| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 161 | Biharilal Chhaterpal vs. State of U.P. & Ors. | 16-11-2021 | Seizure of goods and penalty for absence of e-way bill in inter-State movement – Sections 129 and 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 read with Section 20(xv) of the IGST Act, 2017 and Rule 138 of the CGST Rules, 2017. | View Download |
Facts:The petitioner’s goods (barbed wire) being transported from Raipur (Chhattisgarh) to Sitapur (U.P.) were intercepted on 19.02.2018. The authorities seized the goods and imposed tax of ₹2,08,800 and equal penalty under Section 129(3) of the U.P. GST Act on the ground that the petitioner was not carrying a U.P. State e-way bill during transportation. The petitioner challenged the seizure and penalty orders before the High Court. Court Decision:The High Court held that the transaction involved inter-State movement of goods and therefore the provisions of the IGST Act and CGST Act would apply. At the relevant time (19.02.2018) the e-way bill system under the CGST Rules had not yet been implemented and the requirement of carrying a U.P. State e-way bill was not applicable to inter-State trade.The Court further observed that the petitioner was carrying valid documents such as tax invoice, consignment note and national e-way bill and IGST had already been paid. As the transportation was bona fide and the requirement of State e-way bill was not applicable, the seizure and penalty orders passed under Section 129(3) of the U.P. GST Act were held to be unsustainable. The impugned orders were quashed and the authorities were directed to refund the amount deposited as tax and penalty. Cases Referred by Court:• Satyendra Goods Transport Corp. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.• ASCICS Trading Company vs. Assistant State Tax Officer & Anr.• Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P.• M/s. Shaurya Enterprises vs. State of U.P. & Ors. | ||||
| Biharilal Chhaterpal vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 16-11-2021 Seizure of goods and penalty for absence of e-way bill in inter-State movement – Sections 129 and 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 read with Section 20(xv) of the IGST Act, 2017 and Rule 138 of the CGST Rules, 2017.Facts:The petitioner’s goods (barbed wire) being transported from Raipur (Chhattisgarh) to Sitapur (U.P.) were intercepted on 19.02.2018. The authorities seized the goods and imposed tax of ₹2,08,800 and equal penalty under Section 129(3) of the U.P. GST Act on the ground that the petitioner was not carrying a U.P. State e-way bill during transportation. The petitioner challenged the seizure and penalty orders before the High Court. Court Decision:The High Court held that the transaction involved inter-State movement of goods and therefore the provisions of the IGST Act and CGST Act would apply. At the relevant time (19.02.2018) the e-way bill system under the CGST Rules had not yet been implemented and the requirement of carrying a U.P. State e-way bill was not applicable to inter-State trade.The Court further observed that the petitioner was carrying valid documents such as tax invoice, consignment note and national e-way bill and IGST had already been paid. As the transportation was bona fide and the requirement of State e-way bill was not applicable, the seizure and penalty orders passed under Section 129(3) of the U.P. GST Act were held to be unsustainable. The impugned orders were quashed and the authorities were directed to refund the amount deposited as tax and penalty. Cases Referred by Court:• Satyendra Goods Transport Corp. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.• ASCICS Trading Company vs. Assistant State Tax Officer & Anr.• Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P.• M/s. Shaurya Enterprises vs. State of U.P. & Ors. | ||||
| 162 | Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors | 20-04-2021 | Validity of provisional attachment of receivables under Section 83 of the HPGST Act, 2017 whether maintainable under Article 226 and whether conditions precedent were strictly fulfilled. | View Download |
BACKGROUNDRadha Krishan Industries, a lead manufacturer registered under GST since July 2017, had purchased goods from GM Powertech, Kala-Amb. Investigation revealed GM Powertech had fraudulently claimed ITC from fake firms. GM Powertech's partners were arrested in December 2018 and a demand of Rs. 39.48 crores was confirmed against GM Powertech under Section 74(9). On 21 October 2020, the Commissioner delegated his powers under Section 83 to the Joint Commissioner. On 28 October 2020, the Joint Commissioner provisionally attached the appellant's receivables — Rs. 4 crores from Fujikawa Power and Rs. 2.91 crores from Deepak International — on the ground that appellant had fraudulently claimed ITC of Rs. 5.03 crores based on supplies from GM Powertech. Crucially, the Show Cause Notice against the appellant under Section 74(1) was issued only on 27 November 2020 — i.e., after the provisional attachment. The appellant filed objections on 4 November 2020 which were rejected on 6 November 2020 without granting any personal hearing. The appellant challenged the provisional attachment before the HP High Court under Article 226, which dismissed the writ petition holding that an efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107 of the HPGST Act was available. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On nature of power of provisional attachment:"The power to levy a provisional attachment is draconian in nature. By the exercise of the power, a property belonging to the taxable person may be attached, including a bank account... Each of these ingredients must be strictly applied before a provisional attachment on the property of an assessee can be levied.""The Commissioner must be alive to the fact that such provisions are not intended to authorize Commissioners to make preemptive strikes on the property of the assessee, merely because property is available for being attached."On necessity vs. expediency:"By utilizing the expression 'it is necessary so to do' the legislature has evinced an intent that an attachment is authorized not merely because it is expedient to do so... but because it is necessary to do so in order to protect interest of the government revenue. Necessity postulates that the interest of the revenue can be protected only by a provisional attachment without which the interest of the revenue would stand defeated."On tangible material:"The formation of the opinion must be based on tangible material which indicates a live link to the necessity to order a provisional attachment to protect the interest of the government revenue."On pendency of proceedings:"We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent that merely because proceedings were pending/concluded against another taxable entity, that is GM Powertech, the powers of Section 83 could also be attracted against the appellant. This interpretation would be an expansion of a draconian power such as that contained in Section 83, which must necessarily be interpreted restrictively."On the impugned order:"The order of the Joint Commissioner contains absolutely no basis for the formation of the opinion that a provisional attachment was necessary to safeguard the interest of the revenue. No tangible material has been disclosed. The record clearly reveals a breach of the mandatory pre-conditions for the valid exercise of powers under Section 83 of the HPGST Act."On Rule 159(5) — hearing:"It is not open to the Commissioner, as has been stated in the present