Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Genpact India Pvt. Ltd., is a BPO service provider registered under Haryana GST, employing approximately 50,000 employees. It is engaged in providing a host of BPO and IT-enabled services including maintaining vendor/customer master data, processing vendor invoices, book-keeping, software development, technical IT support, data analysis, supply chain management support etc. — all rendered from India remotely through telecommunication/internet links using its own infrastructure.The petitioner entered into a Master Services Sub-Contracting Agreement (MSA) dated 01.01.2013 with Genpact International Inc. (GI), a US entity. Under the MSA, the petitioner was sub-contracted by GI to actually perform and deliver BPO/IT services directly to GI's overseas customers, on a principal-to-principal basis. The petitioner raised invoices on GI and received payment in convertible foreign exchange. There was no separate agreement between the petitioner and GI's customers.For the period July 2017 to March 2018, the petitioner filed a refund application on 18.10.2018 claiming refund of unutilised ITC of Rs. 27,26,27,276/- under Section 16 of the IGST Act read with Section 54 of the CGST Act. The Deputy Commissioner by Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 sanctioned Rs. 26,34,61,625/- accepting the services as export of services.However, the Principal Commissioner exercised revision powers under Section 107(2) of the CGST Act and filed an appeal contending that the petitioner's services were "intermediary services" — relying on a Circular dated 18.07.2019 which was subsequently withdrawn on 04.12.2019. The Joint Commissioner (Appeals) by order dated 27.05.2020 held the services to be intermediary services and ordered recovery of the entire refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/-.In an earlier round of litigation (CWP No. 10302/2020), this Court set aside the order dated 27.05.2020 and remanded the matter for fresh decision. The Appellate Authority on remand again passed order dated 15.02.2021 holding the petitioner to be an intermediary and denying the refund, additionally denying a further claim of Rs. 82,15,102/-. Refund applications for subsequent periods (April 2018–March 2019) were also rejected on identical grounds. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2021, the present writ petition was filed. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A bare perusal of the recitals and relevant clauses of the MSA...do not in any manner indicate that petitioner is acting as an 'intermediary' so as to fall within the scope and ambit of the definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. Such clauses cannot also be interpreted to conclude that the petitioner has facilitated the services. The said clauses are in relation to the modalities of how the actual work would be carried out and do not in any manner establish that the petitioner was required to arrange/facilitate a 3rd party to render the main service which has actually been rendered by the petitioner.""As per definition of 'intermediary' under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act the following three conditions must be satisfied for a person to qualify as an 'intermediary'; First, the relationship between the parties must be that of a principal-agency relationship. Second, the person must be involved in arrangement or facilitation of provisions of the service provided to the principal by a 3rd party. Third, the person must not actually perform the main service intended to be received by the service recipient itself.""There is no change in the legal position i.e. with regard to the scope and ambit of 'intermediary' services under the service tax regime vis-a-vis the GST regime and there being no change of facts as it is the MSA of 2013 (Annexure P-1) which continues to operate, the department cannot take a different view for different periods.""The finding recorded by the respondents-department to hold the petitioner to be in a principal agent relationship with the GI to be without any basis and to be clearly erroneous. The impugned order proceeds oblivious of Clause 21.6 of the MSA... Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute or be deemed to constitute a relationship of employer and employee, agency, joint venture or partnership between the parties hereto...""Even as per the afore-noticed circular dated 20.09.2021 and in reference to para 3.5 it stands clarified that sub-contracting for a service is not an 'intermediary' service.""The written statement seeks to justify the impugned order on grounds which are not even part of the impugned order and which is clearly impermissible in law." [Relying on Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner]"The principle of consistency as such ought to apply in the present matter as well and we find merit in the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner that the view taken in the order in original dated 25.01.2018...holding the petitioner to be not an 'intermediary' under the MSA, should prevail even under the GST regime."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. Impugned order dated 15.02.2021 quashed. Order-in-Original dated 14.03.2019 granting refund of Rs. 26,34,61,625/- restored. Directed that the benefit of this order shall enure to the petitioner for subsequent refunds as well. 👍 In favour of Assessee.   

