BackgroundThe appellant’s bank accounts were provisionally attached by orders dated 17.10.2023 and 26.10.2023. Its objection dated 01.05.2024 under Rule 159(5) was never decided. When the attachments lapsed by efflux of one year, the respondent issued fresh attachment orders dated 13.11.2024 and 18.12.2024 describing them as a ‘renewal’, alleging large-scale fraud and apprehension of non-recovery. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the law places no embargo on a second attachment after the first lapses.Final VerdictEndorsing Radha Krishan Industries on Section 83(1), the Supreme Court held that an authority exercising this draconian power must be empowered by statute or by executive instructions; absence of a prohibition is no source of power. Unlike Section 11DDA of the Central Excise Act and Section 28BA of the Customs Act, Section 83 contains no provision for extension, and permitting a fresh order after lapse would render Section 83(2) otiose; a fresh order on substantially the same grounds would do indirectly what cannot be done directly – “old wine in a new bottle”. Provisional attachment is a pre-emptive measure, not a recovery tool, and one year is enough for the revenue to conclude its investigation. The Court held that when a statute does not provide for an extension, renewal, re-issuance, revival – whatever be the nomenclature – the executive cannot overreach the statute, approved the Kerala High Court in Ali K., and noted with concern that debit freezes continue after the statutory lapse, as also flagged in the GST Council’s 53rd meeting agenda. The impugned attachment orders were set aside and the bank accounts directed to be de-freezed forthwith; the investigation may continue in accordance with law.

Facts:A search was conducted on 03.08.2021 at the premises of the petitioner, a metal scrap dealer. Investigation by DGGI revealed that the petitioner had allegedly availed fraudulent ITC from several non-existent supplier firms and passed on such ITC through fake invoices. A show cause notice dated 29.05.2023 was issued for the period 2017-18 to 2021-22 proposing recovery of ₹83,76,32,528/- under Section 74 along with interest and penalty, which was confirmed by the adjudication order dated 23.01.2025.Court Decision:The Court held that the impugned adjudication order was a detailed order passed after granting multiple opportunities of hearing and after considering the replies filed by the petitioner. The contention that the replies were not considered was rejected.The Court further held that issuance of a consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years under Section 74 of the CGST Act is permissible as the provisions use the expressions “for any period” and “for such periods”. In cases involving fraudulent availment or utilisation of ITC, transactions across several years may have to be examined together to establish the pattern of fraud.The Court also held that denial of cross-examination in show cause notice proceedings does not automatically vitiate the adjudication, as the right of cross-examination is not an unfettered right and depends on the facts of each case.Since the adjudication order was appealable under Section 107 of the CGST Act and involved disputed questions of fact, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and relegated the petitioner to the statutory appellate remedy.Cases Referred by Court:·         Vallabh Textile Through Its Authorized Representative v. Additional/Joint Commissioner, CGST Delhi East Commissionerate & Ors.·         Sushil Aggarwal v. Principal Commissioner of Customs·         Telestar Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. Special Director of Enforcement, (2013) 9 SCC 549·         Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1·         HIM Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1236·         Flevel International v. Central Excise, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12173 

BackgroundThe appellant was arrested on 17-8-2023 in  registered with the Satara City Police Station, Maharashtra, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506 read with 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the appellant, while employed as a business development manager with the complainant’s advertising business and training institute, siphoned off about Rs. 1,66,00,000 (recorded by the Supreme Court at one place as Rs. 1,60,00,000) from the legitimate funds of the complainant. After the Trial Court declined to release him on regular bail, the appellant approached the High Court of Bombay.FactsBefore the High Court, the appellant voluntarily filed an affidavit-cum-undertaking dated 22-3-2024, affirming that he would deposit Rs. 25,00,000 within five months to demonstrate his bona fides. On the basis of this undertaking, the High Court, by order dated 1-4-2024, granted regular bail subject (inter alia) to condition (i) requiring deposit of Rs. 25,00,000 in the Trial Court. The appellant secured