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Latest GST Case Law and Judgements
S.No Name Date of Order Subject Actions
71IDFC First Bank Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.17-05-2026Scrutiny, audit and a DRC-07 demand order pursued for years against three companies long after their amalgamation and cancellation of registration, notwithstanding repeated intimation. At issue: the validity of proceedings conducted throughout against a n View Download

Background.  By order dated 12.12.2018 of the NCLT, Chennai, Capital First Limited, Capital First Home Finance Ltd. and Capital First Securities Ltd. were amalgamated with the petitioner. An application for cancellation of CFL’s registration was filed on 21.01.2019 and the cancellation order was passed on 14.06.2019. The department nevertheless issued ASMT-10 scrutiny, an ADT-01 audit notice for FY 2018-19, an audit report in ADT-02 alleging eighteen discrepancies, DRC-01A intimations, a DRC-01 show cause notice dated 30.12.2023 and finally a DRC-07 order dated 26.04.2024, all in CFL’s name, notwithstanding repeated intimations and a request to transfer the proceedings to the jurisdictional officer of the amalgamated entity.Observations of the Court.  The Court recorded that the facts of amalgamation and the legal consequence on the existence of CFL were undisputed, leaving no doubt that CFL was a non-existent entity, and that no proceedings qua that entity could be adopted against the petitioner.It extracted and adopted its own reasoning in Vodafone Idea Ltd. and paragraphs 16 to 18 of the Delhi High Court’s judgment in HCL Infosystems Ltd., including the holding that under Section 87 the liabilities of the non-existent company in any case stand transposed to be borne by the amalgamated entity, so that this is not a case where the revenue stands to lose its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict.  Both petitions were allowed and rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the impugned order. The Court expressly observed that it had not examined any other issue, and kept open all contentions of the petitioner as well as the department in relation to any other steps that may be required to be taken in law.

IDFC First Bank Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 17-05-2026
Scrutiny, audit and a DRC-07 demand order pursued for years against three companies long after their amalgamation and cancellation of registration, notwithstanding repeated intimation. At issue: the validity of proceedings conducted throughout against a n

Background.  By order dated 12.12.2018 of the NCLT, Chennai, Capital First Limited, Capital First Home Finance Ltd. and Capital First Securities Ltd. were amalgamated with the petitioner. An application for cancellation of CFL’s registration was filed on 21.01.2019 and the cancellation order was passed on 14.06.2019. The department nevertheless issued ASMT-10 scrutiny, an ADT-01 audit notice for FY 2018-19, an audit report in ADT-02 alleging eighteen discrepancies, DRC-01A intimations, a DRC-01 show cause notice dated 30.12.2023 and finally a DRC-07 order dated 26.04.2024, all in CFL’s name, notwithstanding repeated intimations and a request to transfer the proceedings to the jurisdictional officer of the amalgamated entity.Observations of the Court.  The Court recorded that the facts of amalgamation and the legal consequence on the existence of CFL were undisputed, leaving no doubt that CFL was a non-existent entity, and that no proceedings qua that entity could be adopted against the petitioner.It extracted and adopted its own reasoning in Vodafone Idea Ltd. and paragraphs 16 to 18 of the Delhi High Court’s judgment in HCL Infosystems Ltd., including the holding that under Section 87 the liabilities of the non-existent company in any case stand transposed to be borne by the amalgamated entity, so that this is not a case where the revenue stands to lose its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict.  Both petitions were allowed and rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), quashing the impugned order. The Court expressly observed that it had not examined any other issue, and kept open all contentions of the petitioner as well as the department in relation to any other steps that may be required to be taken in law.

72Sushant Goel vs Directorate General of GST Intelligence & Ors.13-05-2026Whether arrest and judicial remand under the CGST Act are illegal where the grounds of arrest are not annexed to the arrest memo, bear no DIN, are not communicated to the arrestee's family, and the remand order is passed mechanically — sustained on a wr View Download

BackgroundThe petitioner was arrested on 31.10.2025 by GST Intelligence as the alleged mastermind of a fake billing racket involving fraudulent availment and passing on of Input Tax Credit, with GST evasion stated to exceed Rs. 5 crore (an offence treated as cognizable and non-bailable). He was remanded to judicial custody by the CJM, Meerut on 01.11.2025. Having first filed and withdrawn a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition on 08.05.2026, he then moved this habeas corpus petition seeking his release and quashing of the remand order, contending that the mandatory safeguards governing arrest were violated.FactsThe arrest memo dated 31.10.2025 did not annex the grounds of arrest, and there was no contemporaneous acknowledgment that the grounds were furnished as an annexure at the time of service. The grounds of arrest carried no Document Identification Number (DIN), which the Department's own circulars treat as rendering the document as never issued. Intimation to the petitioner's wife, Mrs. Parul Goel, was not served at the time of arrest — the arrest memo did not bear her signature, and she received the intimation only by post on 08.11.2025; even that intimation did not set out the grounds of arrest. The grounds also failed to disclose any necessity for arrest or custodial interrogation, merely reciting the amount involved and the "mastermind" label. No place of arrest was recorded in the arrest memo, and the "Jama-Talasi" memo was left blank as to what was recovered, with only a signature taken without endorsement of receipt. The petitioner argued parity with co-accused Hari Shankar Sharma, whose habeas corpus petition (HC WP No. 369 of 2026) had been allowed on identical infirmities. The Department contended that the grounds were part of the arrest memo, sharing the same DIN, and that remand was passed after due application of mind.Court's Observations (verbatim)"After hearing the rival submissions and considering averments made in the counter affidavit… we find that there is no mention of any annexure of 'grounds of arrest' in the 'arrest memo'. The 'grounds of arrest' has been separately filed in the counter affidavit with endorsement of the petitioner that he has received the same… However, in the present case, no DIN is mentioned on the grounds of arrest, nor it has been shown to be annexed with the arrest memo.""There is no place of arrest mentioned in the arrest memo issued by the CGST official while arresting the petitioner, which is in clear violation of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Basu… It does not bears any recital to the effect that the 'grounds of arrest' have been supplied to the petitioner as an annexure to the 'memo of arrest'.""Remand Magistrate has not considered anything and has only mentioned that there are allegations against the petitioner… The Remand Magistrate has not considered whether the 'grounds of arrest' were served on the petitioner by the respondents or not and has passed the order in most casual manner… once it is found that the remand order has been passed mechanically and without application of mind[,] [t]he habeas corpus writ petition becomes maintainable…"Final VerdictThe remand order dated 01.11.2025, and the detention and arrest of the petitioner, were held illegal and quashed. The petition was allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released forthwith, leaving it open to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. Cases Referred by the CourtRadhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269Arnesh Kumar v. State of BiharSatendra Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 162D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1997 SCC (Cri) 92Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, AIR Online 2021 SC 246Pagariya Auto Private Limited vs. Union of India & Others 

