226(2) amendment; distinguished on facts | ||||
| Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs Union Of India And Anr, 28-04-2004 Whether the seat of Parliament or a State Legislature constitutes a relevant factor for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutionalityBackgroundThe appellant, a company with its registered office at Mumbai, had availed a loan from the Bhopal branch of State Bank of India. The respondent issued a notice for repayment of the loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). Questioning the constitutional validity of the said Act, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court challenging that dismissal. Crucial FactsThe sole submission of the appellant, both before the High Court and the Supreme Court, was that since the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act was under challenge, the Delhi High Court had requisite jurisdiction as Parliament sits in Delhi. No part of the cause of action — neither the loan, nor the notice of demand, nor any executive action — arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The registered office of the appellant was in Mumbai and the demand notice was issued from Bhopal. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner."— S.B. Sinha, J."A writ petition, however, questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act shall not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi only because the seat of the Union of India is in Delhi."— S.B. Sinha, J. (Citing Abdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 Cal 354)"Situs of office of the Parliament, Legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof."— S.B. Sinha, J."The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court."— S.B. Sinha, J."When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place."— S.B. Sinha, J."Even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens."— S.B. Sinha, J. (On Forum Conveniens) Note — Overruled DecisionThe view in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. (1995) 4 SCC 738 — that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government confers jurisdiction on the High Court — was expressly overruled to the extent it held otherwise. Final Verdict👎 Appeal dismissed. The Delhi High Court rightly declined jurisdiction as no cause of action — neither wholly nor in part — arose within its territorial limits. Mere location of Parliament in Delhi does not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging a Parliamentary enactment. No costs. Cases Referred by the CourtMussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh — 15 IA 156 — Definition and scope of cause of actionOil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. — (1994) 4 SCC 711 — Territorial jurisdiction; integral facts testState of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr. — (1985) 3 SCC 217 — Mere service of notice not integral cause of actionAligarh Muslim University & Anr. vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. — (1994) 4 SCC 710 — Abuse of jurisdictionUnion of India & Ors. vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr. — (2002) 1 SCC 567 — Integral facts must form cause of action for High Court jurisdictionNational Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M/s. Haribox Swalram & Ors. — JT 2004 (4) SC 508 — Mere carrying on of business at a place not integral cause of actionAbdul Kafi Khan vs. Union of India & Ors. — AIR 1979 Cal 354 — Delhi HC not automatically having jurisdiction over Parliament seatNasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal — AIR 1976 SC 331 — Cause of action; appellate order situs (distinguished)U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. & Ors. — (1995) 4 SCC 738 — Overruled to the extent of holding situs of notification issuance as conferring jurisdictionLt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. The Union of India & Anr. — (1961) 2 SCR 828 — Pre-Art.226(2) amendment; distinguished on facts | ||||
| 182 | Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. | 19-02-1987 | Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 — whether the State is entitled to the same standard of "sufficient cause" as a private litigant when seeking condoning of a 4-day delay in filing an appeal against an order enhanci | View Download |
BackgroundThe State of Jammu & Kashmir challenged a High Court order that enhanced land acquisition compensation by 800% — from Rs. 1,000 per kanal to Rs. 8,000 per kanal — amounting to an upward revision of nearly Rs. 14 lakhs. The appeal also raised important questions on principles of valuation. The State's appeal before the High Court was filed 4 days beyond the limitation period. The High Court rejected the State's condonation application and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The State approached the Supreme Court by special leave.Relevant FactsThe delay of only 4 days arose in the context of a government department operating through an impersonal bureaucratic machinery where no individual officer is personally affected by the judgment under challenge. The High Court, without giving the benefit of this institutional reality, dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of limitation by applying a strict standard. No mala fides or deliberate delay was alleged or found. The State, as appellant, argued that "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act existed for the delay. The matter involved not only a large sum of compensation but also principles of valuation relevant to public interest.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.""Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.""'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.""When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.""There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.""It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.""The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay.""Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve.""The State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status."Final VerdictHigh Court order dismissing appeal as time-barred set aside. Delay of 4 days condoned, sufficient cause held to exist. Matter remitted to High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to both sides. Appeal allowed. No costs awarded. | ||||
| Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. 19-02-1987 Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 — whether the State is entitled to the same standard of "sufficient cause" as a private litigant when seeking condoning of a 4-day delay in filing an appeal against an order enhanciBackgroundThe State of Jammu & Kashmir challenged a High Court order that enhanced land acquisition compensation by 800% — from Rs. 1,000 per kanal to Rs. 8,000 per kanal — amounting to an upward revision of nearly Rs. 14 lakhs. The appeal also raised important questions on principles of valuation. The State's appeal before the High Court was filed 4 days beyond the limitation period. The High Court rejected the State's condonation application and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The State approached the Supreme Court by special leave.Relevant FactsThe delay of only 4 days arose in the context of a government department operating through an impersonal bureaucratic machinery where no individual officer is personally affected by the judgment under challenge. The High Court, without giving the benefit of this institutional reality, dismissed the appeal solely on the ground of limitation by applying a strict standard. No mala fides or deliberate delay was alleged or found. The State, as appellant, argued that "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act existed for the delay. The matter involved not only a large sum of compensation but also principles of valuation relevant to public interest.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.""Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.""'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.""When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.""There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.""It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.""The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay.""Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve.""The State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status."Final VerdictHigh Court order dismissing appeal as time-barred set aside. Delay of 4 days condoned, sufficient cause held to exist. Matter remitted to High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to both sides. Appeal allowed. No costs awarded. | ||||
| 183 | Vishwa Mitter vs. O. P. Poddar and Others, | 30-09-1983 | Competency of a complainant to file a criminal complaint under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 read with Section 420 IPC, and whether a Magistrate can refuse to take cognizance on the ground that the complainant is not the | View Download |
The appellant, Vishwa Mitter, was a dealer in beedies and the constituted attorney of Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, the registered owner of certain trademarks. He filed a criminal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging that the respondents had infringed registered trademarks by selling inferior quality beedies in deceptively similar wrappers, thereby committing offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Section 420 IPC.Initially, the Magistrate issued process after preliminary inquiry. However, on revision, the High Court quashed the order on a technical ground and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Upon rehearing, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint holding that the complainant, being only a dealer and not the registered trademark owner, was not competent to file the complaint. The revision petition filed against this dismissal was rejected in limine by the High Court. The matter then reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a Magistrate can decline to take cognizance of an offence on the sole ground that the complainant is not the registered owner of the trademark, and whether any statutory provision restricted the right to file such complaint only to the registered proprietor.Court Observations and DecisionThe Supreme Court examined Sections 4 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It observed that Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence, without prescribing any qualification for the complainant. The Court held that, generally, anyone can set the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary.The Court further noted that under Section 4(2) CrPC, offences under other laws are to be dealt with according to the CrPC unless a special statute provides otherwise. It examined Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which restricts cognizance for offences under Sections 81, 82, and 83 to complaints made by the Registrar or authorized officer. However, no such restriction exists for offences under Sections 78 and 79. Therefore, there was no statutory bar preventing the appellant from filing the complaint.The Court also observed that even in the absence of specific statutory qualification, a person having a subsisting interest in the protection of a registered trademark cannot be said to lack standing. The appellant, being both a dealer in the concerned products and a constituted attorney of the registered proprietor, had sufficient interest.The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of lack of competency and that the High Court was also wrong in dismissing the revision petition in limine.The appeal was allowed. The orders of the Magistrate dated 20 February 1980 and of the High Court dated 4 November 1980 were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law in light of the Court’s observations.Cases ReferredThe judgment does not record reliance on any specific prior decided cases. The Court referred to statutory provisions including:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4, 190, 195, 198, 199Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 – Sections 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – Section 20Companies Act, 1956 – Section 621 | ||||