his release pursuant to this order but failed to deposit the amount as undertaken on oath.The appellant first filed Interim Application No. 3106 of 2024 (on 6-8-2024) seeking relaxation of the deposit condition, but unconditionally withdrew that application on 23-6-2025. The original complainant thereafter filed Interim Application No. 4524 of 2024 seeking cancellation of bail. By the impugned order dated 1-7-2025, the High Court held that the appellant had foreclosed consideration of his bail on merits by voluntarily offering the deposit and had then reneged on it, and accordingly cancelled the bail in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 483(3) of the BNSS, 2023, directing the appellant to surrender. The appellant challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court and also pressed his plea for regular bail.Court’s Observations (verbatim)15. We have noticed over a period of time that orders of regular bail and anticipatory bail are being passed by different High Courts subject to deposit of some amount.16. We have come across cases like the one in hand where accused persons have gone to the extent of filing affidavits in the form of undertaking that they would deposit a particular amount within a particular period and then conveniently resile from such undertakings saying it is an onerous condition.17. In some cases, perhaps the accused may abide by such undertaking, but our experience so far has been that in many cases the accused later would not abide and flout the undertaking. In many cases it would be argued on behalf of the accused that he had never made such a statement and the court on its own had recorded in the order that the accused is ready and willing to deposit a particular amount. At times the entire blame is thrown on the lawyer in making such statement for the purpose of obtaining order of bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. In such circumstances, the concerned court would be left with no other option but to cancel the bail either at the instance of the State or the original complainant.18. The case in hand is one in which the appellant on his own free will and volition filed an affidavit in the form of an undertaking before the High Court that he would deposit an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- but ultimately resiled to do so and the High Court had to cancel the bail. It was too much for the lawyer of the appellant to argue before the High Court that asking his client to deposit Rs. 25,00,000/- was unreasonable. It reflects on the professional ethics.19. By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs.20. The High Courts as well as the Trial Courts shall decide the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail strictly on the merits of the case. The High Courts and the Trial Courts shall not exercise their discretion in this regard on any undertaking or any statement that the accused may be ready and willing to make.21. This practice has to be stopped. Litigants are taking the courts for a ride and thereby undermining the dignity and honor of the court.23. In the case in hand, so far as the plea for regular bail is concerned, we are not inclined to look into. The appellant has made a mockery of justice. He could be said to have abused the process of law. If at all the High Court wanted to release the appellant on bail, it should have first asked him to deposit the amount within a particular period of time and upon such deposit the appellant could have been released.24. Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail.Final VerdictThe appeal was dismissed and the cancellation of bail was upheld; the appellant was directed to surrender and a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed for gross abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court further directed that henceforth no Trial Court or High Court shall grant regular or anticipatory bail on the basis of any undertaking to deposit money, and that such pleas must be decided strictly on merits, with the order circulated to all High Courts.Cases Referred / Relied UponKundan Singh v. The Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise — relied upon by the High Court; deprecates the practice of foreclosing consideration of a bail application on merits by voluntarily offering monetary deposits and thereafter reneging on it.Ramesh Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi — cited for the proposition that a criminal court exercising bail jurisdiction is not expected to act as a recovery agent and that financial deposit as a condition for bail is impermissible.Apurva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra — cited along with Ramesh Kumar for the same proposition on impermissibility of financial deposit as a bail condition.Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee — cited for the proposition that non-fulfilment of the terms of a compromise cannot, by itself, be the basis of granting or cancelling bail.