case, to hold the view that the only safeguard under sub-Rule 5 is to submit an objection without an opportunity of a personal hearing. Such a construction would be plainly contrary to sub-Rule 5 which contemplates both the submission of an objection to the attachment and an opportunity of being heard... Both the right to submit an objection and to be afforded an opportunity of being heard are valuable safeguards.""The Commissioner who hears the objections must pass a reasoned order either accepting or rejecting the objections."On maintainability of writ:"The Joint Commissioner while ordering a provisional attachment under Section 83 was acting as a delegate of the Commissioner... the order passed by the Joint Commissioner as a delegate of the Commissioner was not subject to an appeal under Section 107(1) and the only remedy that was available was in the form of the invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in declining to entertain the writ proceedings."FINAL VERDICTAppeal allowed. Orders of provisional attachment dated 28 October 2020 set aside. High Court judgment dated 1 January 2021 quashed. Writ petition under Article 226 held maintainable and provisional attachment held illegal for non-fulfillment of conditions under Section 83 and breach of Rule 159(5). | ||||
| Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors 20-04-2021 Validity of provisional attachment of receivables under Section 83 of the HPGST Act, 2017 whether maintainable under Article 226 and whether conditions precedent were strictly fulfilled.BACKGROUNDRadha Krishan Industries, a lead manufacturer registered under GST since July 2017, had purchased goods from GM Powertech, Kala-Amb. Investigation revealed GM Powertech had fraudulently claimed ITC from fake firms. GM Powertech's partners were arrested in December 2018 and a demand of Rs. 39.48 crores was confirmed against GM Powertech under Section 74(9). On 21 October 2020, the Commissioner delegated his powers under Section 83 to the Joint Commissioner. On 28 October 2020, the Joint Commissioner provisionally attached the appellant's receivables — Rs. 4 crores from Fujikawa Power and Rs. 2.91 crores from Deepak International — on the ground that appellant had fraudulently claimed ITC of Rs. 5.03 crores based on supplies from GM Powertech. Crucially, the Show Cause Notice against the appellant under Section 74(1) was issued only on 27 November 2020 — i.e., after the provisional attachment. The appellant filed objections on 4 November 2020 which were rejected on 6 November 2020 without granting any personal hearing. The appellant challenged the provisional attachment before the HP High Court under Article 226, which dismissed the writ petition holding that an efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107 of the HPGST Act was available. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)On nature of power of provisional attachment:"The power to levy a provisional attachment is draconian in nature. By the exercise of the power, a property belonging to the taxable person may be attached, including a bank account... Each of these ingredients must be strictly applied before a provisional attachment on the property of an assessee can be levied.""The Commissioner must be alive to the fact that such provisions are not intended to authorize Commissioners to make preemptive strikes on the property of the assessee, merely because property is available for being attached."On necessity vs. expediency:"By utilizing the expression 'it is necessary so to do' the legislature has evinced an intent that an attachment is authorized not merely because it is expedient to do so... but because it is necessary to do so in order to protect interest of the government revenue. Necessity postulates that the interest of the revenue can be protected only by a provisional attachment without which the interest of the revenue would stand defeated."On tangible material:"The formation of the opinion must be based on tangible material which indicates a live link to the necessity to order a provisional attachment to protect the interest of the government revenue."On pendency of proceedings:"We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent that merely because proceedings were pending/concluded against another taxable entity, that is GM Powertech, the powers of Section 83 could also be attracted against the appellant. This interpretation would be an expansion of a draconian power such as that contained in Section 83, which must necessarily be interpreted restrictively."On the impugned order:"The order of the Joint Commissioner contains absolutely no basis for the formation of the opinion that a provisional attachment was necessary to safeguard the interest of the revenue. No tangible material has been disclosed. The record clearly reveals a breach of the mandatory pre-conditions for the valid exercise of powers under Section 83 of the HPGST Act."On Rule 159(5) — hearing:"It is not open to the Commissioner, as has been stated in the present case, to hold the view that the only safeguard under sub-Rule 5 is to submit an objection without an opportunity of a personal hearing. Such a construction would be plainly contrary to sub-Rule 5 which contemplates both the submission of an objection to the attachment and an opportunity of being heard... Both the right to submit an objection and to be afforded an opportunity of being heard are valuable safeguards.""The Commissioner who hears the objections must pass a reasoned order either accepting or rejecting the objections."On maintainability of writ:"The Joint Commissioner while ordering a provisional attachment under Section 83 was acting as a delegate of the Commissioner... the order passed by the Joint Commissioner as a delegate of the Commissioner was not subject to an appeal under Section 107(1) and the only remedy that was available was in the form of the invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in declining to entertain the writ proceedings."FINAL VERDICTAppeal allowed. Orders of provisional attachment dated 28 October 2020 set aside. High Court judgment dated 1 January 2021 quashed. Writ petition under Article 226 held maintainable and provisional attachment held illegal for non-fulfillment of conditions under Section 83 and breach of Rule 159(5). | ||||
| 163 | The State of Karnataka v. M/s. Tallam Apparels | 26-02-2021 | Whether a purchasing dealer can be denied Input Tax Credit (ITC) on the ground that the selling dealer has failed to remit the tax collected to the Government, despite the purchasing dealer having made genuine purchases supported by proper tax invoices an | View Download |