Sushant Goel vs Directorate General of GST Intelligence & Ors. 13-05-2026
Whether arrest and judicial remand under the CGST Act are illegal where the grounds of arrest are not annexed to the arrest memo, bear no DIN, are not communicated to the arrestee's family, and the remand order is passed mechanically — sustained on a wr

BackgroundThe petitioner was arrested on 31.10.2025 by GST Intelligence as the alleged mastermind of a fake billing racket involving fraudulent availment and passing on of Input Tax Credit, with GST evasion stated to exceed Rs. 5 crore (an offence treated as cognizable and non-bailable). He was remanded to judicial custody by the CJM, Meerut on 01.11.2025. Having first filed and withdrawn a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition on 08.05.2026, he then moved this habeas corpus petition seeking his release and quashing of the remand order, contending that the mandatory safeguards governing arrest were violated.FactsThe arrest memo dated 31.10.2025 did not annex the grounds of arrest, and there was no contemporaneous acknowledgment that the grounds were furnished as an annexure at the time of service. The grounds of arrest carried no Document Identification Number (DIN), which the Department's own circulars treat as rendering the document as never issued. Intimation to the petitioner's wife, Mrs. Parul Goel, was not served at the time of arrest — the arrest memo did not bear her signature, and she received the intimation only by post on 08.11.2025; even that intimation did not set out the grounds of arrest. The grounds also failed to disclose any necessity for arrest or custodial interrogation, merely reciting the amount involved and the "mastermind" label. No place of arrest was recorded in the arrest memo, and the "Jama-Talasi" memo was left blank as to what was recovered, with only a signature taken without endorsement of receipt. The petitioner argued parity with co-accused Hari Shankar Sharma, whose habeas corpus petition (HC WP No. 369 of 2026) had been allowed on identical infirmities. The Department contended that the grounds were part of the arrest memo, sharing the same DIN, and that remand was passed after due application of mind.Court's Observations (verbatim)"After hearing the rival submissions and considering averments made in the counter affidavit… we find that there is no mention of any annexure of 'grounds of arrest' in the 'arrest memo'. The 'grounds of arrest' has been separately filed in the counter affidavit with endorsement of the petitioner that he has received the same… However, in the present case, no DIN is mentioned on the grounds of arrest, nor it has been shown to be annexed with the arrest memo.""There is no place of arrest mentioned in the arrest memo issued by the CGST official while arresting the petitioner, which is in clear violation of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Basu… It does not bears any recital to the effect that the 'grounds of arrest' have been supplied to the petitioner as an annexure to the 'memo of arrest'.""Remand Magistrate has not considered anything and has only mentioned that there are allegations against the petitioner… The Remand Magistrate has not considered whether the 'grounds of arrest' were served on the petitioner by the respondents or not and has passed the order in most casual manner… once it is found that the remand order has been passed mechanically and without application of mind[,] [t]he habeas corpus writ petition becomes maintainable…"Final VerdictThe remand order dated 01.11.2025, and the detention and arrest of the petitioner, were held illegal and quashed. The petition was allowed and the petitioner ordered to be released forthwith, leaving it open to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. Cases Referred by the CourtRadhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269Arnesh Kumar v. State of BiharSatendra Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 162D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1997 SCC (Cri) 92Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, AIR Online 2021 SC 246Pagariya Auto Private Limited vs. Union of India & Others 

73A.G. and Sons HUF & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.12-05-2026Whether an order passed under the CGST Act by an officer who did not personally conduct the hearing violates the principle of natural justice — specifically the maxim View Download

BackgroundAn impugned order dated 30th December 2025 was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee, an officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner. The personal hearing in the matter, however, had been conducted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, another Additional Commissioner who had earlier been manning the same post. Upon Mr. Jha's transfer, Mr. Banerjee assumed charge and passed the final order. The Petitioners challenged the impugned order before the Delhi High Court by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All three petitions raised identical issues and were decided by a common order, with the facts in W.P.(C) 2630/2026 taken as the lead matter.Relevant FactsThe Petitioners contended that the personal hearing was granted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, but the final order was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee who had not conducted that hearing — a clear violation of the principle that the deciding authority must itself hear the parties. The Revenue contended that there was no statutory embargo preventing the successor officer from passing the order based on the notes of the final hearing prepared by Mr. Jha. When confronted on this point, the Court was unable to satisfy itself that any such notes by Mr. Jha were actually available to or considered by Mr. Banerjee before passing the impugned order. The Revenue further raised a preliminary objection that the Petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable. The Petitioners also raised an additional grievance that the documents relied upon in the proceedings were not supplied to them, which itself amounted to a denial of opportunity of hearing.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and order impugned as such goes contrary to the constitutional protections guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."— Para 6 (Court's own observation)"In the aforesaid background, we have no hesitation to entertain the present petition, even if, there exits an alternate remedy as the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice."— Para 9 (Court's own observation)From Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority & Ors. — relied upon by Court (Para 7):"if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality."— Para 83, as quoted in Para 7"In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly."— Para 84, as quoted in Para 7From Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others — (1998) 8 SCC 1 — relied upon by Court (Para 8):"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged…"— Para 15, as quoted in Para 8Final VerdictAll three writ petitions allowed. Impugned order dated 30th December 2025 set aside as being passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner permitted to appear before the Additional Commissioner with written submissions on 25th May 2026. The Respondent directed to supply the documents sought by the Petitioner and to deal with the matter afresh. All rights and contentions of the Petitioner kept open.Cases Referred by CourtAutomotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority and Ors.Supreme Court of India  |  Citation not specified in the order  |  Paras 83 & 84 relied upon — held that when one officer hears and another decides, personal hearing becomes an empty formality and the final order offends the basic principle of natural justice.Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and OthersSupreme Court of India    

A.G. and Sons HUF & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 12-05-2026
Whether an order passed under the CGST Act by an officer who did not personally conduct the hearing violates the principle of natural justice — specifically the maxim