BackgroundThe Respondent-assessee was subjected to proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act. A tax and penalty of more than Rs. 9.40 Crores was imposed upon him. During the enquiry, the proper officer recorded statements of third parties and entirely based his opinion of guilt on those statements, which were subsequently relied upon while passing the impugned order. The assessee requested an opportunity to cross-examine those persons — a request that was denied. Despite the availability of an appellate remedy, the assessee filed a Writ Petition before the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court alleging a serious infraction of the principles of natural justice. The Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the impugned order, relying on Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II [(2016) 15 SCC 785]. The Revenue preferred the present Writ Appeal challenging that judgment.Relevant FactsThe Revenue contended that Section 74 of the CGST Act contains no express provision for cross-examination of witnesses, and therefore no such right can be insisted upon as a matter of law. The Revenue further argued that the Single Judge wrongly relied on Andaman Timber Industries, which was rendered without considering the binding three-Judge Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in Kanungo & Co. v. Collector of Customs [1983 (13) ELT 1486 (SC)] and Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India [1997 (89) ELT 646 (SC)]. The assessee countered that the principles of natural justice must be read into the statute regardless of express provision, and that denial of cross-examination — when statements of third parties formed the entire evidentiary foundation against him — rendered the proceedings void. The Division Bench also considered, suo motu, that certain persons were arrayed as co-noticees in the same proceedings and distinguished the right of cross-examination in respect of independent witnesses from co-noticees.Court Observations (Verbatim)"The question of maintainability of the writ petition, despite the existence of an alternate remedy, is no longer res integra...when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation." — However, since the challenge was on the ground of violation of natural justice, the writ petition was held to be perfectly maintainable.— Para 9 & 10 (relying on CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal)"It is now settled law that in every quasi-judicial proceedings, the rule of natural justice has to be followed. The rule of natural justice is the tenet of every adjudication proceedings, a violation of which renders the proceedings void. When courts are called upon to decide the validity of quasi-judicial proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, it cannot shut its eyes and adopt a pedantic approach and hold that unless the said principle is specifically extended under plenary legislation or the rules framed under it, the insistence of the principles is not mandatory."— Para 15"The entire basis for the formation of an opinion of guilt against the petitioner was the statements of third parties recorded by the proper officer. If the writ petitioner was to prefer an effective representation against the proposals in the notice, he had to know the basis of the allegations against him and test the evidence used against him. It was therefore imperative for the proper officer to have granted the opportunity of cross-examination to the petitioner."— Para 14"A breach of the principles of natural justice strikes at the fundamental core of procedural fairness, rendering the decision invalid unless exceptional circumstances justify such deviation...the denial of natural justice at the initial stage cannot be cured at the appellate stage...the principles of natural justice are the cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no person is condemned unheard."— Para 16 (relying on Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC Online 179)"Principles of natural justice that are reflected in Article 311, are not an empty incantation. They form the very bedrock of Article 14 and any violation of these principles tantamounts to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution...principles of natural justice guaranteed under Article 14, prohibit a decision-making adjudicatory authority from taking any arbitrary action, be it substantive or procedural in nature."— Para 22 (relying on Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa [(2024) 1 SCC 632], Para 35-36)"We hold that in appropriate cases, extending an opportunity of cross-examination in a proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act 2017 is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, a violation of which will render the proceedings void."— Para 25 (Court's final conclusion)Important Limitation (Para 24): The right to cross-examine does NOT extend to co-noticees. The assessee can only request the proper officer to supply copies of replies submitted by co-noticees — not seek their cross-examination.Final VerdictWrit Appeal filed by Revenue dismissed. Single Judge's order setting aside the impugned GST order confirmed and upheld. Division Bench held that in proceedings under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act, the right to cross-examine independent witnesses whose statements form the basis of the impugned order is an integral part of the principles of natural justice — denial thereof renders the order void. No costs.Cases Referred by CourtAndaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-IIRelied upon(2016) 15 SCC 785 — Supreme Court — Single Judge's basis for allowing writ petition; upheld by Division BenchKanungo & Co. v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and OthersDistinguished1983 (13) ELT 1486 (SC) — Supreme Court — Rendered under Sea Customs Act, 1878 (repealed); held inapplicable; cannot have universal applicationSurjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of IndiaDistinguished1997 (89) ELT 646 (SC) — Supreme Court — Relied upon by Revenue; not accepted by Division BenchCommissioner of Income Tax & Ors. v. Chhabil Dass AgarwalRelied upon(2014) 1 SCC 603 — Supreme Court — Four exceptional circumstances where writ lies despite alternate remedy, including violation of natural justiceKrishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. and OthersRelied upon3-Judge Bench2025 SCC Online 179 — Supreme Court — Breach of natural justice strikes at fundamental core of procedural fairness; denial at initial stage cannot be cured at appellate stageAyaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of MaharashtraRelied upon(2013) 4 SCC 465 — Supreme Court — Non-extension of cross-examination opportunity vitiates decision; part of principles of natural justiceAjay Saraogi v. Union of IndiaRelied upon2024 (136) GSTR 330 — Calcutta High Court (Division Bench) — Right of cross-examination imbued under Customs Act; principles of natural justice not excludedUnion of India & Another v. Tulsiram PatelRelied uponConstitution Bench(1985) 3 SCC 398 — Supreme Court — Principles of natural justice cannot be altogether excluded even by plenary/subordinate legislation; if excluded, such rule is ultra viresKothari Filaments and Another v. Commissioner of Customs (Port) Kolkata and OthersRelied upon(2009) 2 SCC 192 — Supreme Court — Customs Act does not specifically exclude natural justice; denial of cross-examination of relied-upon witnesses renders confiscation order invalidAureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa and OthersRelied upon(2024) 1 SCC 632 — Supreme Court — Natural justice is not empty incantation; forms bedrock of Article 14; violation tantamounts to violation of Article 14; Audi Alteram Partem is a twin anchor of natural justiceManeka Gandhi v. Union of IndiaRelied upon7-Judge Bench(1978) 1 SCC 248 — Supreme Court — Referenced within Aureliano Fernandes; life and liberty cannot be restricted except by procedure that is just, fair and reasonable

BackgroundThe petitioner is engaged in providing financial back-office services to an overseas entity under a service agreement. The department treated these services as "intermediary services" under Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, 2017, holding that the place of supply was in India and hence the transactions could not qualify as "export of services." A show cause notice dated 28.11.2024 was issued. The petitioner filed detailed replies on 27.01.2025 and 06.02.2025 relying upon at least nine judicial precedents and a Board Circular dated 20.09.2021. However, the adjudicating authority passed an order dated 24.02.2025 confirming the GST demand of ₹70,57,98,208/- for the period April 2020 to March 2021, without independently addressing any of the contentions or precedents cited by the petitioner. A comparative chart submitted by the petitioner's counsel demonstrated that the so-called "reasoning" in the impugned order was a verbatim cut-and-paste of the allegations in the show cause notice itself. Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 8: "We are satisfied that the adjudicating authority has failed to independently apply its mind to the various contentions raised in the replies filed on behalf of the Petitioner. Instead, the adjudicating authority has chosen to copy or rather cut and paste verbatim the allegations in the show cause notice dated 28 November 2024 to pass them off as reasons supporting the impugned order."Para 13: "Besides the grounds, the adjudicating authority is obliged to issue an order after thoroughly considering all relevant arguments and to state the reasons supporting its decision briefly. Any decision made without considering the main contentions or without providing any supporting reasons would be indicative of a lack of application of mind. Simply cutting and pasting the allegations in the show cause notice or mechanically reciting them verbatim does not inspire confidence that due consideration has been shown to the cause, and the decision is made after its due consideration. Ultimately, these are aspects of natural justice principles that should guide the decision-making process in such cases."Para 15: "The phrase 'consider' does not mean that the contents of the representation are transcribed in the impugned order and without any discussion on the contentions raised, a conclusion is reached. In this case, the so-called reasoning is merely a cut-and-paste of most of the contents of the show cause notice, as noticed above."Para 17: "Section 75(6) of the CGST Act provides that the proper officer, in his order, shall set out the relevant facts and the basis of his decision. The emphasis of this provision is on the 'basis of decision'. This means the emphasis is on the reasons that support the decision. Merely cutting and pasting the allegations from the show cause notice does not amount to giving any independent reasons after due consideration the assessee's contentions or after due application of mind to those contentions."Para 19: "Since this is a case of complete non-application of mind and violation of principles of natural justice, there is no point in directing the Petitioner to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal. A clear breach of natural justice is an exception to the general rule that statutory remedies should usually be exhausted before seeking this Court's extraordinary intervention." Final VerdictThe impugned demand order dated 24.02.2025 was quashed and set aside. The matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for fresh consideration and disposal of the show cause notice within three months, with a direction to follow principles of natural justice, including an opportunity of hearing and proper consideration of the petitioner's replies. All contentions on merits were left open.👍 In favour of the Assessee Cases / Provisions ReferredCitationCase NameWrit Petition No.2836 of 2021 (Bombay HC, decided 11.06.2024)Piramal Enterprises Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(1985) SCC OnLine SC 178Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel2017 SCC OnLine Hyd. 164S. Kiranmayi v. Sri N. Sambasiva RaoStatutory Provisions Referred:Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, 2017 — Place of supply of intermediary servicesSection 73(9) of the CGST Act / MGST Act — Determination of tax and issuance of demand orderSection 75(6) of the CGST Act — Requirement to set out relevant facts and basis of decisionSection 7(5)(c) of the IGST Act — Inter-state supply provisionsSection 8(2) of the IGST Act — Intra-state supply provisionsSection 2(6) of the IGST Act — Definition of "export of services"