BackgroundThe assessee, a manufacturer of ply-woods and related products, sold approximately 2% of its production ex-factory at its manufacturing location and the remaining 98% to dealers from its depots across the country. The assessee had filed a declaration under the Central Excise Rules declaring ex-factory prices. The Revenue found a significant price difference between ex-factory prices and prices at which goods were sold from the depots. In the course of investigation, statements of two buyers — partners of two trading firms — were recorded by the Revenue. Based solely on these statements, a Show Cause Notice dated 03.05.1995 was issued proposing that the depot sale prices be adopted as the basis for determination of excise duty value. The assessee filed a reply contesting the demand, pointed out that earlier identical proceedings had been decided in its favour by the Tribunal (not appealed by Revenue), challenged the correctness of the statements of both witnesses and specifically demanded the right to cross-examine them. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand without granting cross-examination — and notably, the Adjudicating Authority itself acknowledged in its order that such a request had been made. The CESTAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, holding that cross-examination of the dealers could not have brought out any material not already in the assessee's possession. Relevant FactsThe entire basis for issuing the Show Cause Notice was the statements of the two witnesses. No other independent material was relied upon by the Revenue to justify the demand. The assessee had specifically and expressly demanded cross-examination of those witnesses and disputed the truthfulness of their statements. The Adjudicating Authority not only rejected the cross-examination request but also failed to deal with that plea in the order. The CESTAT further compounded the error by ruling that cross-examination "could not have brought out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves" — thereby substituting its own guesswork for the assessee's strategic litigation decision. Additionally, the price list of the assessee maintained at its depots was also independently relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the duty value. The Supreme Court noted that whether the goods were in fact sold at the price mentioned in the price list was itself a matter that could have been probed in cross-examination.   Court Observations (Verbatim)"Not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though the statements of those witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of principles of natural justice because of which the assessee was adversely affected."— Court's core finding on violation of natural justice"It would be pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority he has specifically mentioned that such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However, no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea is not even dealt with by the Adjudicating Authority."— On the Adjudicating Authority's conduct"As far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could not have brought out any material which would not be in possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for the Tribunal to have guess work as to for what purposes the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and what extraction the appellant wanted from them."— On the Tribunal's reasoning being "totally untenable""The appellant had contested the truthfulness of the statements of these two witnesses and wanted to discredit their testimony for which purpose it wanted to avail the opportunity of cross-examination. That apart, the Adjudicating Authority simply relied upon the price list as maintained at the depot to determine the price for the purpose of levy of excise duty. Whether the goods were, in fact, sold to the said dealers/witnesses at the price which is mentioned in the price list itself could be the subject matter of cross-examination. Therefore, it was not for the Adjudicating Authority to presuppose as to what could be the subject matter of the cross-examination and make the remarks as mentioned above."— On the scope and purpose of cross-examination"If the testimony of these two witnesses is discredited, there was no material with the Department on the basis of which it could justify its action, as the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses was the only basis of issuing the Show Cause Notice."— On the critical evidentiary consequence of denial of cross-examinationTribunal's Rejected Reasoning (Para 6 of Tribunal Order — Quoted and Overruled):"The plea of no cross examination granted to the various dealers would not help the appellant case since the examination of the dealers would not bring out any material which would not be in the possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to why their ex factory prices remain static. Since we are not upholding and applying the ex factory prices, as we find them contravened and not normal price as envisaged under section 4(1), we find no reason to disturb the Commissioners orders."— Held by Supreme Court to be "totally untenable"  Final VerdictAppeal allowed. Impugned order of the CESTAT set aside. The Supreme Court held that denial of cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the sole basis of the Show Cause Notice and the demand order is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. No costs.

Case Facts:The petitioner challenged an order dated 26.12.2025 confirming tax liability for FY 2018–19. The show cause notice proposed a demand of Rs.1.37 crore, whereas the final order confirmed Rs.2.41 crore. The petitioner contended that the order exceeded the scope of the show cause notice. The writ petition was filed seeking quashing of both the show cause notice and consequential order. Court Decision:The Court held that the impugned order was contrary to Section 75(7) as it confirmed demand beyond what was proposed in the show cause notice. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner was directed to file a reply within 30 days and the authority was directed to pass a fresh order after granting opportunity. The authority was permitted to proceed in accordance with law in case of non-compliance by the petitioner.