BackgroundAn impugned order dated 30th December 2025 was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee, an officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner. The personal hearing in the matter, however, had been conducted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, another Additional Commissioner who had earlier been manning the same post. Upon Mr. Jha's transfer, Mr. Banerjee assumed charge and passed the final order. The Petitioners challenged the impugned order before the Delhi High Court by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. All three petitions raised identical issues and were decided by a common order, with the facts in W.P.(C) 2630/2026 taken as the lead matter.Relevant FactsThe Petitioners contended that the personal hearing was granted by Mr. Sammer Kumar Jha, but the final order was passed by Mr. Debjit Banerjee who had not conducted that hearing — a clear violation of the principle that the deciding authority must itself hear the parties. The Revenue contended that there was no statutory embargo preventing the successor officer from passing the order based on the notes of the final hearing prepared by Mr. Jha. When confronted on this point, the Court was unable to satisfy itself that any such notes by Mr. Jha were actually available to or considered by Mr. Banerjee before passing the impugned order. The Revenue further raised a preliminary objection that the Petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable. The Petitioners also raised an additional grievance that the documents relied upon in the proceedings were not supplied to them, which itself amounted to a denial of opportunity of hearing.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Such conduct, in our opinion, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and order impugned as such goes contrary to the constitutional protections guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."— Para 6 (Court's own observation)"In the aforesaid background, we have no hesitation to entertain the present petition, even if, there exits an alternate remedy as the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice."— Para 9 (Court's own observation)From Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority & Ors. — relied upon by Court (Para 7):"if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality."— Para 83, as quoted in Para 7"In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly."— Para 84, as quoted in Para 7From Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others — (1998) 8 SCC 1 — relied upon by Court (Para 8):"Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged…"— Para 15, as quoted in Para 8Final VerdictAll three writ petitions allowed. Impugned order dated 30th December 2025 set aside as being passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner permitted to appear before the Additional Commissioner with written submissions on 25th May 2026. The Respondent directed to supply the documents sought by the Petitioner and to deal with the matter afresh. All rights and contentions of the Petitioner kept open.Cases Referred by CourtAutomotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn. v. Designated Authority and Ors.Supreme Court of India  |  Citation not specified in the order  |  Paras 83 & 84 relied upon — held that when one officer hears and another decides, personal hearing becomes an empty formality and the final order offends the basic principle of natural justice.Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and OthersSupreme Court of India    

74Shri Girish Kumar Raval vs. Union of India & Others08-05-2026Whether penalty and liability under Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act can be imposed on an employee of a company for alleged GST defaults of the company — i.e., applicability of vicarious liability on employees under the GST Act. View Download

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, an individual employee, was subjected to imposition of penalty by the Revenue authorities under the GST Act. The petitioner challenged this imposition by way of a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench. The petitioner relied upon a binding precedent already settled by the Bombay High Court and confirmed by the Supreme Court, wherein an identical issue — of fastening GST penalty liability on an employee of a company under Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act — had been conclusively decided in favour of the employee. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner submitted before the Court that the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India, which was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari. In that precedent case, the Revenue had sought recovery of a massive demand from a person who was merely an employee of the company. The Bombay High Court had quashed the show cause notice against the employee holding that the basic jurisdictional requirements for invoking Section 74 of the CGST Act to invoke Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 against the petitioner-employee were not attracted. The Supreme Court, on appeal by Revenue, confirmed the Bombay High Court's ruling and recorded that the employee could not have been fastened with the company's liability. Counsel for the respondents in the present case sought time to seek instructions on the applicability of the said Supreme Court ruling. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)Bombay HC in Shantanu Hundekari (as reproduced and relied upon by the present Court):"For the aforesaid reasons, it is clear from the relevant contents of the show cause notice that the basic jurisdictional requirements/ingredients, are nor attracted for issuance of the show cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act so as to inter alia invoke Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 against the petitioner. Even otherwise, it is ill-conceivable to read and recognize into the provisions of Section 122 and Section 137, of the CGST Act any principle of vicarious liability being attracted. There could be none. Thus, Respondent no. 3 clearly lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the show cause notice in its applicability to the petitioner. Thus qua the petitioner, the impugned show cause notice is rendered bad and illegal, deserving it to be quashed and set aside.""The foregoing discussion would also lead us to conclude that it is highly unconscionable and disproportionate for the concerned officer of the Revenue to demand from the petitioner an amount of Rs.3731 crores, which in fact is clearly alleged to be the liability of Maersk, as the contents of the show cause notice itself would demonstrate. The petitioner would not be incorrect in contending that the purpose of issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner who is merely an employee, was designed to threaten and pressurize the petitioner."Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (as reproduced and relied upon by the present Court):"The issue before the High Court was one relating to the interpretation of Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the GST Act.""The High Court after assigning cogent reasons took the view that the respondent-herein was merely an employee of the Company and he could not have been fastened with the liability of Rs.3731 Crore."Present Court's Order:"We have gone through the said observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court.""In the meantime, no coercive action shall be taken by the Respondents to recover the amount towards the penalty till filing of the reply." FINAL VERDICTThe Court granted an interim stay on all coercive recovery action for penalty against the petitioner-employee. The matter is listed after Summer Vacation for further hearing. The Revenue counsel has been directed to seek instructions in view of the binding Supreme Court ruling.👍 THUMBS UP (In Favour of Assessee — Interim Protection Granted) 

Shri Girish Kumar Raval vs. Union of India & Others 08-05-2026
Whether penalty and liability under Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act can be imposed on an employee of a company for alleged GST defaults of the company — i.e., applicability of vicarious liability on employees under the GST Act.