BackgroundThe assessee is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, engaged in the business of sale of textiles and readymade garments. The assessee purchased goods from registered dealers within the State, paid tax through account payee cheques, and issued tax invoices to buyers as required under Section 29 of the KVAT Act. The Audit Authority, upon audit of the books of accounts, rejected the returns and by order dated December 26, 2014 under Section 39(1) of the Act, disallowed the Input Tax Credit claimed by the assessee for the tax period September 2012 to March 2013, on the ground that certain selling dealers — namely M/s. Taksons, M/s. Jasky Exporters Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Venus Printers — were suspected to be bogus dealers and had not remitted the tax to the Department. FactsThe assessee challenged the order of the Audit Authority before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal by order dated October 30, 2015, upholding the re-assessment and penalty order. The assessee thereafter appealed to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (KAT), which by judgment dated August 21, 2017 allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below, and restored the ITC claim of the assessee. The State of Karnataka filed the present revision petition before the High Court challenging the order of the KAT. The State contended that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that under the KVAT Act, only tax actually collected and discharged by the selling dealer is eligible to be availed as ITC by the purchasing dealer, and that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the transactions and that the selling dealers were not bogus. The assessee, on the other hand, maintained that it had made purchases supported by proper documentation including account payee cheques reflected in the invoices themselves, thereby fully discharging its burden under Section 71 of the Act, and that it cannot be made responsible for the failure of the selling dealer to remit tax. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Extracts)"From perusal of these documents, it can safely be concluded that the transaction is not a bogus transaction or make believe transaction. Since M/s. Tallam Apparels is not a bogus dealer, as is evident from the documents produced by the assessee, dis-allowing of input tax is incorrect. There cannot be any dispute, that burden is cast on the assessee to establish the transaction to lay a claim for deduction of input tax by production of necessary documents. This Court is of the considered opinion that the assessee has discharged this burden by placing necessary documents referred to supra. The details of the account payee cheques mentioned in the invoice itself demonstrates that the amount is transferred from the assessee to the dealer through the Bank which fact establishes that the transaction is not a bogus transaction." — Para 12"In the case on hand, if M/s. Tallam Apparels has not remitted the tax to the Department, for which assessee cannot be penalized." — Para 13"Under the scheme of the Act, there is no power vested in the authority to proceed against the assessee for non-remittance of tax by his purchaser. This aspect of the matter has been rightly considered by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in the right perspective." — Para 14 Final VerdictThe High Court of Karnataka dismissed the State's revision petition and upheld the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. It was held that once the assessee had established the genuineness of purchases through proper documentation including account payee cheques, ITC could not be denied merely on the ground that the selling dealer had not remitted tax to the Department, as the assessee cannot be penalized for the default of the selling dealer. | ||||
| The State of Karnataka v. M/s. Tallam Apparels 26-02-2021 Whether a purchasing dealer can be denied Input Tax Credit (ITC) on the ground that the selling dealer has failed to remit the tax collected to the Government, despite the purchasing dealer having made genuine purchases supported by proper tax invoices anBackgroundThe assessee is a registered dealer under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, engaged in the business of sale of textiles and readymade garments. The assessee purchased goods from registered dealers within the State, paid tax through account payee cheques, and issued tax invoices to buyers as required under Section 29 of the KVAT Act. The Audit Authority, upon audit of the books of accounts, rejected the returns and by order dated December 26, 2014 under Section 39(1) of the Act, disallowed the Input Tax Credit claimed by the assessee for the tax period September 2012 to March 2013, on the ground that certain selling dealers — namely M/s. Taksons, M/s. Jasky Exporters Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Venus Printers — were suspected to be bogus dealers and had not remitted the tax to the Department. FactsThe assessee challenged the order of the Audit Authority before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal by order dated October 30, 2015, upholding the re-assessment and penalty order. The assessee thereafter appealed to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (KAT), which by judgment dated August 21, 2017 allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below, and restored the ITC claim of the assessee. The State of Karnataka filed the present revision petition before the High Court challenging the order of the KAT. The State contended that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that under the KVAT Act, only tax actually collected and discharged by the selling dealer is eligible to be availed as ITC by the purchasing dealer, and that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the transactions and that the selling dealers were not bogus. The assessee, on the other hand, maintained that it had made purchases supported by proper documentation including account payee cheques reflected in the invoices themselves, thereby fully discharging its burden under Section 71 of the Act, and that it cannot be made responsible for the failure of the selling dealer to remit tax. Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Extracts)"From perusal of these documents, it can safely be concluded that the transaction is not a bogus transaction or make believe transaction. Since M/s. Tallam Apparels is not a bogus dealer, as is evident from the documents produced by the assessee, dis-allowing of input tax is incorrect. There cannot be any dispute, that burden is cast on the assessee to establish the transaction to lay a claim for deduction of input tax by production of necessary documents. This Court is of the considered opinion that the assessee has discharged this burden by placing necessary documents referred to supra. The details of the account payee cheques mentioned in the invoice itself demonstrates that the amount is transferred from the assessee to the dealer through the Bank which fact establishes that the transaction is not a bogus transaction." — Para 12"In the case on hand, if M/s. Tallam Apparels has not remitted the tax to the Department, for which assessee cannot be penalized." — Para 13"Under the scheme of the Act, there is no power vested in the authority to proceed against the assessee for non-remittance of tax by his purchaser. This aspect of the matter has been rightly considered by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in the right perspective." — Para 14 Final VerdictThe High Court of Karnataka dismissed the State's revision petition and upheld the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. It was held that once the assessee had established the genuineness of purchases through proper documentation including account payee cheques, ITC could not be denied merely on the ground that the selling dealer had not remitted tax to the Department, as the assessee cannot be penalized for the default of the selling dealer. | ||||
| 164 | State of Karnataka v. M/s Tallam Apparels | 26-02-2021 | Disallowance of Input Tax Credit on allegation of non-genuine transactions and non-payment of tax by selling dealer under VAT (Sections involved: Section 70(1), Section 39(1), and relevant provisions of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003) | View Download |
