Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged Order-in-Original No.102/2025 dated 04.02.2025 confirming tax demand of ₹30,13,02,903 along with interest and penalty under Section 74 of the CGST/TNGST Act. The department had issued a single show cause notice and passed a single assessment order covering six financial years from 2017-18 to 2022-23. The petitioner contended that bunching of show cause notices for multiple financial years is contrary to Sections 73 and 74 of the GST Act.Court Decision:The Court held that under Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, issuance of show cause notice must be based on the “tax period”, which is linked to the return filed by the assessee. If notice is issued based on annual returns, it can cover the relevant financial year but cannot extend beyond that financial year.The Court observed that the limitation under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) is calculated separately for each financial year from the due date of filing annual return. Since each financial year constitutes a distinct tax period with separate limitation, clubbing multiple financial years in a single show cause notice and passing a composite assessment order is impermissible in law.Accordingly, the Court held that issuance of a composite show cause notice and passing of a single order for multiple financial years amounts to jurisdictional overreach. The impugned order dated 04.02.2025 was quashed on the ground that clubbing of financial years is not permissible under the GST Act.Cases Referred by Court:· Titan Company Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST & Central Excise, (2024) 15 Centax 118 (Madras High Court)· State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1350· M/s Tharayil Medicals (Division Bench, Kerala High Court)· Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence v. Minimol Sabu, W.A. No.238 of 2025 (Kerala High Court)
R A and Co. vs The Additional Commissioner of Central Taxes 21-07-2025
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged Order-in-Original No.102/2025 dated 04.02.2025 confirming tax demand of ₹30,13,02,903 along with interest and penalty under Section 74 of the CGST/TNGST Act. The department had issued a single show cause notice and passed a single assessment order covering six financial years from 2017-18 to 2022-23. The petitioner contended that bunching of show cause notices for multiple financial years is contrary to Sections 73 and 74 of the GST Act.Court Decision:The Court held that under Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, issuance of show cause notice must be based on the “tax period”, which is linked to the return filed by the assessee. If notice is issued based on annual returns, it can cover the relevant financial year but cannot extend beyond that financial year.The Court observed that the limitation under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) is calculated separately for each financial year from the due date of filing annual return. Since each financial year constitutes a distinct tax period with separate limitation, clubbing multiple financial years in a single show cause notice and passing a composite assessment order is impermissible in law.Accordingly, the Court held that issuance of a composite show cause notice and passing of a single order for multiple financial years amounts to jurisdictional overreach. The impugned order dated 04.02.2025 was quashed on the ground that clubbing of financial years is not permissible under the GST Act.Cases Referred by Court:· Titan Company Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST & Central Excise, (2024) 15 Centax 118 (Madras High Court)· State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1350· M/s Tharayil Medicals (Division Bench, Kerala High Court)· Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence v. Minimol Sabu, W.A. No.238 of 2025 (Kerala High Court)
Facts of the CaseThe complainant department filed Complaint No. GST/01/2018 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, alleging commission of offences under Section 69 read with Section 132 of the HPGST/CGST Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017 against the petitioners, who were partners of M/s G.M. Powertech.It was alleged that the firm had availed fraudulent input tax credit (ITC) during the financial years 2017–18 and 2018–19 by declaring inward supplies from fictitious and non-existent firms based in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. The GST portal verification revealed that goods were purportedly transported in fake or non-existent vehicles, including two-wheelers and cars incapable of carrying heavy consignments. Investigation showed that suppliers mentioned in invoices did not exist at the given addresses. Fraudulent ITC amounting to substantial sums was alleged.The learned Trial Court, upon finding sufficient material, summoned the accused and fixed the matter for recording pre-charge evidence.Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint and subsequent proceedings. They contended that the GST Acts were silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint, that departmental officers exercised unbridled powers, that Sections 69 and 132 were arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, and that the trial court erred in proceeding as a warrant case and ordering pre-charge evidence.The principal questions before the High Court were:Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to investigation and trial under the GST Acts.Whether the complaint and proceedings were liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.Whether the trial court erred in treating the matter as a warrant case and directing pre-charge evidence.Court Observations and DecisionThe High Court examined the law relating to quashing of criminal proceedings and reiterated the principles governing exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as laid down by the Supreme Court. It observed that quashing is permissible only in limited circumstances such as absence of prima facie offence, legal bar to proceedings, or manifest abuse of process.On applicability of Cr.P.C., the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, holding that by virtue of Sections 4(2) and 5 Cr.P.C., the provisions of the Code apply to offences under special statutes unless expressly excluded. It further noted that GST Acts are not a complete code in respect of search, seizure, arrest and procedure, and therefore Cr.P.C. provisions apply in the absence of any contrary provision.The Court rejected the contention that the Act was silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint. It held that Cr.P.C. governs such procedure unless excluded.Regarding the trial as a warrant case, the Court observed that Section 132 provides punishment up to five years’ imprisonment. Since a warrant case under Section 2(x) Cr.P.C. includes offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years, the trial court was correct in proceeding as a warrant case. Under Section 244 Cr.P.C., in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, the Magistrate is required to record prosecution evidence after appearance of the accused. Therefore, ordering pre-charge evidence was legally justified.On the contention that investigation was improperly conducted, the Court held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction, it only examines whether a prima facie case exists and does not evaluate the sufficiency or credibility of evidence. The verification conducted by officials, who found that suppliers did not exist at the given addresses, was sufficient at the prima facie stage. Issues relating to quality of investigation are matters for trial.The Court also held that the decision in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) did not assist the petitioners, as it does not render departmental investigation invalid per se.Finding no ground falling within the parameters for quashing, the High Court dismissed the petition. It clarified that its observations were confined to disposal of the petition and would not affect the merits of the trial.Cases ReferredB.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, Supreme Court of India.State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Supreme Court of India.Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, Supreme Court of India.Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 150 GSTR 121, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 4794, Supreme Court of India.
Gagandeep Singh and Another vs. State of H.P. and Another, 23-06-2025
Facts of the CaseThe complainant department filed Complaint No. GST/01/2018 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, alleging commission of offences under Section 69 read with Section 132 of the HPGST/CGST Act, 2017 and Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017 against the petitioners, who were partners of M/s G.M. Powertech.It was alleged that the firm had availed fraudulent input tax credit (ITC) during the financial years 2017–18 and 2018–19 by declaring inward supplies from fictitious and non-existent firms based in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. The GST portal verification revealed that goods were purportedly transported in fake or non-existent vehicles, including two-wheelers and cars incapable of carrying heavy consignments. Investigation showed that suppliers mentioned in invoices did not exist at the given addresses. Fraudulent ITC amounting to substantial sums was alleged.The learned Trial Court, upon finding sufficient material, summoned the accused and fixed the matter for recording pre-charge evidence.Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint and subsequent proceedings. They contended that the GST Acts were silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint, that departmental officers exercised unbridled powers, that Sections 69 and 132 were arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, and that the trial court erred in proceeding as a warrant case and ordering pre-charge evidence.The principal questions before the High Court were:Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to investigation and trial under the GST Acts.Whether the complaint and proceedings were liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.Whether the trial court erred in treating the matter as a warrant case and directing pre-charge evidence.Court Observations and DecisionThe High Court examined the law relating to quashing of criminal proceedings and reiterated the principles governing exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as laid down by the Supreme Court. It observed that quashing is permissible only in limited circumstances such as absence of prima facie offence, legal bar to proceedings, or manifest abuse of process.On applicability of Cr.P.C., the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, holding that by virtue of Sections 4(2) and 5 Cr.P.C., the provisions of the Code apply to offences under special statutes unless expressly excluded. It further noted that GST Acts are not a complete code in respect of search, seizure, arrest and procedure, and therefore Cr.P.C. provisions apply in the absence of any contrary provision.The Court rejected the contention that the Act was silent regarding investigation and filing of complaint. It held that Cr.P.C. governs such procedure unless excluded.Regarding the trial as a warrant case, the Court observed that Section 132 provides punishment up to five years’ imprisonment. Since a warrant case under Section 2(x) Cr.P.C. includes offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years, the trial court was correct in proceeding as a warrant case. Under Section 244 Cr.P.C., in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, the Magistrate is required to record prosecution evidence after appearance of the accused. Therefore, ordering pre-charge evidence was legally justified.On the contention that investigation was improperly conducted, the Court held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction, it only examines whether a prima facie case exists and does not evaluate the sufficiency or credibility of evidence. The verification conducted by officials, who found that suppliers did not exist at the given addresses, was sufficient at the prima facie stage. Issues relating to quality of investigation are matters for trial.The Court also held that the decision in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) did not assist the petitioners, as it does not render departmental investigation invalid per se.Finding no ground falling within the parameters for quashing, the High Court dismissed the petition. It clarified that its observations were confined to disposal of the petition and would not affect the merits of the trial.Cases ReferredB.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, Supreme Court of India.State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Supreme Court of India.Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, Supreme Court of India.Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 150 GSTR 121, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 4794, Supreme Court of India.