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, an individual employee, was subjected to imposition of penalty by the Revenue authorities under the GST Act. The petitioner challenged this imposition by way of a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench. The petitioner relied upon a binding precedent already settled by the Bombay High Court and confirmed by the Supreme Court, wherein an identical issue — of fastening GST penalty liability on an employee of a company under Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the CGST Act — had been conclusively decided in favour of the employee. CRUCIAL FACTSThe petitioner submitted before the Court that the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari vs. Union of India, which was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari. In that precedent case, the Revenue had sought recovery of a massive demand from a person who was merely an employee of the company. The Bombay High Court had quashed the show cause notice against the employee holding that the basic jurisdictional requirements for invoking Section 74 of the CGST Act to invoke Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 against the petitioner-employee were not attracted. The Supreme Court, on appeal by Revenue, confirmed the Bombay High Court's ruling and recorded that the employee could not have been fastened with the company's liability. Counsel for the respondents in the present case sought time to seek instructions on the applicability of the said Supreme Court ruling. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim — Crucial)Bombay HC in Shantanu Hundekari (as reproduced and relied upon by the present Court):"For the aforesaid reasons, it is clear from the relevant contents of the show cause notice that the basic jurisdictional requirements/ingredients, are nor attracted for issuance of the show cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act so as to inter alia invoke Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 against the petitioner. Even otherwise, it is ill-conceivable to read and recognize into the provisions of Section 122 and Section 137, of the CGST Act any principle of vicarious liability being attracted. There could be none. Thus, Respondent no. 3 clearly lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the show cause notice in its applicability to the petitioner. Thus qua the petitioner, the impugned show cause notice is rendered bad and illegal, deserving it to be quashed and set aside.""The foregoing discussion would also lead us to conclude that it is highly unconscionable and disproportionate for the concerned officer of the Revenue to demand from the petitioner an amount of Rs.3731 crores, which in fact is clearly alleged to be the liability of Maersk, as the contents of the show cause notice itself would demonstrate. The petitioner would not be incorrect in contending that the purpose of issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner who is merely an employee, was designed to threaten and pressurize the petitioner."Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (as reproduced and relied upon by the present Court):"The issue before the High Court was one relating to the interpretation of Section 122(1-A) and Section 137 of the GST Act.""The High Court after assigning cogent reasons took the view that the respondent-herein was merely an employee of the Company and he could not have been fastened with the liability of Rs.3731 Crore."Present Court's Order:"We have gone through the said observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court.""In the meantime, no coercive action shall be taken by the Respondents to recover the amount towards the penalty till filing of the reply." FINAL VERDICTThe Court granted an interim stay on all coercive recovery action for penalty against the petitioner-employee. The matter is listed after Summer Vacation for further hearing. The Revenue counsel has been directed to seek instructions in view of the binding Supreme Court ruling.👍 THUMBS UP (In Favour of Assessee — Interim Protection Granted) 

75Sri Nikhil Debnath vs. The Union of India & Others06-05-2026Validity of service of GST order in original — whether uploading on GST common portal and dispatch by Speed Post without Acknowledgement Due constitutes valid and legal service under Section 169 of the CGST Act. View Download

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner challenged an order in original passed under GST on the ground that the same was never validly served upon him. The respondents (Union of India and others) contended in their counter affidavit that the order was duly served — first, by uploading it on the GST common portal on 08.06.2023, and second, by dispatching it through Speed Post on 01.06.2023 to the address registered in the GST records.FACTSThe respondents, in support of their claim of valid service by Speed Post, produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch. However, they failed to produce the Acknowledgement card, which is the document returned to the sender after the article is received by the addressee bearing the signature of the addressee or his representative. Further, the Department of Posts, Government of India, vide its communication dated 07.04.2026, informed the petitioner that there is no evidence of service of the said article upon the petitioner after it was dispatched by the respondents. The court also noted the earlier interim order dated 17.12.2025 already granted in favour of the petitioner.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"mere uploading of the order in the GST Portal would not suffice, and that the respondents ought to choose other modes of service also, which would be a proper exercise of the power of the respondents when there are other choices also made available under Section 169 of the Act.""what sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 169 of the Act requires is that the order in original should be sent by Speed Post with 'Acknowledgement due'.""Though the respondents have produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch by Speed Post, they have not produced the 'Acknowledgment' card which would have been returned to the respondent after the article sent by speed post is received by the petitioner with signature of petitioner's representative.""Therefore, prima facie it cannot be said that there is compliance of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the CGST Act."FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was admitted and the interim order dated 17.12.2025 already in favour of the petitioner was made absolute. The Court held, prima facie, that neither uploading the order on the GST portal alone nor dispatch by Speed Post without producing the Acknowledgement card satisfies the requirement of valid service under Section 169(1)(b) of the CGST Act.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEECASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationSharp Tanks and Structurals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner (GST) (Appeals), Tirunelveli(2025) 34 CENTEX 426 (Madras High Court) 

Sri Nikhil Debnath vs. The Union of India & Others 06-05-2026
Validity of service of GST order in original — whether uploading on GST common portal and dispatch by Speed Post without Acknowledgement Due constitutes valid and legal service under Section 169 of the CGST Act.

BACKGROUNDThe petitioner challenged an order in original passed under GST on the ground that the same was never validly served upon him. The respondents (Union of India and others) contended in their counter affidavit that the order was duly served — first, by uploading it on the GST common portal on 08.06.2023, and second, by dispatching it through Speed Post on 01.06.2023 to the address registered in the GST records.FACTSThe respondents, in support of their claim of valid service by Speed Post, produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch. However, they failed to produce the Acknowledgement card, which is the document returned to the sender after the article is received by the addressee bearing the signature of the addressee or his representative. Further, the Department of Posts, Government of India, vide its communication dated 07.04.2026, informed the petitioner that there is no evidence of service of the said article upon the petitioner after it was dispatched by the respondents. The court also noted the earlier interim order dated 17.12.2025 already granted in favour of the petitioner.COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"mere uploading of the order in the GST Portal would not suffice, and that the respondents ought to choose other modes of service also, which would be a proper exercise of the power of the respondents when there are other choices also made available under Section 169 of the Act.""what sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 169 of the Act requires is that the order in original should be sent by Speed Post with 'Acknowledgement due'.""Though the respondents have produced the Dispatch Register and a photocopy of the receipt issued by the Postal Department showing dispatch by Speed Post, they have not produced the 'Acknowledgment' card which would have been returned to the respondent after the article sent by speed post is received by the petitioner with signature of petitioner's representative.""Therefore, prima facie it cannot be said that there is compliance of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the CGST Act."FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was admitted and the interim order dated 17.12.2025 already in favour of the petitioner was made absolute. The Court held, prima facie, that neither uploading the order on the GST portal alone nor dispatch by Speed Post without producing the Acknowledgement card satisfies the requirement of valid service under Section 169(1)(b) of the CGST Act.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEECASE LAW REFERREDCaseCitationSharp Tanks and Structurals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner (GST) (Appeals), Tirunelveli(2025) 34 CENTEX 426 (Madras High Court) 

