| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151 | Infac India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of GST & Central Excise | 14-09-2023 | Refund of wrongly adjusted interest on transitional credit under GST regime (Sections 49(5), 50(3), 140, 142(3) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 11B – Central Excise Act, 1944) | View Download |
Facts :Petitioner wrongly transitioned balance from Personal Ledger Account as input tax credit under Section 140 of CGST Act.Refund was sanctioned, but ₹9,25,366 was adjusted towards interest on such utilization.Petitioner contended that sufficient Input Tax Credit was available and there was no loss to revenue.Dispute arose on legality of interest adjustment while granting refund.Court Decision:Petitioner ought to have claimed refund under Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 142(3) of CGST Act.Wrong transition of credit was acknowledged, but tax liability was subsequently squared up using available Input Tax Credit.There was no loss to revenue, as sufficient credit existed.Directions:Deduction of ₹9,25,366 towards interest held unsustainable.Impugned order modified to that extent.Respondent directed to refund ₹9,25,366 to petitioner.Refund to be made within 8 weeks. | ||||
| Infac India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of GST & Central Excise 14-09-2023 Refund of wrongly adjusted interest on transitional credit under GST regime (Sections 49(5), 50(3), 140, 142(3) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 11B – Central Excise Act, 1944)Facts :Petitioner wrongly transitioned balance from Personal Ledger Account as input tax credit under Section 140 of CGST Act.Refund was sanctioned, but ₹9,25,366 was adjusted towards interest on such utilization.Petitioner contended that sufficient Input Tax Credit was available and there was no loss to revenue.Dispute arose on legality of interest adjustment while granting refund.Court Decision:Petitioner ought to have claimed refund under Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 142(3) of CGST Act.Wrong transition of credit was acknowledged, but tax liability was subsequently squared up using available Input Tax Credit.There was no loss to revenue, as sufficient credit existed.Directions:Deduction of ₹9,25,366 towards interest held unsustainable.Impugned order modified to that extent.Respondent directed to refund ₹9,25,366 to petitioner.Refund to be made within 8 weeks. | ||||
| 152 | Guru Storage Batteries vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. | 11-09-2023 | Validity of blocking of Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) by an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017. | View Download |
Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Guru Storage Batteries, a partnership firm based in Nagpur, challenged the action of Respondent No. 3 — the State Tax Officer, Kamptee — in blocking its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). The blocking was carried out by Mr. Ujval Shrirampant Deshmukh, a State Tax Officer, who is admittedly an officer of a rank below that of Assistant Commissioner. The respondents sought to justify this action by relying on a Notification dated 24/01/2020, contending that the Commissioner had delegated the power to block ECL to Respondent No. 3. The petitioner also alleged that illegal recovery notices were being issued consequent to the said blocking. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, indicates that such a blocking can be done by the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him in this behalf, not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner. Admittedly, the respondent No.3 does not fall within that category and is an Officer of the rank below that of the Assistant Commissioner.""Though the Notification dated 24/1/2020 has been relied upon to contend that the power has now been delegated by the Commissioner to the respondent No.3 (page 104), the same is under the State GST Act, whereas Rule 86-A of the aforesaid Act would contemplate a delegation by way of amendment to the Rule. The Notification dated 24/01/2020, would be of no assistance to the respondents." Final VerdictThe action of Respondent No. 3 in blocking the ECL was held to be without authority and was quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed with no costs, and the Rule was made absolute. Cases ReferredDee Vee Projects Ltd. vs. Government of Maharashtra and Ors. — 2022(2) Bom.C.R. 239 (Bombay High Court) | ||||
| Guru Storage Batteries vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 11-09-2023 Validity of blocking of Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) by an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017.Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Guru Storage Batteries, a partnership firm based in Nagpur, challenged the action of Respondent No. 3 — the State Tax Officer, Kamptee — in blocking its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). The blocking was carried out by Mr. Ujval Shrirampant Deshmukh, a State Tax Officer, who is admittedly an officer of a rank below that of Assistant Commissioner. The respondents sought to justify this action by relying on a Notification dated 24/01/2020, contending that the Commissioner had delegated the power to block ECL to Respondent No. 3. The petitioner also alleged that illegal recovery notices were being issued consequent to the said blocking. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, indicates that such a blocking can be done by the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him in this behalf, not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner. Admittedly, the respondent No.3 does not fall within that category and is an Officer of the rank below that of the Assistant Commissioner.""Though the Notification dated 24/1/2020 has been relied upon to contend that the power has now been delegated by the Commissioner to the respondent No.3 (page 104), the same is under the State GST Act, whereas Rule 86-A of the aforesaid Act would contemplate a delegation by way of amendment to the Rule. The Notification dated 24/01/2020, would be of no assistance to the respondents." Final VerdictThe action of Respondent No. 3 in blocking the ECL was held to be without authority and was quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed with no costs, and the Rule was made absolute. Cases ReferredDee Vee Projects Ltd. vs. Government of Maharashtra and Ors. — 2022(2) Bom.C.R. 239 (Bombay High Court) | ||||
| 153 | Punit Kumar Choubey vs The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Patna & Ors. | 10-08-2023 | Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the BGST Act, 2017 – writ petition against assessment order when appeal filed beyond statutory limitation. | View Download |
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 10.12.2021 passed under Section 73(9) of the BGST Act determining excess input tax credit. Notices were issued through the GST portal and reminders were sent, but the petitioner did not respond. The petitioner later filed an appeal with delay, which was rejected as time-barred, and thereafter approached the High Court.Court Decision:The Court held that the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 must be filed within three months with a further condonable period of one month. Even considering the extension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, the appeal should have been filed by 28.06.2022, but it was filed only on 10.07.2022.The Court held that when the statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay, neither the appellate authority nor the High Court under Article 226 can extend the limitation further. As the petitioner failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed period and no jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice was established, the writ petition was dismissed.Cases Referred by Court: In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (Supreme Court of India ; State of H.P. & Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 499 | ||||