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner's husband was the proprietor of a chemicals firm supplying industrial soaps and polishes. He died on 05.03.2019, after which the business was discontinued and closed, and the registration was cancelled w.e.f. 31.12.2019. Despite this, the Revenue initiated proceedings for FY 2018-19 against the legal heir (wife), leading to this writ challenging the demand on the ground that no proceeding had ever commenced while the proprietor was alive. FACTSAfter cancellation of registration, the petitioner received a communication dated 10.03.2025, followed by a notice in Form DRC-01A dated 20.05.2025, alleging that the firm had failed to file returns for certain e-way bills generated during FY 2018-19. The petitioner replied that, following her husband's death on 05.03.2019, the business had been discontinued and closed, and that she was neither involved in nor aware of the business dealings. A show cause notice in Form DRC-01 was thereafter issued on 26.06.2025, to which the petitioner again replied on 24.10.2025 reiterating her stand. Rejecting her explanation, the respondent passed the impugned order dated 11.12.2025 under Section 74, determining a tax liability of Rs.3,42,355/- with interest and penalty. The core legal issue was whether the words "determined after his death" in Section 93 permit initiation of fresh proceedings against the legal heir, or whether they apply only where proceedings were already pending at the time of death. The petitioner argued that "person chargeable with tax" in Section 74 means only the person on whom the incidence of levy falls, and that Section 93 read with Sections 9 and 2(107) cannot bring in a legal heir who did not continue the business. The Revenue contended that Section 93 expressly creates a statutory liability on the legal heir, covering both liability determined before death and liability "determined after his death," and that Income Tax principles cannot be mechanically imported into the CGST scheme. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"Section 74 of the CGST Act does not employ the expression 'taxable person' but uses the wider expression 'person chargeable with tax'. The said expression cannot be confined only to a taxable person as defined under Section 2(107) of the CGST Act. It would encompass not only registered taxable persons and persons liable for registration, but also the legal heirs from whom the tax is recoverable, and persons such as recipients liable to pay tax under the reverse charge mechanism, electronic commerce operators, etc., in cases where the statute fastens the liability upon them." (Para 4.4)"Once the statute authorises determination of liability after the death of the taxable person, the expression 'determined after his death' must necessarily include the entire adjudicatory process contemplated under Sections 73, 74 or 74A of the CGST Act, as the case may be. Such process would include not merely the passing of the final order, but also the issuance of notices and all other procedural steps preceding determination. Any other interpretation would have the effect of altering the plain, simple and clear meaning of the express words employed in Section 93 of the CGST Act." (Para 4.7)"A taxing statute creating a liability must ordinarily be construed in accordance with its plain language, and the Court cannot read into the provision limitations which the Legislature has consciously omitted." (Para 4.8)"...even in a case where the business of the deceased taxable person has been discontinued and no show cause notice or assessment proceedings had been initiated during his lifetime, fresh proceedings may nevertheless be initiated against the legal heir under Section 73, 74 or 74-A of the CGST Act, 2017 in view of section 93 of the CGST Act. However, in cases of discontinued businesses, the liability of the legal heir shall be limited to the extent to which the estate inherited by him is capable of meeting the charge." (Para 4.10) FINAL VERDICT 👎Writ Petition dismissed. Fresh proceedings can be initiated against the legal heir even where no proceedings were started during the deceased's lifetime, the liability being capped at the value of the inherited estate. CASES REFERREDBy the Petitioner:Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner — (2007) 4 SCC 30Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. State of Bihar — (2004) 7 SCC 642Laghu Udyog Bharati v. Union of India — (1999) 6 SCC 418Rishi Shangari v. Union of India — 2025:JHHC:11331-DBS. Gowthaman v. The Income Tax Officer — W.A.No.529 of 2026, dated 23.03.2026Relied on by the Court:Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. — 2024 INSC 756  

BackgroundThe petitioners are suppliers of pulses (Moong Dhal, Thoor Dhal) selling under brand names not registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Copyright Act, 1957. Under the original 2017 rate notifications, GST attached only to goods "put up in unit container and bearing a registered brand name," so the petitioners' unregistered-brand goods fell outside the tax net, and many traders de-registered brands to escape liability. To plug this, the Government issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and 28/2017 dated 22.09.2017 (and the State issued GO(MS) No. 114), expanding the levy to brands bearing an "actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law." Show cause notices followed, and the petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A and sought to quash the SCNs.FactsThe writ petitioners are suppliers of pulses selling under unregistered brand names. Notification No. 1/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 levied 2.5% Central Tax on dried leguminous vegetables put up in a unit container and bearing a registered brand name, and Notification No. 2/2017 exempted such goods other than those bearing a registered brand name. As the petitioners' goods carried no registered brand name, they were not liable to GST, and a substantial volume of trade in pulses fell outside the tax net.To remedy this, the Ministry of Finance issued amending Notifications No. 27/2017 and No. 28/2017 – Central Tax (Rate) and Integrated Tax (Rate), all dated 22.09.2017, and the State Government issued GO(MS) No. 114 dated 22.09.2017 (verbatim reproducing the Central notifications), bringing within the levy products bearing a brand name "on which an actionable claim or enforceable right in a court of law is available" (other than where such claim or right was voluntarily foregone, subject to the conditions in Annexure I). The impugned show cause notices were issued to the petitioners as a consequence. The petitioners challenged the amending notifications as ultra vires Article 279A to the extent they affected them and sought to quash the SCNs as null and void.The petitioners primarily relied on Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited. The respondents, through the Additional Solicitor General, contended that GST Council recommendations are not binding in the sense that the Government need not reproduce a mirror image, also relying on Mohit Minerals; they submitted that drafting mistakes in the recommendation of the 21st GST Council meeting (09.09.2017) were rectified through Notifications 27/2017 and 28/2017, and that these were duly ratified in the 22nd GST Council meeting held on 06.10.2017. Two issues thus arose: whether notifications under Sections 9 and 11 could go beyond the Council's recommendations, and whether the GST Council had the power to ratify such notifications.Court Observations (Verbatim)Para 1: "Taxation is often a cat and mouse game between the authority and the assessee. The authority spreads the net and seeks to ensnare the assessee who makes every effort to slip away. The game may witness more than one round with fluctuating fortunes."Para 10 (applying Mohit Minerals): "While the GST Council's function is to make recommendations, the Central Government has the power to issue notifications. From the language of Sections 9 and 11 of the Act, it is seen that the notification by the Government will have to be 'on the recommendations' of the Council. In other words, the notification should be preceded by the recommendations... applying the very same yardstick, the recommendations of the GST Council will bind the Government when it issues statutory notifications under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act."Para 14: "A bare comparison of the notifications with the Council recommendations would show that there has been an addition of the words 'enforceable right in a court of law'... It is too obvious that the expressions 'actionable claim' and 'enforceable right in a court of law' are not synonymous. While actionable claims may be enforceable rights, the vice versa may not hold good... The Government had gone over and above what was recommended by the GST Council... We are of the view that the additions lack the foundation of recommendation and it is not 'on the recommendation' of the GST Council. Thus, the impugned notifications by the Central Government as well as the State Government have to be declared as ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression 'enforceable right in a court of law'. Minus this expression, the notifications are intra vires."Para 16: "The power of GST Council is traceable to Article 279A of the Constitution of India. Article 279A empowers the GST Council to make recommendation with respect to the matters set out in Article 279A(4). The power to ratify has no where been conferred."Para 17 (quoting Marathwada University): "These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified."Para 19–20: "...the power to ratify should also be conferred explicitly or by necessary implication. Neither the Constitution nor any statute has invested the GST Council with the power of ratification. We, therefore, hold that ratification made by the GST Council in 22nd meeting is without jurisdiction... Since the impugned show cause notices are a fallout of the impugned notifications, they are liable to be set aside and stand set aside. Liberty is given to the department to issue fresh show cause notices if they can be issued in terms of the impugned notifications to the extent they have been held valid."VerdictThe writ petitions were allowed. The impugned notifications of the Central and State Governments were declared ultra vires the parent statute insofar as they incorporate the expression "enforceable right in a court of law"; minus that expression, the notifications are intra vires. The ratification made by the GST Council in its 22nd meeting was held to be without jurisdiction. The impugned show cause notices, being a fallout of the impugned notifications, were set aside, with liberty to the department to issue fresh SCNs in terms of the notifications to the extent held valid. Cases Referred by the CourtRelied upon / applied by the Court:Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Private Limited — (2022) 10 SCC 700 (relied on by both sides; ratio that the Government is bound by GST Council recommendations in rule-making extended to notifications under Sections 9 and 11)State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. Krishnamurthy — (2006) 4 SCC 517 (parameters for striking down subordinate legislation)Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan — (1989) 3 SCC 132 (ratification is alien to exercise of statutory power)Brunda Infra (P) Ltd. vs. Commr. of Central Tax — (2025) 139 GSTR 657 (Telangana HC) (ratification cannot be equated to recommendation; post-issuance ratification gives no life to a notification)Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. vs. Sunil — (2006) 5 SCC 96 (ratification assumes an invalid act retrospectively validated)Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji — (1971) 3 SCC 844 (authorities have no inherent power; power must be conferred)Hartman vs. Hornsby — 142 Mo 368, 44 SW 242, 244 (meaning of "ratification")Referred and distinguished (Section 168A context):M/s. Tata Play Limited vs. Union of India — WP No. 17184 of 2024 & batch, dated 12.06.2025 (Madras HC, Single Judge) — its reasoning that the "Government may decline to act on the recommendation but cannot act without it" was found appositeOasys Cybernetics Pvt Ltd vs. STO, Veppery Assessment Circle — (2025) 36 Centax 228 (Mad.) (Division Bench confirmation of Tata Play)The Court noted divergent High Court views on Section 168A and that the issue is pending before the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 4240 of 2025