76D.P. Jain & Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.06-05-2026GST liability on Corporate Guarantee provided by a parent/holding company to banks on behalf of its subsidiary companies without any consideration — validity of CBIC Circular No. 204/16/2023 and Rule 28(2) of CGST Rules, 2017. View Download

BACKGROUNDThe Petitioner, D.P. Jain & Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., is engaged in construction of National and State Highways. The Petitioner executed three Corporate Guarantees in favour of State Bank of India and Bank of Maharashtra against term loans sanctioned to its subsidiary/group companies for highway projects in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat under NHAI HAM/TOT models. All three guarantee deeds specifically contained a clause that the Petitioner (guarantor) has not received and shall not receive any security, fee, commission, or any other consideration from the borrower for providing the guarantee. The guarantees were executed on 03.11.2020, 28.12.2021 and 08.08.2022 — all prior to 26.10.2023.The DGGI, Coimbatore Zonal Unit (Respondent No. 2) issued a Summons dated 20.07.2023 alleging non-payment of GST on corporate guarantees. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance issued Circular No. 204/16/2023 dated 27.10.2023 declaring corporate guarantee as a taxable supply of service even without consideration. Rule 28 of CGST Rules was amended by inserting Sub-Rule (2) vide Notification No. 52/2023-CT dated 26.10.2023 (further amended retrospectively by Notification No. 12/2024-CT dated 10.07.2024), prescribing deemed valuation at 1% per annum of the guarantee amount. A Show Cause Notice No. 02/2025-GST dated 28.01.2025 was issued demanding GST on the corporate guarantees. State tax authorities (Respondent No. 5) had already conducted a detailed investigation for FY 2017-18 to 2022-23 and had not levied any GST on the corporate guarantees after examining all books and records. COURT OBSERVATIONS"It is nobody's case that Petitioner is doing the business of providing corporate guarantee on a regular basis. The corporate guarantee that was entered into by Petitioner is only for the limited purpose of securing the loans to its subsidiaries. Corporate guarantees are issued in order to safeguard the financial health of their associate enterprises and to provide it support... Corporate guarantee is actually an in-house guarantee and is not issued to customers generally." (Para 52)"Admittedly, all three corporate guarantees in the present case, wherein specific clause is 'the corporate guarantor hereby declares and agrees that the corporate guarantor has not received and shall not receive any security, fee, commission or any other consideration from the borrower for giving this deed so long as any monies remain due and payable by the borrower to the lender under the common loan agreement and the other finance documents'. This clause itself shows that, the supply was not for consideration." (Para 63)"Now the issue is covered under the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise Vs. Edelweiss Financial Services Ltd., (supra), wherein in specific words the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that, issuance of corporate guarantee to group companies without any consideration would not fall within the ambit of taxable service. Therefore, there is a substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that execution of corporate guarantee is in the nature of contingent contract which becomes enforceable only at the instance of the bank/financial institution in the event of a default. There was no flow of consideration for the rendering of services. Therefore, taxability does not arise." (Para 68)"Thus, executing a corporate guarantee to its subsidiary is not in the nature of supply and supply of service taxable under Section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017." (Para 70)"In the light of the well settled legal position the impugned challenge made before us declaring Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 28 be declared as ultravires is not sustainable. There could be a valid reason administratively, economically etc., which goes in the decision making process before such Rule is amended." (Para 79) FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was partly allowed. The Show Cause Notice No. 02/2025-GST dated 28.01.2025 and the Summons dated 20.07.2023 issued by DGGI were quashed and set aside. However, the prayers to declare the GST Circulars and Sub-Rule 28(2) as ultra vires were rejected.

D.P. Jain & Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. 06-05-2026
GST liability on Corporate Guarantee provided by a parent/holding company to banks on behalf of its subsidiary companies without any consideration — validity of CBIC Circular No. 204/16/2023 and Rule 28(2) of CGST Rules, 2017.

BACKGROUNDThe Petitioner, D.P. Jain & Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., is engaged in construction of National and State Highways. The Petitioner executed three Corporate Guarantees in favour of State Bank of India and Bank of Maharashtra against term loans sanctioned to its subsidiary/group companies for highway projects in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat under NHAI HAM/TOT models. All three guarantee deeds specifically contained a clause that the Petitioner (guarantor) has not received and shall not receive any security, fee, commission, or any other consideration from the borrower for providing the guarantee. The guarantees were executed on 03.11.2020, 28.12.2021 and 08.08.2022 — all prior to 26.10.2023.The DGGI, Coimbatore Zonal Unit (Respondent No. 2) issued a Summons dated 20.07.2023 alleging non-payment of GST on corporate guarantees. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance issued Circular No. 204/16/2023 dated 27.10.2023 declaring corporate guarantee as a taxable supply of service even without consideration. Rule 28 of CGST Rules was amended by inserting Sub-Rule (2) vide Notification No. 52/2023-CT dated 26.10.2023 (further amended retrospectively by Notification No. 12/2024-CT dated 10.07.2024), prescribing deemed valuation at 1% per annum of the guarantee amount. A Show Cause Notice No. 02/2025-GST dated 28.01.2025 was issued demanding GST on the corporate guarantees. State tax authorities (Respondent No. 5) had already conducted a detailed investigation for FY 2017-18 to 2022-23 and had not levied any GST on the corporate guarantees after examining all books and records. COURT OBSERVATIONS"It is nobody's case that Petitioner is doing the business of providing corporate guarantee on a regular basis. The corporate guarantee that was entered into by Petitioner is only for the limited purpose of securing the loans to its subsidiaries. Corporate guarantees are issued in order to safeguard the financial health of their associate enterprises and to provide it support... Corporate guarantee is actually an in-house guarantee and is not issued to customers generally." (Para 52)"Admittedly, all three corporate guarantees in the present case, wherein specific clause is 'the corporate guarantor hereby declares and agrees that the corporate guarantor has not received and shall not receive any security, fee, commission or any other consideration from the borrower for giving this deed so long as any monies remain due and payable by the borrower to the lender under the common loan agreement and the other finance documents'. This clause itself shows that, the supply was not for consideration." (Para 63)"Now the issue is covered under the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise Vs. Edelweiss Financial Services Ltd., (supra), wherein in specific words the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that, issuance of corporate guarantee to group companies without any consideration would not fall within the ambit of taxable service. Therefore, there is a substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that execution of corporate guarantee is in the nature of contingent contract which becomes enforceable only at the instance of the bank/financial institution in the event of a default. There was no flow of consideration for the rendering of services. Therefore, taxability does not arise." (Para 68)"Thus, executing a corporate guarantee to its subsidiary is not in the nature of supply and supply of service taxable under Section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017." (Para 70)"In the light of the well settled legal position the impugned challenge made before us declaring Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 28 be declared as ultravires is not sustainable. There could be a valid reason administratively, economically etc., which goes in the decision making process before such Rule is amended." (Para 79) FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was partly allowed. The Show Cause Notice No. 02/2025-GST dated 28.01.2025 and the Summons dated 20.07.2023 issued by DGGI were quashed and set aside. However, the prayers to declare the GST Circulars and Sub-Rule 28(2) as ultra vires were rejected.