| Punit Kumar Choubey vs The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Patna & Ors. 10-08-2023 Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the BGST Act, 2017 – writ petition against assessment order when appeal filed beyond statutory limitation.Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 10.12.2021 passed under Section 73(9) of the BGST Act determining excess input tax credit. Notices were issued through the GST portal and reminders were sent, but the petitioner did not respond. The petitioner later filed an appeal with delay, which was rejected as time-barred, and thereafter approached the High Court.Court Decision:The Court held that the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 must be filed within three months with a further condonable period of one month. Even considering the extension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, the appeal should have been filed by 28.06.2022, but it was filed only on 10.07.2022.The Court held that when the statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay, neither the appellate authority nor the High Court under Article 226 can extend the limitation further. As the petitioner failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed period and no jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice was established, the writ petition was dismissed.Cases Referred by Court: In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (Supreme Court of India ; State of H.P. & Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 499 | ||||
| 154 | Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Assistant Commissioner, | 03-08-2023 | Whether interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit is to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original refund app | View Download |
Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd., was engaged in providing marketing, administration and support services to Blackberry Singapore Pte. Ltd., an overseas entity. The petitioner claimed these services constituted export of services under the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and accordingly filed three separate applications for refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit for the following periods:April–June 2012: Rs. 3,18,11,287/- filed on 28.03.2013April–June 2013: Rs. 2,89,94,208/- filed on 31.03.2014July–September 2013: Rs. 2,47,28,850/- filed on 30.06.2014Total: Rs. 8,55,34,345/-The refund applications were not processed for years. The Adjudicating Authority issued a Show Cause Notice dated 22.01.2020, proposing to reject the refund on the ground that the petitioner was an "intermediary" and hence the place of provision of services was India, not outside India. By Order-in-Original dated 31.08.2020, the refund claims were rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this rejection on 19.08.2021.The petitioner appealed to CESTAT, which by Final Order No. 51150/2022 dated 07.12.2022 allowed the appeal and held the services to be export of services — entitling the petitioner to refund. Even after CESTAT's order, the refund was not processed. The petitioner sent a letter dated 07.02.2023 requesting processing of the refund. The Revenue also filed an appeal against the CESTAT order before the Delhi High Court (SERTA 7/2023), which was dismissed on 12.07.2023.The Adjudicating Authority then processed the refund by the impugned order dated 04.05.2023 — sanctioning the principal amount of Rs. 8,55,34,345/- but denying interest under Section 11BB, treating the petitioner's letter dated 07.02.2023 as the date of refund application and holding that since refund was granted within three months thereof, no interest was payable. The petitioner challenged only the denial of interest in the present writ petition.Court Observations (Verbatim)"In a case where Revenue denies the claim for refund and the assessee succeeds before the Appellate Authorities, the interest is required to be calculated from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of application for the refund and not from the date of the appellate orders. This issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India: (2011) 10 SCC 292.""The said contention [that interest should be calculated from three months from the CESTAT order dated 07.12.2022] is unmerited and as stated above, the said issue stands authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (supra).""The impugned order is, ex facie, erroneous to the extent it rejects the petitioner's claim for interest. The impugned order sets out a tabular statement...clearly stating the dates on which the petitioner had made its claim for refund.""The Adjudicating Authority has failed to consider that the petitioner had filed its applications of refund on 28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 for the tax periods April-June 2012, April-June 2013, and July-September 2013 respectively. And the interest payable to the petitioner is required to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the dates on which those applications were made."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. The Adjudicating Authority directed to forthwith process the petitioner's claim for interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, computed from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original application dates (28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 respectively) — not from the letter dated 07.02.2023. 👍 In favour of Assessee. | ||||
| Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Assistant Commissioner, 03-08-2023 Whether interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit is to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original refund appBackground & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd., was engaged in providing marketing, administration and support services to Blackberry Singapore Pte. Ltd., an overseas entity. The petitioner claimed these services constituted export of services under the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and accordingly filed three separate applications for refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit for the following periods:April–June 2012: Rs. 3,18,11,287/- filed on 28.03.2013April–June 2013: Rs. 2,89,94,208/- filed on 31.03.2014July–September 2013: Rs. 2,47,28,850/- filed on 30.06.2014Total: Rs. 8,55,34,345/-The refund applications were not processed for years. The Adjudicating Authority issued a Show Cause Notice dated 22.01.2020, proposing to reject the refund on the ground that the petitioner was an "intermediary" and hence the place of provision of services was India, not outside India. By Order-in-Original dated 31.08.2020, the refund claims were rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this rejection on 19.08.2021.The petitioner appealed to CESTAT, which by Final Order No. 51150/2022 dated 07.12.2022 allowed the appeal and held the services to be export of services — entitling the petitioner to refund. Even after CESTAT's order, the refund was not processed. The petitioner sent a letter dated 07.02.2023 requesting processing of the refund. The Revenue also filed an appeal against the CESTAT order before the Delhi High Court (SERTA 7/2023), which was dismissed on 12.07.2023.The Adjudicating Authority then processed the refund by the impugned order dated 04.05.2023 — sanctioning the principal amount of Rs. 8,55,34,345/- but denying interest under Section 11BB, treating the petitioner's letter dated 07.02.2023 as the date of refund application and holding that since refund was granted within three months thereof, no interest was payable. The petitioner challenged only the denial of interest in the present writ petition.Court Observations (Verbatim)"In a case where Revenue denies the claim for refund and the assessee succeeds before the Appellate Authorities, the interest is required to be calculated from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of application for the refund and not from the date of the appellate orders. This issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India: (2011) 10 SCC 292.""The said contention [that interest should be calculated from three months from the CESTAT order dated 07.12.2022] is unmerited and as stated above, the said issue stands authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (supra).""The impugned order is, ex facie, erroneous to the extent it rejects the petitioner's claim for interest. The impugned order sets out a tabular statement...clearly stating the dates on which the petitioner had made its claim for refund.""The Adjudicating Authority has failed to consider that the petitioner had filed its applications of refund on 28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 for the tax periods April-June 2012, April-June 2013, and July-September 2013 respectively. And the interest payable to the petitioner is required to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the dates on which those applications were made."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. The Adjudicating Authority directed to forthwith process the petitioner's claim for interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, computed from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original application dates (28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 respectively) — not from the letter dated 07.02.2023. 👍 In favour of Assessee. | ||||