| Vishwa Mitter vs. O. P. Poddar and Others, 30-09-1983 Competency of a complainant to file a criminal complaint under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 read with Section 420 IPC, and whether a Magistrate can refuse to take cognizance on the ground that the complainant is not theThe appellant, Vishwa Mitter, was a dealer in beedies and the constituted attorney of Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, the registered owner of certain trademarks. He filed a criminal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging that the respondents had infringed registered trademarks by selling inferior quality beedies in deceptively similar wrappers, thereby committing offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Section 420 IPC.Initially, the Magistrate issued process after preliminary inquiry. However, on revision, the High Court quashed the order on a technical ground and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Upon rehearing, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint holding that the complainant, being only a dealer and not the registered trademark owner, was not competent to file the complaint. The revision petition filed against this dismissal was rejected in limine by the High Court. The matter then reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a Magistrate can decline to take cognizance of an offence on the sole ground that the complainant is not the registered owner of the trademark, and whether any statutory provision restricted the right to file such complaint only to the registered proprietor.Court Observations and DecisionThe Supreme Court examined Sections 4 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It observed that Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence, without prescribing any qualification for the complainant. The Court held that, generally, anyone can set the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary.The Court further noted that under Section 4(2) CrPC, offences under other laws are to be dealt with according to the CrPC unless a special statute provides otherwise. It examined Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which restricts cognizance for offences under Sections 81, 82, and 83 to complaints made by the Registrar or authorized officer. However, no such restriction exists for offences under Sections 78 and 79. Therefore, there was no statutory bar preventing the appellant from filing the complaint.The Court also observed that even in the absence of specific statutory qualification, a person having a subsisting interest in the protection of a registered trademark cannot be said to lack standing. The appellant, being both a dealer in the concerned products and a constituted attorney of the registered proprietor, had sufficient interest.The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of lack of competency and that the High Court was also wrong in dismissing the revision petition in limine.The appeal was allowed. The orders of the Magistrate dated 20 February 1980 and of the High Court dated 4 November 1980 were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law in light of the Court’s observations.Cases ReferredThe judgment does not record reliance on any specific prior decided cases. The Court referred to statutory provisions including:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4, 190, 195, 198, 199Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 – Sections 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – Section 20Companies Act, 1956 – Section 621 | ||||
| 184 | Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh | 23-02-1953 | Whether amendment imposing pre-deposit condition for appeal applies retrospectively and affects vested right of appeal | View Download |
Facts :The assessee filed a sales tax return in 1947 and assessment proceedings were initiated under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. During pendency, Section 22(1) was amended in 1949 requiring full payment of assessed tax as a condition for admitting an appeal. After assessment in 1950, the assessee filed an appeal without depositing tax. Authorities rejected the appeal applying the amended provision, and the High Court upheld the rejection.Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal is a substantive and vested right accruing when proceedings are initiated. The amendment imposing a pre-deposit condition materially restricted this right and was not merely procedural. Since the amendment did not expressly or by necessary implication operate retrospectively, it could not apply to proceedings initiated prior to the amendment. The Court directed that the appeal be admitted without requiring deposit of tax.Cases Referred:Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. IrvingNana bin Aba v. Sheku bin AnduDelhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax CommissionerKirpa Singh v. Rasaldar Ajaipal SinghSardar Ali v. DalimuddinBadruddin Abdul Rahim v. Sitaram Vinayak ApteIn re Vasudeva SamiarRam Singha v. Shankar DayalRadhakisan v. ShridharGordhan Das v. Governor-General in CouncilNagendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha RoyJanardan Reddy v. StateGanpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. | ||||
| Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 23-02-1953 Whether amendment imposing pre-deposit condition for appeal applies retrospectively and affects vested right of appealFacts :The assessee filed a sales tax return in 1947 and assessment proceedings were initiated under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. During pendency, Section 22(1) was amended in 1949 requiring full payment of assessed tax as a condition for admitting an appeal. After assessment in 1950, the assessee filed an appeal without depositing tax. Authorities rejected the appeal applying the amended provision, and the High Court upheld the rejection.Court Decision:The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal is a substantive and vested right accruing when proceedings are initiated. The amendment imposing a pre-deposit condition materially restricted this right and was not merely procedural. Since the amendment did not expressly or by necessary implication operate retrospectively, it could not apply to proceedings initiated prior to the amendment. The Court directed that the appeal be admitted without requiring deposit of tax.Cases Referred:Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. IrvingNana bin Aba v. Sheku bin AnduDelhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax CommissionerKirpa Singh v. Rasaldar Ajaipal SinghSardar Ali v. DalimuddinBadruddin Abdul Rahim v. Sitaram Vinayak ApteIn re Vasudeva SamiarRam Singha v. Shankar DayalRadhakisan v. ShridharGordhan Das v. Governor-General in CouncilNagendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha RoyJanardan Reddy v. StateGanpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. | ||||