77Maruti Enterprise v. Union of India & Ors.01-05-2026Constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act – whether denial of ITC to a bona fide purchaser for the supplier’s failure to deposit tax violates Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 265 and 300A, or whether the provision should be read down to cases View Download

BackgroundIn a large group of petitions, purchasing dealers denied ITC because their suppliers had not deposited the tax collected challenged Section 16(2)(c). They argued that the GST system gives a purchaser no means to verify the supplier’s GSTR-3B or tax payment, invoked the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, and relied on On Quest Merchandising (Delhi HC), which read down Section 9(2)(g) of the DVAT Act, and Sahil Enterprises (Tripura HC), which read down Section 16(2)(c). The Court confined itself to the question of vires and did not examine individual merits.Final VerdictThe Court held that the GST regime cannot be equated with VAT: it is destination-based, ITC crosses State lines, and under Section 53 the originating State would have to transfer tax it never received if credit were allowed without payment. The purchaser is not left remediless, because the Revenue can recover from the supplier under Sections 73 and 74, and Section 41(2) with Rule 37A allows re-availment once the supplier pays; mere delay or hardship in availing ITC cannot constitute a valid ground for reading down Section 16(2)(c). ITC is a statutory concession, Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant, and the Court respectfully disagreed with the Tripura High Court. It held that Section 16(2)(c) is clear, self-explanatory and unambiguous, and its plain reading does not give rise to any constitutional or legal infirmity, and declined to read it down or declare it ultra vires.In its final observations, the Court referred to the Axel Kittel principle that ITC may be denied only where the recipient knew or ought to have known of the fraud, and urged the Government to re-evaluate the position of honest purchasers, through legislative amendment or clarification, a real-time technology-driven mechanism to verify suppliers’ tax payments against specific invoices, and prompt recovery from erring suppliers. The petitions were directed to be listed for decision on merits. 

Maruti Enterprise v. Union of India & Ors. 01-05-2026
Constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act – whether denial of ITC to a bona fide purchaser for the supplier’s failure to deposit tax violates Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 265 and 300A, or whether the provision should be read down to cases

BackgroundIn a large group of petitions, purchasing dealers denied ITC because their suppliers had not deposited the tax collected challenged Section 16(2)(c). They argued that the GST system gives a purchaser no means to verify the supplier’s GSTR-3B or tax payment, invoked the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, and relied on On Quest Merchandising (Delhi HC), which read down Section 9(2)(g) of the DVAT Act, and Sahil Enterprises (Tripura HC), which read down Section 16(2)(c). The Court confined itself to the question of vires and did not examine individual merits.Final VerdictThe Court held that the GST regime cannot be equated with VAT: it is destination-based, ITC crosses State lines, and under Section 53 the originating State would have to transfer tax it never received if credit were allowed without payment. The purchaser is not left remediless, because the Revenue can recover from the supplier under Sections 73 and 74, and Section 41(2) with Rule 37A allows re-availment once the supplier pays; mere delay or hardship in availing ITC cannot constitute a valid ground for reading down Section 16(2)(c). ITC is a statutory concession, Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant, and the Court respectfully disagreed with the Tripura High Court. It held that Section 16(2)(c) is clear, self-explanatory and unambiguous, and its plain reading does not give rise to any constitutional or legal infirmity, and declined to read it down or declare it ultra vires.In its final observations, the Court referred to the Axel Kittel principle that ITC may be denied only where the recipient knew or ought to have known of the fraud, and urged the Government to re-evaluate the position of honest purchasers, through legislative amendment or clarification, a real-time technology-driven mechanism to verify suppliers’ tax payments against specific invoices, and prompt recovery from erring suppliers. The petitions were directed to be listed for decision on merits. 

78Vodafone Idea Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.29-04-2026Validity of Section 74 CGST proceedings against an amalgamating company after merger, and whether Section 87 permits such proceedings against a non-existent entity. View Download

BackgroundPursuant to an order of the NCLT dated 30 August 2018, Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. and Vodafone India Limited merged with Idea Cellular Limited, resulting in the petitioner being the merged entity. The fact of the merger was intimated to the GST authorities at the time of amendment of the GST registration. Before the merger, one of the businesses of the amalgamating company was its tower business, which was transferred as a going concern on a slump-sale basis. The petitioner contended that the transfer of the entire business was not a supply in the course or furtherance of business and therefore was not declared in GST returns.Between March and July 2022, the DGGI sought documents from the petitioner. Thereafter, summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act were issued on 7 February 2024, followed by a show-cause notice dated 1 August 2024 demanding ₹363 crores under Section 74, along with penalty, on the ground that transfer of a going concern was an exempt supply and that ITC had been wrongly availed. Detailed replies were filed, but the impugned order dated 29 January 2025 was passed without considering the submissions concerning the merger.2. Court ObservationThe Court noted that the merger pursuant to the NCLT order was undisputed and that the GST authorities had been informed of the merger. The Court accepted the principle laid down in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. that once an amalgamating entity ceases to exist pursuant to an approved scheme of amalgamation, proceedings initiated against that non-existent entity are void ab initio.The Court specifically examined Section 87 of the CGST Act and held that its provisions operate in relation to the intervening period between the effective date of merger and the date of the merger order, where transactions between the amalgamating companies have to be accounted for. Section 87 does not confer authority upon the Department to issue a show-cause notice against a non-existent entity after the merger. Post-merger, the amalgamating entity has no legal status and proceedings cannot be initiated against it.The Court therefore held that the ingredients of Section 87 could not be invoked to continue the proceedings contemplated by the show-cause notice. Since the show-cause notice itself was issued without jurisdiction, the proceedings were vitiated and void ab initio.3. Final VerdictThe Bombay High Court held that Section 87 of the CGST Act could not be invoked to continue the proceedings against the non-existent amalgamating entity. The show-cause notice dated 1 August 2024, having been issued without jurisdiction, and the proceedings arising from it, were held to be void ab initio.Accordingly, the Court held that the petition succeeded and was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), thereby quashing the impugned order dated 29 January 2025.4. Cases Referred by CourtCaseCourtDate / CitationPrincipal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.Supreme Court of India[2019] 416 ITR 613; specific order date not stated in the PDFReliance Industries Limited v. P. L. RoongtaHigh Court of Bombay[2025] 479 ITR 770; specific order date not stated in the PDFHCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax and AnotherHigh Court of Delhi2024 SCC OnLine Del 8287; specific order date not stated in the PDFThe Court relied particularly on Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. for the principle that proceedings initiated against an entity that had ceased to exist following amalgamation are void ab initio, and on Reliance Industries Ltd. v. P. L. Roongta for applying that principle to proceedings against a non-existent amalgamating entity.The Court also found support in HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax and Another, which interpreted Section 87 as preserving the tax treatment of transactions during the relevant period but not as authorising proceedings or an assessment against a non-existent amalgamating company.  