| 155 | Suncraft Energy Private Limited & Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner, State Tax, Ballygunge Charge & Ors. | 02-08-2023 | forms under GST (Sections involved: Section 16(2) and Section 73 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017) | View Download |
Facts The appellant availed Input Tax Credit on purchases made from a supplier and paid the tax amount along with the value of goods/services. The department issued notices alleging mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B and non-reflection of supplier invoices in GSTR-1. A demand order under Section 73(10) was passed reversing ITC along with interest and penalty. The writ petition was disposed of directing the appellant to file a statutory appeal, which led to the present intra-court appeal. Court Decision:The High Court set aside the demand order and held that reversal of ITC was not justified without first taking action against the selling dealer. The Court held that when the purchasing dealer has fulfilled conditions under Section 16(2), including possession of invoice, receipt of goods/services, and payment of tax, ITC cannot be denied merely due to non-reflection in GSTR forms. It was further held that proceedings against the purchaser can arise only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud, collusion, or where the supplier is non-existent or without assets. Cases Referred by Court:• Union of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. • Arise India Limited v. Commissioner of Trade and Taxes, Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Limited (SLP dismissed) | ||||
| Suncraft Energy Private Limited & Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner, State Tax, Ballygunge Charge & Ors. 02-08-2023 forms under GST (Sections involved: Section 16(2) and Section 73 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017)Facts The appellant availed Input Tax Credit on purchases made from a supplier and paid the tax amount along with the value of goods/services. The department issued notices alleging mismatch between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B and non-reflection of supplier invoices in GSTR-1. A demand order under Section 73(10) was passed reversing ITC along with interest and penalty. The writ petition was disposed of directing the appellant to file a statutory appeal, which led to the present intra-court appeal. Court Decision:The High Court set aside the demand order and held that reversal of ITC was not justified without first taking action against the selling dealer. The Court held that when the purchasing dealer has fulfilled conditions under Section 16(2), including possession of invoice, receipt of goods/services, and payment of tax, ITC cannot be denied merely due to non-reflection in GSTR forms. It was further held that proceedings against the purchaser can arise only in exceptional circumstances such as fraud, collusion, or where the supplier is non-existent or without assets. Cases Referred by Court:• Union of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. • Arise India Limited v. Commissioner of Trade and Taxes, Delhi • Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Arise India Limited (SLP dismissed) | ||||
| 156 | Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & 3 Ors. | 13-02-2023 | Whether issuance of a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 without prior issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 under Section 61 read with Rule 99 of CGST Rules, 2017 is legally valid and jurisdictionally competent. | View Download |
BACKGROUND The Department issued a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST Act alleging wrongly availed Input Tax Credit amounting to Rs. 19.51 crores for Financial Year 2017-18. The alleged discrepancy was that the petitioner-assessee had not submitted information in Table 14 of Form GSTR-9C, resulting in a mismatch with details in Form GSTR-9. The assessee challenged the notice before the High Court contending that Table 14 of GSTR-9C had been made optional for FY 2017-18 onwards by a series of Government Notifications, and more crucially, that the mandatory pre-condition of issuing Form GST ASMT-10 under Section 61 read with Rule 99 was never complied with before jumping directly to the SCN under Section 73(1). The Department admitted non-issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 but argued that CAG letters had been sent to the assessee and that natural justice was not violated since the SCN itself provided an opportunity of hearing. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Prior to issuance of a show cause notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017, it is mere discrepancy. At that stage, the alleged discrepancy would only be a discrepancy simplicitor but at the stage of issuance of Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017, there is formation of a prima facie opinion on the part of the Proper Officer that there is an act, which is in violation of the statutory obligation cast on the noticee.""The issues raised in the present writ petition, prima facie, are not relatable to any disputed questions of fact. The petitioner has raised a contention that the statutory prescriptions contained in Section 61 and Section 73 of CGST Act, 2017 r/w Rule 99 of the CGST Rules, 2017 have not been adhered to and without adherence to the conditions precedent, that is, issuance of notice to the registered person in Form GST ASMT-10 to provide the noticee either to accept or not to accept the discrepancy or to furnish an explanation for the discrepancy in Form GST ASMT-11 or not to furnish any explanation, at a period of time anterior to the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice, the Proper Officer could not have assumed jurisdiction to issue the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under sub-section [1] of Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017.""Prima facie, this Court finds force in the above contentions advanced by the petitioner that an act of issuance of the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 05.09.2023 under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017 by the Proper Officer was without compliance of the mandatory conditions precedent, prescribed under the CGST Act, 2017 and the CGST Rules, 2017, more particularly, the provisions of Section 61 of the CGST Act, 2017 r/w Rule 99 of the CGST Rules, 2017, to derive jurisdiction to issue such a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017." FINAL VERDICT The High Court stayed the operation of the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice, finding prima facie force in the petitioner's contention that issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 is a mandatory condition precedent before invoking Section 73(1) and its non-compliance goes to the root of jurisdiction. 👍 | ||||
| Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & 3 Ors. 13-02-2023 Whether issuance of a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 without prior issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 under Section 61 read with Rule 99 of CGST Rules, 2017 is legally valid and jurisdictionally competent.BACKGROUND The Department issued a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST Act alleging wrongly availed Input Tax Credit amounting to Rs. 19.51 crores for Financial Year 2017-18. The alleged discrepancy was that the petitioner-assessee had not submitted information in Table 14 of Form GSTR-9C, resulting in a mismatch with details in Form GSTR-9. The assessee challenged the notice before the High Court contending that Table 14 of GSTR-9C had been made optional for FY 2017-18 onwards by a series of Government Notifications, and more crucially, that the mandatory pre-condition of issuing Form GST ASMT-10 under Section 61 read with Rule 99 was never complied with before jumping directly to the SCN under Section 73(1). The Department admitted non-issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 but argued that CAG letters had been sent to the assessee and that natural justice was not violated since the SCN itself provided an opportunity of hearing. CRUCIAL COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Prior to issuance of a show cause notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017, it is mere discrepancy. At that stage, the alleged discrepancy would only be a discrepancy simplicitor but at the stage of issuance of Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017, there is formation of a prima facie