Facts :The petitioner challenged an order passed under Section 73 of the CGST/SGST Act on the ground that proper notice was not served. It was contended that although the show cause notice was uploaded on the GST portal, it was not served through other modes under Section 169(1)(a) to (c). The petitioner argued that mere portal upload does not constitute valid service and the order violated principles of natural justice.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 169 permits service of notice through any one of the prescribed modes, including making it available on the common portal under Section 169(1)(d). It ruled that service through the portal constitutes valid service and is sufficient compliance under the statute. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Sunil Kumar K., the Court found no infirmity in the proceedings and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to pursue statutory remedies.Cases Referred:Sunil Kumar K. v. State Tax Officer-I, Kottarakkara
T.K. Navas v. Commissioner of Goods and Services Taxes & Ors. 09-06-2025
Facts :The petitioner challenged an order passed under Section 73 of the CGST/SGST Act on the ground that proper notice was not served. It was contended that although the show cause notice was uploaded on the GST portal, it was not served through other modes under Section 169(1)(a) to (c). The petitioner argued that mere portal upload does not constitute valid service and the order violated principles of natural justice.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 169 permits service of notice through any one of the prescribed modes, including making it available on the common portal under Section 169(1)(d). It ruled that service through the portal constitutes valid service and is sufficient compliance under the statute. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Sunil Kumar K., the Court found no infirmity in the proceedings and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to pursue statutory remedies.Cases Referred:Sunil Kumar K. v. State Tax Officer-I, Kottarakkara
Facts / Background:The petitioner association challenged GST liability on services rendered to its members under various welfare schemes. It relied on the doctrine of mutuality, contending that services by an association to its members are not taxable. Amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 inserted Section 7(1)(aa) deeming such transactions as taxable supplies retrospectively from 01.07.2017. The Single Judge upheld the validity of levy but struck down the retrospective operation, leading to cross appeals by both parties. ________________________________________Court Decision:The Division Bench upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 2(17)(e) and 7(1)(aa) of the CGST/KGST Acts, holding that the legislature was competent to treat transactions between an association and its members as taxable supplies. It held that the amendment validly removes the basis of the doctrine of mutuality for GST purposes. However, the Court held that giving retrospective effect to the amendment from 01.07.2017 was not legally sustainable on principles of fairness. Accordingly, retrospective operation of the amendment was set aside, while upholding its prospective applicability. ________________________________________Cases Referred by Court:• State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Club Ltd. • Ranchi Club Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax • Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. Management of Gymkhana Club • Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Bombay Labour Union • JCTO v. Young Men’s Indian Association • State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. • Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. • Jayam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu • Rai Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar • Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE • Union of India v. Exide Industries Ltd.