Vodafone Idea Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 29-04-2026
Validity of Section 74 CGST proceedings against an amalgamating company after merger, and whether Section 87 permits such proceedings against a non-existent entity.

BackgroundPursuant to an order of the NCLT dated 30 August 2018, Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. and Vodafone India Limited merged with Idea Cellular Limited, resulting in the petitioner being the merged entity. The fact of the merger was intimated to the GST authorities at the time of amendment of the GST registration. Before the merger, one of the businesses of the amalgamating company was its tower business, which was transferred as a going concern on a slump-sale basis. The petitioner contended that the transfer of the entire business was not a supply in the course or furtherance of business and therefore was not declared in GST returns.Between March and July 2022, the DGGI sought documents from the petitioner. Thereafter, summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act were issued on 7 February 2024, followed by a show-cause notice dated 1 August 2024 demanding ₹363 crores under Section 74, along with penalty, on the ground that transfer of a going concern was an exempt supply and that ITC had been wrongly availed. Detailed replies were filed, but the impugned order dated 29 January 2025 was passed without considering the submissions concerning the merger.2. Court ObservationThe Court noted that the merger pursuant to the NCLT order was undisputed and that the GST authorities had been informed of the merger. The Court accepted the principle laid down in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. that once an amalgamating entity ceases to exist pursuant to an approved scheme of amalgamation, proceedings initiated against that non-existent entity are void ab initio.The Court specifically examined Section 87 of the CGST Act and held that its provisions operate in relation to the intervening period between the effective date of merger and the date of the merger order, where transactions between the amalgamating companies have to be accounted for. Section 87 does not confer authority upon the Department to issue a show-cause notice against a non-existent entity after the merger. Post-merger, the amalgamating entity has no legal status and proceedings cannot be initiated against it.The Court therefore held that the ingredients of Section 87 could not be invoked to continue the proceedings contemplated by the show-cause notice. Since the show-cause notice itself was issued without jurisdiction, the proceedings were vitiated and void ab initio.3. Final VerdictThe Bombay High Court held that Section 87 of the CGST Act could not be invoked to continue the proceedings against the non-existent amalgamating entity. The show-cause notice dated 1 August 2024, having been issued without jurisdiction, and the proceedings arising from it, were held to be void ab initio.Accordingly, the Court held that the petition succeeded and was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), thereby quashing the impugned order dated 29 January 2025.4. Cases Referred by CourtCaseCourtDate / CitationPrincipal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.Supreme Court of India[2019] 416 ITR 613; specific order date not stated in the PDFReliance Industries Limited v. P. L. RoongtaHigh Court of Bombay[2025] 479 ITR 770; specific order date not stated in the PDFHCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax and AnotherHigh Court of Delhi2024 SCC OnLine Del 8287; specific order date not stated in the PDFThe Court relied particularly on Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. for the principle that proceedings initiated against an entity that had ceased to exist following amalgamation are void ab initio, and on Reliance Industries Ltd. v. P. L. Roongta for applying that principle to proceedings against a non-existent amalgamating entity.The Court also found support in HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax and Another, which interpreted Section 87 as preserving the tax treatment of transactions during the relevant period but not as authorising proceedings or an assessment against a non-existent amalgamating company.  

79Vodafone Idea Ltd. (formerly Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd.) v. Union of India29-04-2026A Section 74 demand of about Rs. 363 crore, raised on a company merged out of existence, on the theory that its pre-merger going-concern transfer of a tower business was an exempt supply restricting input tax credit. At issue: jurisdiction over a non-exis View Download

Background.  By NCLT order dated 30.08.2018, Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. and Vodafone India Ltd. merged into Idea Cellular Ltd., the merger being intimated to the GST authorities at the time of amendment of registration. Earlier, on 13.11.2017, VMSL had transferred its entire tower business to ATC Telecom Infrastructure, with all rights and liabilities, as a going concern on a slump-sale basis; it was not declared in the GST returns and no invoice was raised. DGGI issued a show cause notice dated 01.08.2024 under Section 74 demanding INR 363 crore with penalty, on the footing that transfer of a going concern is an exempted supply and VMSL was therefore not entitled to input tax credit. The order followed on 29.01.2025.Observations of the Court.  The Court held that the conditions in Section 87 operate only in respect of the intervening period from the date on which the order takes effect till the date of the order, and in no way authorise the department to issue a show cause notice on a non-existent entity post merger or amalgamation, since a merged entity has no status in the eyes of law and no proceedings can be initiated against it. The submission that Section 87 applied on these facts was rejected.The department’s contention that Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., having been rendered under the Income-tax Act, would not apply where Section 87 was attracted, was not accepted. The Court drew support from Reliance Industries Limited v. P. L. Roongta and from the Delhi High Court’s reasoning in HCL Infosystems Ltd., which it extracted. It is to be noted that prayer clause (c), challenging Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017 as ultra vires, was not pressed and remains undecided.Final verdict.  he petition succeeded and was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), the impugned order being quashed as void ab initio for want of jurisdiction. The exempt-supply and consequent credit-restriction theory underlying the demand was not adjudicated on merits.