Facts :The assessee, a registered dealer dealing in garments, claimed input tax credit on purchases supported by invoices. The audit authority disallowed ITC under Section 39(1) alleging that transactions with certain dealers were not genuine and that the burden under Section 70 was not discharged. The First Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance, but the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal. The State filed a revision petition before the High Court challenging the Tribunal’s order. Court Decision:The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s order and dismissed the revision petition. It held that the assessee had discharged the burden under Section 70 by producing invoices and proof of payment through banking channels, establishing genuineness of transactions. The Court further held that once transactions are proved genuine, input tax credit cannot be denied merely because the selling dealer failed to remit tax. It was also held that the statute does not permit action against the purchasing dealer for default of the selling dealer. Cases Referred by Court:• Microqual Techno Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes • Packwell Industries v. State of Karnataka | ||||
| State of Karnataka v. M/s Tallam Apparels 26-02-2021 Disallowance of Input Tax Credit on allegation of non-genuine transactions and non-payment of tax by selling dealer under VAT (Sections involved: Section 70(1), Section 39(1), and relevant provisions of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003)Facts :The assessee, a registered dealer dealing in garments, claimed input tax credit on purchases supported by invoices. The audit authority disallowed ITC under Section 39(1) alleging that transactions with certain dealers were not genuine and that the burden under Section 70 was not discharged. The First Appellate Authority upheld the disallowance, but the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal. The State filed a revision petition before the High Court challenging the Tribunal’s order. Court Decision:The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s order and dismissed the revision petition. It held that the assessee had discharged the burden under Section 70 by producing invoices and proof of payment through banking channels, establishing genuineness of transactions. The Court further held that once transactions are proved genuine, input tax credit cannot be denied merely because the selling dealer failed to remit tax. It was also held that the statute does not permit action against the purchasing dealer for default of the selling dealer. Cases Referred by Court:• Microqual Techno Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes • Packwell Industries v. State of Karnataka | ||||
| 165 | Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. | 23-12-2019 | Whether Sections 129 (detention, seizure and release of goods in transit) and 130 (confiscation of goods and conveyance) of the CGST Act, 2017 are sequential — i.e., whether Section 130 can only be invoked after non-compliance of Section 129(6) — or w | View Download |
BackgroundThe lead petitioner is a company engaged in import and sale of Ceramic Pigment Ink. It placed an order for a consignment from its principal in Spain, imported through Ahmedabad Airport. The company filed a bill of entry for home consumption and paid applicable customs duty as well as IGST before commencement of movement of goods. While the goods were being transported from Ahmedabad Airport to the company's warehouse in Vadodara, the truck was intercepted on the Ahmedabad-Vadodara Expressway by the GST Authorities. The transporter duly produced all documents including the bill of entry evidencing prior payment of IGST. The vehicle was detained solely on the ground that the e-way bill had not been generated — the clearing and forwarding agent had urgently dispatched the consignment given its perishable nature without waiting for the e-way bill. On learning of the detention, the company promptly generated the e-way bill. However, the authorities refused to release the goods and raised a demand for release which far exceeded the value of the goods themselves. The authorities proceeded to issue a Show Cause Notice directly under Section 130 of the CGST Act demanding payment of tax, 100% penalty and redemption fine equal to the value of goods in lieu of confiscation — without first following the procedure under Section 129 of the Act. Five writ applications raising identical issues were clubbed and disposed of by a common judgment.Relevant FactsIGST had been paid in full at the time of import — before movement commenced. Bill of entry for home consumption accompanying the goods evidenced prior payment of tax. The only lapse was non-generation of e-way bill at the time of transport — attributable to the C&F agent acting in urgency given the perishable nature of the goods and their limited shelf-life. Despite tax having already been paid, the authorities levied 100% penalty under Section 129 AND simultaneously invoked Section 130 for confiscation with redemption fine equal to the full value of goods. The Show Cause Notice under Section 130 was issued without first completing Section 129 proceedings — i.e., without issuing the Section 129(3) notice, granting hearing, and allowing the 14-day compliance window. The petitioners' central argument was that Section 130 is entirely dependent on non-compliance with Section 129(6) and cannot be independently invoked. The Revenue's case was that both sections carry non-obstante clauses making them independent of each other.Court Observations (Verbatim — Final Conclusions)"(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, Section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although, both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to Section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive."— Para 182(i) — Core ratio: Sections 129 & 130 are independent"(ii) The phrase 'with an intent to evade the payment of tax' in Section 130 of the Act assumes importance. When the law requires an intention to evade payment of tax, then it is not mere failure to pay tax. It must be something more. The word 'evade' in the context means defeating the provisions of law of paying tax. It is made more stringent by use of the word 'intent'. The assessee must deliberately avoid the payment of tax which is payable in accordance with law. However, the element of mens rea cannot be read into Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(ii) — On "intent to evade" in Section 130"(iii) For the purpose of issuing a notice of confiscation under Section 130 of the Act at the threshold, i.e., at the stage of detention and seizure of the goods and conveyance, the case has to be of such a nature that on the face of the entire transaction, the authority concerned should be convinced that the contravention was with a definite intent to evade payment of tax. The action, in such circumstances, should be in good faith and not be a mere pretence. In other words, the authorities need to make out a very strong case. Mere suspicion may not be sufficient to invoke Section 130 of the Act straightway."— Para 182(iii) — Strong case needed for invoking Section 130 at threshold"(iv) If the authorities are of the view that the case is one of invoking Section 130 of the Act at the very threshold, then they need to record their reasons for such belief in writing, and such reasons recorded in writing should, thereafter, be looked into by the superior authority so that the superior authority can take an appropriate decision whether the case is one of straightway invoking Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(iv) — Mandatory written reasons & superior authority approval"(vi) Section 130 of the Act is not dependent on clause (6) of Section 129 of the Act."