opinion on the part of the Proper Officer that there is an act, which is in violation of the statutory obligation cast on the noticee.""The issues raised in the present writ petition, prima facie, are not relatable to any disputed questions of fact. The petitioner has raised a contention that the statutory prescriptions contained in Section 61 and Section 73 of CGST Act, 2017 r/w Rule 99 of the CGST Rules, 2017 have not been adhered to and without adherence to the conditions precedent, that is, issuance of notice to the registered person in Form GST ASMT-10 to provide the noticee either to accept or not to accept the discrepancy or to furnish an explanation for the discrepancy in Form GST ASMT-11 or not to furnish any explanation, at a period of time anterior to the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice, the Proper Officer could not have assumed jurisdiction to issue the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under sub-section [1] of Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017.""Prima facie, this Court finds force in the above contentions advanced by the petitioner that an act of issuance of the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 05.09.2023 under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017 by the Proper Officer was without compliance of the mandatory conditions precedent, prescribed under the CGST Act, 2017 and the CGST Rules, 2017, more particularly, the provisions of Section 61 of the CGST Act, 2017 r/w Rule 99 of the CGST Rules, 2017, to derive jurisdiction to issue such a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice under Section 73[1] of the CGST Act, 2017." FINAL VERDICT The High Court stayed the operation of the impugned Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice, finding prima facie force in the petitioner's contention that issuance of Form GST ASMT-10 is a mandatory condition precedent before invoking Section 73(1) and its non-compliance goes to the root of jurisdiction. 👍 | ||||
| 157 | Ram Prakash Chauhan v. Commissioner of Delhi (GST) & Anr. | 19-01-2023 | Validity of detention order and demand of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the CGST Act, 2017 for alleged defective documents accompanying goods in transit — whether payment of tax and penalty for release of detained goods amounts to voluntary payme | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a sole proprietor trading in steel/iron bars, purchased a consignment of steel and sold it onward. An e-way bill was generated for transporting the goods directly from the seller's premises to the buyer's premises. The e-way bill reflected the petitioner's GSTIN, while the address mentioned was that of the buyer, since the goods had already been sold. RELEVANT FACTSThe truck carrying the goods was intercepted by GST authorities on 19-10-2020 at 11:00 p.m. and detained on the ground that the documents accompanying the goods were found defective. A detention order dated 23-10-2020 was passed, followed on the same date by a show-cause notice under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act stating the reason as "prima facie, the documents tendered are found to be defective" — without specifying any particular defect. Simultaneously, an order of demand of tax and penalty of Rs. 2,78,129 each was raised. Since the petitioner urgently required the goods, he paid the demanded tax and penalty to secure release of the goods. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 31-12-2021, which also failed to disclose the specific discrepancy alleged between the e-way bill and the goods. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging both orders. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)Para 20: "We are unable to accept that the order of demand and penalty is a consent order and the petitioner was precluded from challenging the same. The goods had been detained and it is not disputed that the same would not have been released unless the tax and penalty was paid. We are persuaded to accept that the petitioner had paid the tax and penalty for release of the goods and the said payment was not voluntary."Para 21: "As stated above, it is apparent that neither the show-cause notice nor the order of demand clearly sets out the reason for imposing the tax liability as well as penalty."Para 22: "In the given facts, we are of the view that it would be apposite to remand the matter to the GST officer concerned to decide afresh after giving the petitioner full opportunity to address the allegation against him." FINAL VERDICT 👍Both the order dated 23-10-2020 raising demand of tax and penalty, and the appellate order dated 31-12-2021, were set aside. The matter was remanded to the GST officer concerned, who was directed to issue a fresh show-cause notice within two weeks and pass a fresh order after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. | ||||
| Ram Prakash Chauhan v. Commissioner of Delhi (GST) & Anr. 19-01-2023 Validity of detention order and demand of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the CGST Act, 2017 for alleged defective documents accompanying goods in transit — whether payment of tax and penalty for release of detained goods amounts to voluntary paymeBACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a sole proprietor trading in steel/iron bars, purchased a consignment of steel and sold it onward. An e-way bill was generated for transporting the goods directly from the seller's premises to the buyer's premises. The e-way bill reflected the petitioner's GSTIN, while the address mentioned was that of the buyer, since the goods had already been sold. RELEVANT FACTSThe truck carrying the goods was intercepted by GST authorities on 19-10-2020 at 11:00 p.m. and detained on the ground that the documents accompanying the goods were found defective. A detention order dated 23-10-2020 was passed, followed on the same date by a show-cause notice under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act stating the reason as "prima facie, the documents tendered are found to be defective" — without specifying any particular defect. Simultaneously, an order of demand of tax and penalty of Rs. 2,78,129 each was raised. Since the petitioner urgently required the goods, he paid the demanded tax and penalty to secure release of the goods. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 31-12-2021, which also failed to disclose the specific discrepancy alleged between the e-way bill and the goods. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging both orders. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)Para 20: "We are unable to accept that the order of demand and penalty is a consent order and the petitioner was precluded from challenging the same. The goods had been detained and it is not disputed that the same would not have been released unless the tax and penalty was paid. We are persuaded to accept that the petitioner had paid the tax and penalty for release of the goods and the said payment was not voluntary."Para 21: "As stated above, it is apparent that neither the show-cause notice nor the order of demand clearly sets out the reason for imposing the tax liability as well as penalty."Para 22: "In the given facts, we are of the view that it would be apposite to remand the matter to the GST officer concerned to decide afresh after giving the petitioner full opportunity to address the allegation against him." FINAL VERDICT 👍Both the order dated 23-10-2020 raising demand of tax and penalty, and the appellate order dated 31-12-2021, were set aside. The matter was remanded to the GST officer concerned, who was directed to issue a fresh show-cause notice within two weeks and pass a fresh order after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. | ||||
| 158 | Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt v. Union of India | 06-05-2022 | Validity of mandatory 1/3rd deemed deduction towards land value under Paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) for computing GST on construction services involving transfer of land. | View Download |