Vodafone Idea Ltd. (formerly Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd.) v. Union of India 29-04-2026
A Section 74 demand of about Rs. 363 crore, raised on a company merged out of existence, on the theory that its pre-merger going-concern transfer of a tower business was an exempt supply restricting input tax credit. At issue: jurisdiction over a non-exis

Background.  By NCLT order dated 30.08.2018, Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. and Vodafone India Ltd. merged into Idea Cellular Ltd., the merger being intimated to the GST authorities at the time of amendment of registration. Earlier, on 13.11.2017, VMSL had transferred its entire tower business to ATC Telecom Infrastructure, with all rights and liabilities, as a going concern on a slump-sale basis; it was not declared in the GST returns and no invoice was raised. DGGI issued a show cause notice dated 01.08.2024 under Section 74 demanding INR 363 crore with penalty, on the footing that transfer of a going concern is an exempted supply and VMSL was therefore not entitled to input tax credit. The order followed on 29.01.2025.Observations of the Court.  The Court held that the conditions in Section 87 operate only in respect of the intervening period from the date on which the order takes effect till the date of the order, and in no way authorise the department to issue a show cause notice on a non-existent entity post merger or amalgamation, since a merged entity has no status in the eyes of law and no proceedings can be initiated against it. The submission that Section 87 applied on these facts was rejected.The department’s contention that Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., having been rendered under the Income-tax Act, would not apply where Section 87 was attracted, was not accepted. The Court drew support from Reliance Industries Limited v. P. L. Roongta and from the Delhi High Court’s reasoning in HCL Infosystems Ltd., which it extracted. It is to be noted that prayer clause (c), challenging Serial No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017 as ultra vires, was not pressed and remains undecided.Final verdict.  he petition succeeded and was allowed in terms of prayer clause (a), the impugned order being quashed as void ab initio for want of jurisdiction. The exempt-supply and consequent credit-restriction theory underlying the demand was not adjudicated on merits.

80Sumukha Ventures vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors.24-04-2026Challenge to Show Cause Notice and Order-in-Original passed by the same officer who conducted the audit proceedings — violation of principles of natural justice under GST. View Download

BackgroundSumukha Ventures, a partnership firm based in Bengaluru, was subjected to proceedings initiated by both the audit authority and the enforcement authority under GST. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Audit)-3.7 issued a Show Cause Notice dated 30.09.2025 (Form GST DRC-01, Reference No. ZD290925221988K). Thereafter, an Order-in-Original (Annexure-B) was passed by the same officer who had conducted the audit proceedings. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Karnataka challenging both the Show Cause Notice and the Order-in-Original. Court Observations (Verbatim)"It is submitted that such action is impermissible and being in violation of principles of natural justice, insofar as the authority while conducting audit has expressed its opinion and findings are recorded at one stage. It is submitted that once again if the same officer were to conduct the assessment proceedings, the authority would be guided by the findings made in the audit report.""Taking note that this identical question is often raised by assessees, it would be appropriate that this aspect has the benefit of adjudication by the appropriate authority. By keeping open all contentions raised, the matter is remitted to respondent No.2.""The petitioner to take their stand before respondent No.2, regarding the aspect of jurisdiction as raised in the present petition. Upon such objection being raised, it is open for the authority to obtain necessary orders on the administrative side from the authority which assigns i.e., the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) - respondent No.1.""Taking note of the nature of objection raised, the authority to record a finding of their aspect of jurisdiction as per the procedure referred to above and only thereafter, consider the proceedings on merits.""Needless to state, no steps to be taken on merits till finding is recorded in terms of the observations made." Final VerdictThe Order-in-Original (Annexure-B) was set aside and the matter was remitted to Respondent No. 2 (Deputy Commissioner) to first decide the question of jurisdiction — specifically whether the same officer who conducted the audit can also pass the adjudication order — before proceeding on merits. The petition was disposed of accordingly. Citations / Circulars ReferredReferenceDetailsCircular No. 31/05/2018-GSTDated 09.02.2018 (Annexure-AB) — referred by Petitioner regarding impermissibility of same officer conducting audit and adjudicationCircular No. 169/01/2022-GSTDated 12.03.2022 (Annexure-AC) — referred by Petitioner on same issue 

Sumukha Ventures vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. 24-04-2026
Challenge to Show Cause Notice and Order-in-Original passed by the same officer who conducted the audit proceedings — violation of principles of natural justice under GST.

BackgroundSumukha Ventures, a partnership firm based in Bengaluru, was subjected to proceedings initiated by both the audit authority and the enforcement authority under GST. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Audit)-3.7 issued a Show Cause Notice dated 30.09.2025 (Form GST DRC-01, Reference No. ZD290925221988K). Thereafter, an Order-in-Original (Annexure-B) was passed by the same officer who had conducted the audit proceedings. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Karnataka challenging both the Show Cause Notice and the Order-in-Original. Court Observations (Verbatim)"It is submitted that such action is impermissible and being in violation of principles of natural justice, insofar as the authority while conducting audit has expressed its opinion and findings are recorded at one stage. It is submitted that once again if the same officer were to conduct the assessment proceedings, the authority would be guided by the findings made in the audit report.""Taking note that this identical question is often raised by assessees, it would be appropriate that this aspect has the benefit of adjudication by the appropriate authority. By keeping open all contentions raised, the matter is remitted to respondent No.2.""The petitioner to take their stand before respondent No.2, regarding the aspect of jurisdiction as raised in the present petition. Upon such objection being raised, it is open for the authority to obtain necessary orders on the administrative side from the authority which assigns i.e., the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) - respondent No.1.""Taking note of the nature of objection raised, the authority to record a finding of their aspect of jurisdiction as per the procedure referred to above and only thereafter, consider the proceedings on merits.""Needless to state, no steps to be taken on merits till finding is recorded in terms of the observations made." Final VerdictThe Order-in-Original (Annexure-B) was set aside and the matter was remitted to Respondent No. 2 (Deputy Commissioner) to first decide the question of jurisdiction — specifically whether the same officer who conducted the audit can also pass the adjudication order — before proceeding on merits. The petition was disposed of accordingly. Citations / Circulars ReferredReferenceDetailsCircular No. 31/05/2018-GSTDated 09.02.2018 (Annexure-AB) — referred by Petitioner regarding impermissibility of same officer conducting audit and adjudicationCircular No. 169/01/2022-GSTDated 12.03.2022 (Annexure-AC) — referred by Petitioner on same issue 

Total: 272 case laws