— Para 182(vi) — Rejecting assessee's sequential argument"(xiv) The goods are not liable to be detained on the ground that the tax paid on the product was less. In such circumstances, the Inspecting Authority is expected to alert the Assessing Authority to initiate appropriate proceedings 'for assessment of any alleged sale at which the dealer will have his opportunities to put forward his pleas on law and on fact. The process of detention of the goods cannot be resorted to when the dispute is bona fide, especially concerning the exigibility of tax and, more particularly, the rate of that tax.'"— Para 182(xiv) — Inspecting authority has no jurisdiction on valuation"(xvi) The extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, directing for release of the vehicles or goods, during the pendency of the confiscation, can only be sparingly exercised under extraordinary situations and circumstances when injustice occurs because of non-fulfillment of the conditions for confiscation."— Para 182(xvi) — Restricted scope of writ interferenceSummary of Mixed OutcomesAgainst AssesseeSections 129 & 130 held independent — Section 130 can be invoked without first completing Section 129. Section 130 is NOT dependent on Section 129(6) non-compliance. Mens rea not required for Section 130.For AssesseeStrong evidence of "definite intent to evade" mandatory at threshold. Written reasons + superior authority approval mandated. Detention for valuation disputes not permissible. Goods directed to be released pending confiscation proceedings.Final VerdictThe Court laid down 16 general principles on the interpretation of Sections 129 and 130 of the CGST Act and directed all matters to be listed before the tax bench for deciding individual confiscation challenges on merits. The primary argument of the assessees — that Section 130 cannot be independently invoked and is subject to Section 129(6) — was rejected. However, the Court ordered interim release of goods and conveyances in all petitions pending confiscation proceedings, subject to final outcome. No final adjudication on the merits of individual petitions was undertaken. | ||||
| Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 23-12-2019 Whether Sections 129 (detention, seizure and release of goods in transit) and 130 (confiscation of goods and conveyance) of the CGST Act, 2017 are sequential — i.e., whether Section 130 can only be invoked after non-compliance of Section 129(6) — or wBackgroundThe lead petitioner is a company engaged in import and sale of Ceramic Pigment Ink. It placed an order for a consignment from its principal in Spain, imported through Ahmedabad Airport. The company filed a bill of entry for home consumption and paid applicable customs duty as well as IGST before commencement of movement of goods. While the goods were being transported from Ahmedabad Airport to the company's warehouse in Vadodara, the truck was intercepted on the Ahmedabad-Vadodara Expressway by the GST Authorities. The transporter duly produced all documents including the bill of entry evidencing prior payment of IGST. The vehicle was detained solely on the ground that the e-way bill had not been generated — the clearing and forwarding agent had urgently dispatched the consignment given its perishable nature without waiting for the e-way bill. On learning of the detention, the company promptly generated the e-way bill. However, the authorities refused to release the goods and raised a demand for release which far exceeded the value of the goods themselves. The authorities proceeded to issue a Show Cause Notice directly under Section 130 of the CGST Act demanding payment of tax, 100% penalty and redemption fine equal to the value of goods in lieu of confiscation — without first following the procedure under Section 129 of the Act. Five writ applications raising identical issues were clubbed and disposed of by a common judgment.Relevant FactsIGST had been paid in full at the time of import — before movement commenced. Bill of entry for home consumption accompanying the goods evidenced prior payment of tax. The only lapse was non-generation of e-way bill at the time of transport — attributable to the C&F agent acting in urgency given the perishable nature of the goods and their limited shelf-life. Despite tax having already been paid, the authorities levied 100% penalty under Section 129 AND simultaneously invoked Section 130 for confiscation with redemption fine equal to the full value of goods. The Show Cause Notice under Section 130 was issued without first completing Section 129 proceedings — i.e., without issuing the Section 129(3) notice, granting hearing, and allowing the 14-day compliance window. The petitioners' central argument was that Section 130 is entirely dependent on non-compliance with Section 129(6) and cannot be independently invoked. The Revenue's case was that both sections carry non-obstante clauses making them independent of each other.Court Observations (Verbatim — Final Conclusions)"(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, Section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although, both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to Section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive."— Para 182(i) — Core ratio: Sections 129 & 130 are independent"(ii) The phrase 'with an intent to evade the payment of tax' in Section 130 of the Act assumes importance. When the law requires an intention to evade payment of tax, then it is not mere failure to pay tax. It must be something more. The word 'evade' in the context means defeating the provisions of law of paying tax. It is made more stringent by use of the word 'intent'. The assessee must deliberately avoid the payment of tax which is payable in accordance with law. However, the element of mens rea cannot be read into Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(ii) — On "intent to evade" in Section 130"(iii) For the purpose of issuing a notice of confiscation under Section 130 of the Act at the threshold, i.e., at the stage of detention and seizure of the goods and conveyance, the case has to be of such a nature that on the face of the entire transaction, the authority concerned should be convinced that the contravention was with a definite intent to evade payment of tax. The action, in such circumstances, should be in good faith and not be a mere pretence. In other words, the authorities need to make out a very strong case. Mere suspicion may not be sufficient to invoke Section 130 of the Act straightway."— Para 182(iii) — Strong case needed for invoking Section 130 at threshold"(iv) If the authorities are of the view that the case is one of invoking Section 130 of the Act at the very threshold, then they need to record their reasons for such belief in writing, and such reasons recorded in writing should, thereafter, be looked into by the superior authority so that the superior authority can take an appropriate decision whether the case is one of straightway invoking Section 130 of the Act."— Para 182(iv) — Mandatory written reasons & superior authority approval"(vi) Section 130 of the Act is not dependent on clause (6) of Section 129 of the Act."— Para 182(vi) — Rejecting assessee's sequential argument"(xiv) The goods are not liable to be detained on the ground that the tax paid on the product was less. In such circumstances, the Inspecting Authority is expected to alert the Assessing Authority to initiate appropriate proceedings 'for assessment of any alleged sale at which the dealer will have his opportunities to put forward his pleas on law and on fact. The process of detention of the goods cannot be resorted to when the dispute is bona fide, especially concerning the exigibility of tax and, more particularly, the rate of that tax.'"