BackgroundThe writ applicant, a practicing advocate, entered into an agreement dated 29th September 2020 with Navratna Organisers & Developers Pvt. Ltd. for purchase of a plot of land admeasuring 1021 sq. mtrs. at "Kalhar Blues and Greens", Ahmedabad, along with construction of a bungalow thereon. Separate and distinct consideration was fixed for (i) sale of land and (ii) construction of bungalow. The developer, relying on Entry 3(if) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read with Paragraph 2 thereof, demanded GST @ 9% CGST + 9% SGST on the entire consideration (land + construction) after deducting only 1/3rd of total value towards land, instead of deducting the entire actual land consideration. Tax was collected from the petitioner under protest. In the companion writ applications, developers had filed advance ruling applications; the authority held only 1/3rd deduction admissible. Those orders were affirmed by the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling. All three petitions were heard together, with SCA No. 1350 of 2021 treated as the lead matter.Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 87:"Thus the legislative intent is to impose tax on construction activity undertaken by a supplier at the behest of or pursuant to contract with the recipient. There is no intention to impose tax on supply of land in any form and it is for this reason that it is provided in the Schedule III to the GST Acts that the supply of land will be neither supply of goods nor supply of services."Para 88:"If the statutory provisions are interpreted from this perspective then the difference sought to be drawn by the learned A.S.G. between developed and undeveloped land pales into insignificance. As such, when the entry in the Schedule III says 'sale of land' then it can be land in any form."Para 90:"However, in the present case what is sought to be argued by the revenue is that the exclusion of sale of land will not be available since the land is a developed piece of land. It is difficult for us to accept such argument as at the point of time when the buyer entered into the picture, the land was already developed. Thus, even without going to Schedule III, the only service which is supplied by the supplier to the recipient is the construction undertaken for the buyer and it is such supply alone which can be taxed. Hence the fact that the land is not a plain parcel of land but a developed land cannot be a ground for imposing tax on the sale of such land."Para 96:"The answer has to be in the negative. When the statutory provision requires valuation in accordance with the actual price paid and payable for the service and where such actual price is available, then tax has to be imposed on such actual value. Deeming fiction can be applied only where actual value is not ascertainable."Para 100:"Thus, mandatory application of deeming fiction of 1/3rd of total agreement value towards land even though the actual value of land is ascertainable is clearly contrary to the provisions and scheme of the CGST Act and therefore ultra-vires the statutory provisions."Para 105:"Such deeming fiction which leads to arbitrary and discriminatory consequences could be clearly said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which guarantees equality to all and also frowns upon arbitrariness in law."Para 109:"Thus, the prescription under Section 15(5) of the CGST Act has to be by rules and not by notification. Be that as it may, wherever a delegated legislation is challenged as being ultra-vires the provisions of the CGST Act as well as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be defended merely on the ground that the Government had competence to issue such delegated piece of legislation. Even if it is presumed that the Government had the competence to fix a deemed value for supplies, if the deeming fiction is found to be arbitrary and contrary to the scheme of the statute, then it can be definitely held to be ultra-vires."Para 122:"In the result, the impugned Paragraph 2 of the Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.6.2017 and identical notification under the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which provide for a mandatory fixed rate of deduction of 1/3rd of total consideration towards the value of land is ultra-vires the provisions as well as the scheme of the GST Acts. Application of such mandatory uniform rate of deduction is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."Para 123–124:"While we so conclude, the question is whether the impugned paragraph 2 needs to be struck down or the same can be saved by reading it down. In our considered view, while maintaining the mandatory deduction of 1/3rd for value of land is not sustainable in cases where the value of land is clearly ascertainable or where the value of construction service can be derived with the aid of valuation rules, such deduction can be permitted at the option of a taxable person particularly in cases where the value of land or undivided share of land is not ascertainable. The impugned paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017 and the parallel State tax Notification is read down to the effect that the deeming fiction of 1/3rd will not be mandatory in nature. It will only be available at the option of the taxable person in cases where the actual value of land or undivided share in land is not ascertainable."Final VerdictParagraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read down — mandatory 1/3rd deemed deduction for land value held ultra-vires and violative of Article 14; it shall operate only as an option for the taxable person where actual land value is not ascertainable. Refund of excess tax directed to petitioner with 6% interest within 12 weeks. Advance ruling appellate orders in companion petitions quashed. | ||||
| Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt v. Union of India 06-05-2022 Validity of mandatory 1/3rd deemed deduction towards land value under Paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) for computing GST on construction services involving transfer of land.BackgroundThe writ applicant, a practicing advocate, entered into an agreement dated 29th September 2020 with Navratna Organisers & Developers Pvt. Ltd. for purchase of a plot of land admeasuring 1021 sq. mtrs. at "Kalhar Blues and Greens", Ahmedabad, along with construction of a bungalow thereon. Separate and distinct consideration was fixed for (i) sale of land and (ii) construction of bungalow. The developer, relying on Entry 3(if) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read with Paragraph 2 thereof, demanded GST @ 9% CGST + 9% SGST on the entire consideration (land + construction) after deducting only 1/3rd of total value towards land, instead of deducting the entire actual land consideration. Tax was collected from the petitioner under protest. In the companion writ applications, developers had filed advance ruling applications; the authority held only 1/3rd deduction admissible. Those orders were affirmed by the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling. All three petitions were heard together, with SCA No. 1350 of 2021 treated as the lead matter.Court Observations (Verbatim — Crucial Paragraphs)Para 87:"Thus the legislative intent is to impose tax on construction activity undertaken by a supplier at the behest of or pursuant to contract with the recipient. There is no intention to impose tax on supply of land in any form and it is for this reason that it is provided in the Schedule III to the GST Acts that the supply of land will be neither supply of goods nor supply of services."Para 88:"If the statutory provisions are interpreted from this perspective then the difference sought to be drawn by the learned A.S.G. between developed and undeveloped land pales into insignificance. As such, when the entry in the Schedule III says 'sale of land' then it can be land in any form."Para 90:"However, in the present case what is sought to be argued by the revenue is that the exclusion of sale of land will not be available since the land is a developed piece of land. It is difficult for us to accept such argument as at the point of time when the buyer entered into the picture, the land was already developed. Thus, even without going to Schedule III, the only service which is supplied by the supplier to the recipient is the construction undertaken for the buyer and it is such supply alone which can be taxed. Hence the fact that the land is not a plain parcel of land but a developed land cannot be a ground for imposing tax on the sale of such land."Para 96:"The answer has to be in the negative. When the statutory provision requires valuation in accordance with the actual price paid and payable for the service and where such actual price is available, then tax has to be imposed on such actual value. Deeming fiction can be applied only where actual value is not ascertainable."Para 100:"Thus, mandatory application of deeming fiction of 1/3rd of total agreement value towards land even though the actual value of land is ascertainable is clearly contrary to the provisions and scheme of the CGST Act and therefore ultra-vires the statutory provisions."Para 105:"Such deeming fiction which leads to arbitrary and discriminatory consequences could be clearly said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which