— Para 182(xiv) — Inspecting authority has no jurisdiction on valuation"(xvi) The extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, directing for release of the vehicles or goods, during the pendency of the confiscation, can only be sparingly exercised under extraordinary situations and circumstances when injustice occurs because of non-fulfillment of the conditions for confiscation."— Para 182(xvi) — Restricted scope of writ interferenceSummary of Mixed OutcomesAgainst AssesseeSections 129 & 130 held independent — Section 130 can be invoked without first completing Section 129. Section 130 is NOT dependent on Section 129(6) non-compliance. Mens rea not required for Section 130.For AssesseeStrong evidence of "definite intent to evade" mandatory at threshold. Written reasons + superior authority approval mandated. Detention for valuation disputes not permissible. Goods directed to be released pending confiscation proceedings.Final VerdictThe Court laid down 16 general principles on the interpretation of Sections 129 and 130 of the CGST Act and directed all matters to be listed before the tax bench for deciding individual confiscation challenges on merits. The primary argument of the assessees — that Section 130 cannot be independently invoked and is subject to Section 129(6) — was rejected. However, the Court ordered interim release of goods and conveyances in all petitions pending confiscation proceedings, subject to final outcome. No final adjudication on the merits of individual petitions was undertaken. | ||||
| 166 | Alfa Group vs The Assistant State Tax Officer & Others | 18-11-2019 | Whether goods can be detained under GST law on the ground of undervaluation compared to MRP and alleged wrong HSN classification. | View Download |
Facts :The petitioner’s goods were detained during transit through a detention order (Form GST MOV-06) on the ground that the invoice value was lower than the MRP and HSN code was wrongly mentioned. The petitioner challenged the detention contending that these grounds do not justify detention under Sections 129 or 130 of the GST Act. It was also contended that there was no discrepancy in tax rate or supporting documents accompanying the goods. The issue arose from detention at a parcel godown during movement of goods.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation with reference to MRP is not a valid ground for detention of goods under the GST Act. There is no statutory provision prohibiting sale of goods below MRP, and such comparison cannot justify detention. The Court further held that incorrect HSN classification, without impact on tax rate, does not warrant detention. The detention order was quashed and authorities were directed to release the goods forthwith. Directions were also issued to the Commissioner to ensure such unwarranted detentions are not repeated. | ||||
| Alfa Group vs The Assistant State Tax Officer & Others 18-11-2019 Whether goods can be detained under GST law on the ground of undervaluation compared to MRP and alleged wrong HSN classification.Facts :The petitioner’s goods were detained during transit through a detention order (Form GST MOV-06) on the ground that the invoice value was lower than the MRP and HSN code was wrongly mentioned. The petitioner challenged the detention contending that these grounds do not justify detention under Sections 129 or 130 of the GST Act. It was also contended that there was no discrepancy in tax rate or supporting documents accompanying the goods. The issue arose from detention at a parcel godown during movement of goods.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation with reference to MRP is not a valid ground for detention of goods under the GST Act. There is no statutory provision prohibiting sale of goods below MRP, and such comparison cannot justify detention. The Court further held that incorrect HSN classification, without impact on tax rate, does not warrant detention. The detention order was quashed and authorities were directed to release the goods forthwith. Directions were also issued to the Commissioner to ensure such unwarranted detentions are not repeated. | ||||
| 167 | State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Calcutta Club Limited & Ors. | 03-10-2019 | Levy of sales tax/VAT on supply of food and beverages by clubs to members – interpretation of Article 366(29-A)(e) of the Constitution and Section 2(30) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994. Applicability of doctrine of mutuality to incorporated and u | View Download |
Facts:The dispute arose from demands of sales tax on supply of food and drinks by clubs to their permanent members. The clubs contended that such supplies were governed by the doctrine of mutuality and did not constitute “sale”. The Tribunal and High Court held that no taxable sale occurred as members and the club were not distinct persons. The matter was referred to a larger Bench to examine the impact of the 46th Constitutional Amendment on the doctrine of mutuality. Court Decision:The Court held that the doctrine of mutuality continues to apply even after the 46th Constitutional Amendment. It ruled that Article 366(29-A)(e) applies only to unincorporated associations and does not cover incorporated clubs. The Court held that in members’ clubs, there is no transfer of property from one person to another, as members and the club are not distinct. Accordingly, supply of food and beverages by clubs to their members does not constitute a “sale” and is not liable to sales tax/VAT. Cases Referred by Court:• C.T.O. v. Young Men’s Indian Association • State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. • Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi • State of Punjab v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. • Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Enfield India Ltd. • Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax • Graff v. Evans • Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald• BSNL v. Union of India | ||||
| State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Calcutta Club Limited & Ors. 03-10-2019 Levy of sales tax/VAT on supply of food and beverages by clubs to members – interpretation of Article 366(29-A)(e) of the Constitution and Section 2(30) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994. Applicability of doctrine of mutuality to incorporated and uFacts:The dispute arose from demands of sales tax on supply of food and drinks by clubs to their permanent members. The clubs contended that such supplies were governed by the doctrine of mutuality and did not constitute “sale”. The Tribunal and High Court held that no taxable sale occurred as members and the club were not distinct persons. The matter was referred to a larger Bench to examine the impact of the 46th Constitutional Amendment on the doctrine of mutuality. Court Decision:The Court held that the doctrine of mutuality continues to apply even after the 46th Constitutional Amendment. It ruled that Article 366(29-A)(e) applies only to unincorporated associations and does not cover incorporated clubs. The Court held that in members’ clubs, there is no transfer of property from one person to another, as members and the club are not distinct. Accordingly, supply of food and beverages by clubs to their members does not constitute a “sale” and is not liable to sales tax/VAT. Cases Referred by Court:• C.T.O. v. Young Men’s Indian Association • State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. • Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi • State of Punjab v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. • Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Enfield India Ltd. • Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax • Graff v. Evans • Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald• BSNL v. Union of India | ||||
| 168 | Builders Association of Navi Mumbai v. Union of India | 28-03-2018 | Levy of GST @ 18% on one-time lease premium charged by CIDCO on long-term (60-year) lease of plots to builders/developers in Navi Mumbai. | View Download |
BackgroundCIDCO (City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.), incorporated on 17th March 1970, is designated as the New Town Development Authority under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act). In furtherance of its planning mandate, CIDCO allots residential-cum-commercial and hotel plots on 60-year leases through a tender process. Successful bidders pay a one-time lease premium (lump sum) plus annual lease rent. In April 2017, upon issuance of allotment letters, CIDCO demanded GST @ 18% on the total one-time lease premium via Demand Draft. Petitioners — an association of builders and a partnership firm — challenged this levy before the Bombay High Court after the GST Commissionerate failed to respond to their grievance correspondence. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 falling in this Chapter leaves us in no manner of doubt that the expression 'supply' includes all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business.""Once this law, in terms of the substantive provisions and the Schedule, treats the activity as supply of goods or supply of services, particularly in relation to land and building and includes a lease, then, the consideration therefor as a premium/one-time premium is a measure on which the tax is levied, assessed and recovered. We cannot then probe into the legislation any further.""It is entirely for the legislature, therefore, to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 7 of the GST Act and issue the requisite notification. Absent that notification, merely going by the status of the CIDCO, we cannot hold that the lease premium would not attract or invite the liability to pay tax in terms of the GST Act.""With respect, it cannot be said that the activities performed by sovereign or public authorities under the provisions of law, which are in the nature of statutory obligations are excluded from the purview of the present enactment.""Pertinently, the dividing line between governmental and non-governmental, sovereign and regal functions and otherwise is not very thin and post globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation."Final VerdictThe demand for GST on the one-time lease premium is held to be in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed and Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. | ||||
| Builders Association of Navi Mumbai v. Union of India 28-03-2018 Levy of GST @ 18% on one-time lease premium charged by CIDCO on long-term (60-year) lease of plots to builders/developers in Navi Mumbai.BackgroundCIDCO (City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.), incorporated on 17th March 1970, is designated as the New Town Development Authority under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act). In furtherance of its planning mandate, CIDCO allots residential-cum-commercial and hotel plots on 60-year leases through a tender process. Successful bidders pay a one-time lease premium (lump sum) plus annual lease rent. In April 2017, upon issuance of allotment letters, CIDCO demanded GST @ 18% on the total one-time lease premium via Demand Draft. Petitioners — an association of builders and a partnership firm — challenged this levy before the Bombay High Court after the GST Commissionerate failed to respond to their grievance correspondence. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 falling in this Chapter leaves us in no manner of doubt that the expression 'supply' includes all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business.""Once this law, in terms of the substantive provisions and the Schedule, treats the activity as supply of goods or supply of services, particularly in relation to land and building and includes a lease, then, the consideration therefor as a premium/one-time premium is a measure on which the tax is levied, assessed and recovered. We cannot then probe into the legislation any further.""It is entirely for the legislature, therefore, to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 7 of the GST Act and issue the requisite notification. Absent that notification, merely going by the status of the CIDCO, we cannot hold that the lease premium would not attract or invite the liability to pay tax in terms of the GST Act.""With respect, it cannot be said that the activities performed by sovereign or public authorities under the provisions of law, which are in the nature of statutory obligations are excluded from the purview of the present enactment.""Pertinently, the dividing line between governmental and non-governmental, sovereign and regal functions and otherwise is not very thin and post globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation."Final VerdictThe demand for GST on the one-time lease premium is held to be in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed and Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. | ||||
| 169 | Commissioner of Trade and Taxes, Delhi v. Arise India Limited | 10-02-2018 | Validity of denial of input tax credit under Delhi VAT law; scope of liability for purchasing dealers (Sections involved: Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 – provisions relating to Input Tax Credit) | View Download |
Facts:The case arose from a batch of matters decided by the Delhi High Court concerning denial of input tax credit to purchasing dealers under the Delhi VAT Act. The tax authorities challenged the High Court’s ruling, which had granted relief to dealers claiming bona fide purchase transactions. The petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the High Court judgment dated 26.10.2017. The issue involved whether purchasing dealers could be denied input tax credit due to default by selling dealers. Court Decision:The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court and dismissed the Special Leave Petition. The Court, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court with necessary particulars in cases where transactions were allegedly not bona fide and seek appropriate directions. | ||||
| Commissioner of Trade and Taxes, Delhi v. Arise India Limited 10-02-2018 Validity of denial of input tax credit under Delhi VAT law; scope of liability for purchasing dealers (Sections involved: Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 – provisions relating to Input Tax Credit)Facts:The case arose from a batch of matters decided by the Delhi High Court concerning denial of input tax credit to purchasing dealers under the Delhi VAT Act. The tax authorities challenged the High Court’s ruling, which had granted relief to dealers claiming bona fide purchase transactions. The petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the High Court judgment dated 26.10.2017. The issue involved whether purchasing dealers could be denied input tax credit due to default by selling dealers. Court Decision:The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court and dismissed the Special Leave Petition. The Court, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court with necessary particulars in cases where transactions were allegedly not bona fide and seek appropriate directions. | ||||