guarantees equality to all and also frowns upon arbitrariness in law."Para 109:"Thus, the prescription under Section 15(5) of the CGST Act has to be by rules and not by notification. Be that as it may, wherever a delegated legislation is challenged as being ultra-vires the provisions of the CGST Act as well as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be defended merely on the ground that the Government had competence to issue such delegated piece of legislation. Even if it is presumed that the Government had the competence to fix a deemed value for supplies, if the deeming fiction is found to be arbitrary and contrary to the scheme of the statute, then it can be definitely held to be ultra-vires."Para 122:"In the result, the impugned Paragraph 2 of the Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.6.2017 and identical notification under the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, which provide for a mandatory fixed rate of deduction of 1/3rd of total consideration towards the value of land is ultra-vires the provisions as well as the scheme of the GST Acts. Application of such mandatory uniform rate of deduction is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."Para 123–124:"While we so conclude, the question is whether the impugned paragraph 2 needs to be struck down or the same can be saved by reading it down. In our considered view, while maintaining the mandatory deduction of 1/3rd for value of land is not sustainable in cases where the value of land is clearly ascertainable or where the value of construction service can be derived with the aid of valuation rules, such deduction can be permitted at the option of a taxable person particularly in cases where the value of land or undivided share of land is not ascertainable. The impugned paragraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June 2017 and the parallel State tax Notification is read down to the effect that the deeming fiction of 1/3rd will not be mandatory in nature. It will only be available at the option of the taxable person in cases where the actual value of land or undivided share in land is not ascertainable."Final VerdictParagraph 2 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) read down — mandatory 1/3rd deemed deduction for land value held ultra-vires and violative of Article 14; it shall operate only as an option for the taxable person where actual land value is not ascertainable. Refund of excess tax directed to petitioner with 6% interest within 12 weeks. Advance ruling appellate orders in companion petitions quashed. | ||||
| 159 | ECGC Limited vs. Mokul Shriram EPC JV | 15-02-2022 | Whether the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would apply to appeals arising from complaints filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, or whether the less oner | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directed the appellant to pay Rs.265.01 Crores with interest at 10% p.a. from 19.09.2016. The complainant had obtained two insurance policies from the appellant by paying a premium of Rs.10,38,03,912/-, obtained for a construction contract awarded by the Government of Basra, Iraq. When the contract was withdrawn due to internal conflict and payments were suspended, the appellant rejected the insurance claim. The complaint was filed and decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, depositing Rs.50,000/- as pre-deposit in accordance with the 1986 Act. However, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had come into force on 20.07.2020, and under Section 67 of the 2019 Act, the condition for filing an appeal is deposit of 50% of the entire awarded amount — with no upper ceiling — which would mean depositing approximately Rs.132 Crores. FACTSThe pre-deposit condition under the two Acts is starkly different. Under the 1986 Act, the condition was 50% of the awarded amount or Rs.50,000, whichever is less. Under the 2019 Act, it is a flat 50% of the awarded amount with no ceiling whatsoever. The appellant filed an Interlocutory Application praying that the appeal be entertained under the conditions prescribed by the 1986 Act, i.e., the law applicable at the time the complaint was filed and proceedings were initiated. The respondent contended that the 2019 Act applies as it was in force at the time of filing of the appeal and that pre-deposit is a mere procedural requirement, hence retrospective. The Court examined a long line of Constitution Bench judgments on the doctrine of vested right of appeal and whether imposition of a more onerous pre-deposit condition amounts to curtailing a substantive right that had already accrued. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)(From Hoosein Kasam Dada — approved and relied upon by the Court): "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right."(From Garikapati Veeraya — Constitution Bench principles approved and applied): "(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."(From State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange — applied by the Court): "it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment."(Court's own final conclusion — Para 34): "In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Interlocutory Application was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will not apply to appeals arising from complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The right of appeal is a vested substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of the proceedings, and it cannot be curtailed by the new law unless the new law expressly or by necessary intendment says so.👍 IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT KEY CASES REFERRED AND RELIED UPON BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.AIR 1931 Cal. 100 (Calcutta HC — approved by SC)2Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court)3Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.AIR 1957 SC 540 (Constitution Bench)4State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.AIR 1960 SC 980 (Three-Judge Bench)5Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., NagpurAIR 1967 SC 344 (Constitution Bench)6M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court)7K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.(2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court)8Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1975) 2 SCC 175 (Four-Judge Bench)9Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors.(1996) 3 SCC 142 (Supreme Court)10M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 428 (Supreme Court)11Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.(2011) 6 SCC 739 (Supreme Court)12Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.2021 SCC OnLine SC 225 (Supreme Court)13Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (Three-Judge Bench)14New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra(1975) 2 SCC 840 (Supreme Court)15M/s. Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 decided on 18.04.2016 (Madras HC, Division Bench) | ||||
| ECGC Limited vs. Mokul Shriram EPC JV 15-02-2022 Whether the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would apply to appeals arising from complaints filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, or whether the less onerBACKGROUNDThe National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directed the appellant to pay Rs.265.01 Crores with interest at 10% p.a. from 19.09.2016. The complainant had obtained two insurance policies from the appellant by paying a premium of Rs.10,38,03,912/-, obtained for a construction contract awarded by the Government of Basra, Iraq. When the contract was withdrawn due to internal conflict and payments were suspended, the appellant rejected the insurance claim. The complaint was filed and decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the 1986 Act, depositing Rs.50,000/- as pre-deposit in accordance with the 1986 Act. However, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had come into force on 20.07.2020, and under Section 67 of the 2019 Act, the condition for filing an appeal is deposit of 50% of the entire awarded amount — with no upper ceiling — which would mean depositing approximately Rs.132 Crores. FACTSThe pre-deposit condition under the two Acts is starkly different. Under the 1986 Act, the condition was 50% of the awarded amount or Rs.50,000, whichever is less. Under the 2019 Act, it is a flat 50% of the awarded amount with no ceiling whatsoever. The appellant filed an Interlocutory Application praying that the appeal be entertained under the conditions prescribed by the 1986 Act, i.e., the law applicable at the time the complaint was filed and proceedings were initiated. The respondent contended that the 2019 Act applies as it was in force at the time of filing of the appeal and that pre-deposit is a mere procedural requirement, hence retrospective. The Court examined a long line of Constitution Bench judgments on the doctrine of vested right of appeal and whether imposition of a more onerous pre-deposit condition amounts to curtailing a substantive right that had already accrued. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)(From Hoosein Kasam Dada — approved and relied upon by the Court): "The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right."(From Garikapati Veeraya — Constitution Bench principles approved and applied): "(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."(From State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange — applied by the Court): "it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment."(Court's own final conclusion — Para 34): "In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act." FINAL VERDICTThe Interlocutory Application was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the more onerous pre-deposit condition of 50% of the entire awarded amount under Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will not apply to appeals arising from complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The right of appeal is a vested substantive right governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of the proceedings, and it cannot be curtailed by the new law unless the new law expressly or by necessary intendment says so.👍 IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT KEY CASES REFERRED AND RELIED UPON BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.AIR 1931 Cal. 100 (Calcutta HC — approved by SC)2Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.AIR 1953 SC 221 (Supreme Court)3Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.AIR 1957 SC 540 (Constitution Bench)4State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.AIR 1960 SC 980 (Three-Judge Bench)5Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., NagpurAIR 1967 SC 344 (Constitution Bench)6M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 724 (Supreme Court)7K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.(2017) 9 SCC 355 (Supreme Court)8Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(1975) 2 SCC 175 (Four-Judge Bench)9Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi & Ors.(1996) 3 SCC 142 (Supreme Court)10M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 428 (Supreme Court)11Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.(2011) 6 SCC 739 (Supreme Court)12Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.2021 SCC OnLine SC 225 (Supreme Court)13Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (Three-Judge Bench)14New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra(1975) 2 SCC 840 (Supreme Court)15M/s. Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 decided on 18.04.2016 (Madras HC, Division Bench) | ||||
| 160 | Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center & Batch vs. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST)(GST) & Others | 31-01-2022 | Whether GST registrations cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of CGST/TNGST Acts for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months can be restored by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, even where the statutory period of limit | View Download |
BACKGROUNDA batch of 27 Writ Petitions was filed by various small traders and businesspersons whose GST registrations were cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the CGST/TNGST Acts for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months. Show Cause Notices in prescribed form were issued to all petitioners and cancellation orders were passed after personal hearing opportunities. The cancellation orders ranged from the year 2018 to 2019. Some petitioners directly challenged the cancellation orders, while others challenged orders of Appellate Commissioners rejecting their appeals as time-barred, and a few challenged rejection of revocation applications. The Government had provided multiple amnesty opportunities through Order No.01/2020-Central Tax dated 25.06.2020 (for cancellations up to 12.06.2020) and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021 (extending deadline to 30.09.2021), but none of the petitioners availed these in time. The Appellate Commissioners correctly rejected all belated appeals as beyond the condonable period under Section 107 of the respective GST Acts. FACTSAll the petitioners had failed to file their GST returns for a continuous period of six months, resulting in cancellation of their registrations. After cancellation, they neither filed applications for revocation under Section 30 of the Act within 30 days, nor did they avail the extended amnesty opportunities granted by the Government on the recommendations of the GST Council to revive their registrations. When some of them filed appeals before Appellate Commissioners under Section 107 of the CGST/TNGST Acts, those appeals were rejected as beyond the condonable period of limitation — the delays ranging from 11 months to over 2 years. The Appellate Commissioners, being statutory authorities, had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107. Several petitioners also pointed to the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation extension orders, CBIC Circular No.157/13/2021-GST dated 20.07.2021, Circular No.158/14/2021-GST dated 06.09.2021, and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021. One petitioner specifically raised an issue about the GST portal architecture not permitting filing of revocation applications despite dues being paid. The Court noted that while the Appellate Authorities rightly rejected the petitions under the statute, there was an overwhelming case for restoring the registrations in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"The law on the limitation has been well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this connection, a reference is invited to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 70, wherein, it has been held that statutory appeal filed beyond the statutory period for condonation of delay under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be condoned. This position of law applies to the facts of these cases.""As original or as appellate authority exercising power under the respective enactments, quasi judicial officers were bound by the provisions of the Act and the limitation under it, they have acted in accordance with law. They cannot look beyond the limitations prescribed under provisions of the Act. Therefore, no fault can be attributed to their action.""the provisions of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 cannot be interpreted in such a manner, so as to debar an assessee, either from obtaining registration or reviving the lapsed/cancelled registration as such an interpretation would be not only contrary to the Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India but also in violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""In my view, no useful purpose will be served by keeping these petitioners out of the bounds of GST regime under the respective GST enactments other than to allow further leakage of the revenue and to isolate these petitioners from the main stream contrary to the objects of the respective GST enactments.""The purpose of GST registration is only to ensure just tax gets collected on supplies of goods or service or both and is paid to the exchequer. Keeping these petitioners outside the bounds of the GST regime is a self defeating move as no tax will get paid on the supplies of these petitioners.""The provisions of the GST enactments cannot be interpreted so as to deny the right to carry on Trade and Commerce to a citizen and subjects. The constitutional guarantee is unconditional and unequivocal and must be enforced regardless of the defect in the scheme of the GST enactments. The right to carry on trade or profession also cannot be curtailed. Only reasonable restriction can be imposed. To deny such rights would militate against their rights under Article 14, read with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""This is a fit case for exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners by quashing the impugned orders and to grant consequential relief to the petitioners. By doing so, the Court is effectuating the object under the GST enactment of levying and collecting just tax from every assessee who either supplies goods or service. Legitimate Trade and Commerce by every supplier should be allowed to be carried on subject to payment of tax and statutory compliance.""These petitioners deserve a chance and therefore should be allowed to revive their registration so that they can proceed to regularize the defaults." FINAL VERDICTAll 27 Writ Petitions were allowed subject to conditions. The petitioners were directed to file all pending returns and pay the defaulted tax, interest, fine and fee within 45 days from receipt of the order, without adjusting from ITC. On compliance, the GST registrations shall stand revived forthwith. The respondents were directed to instruct GSTN to make necessary changes in the portal architecture within 30 days to enable filings. ITC, if any, to be utilized only after scrutiny and approval by competent authorities.