| 170 | Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh | 30-01-2018 | Importance of Electronic Evidence | View Download |
Facts of the CaseThe matter arose from a Special Leave Petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. During the hearing, an important legal question emerged regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence and the necessity of videography at crime scenes. The Court also considered whether the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic records.In earlier proceedings, the Court had recorded submissions from the Additional Solicitor General regarding the usefulness of videography in crime scene investigation. It was noted that videography and digital photography could enhance transparency and accuracy in investigation. The Union Government had also constituted a Committee of Experts to prepare a roadmap and Standard Operating Procedure for videography at crime scenes.Simultaneously, a legal issue arose in connected matters concerning the interpretation of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The apprehension expressed was that if the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) was treated as mandatory in all circumstances, electronic evidence produced by a person not in control of the device would be excluded, resulting in denial of justice.The questions decided by the Court were:Whether electronic evidence is admissible only in compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act.Whether the certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory in all cases.Whether procedural requirements under Section 65B can be relaxed in appropriate cases.Court Observations and DecisionThe Court examined earlier decisions dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence. It noted that electronic evidence is admissible subject to safeguards regarding authenticity and reliability. The Court observed that Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions intended to supplement the law on admissibility of electronic records.The Court clarified that primary electronic evidence is admissible under Section 62 of the Evidence Act and is not governed by Section 65B. Section 65B applies to secondary electronic evidence.Importantly, the Court held that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory. The requirement applies when electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in possession and control of the device from which the electronic record is generated and is capable of producing such certificate.Where electronic evidence is produced by a person who is not in possession of the device, Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act can be invoked. In such cases, insisting on a certificate under Section 65B(4) would result in denial of justice.The Court clarified the legal position that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is procedural and can be relaxed by the Court in the interest of justice. Electronic evidence cannot be excluded merely on technical grounds if it is otherwise relevant and authentic.Case ReferredRam Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, Supreme Court of India.R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, Court of Criminal Appeal (UK).R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699, Court of Appeal (UK).Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, Supreme Court of India.Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Supreme Court of India.Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, Supreme Court of India.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, Supreme Court of India. | ||||
| Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh 30-01-2018 Importance of Electronic EvidenceFacts of the CaseThe matter arose from a Special Leave Petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. During the hearing, an important legal question emerged regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence and the necessity of videography at crime scenes. The Court also considered whether the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic records.In earlier proceedings, the Court had recorded submissions from the Additional Solicitor General regarding the usefulness of videography in crime scene investigation. It was noted that videography and digital photography could enhance transparency and accuracy in investigation. The Union Government had also constituted a Committee of Experts to prepare a roadmap and Standard Operating Procedure for videography at crime scenes.Simultaneously, a legal issue arose in connected matters concerning the interpretation of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The apprehension expressed was that if the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) was treated as mandatory in all circumstances, electronic evidence produced by a person not in control of the device would be excluded, resulting in denial of justice.The questions decided by the Court were:Whether electronic evidence is admissible only in compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act.Whether the certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory in all cases.Whether procedural requirements under Section 65B can be relaxed in appropriate cases.Court Observations and DecisionThe Court examined earlier decisions dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence. It noted that electronic evidence is admissible subject to safeguards regarding authenticity and reliability. The Court observed that Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are procedural provisions intended to supplement the law on admissibility of electronic records.The Court clarified that primary electronic evidence is admissible under Section 62 of the Evidence Act and is not governed by Section 65B. Section 65B applies to secondary electronic evidence.Importantly, the Court held that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is not always mandatory. The requirement applies when electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in possession and control of the device from which the electronic record is generated and is capable of producing such certificate.Where electronic evidence is produced by a person who is not in possession of the device, Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act can be invoked. In such cases, insisting on a certificate under Section 65B(4) would result in denial of justice.The Court clarified the legal position that the requirement of certificate under Section 65B(4) is procedural and can be relaxed by the Court in the interest of justice. Electronic evidence cannot be excluded merely on technical grounds if it is otherwise relevant and authentic.Case ReferredRam Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, Supreme Court of India.R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, Court of Criminal Appeal (UK).R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 All ER 699, Court of Appeal (UK).Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, Supreme Court of India.Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Supreme Court of India.Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, Supreme Court of India.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, Supreme Court of India. | ||||