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1M/s. Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Others(2008) 3 SCC 70 (Supreme Court)2P.R. Mani Electronics vs. Union of India and Others2020 SCC OnLine Mad 8053 (Madras HC, Division Bench)3Tvl. Sunpenta Mining Service Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commissioner (ST), SalemW.P.Nos.20083 & 20086 of 2021 dated 22.09.2021 (Madras HC)4Suresh Trading Corporation vs. Asst. Commissioner (Circle) of SGST, Coimbatore IIW.P.No.21109 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021 (Madras HC)5Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India(1997) 5 SCC 536 (Supreme Court)6In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation2021 SCC OnLine SC 947 (Supreme Court) — M.A. No.665/2021 in SMW(C) No.3/2020 | ||||
| Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center & Batch vs. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST)(GST) & Others 31-01-2022 Whether GST registrations cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of CGST/TNGST Acts for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months can be restored by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, even where the statutory period of limitBACKGROUNDA batch of 27 Writ Petitions was filed by various small traders and businesspersons whose GST registrations were cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the CGST/TNGST Acts for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months. Show Cause Notices in prescribed form were issued to all petitioners and cancellation orders were passed after personal hearing opportunities. The cancellation orders ranged from the year 2018 to 2019. Some petitioners directly challenged the cancellation orders, while others challenged orders of Appellate Commissioners rejecting their appeals as time-barred, and a few challenged rejection of revocation applications. The Government had provided multiple amnesty opportunities through Order No.01/2020-Central Tax dated 25.06.2020 (for cancellations up to 12.06.2020) and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021 (extending deadline to 30.09.2021), but none of the petitioners availed these in time. The Appellate Commissioners correctly rejected all belated appeals as beyond the condonable period under Section 107 of the respective GST Acts. FACTSAll the petitioners had failed to file their GST returns for a continuous period of six months, resulting in cancellation of their registrations. After cancellation, they neither filed applications for revocation under Section 30 of the Act within 30 days, nor did they avail the extended amnesty opportunities granted by the Government on the recommendations of the GST Council to revive their registrations. When some of them filed appeals before Appellate Commissioners under Section 107 of the CGST/TNGST Acts, those appeals were rejected as beyond the condonable period of limitation — the delays ranging from 11 months to over 2 years. The Appellate Commissioners, being statutory authorities, had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107. Several petitioners also pointed to the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation extension orders, CBIC Circular No.157/13/2021-GST dated 20.07.2021, Circular No.158/14/2021-GST dated 06.09.2021, and Notification No.34/2021-Central Tax dated 29.08.2021. One petitioner specifically raised an issue about the GST portal architecture not permitting filing of revocation applications despite dues being paid. The Court noted that while the Appellate Authorities rightly rejected the petitions under the statute, there was an overwhelming case for restoring the registrations in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"The law on the limitation has been well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this connection, a reference is invited to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 70, wherein, it has been held that statutory appeal filed beyond the statutory period for condonation of delay under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be condoned. This position of law applies to the facts of these cases.""As original or as appellate authority exercising power under the respective enactments, quasi judicial officers were bound by the provisions of the Act and the limitation under it, they have acted in accordance with law. They cannot look beyond the limitations prescribed under provisions of the Act. Therefore, no fault can be attributed to their action.""the provisions of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 cannot be interpreted in such a manner, so as to debar an assessee, either from obtaining registration or reviving the lapsed/cancelled registration as such an interpretation would be not only contrary to the Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India but also in violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""In my view, no useful purpose will be served by keeping these petitioners out of the bounds of GST regime under the respective GST enactments other than to allow further leakage of the revenue and to isolate these petitioners from the main stream contrary to the objects of the respective GST enactments.""The purpose of GST registration is only to ensure just tax gets collected on supplies of goods or service or both and is paid to the exchequer. Keeping these petitioners outside the bounds of the GST regime is a self defeating move as no tax will get paid on the supplies of these petitioners.""The provisions of the GST enactments cannot be interpreted so as to deny the right to carry on Trade and Commerce to a citizen and subjects. The constitutional guarantee is unconditional and unequivocal and must be enforced regardless of the defect in the scheme of the GST enactments. The right to carry on trade or profession also cannot be curtailed. Only reasonable restriction can be imposed. To deny such rights would militate against their rights under Article 14, read with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.""This is a fit case for exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners by quashing the impugned orders and to grant consequential relief to the petitioners. By doing so, the Court is effectuating the object under the GST enactment of levying and collecting just tax from every assessee who either supplies goods or service. Legitimate Trade and Commerce by every supplier should be allowed to be carried on subject to payment of tax and statutory compliance.""These petitioners deserve a chance and therefore should be allowed to revive their registration so that they can proceed to regularize the defaults." FINAL VERDICTAll 27 Writ Petitions were allowed subject to conditions. The petitioners were directed to file all pending returns and pay the defaulted tax, interest, fine and fee within 45 days from receipt of the order, without adjusting from ITC. On compliance, the GST registrations shall stand revived forthwith. The respondents were directed to instruct GSTN to make necessary changes in the portal architecture within 30 days to enable filings. ITC, if any, to be utilized only after scrutiny and approval by competent authorities.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1M/s. Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Others(2008) 3 SCC 70 (Supreme Court)2P.R. Mani Electronics vs. Union of India and Others2020 SCC OnLine Mad 8053 (Madras HC, Division Bench)3Tvl. Sunpenta Mining Service Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commissioner (ST), SalemW.P.Nos.20083 & 20086 of 2021 dated 22.09.2021 (Madras HC)4Suresh Trading Corporation vs. Asst. Commissioner (Circle) of SGST, Coimbatore IIW.P.No.21109 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021 (Madras HC)5Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India(1997) 5 SCC 536 (Supreme Court)6In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation2021 SCC OnLine SC 947 (Supreme Court) — M.A. No.665/2021 in SMW(C) No.3/2020 | ||||