Indian Medical Association, Kerala State Branch v. Union of India & Ors. 11-04-2025
Facts / Background:The petitioner association challenged GST liability on services rendered to its members under various welfare schemes. It relied on the doctrine of mutuality, contending that services by an association to its members are not taxable. Amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 inserted Section 7(1)(aa) deeming such transactions as taxable supplies retrospectively from 01.07.2017. The Single Judge upheld the validity of levy but struck down the retrospective operation, leading to cross appeals by both parties. ________________________________________Court Decision:The Division Bench upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 2(17)(e) and 7(1)(aa) of the CGST/KGST Acts, holding that the legislature was competent to treat transactions between an association and its members as taxable supplies. It held that the amendment validly removes the basis of the doctrine of mutuality for GST purposes. However, the Court held that giving retrospective effect to the amendment from 01.07.2017 was not legally sustainable on principles of fairness. Accordingly, retrospective operation of the amendment was set aside, while upholding its prospective applicability. ________________________________________Cases Referred by Court:• State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Club Ltd. • Ranchi Club Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax • Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees Union v. Management of Gymkhana Club • Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Bombay Labour Union • JCTO v. Young Men’s Indian Association • State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. • Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. • Jayam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu • Rai Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar • Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE • Union of India v. Exide Industries Ltd.
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act for filing an appeal against proceedings arising from a show cause notice dated 14.06.2022 alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit for the period 2017-18 to 2019-20. The petitioner sought waiver of the pre-deposit on the ground of financial hardship and amounts allegedly receivable from Government departments.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 107(6) mandates payment of the admitted amount of tax, interest, penalty and a pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax for filing an appeal. The provision does not confer discretion on the Court to waive the statutory pre-deposit requirement.The Court declined the request for waiver of pre-deposit and held that the petitioner must comply with the statutory requirement. However, the petitioner was permitted to approach the Appellate Authority and request adjustment of amounts already lying with the department or government entities towards the pre-deposit. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the remedy before the appellate authority.Cases Referred by Court:Shubh Impex v. Union of India, (2018) 361 ELT 199 (Del)Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. CCE, (2017) 348 ELT A132 (SC)Diamond Entertainment Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Tax Commissionerate, Dehradun & Anr.Pioneer Corporation v. Union of India, (2016) 340 ELT 63Manoj Kumar Jha v. DRI, (2019) 365 ELT 166 (Del)Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash MishraA.B. Bhaskara Rao v. CBIManish Goel v. Rohini GoelState of Bihar v. Arvind Kumar
Impressive Data Services Private Limited vs Commissioner (Appeals-I), Central Tax GST, Delhi 05-04-2025
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act for filing an appeal against proceedings arising from a show cause notice dated 14.06.2022 alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit for the period 2017-18 to 2019-20. The petitioner sought waiver of the pre-deposit on the ground of financial hardship and amounts allegedly receivable from Government departments.Court Decision:The Court held that Section 107(6) mandates payment of the admitted amount of tax, interest, penalty and a pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax for filing an appeal. The provision does not confer discretion on the Court to waive the statutory pre-deposit requirement.The Court declined the request for waiver of pre-deposit and held that the petitioner must comply with the statutory requirement. However, the petitioner was permitted to approach the Appellate Authority and request adjustment of amounts already lying with the department or government entities towards the pre-deposit. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the remedy before the appellate authority.Cases Referred by Court:Shubh Impex v. Union of India, (2018) 361 ELT 199 (Del)Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. CCE, (2017) 348 ELT A132 (SC)Diamond Entertainment Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Tax Commissionerate, Dehradun & Anr.Pioneer Corporation v. Union of India, (2016) 340 ELT 63Manoj Kumar Jha v. DRI, (2019) 365 ELT 166 (Del)Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash MishraA.B. Bhaskara Rao v. CBIManish Goel v. Rohini GoelState of Bihar v. Arvind Kumar
Facts :The petitioner company received a show cause notice under Section 73 CGST Act from State GST authorities for alleged tax shortfall and excess ITC.Subsequently, Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued summons under Section 70 requiring production of documents.The petitioner challenged the summons before Delhi High Court, contending that parallel proceedings on the same subject matter were barred under Section 6(2)(b).The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that summons and investigation are not “proceedings”.Court Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the SLP.It held that issuance of summons under Section 70 is part of inquiry/investigation and cannot be equated with “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b).“Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74.Summons is only a step to collect evidence and precedes formal proceedings; hence, no bar on parallel inquiry by another authority.The Court interpreted Section 6 within the framework of “single interface” and “cross-empowerment”, holding that intelligence-based enforcement actions can be initiated by both Central and State authorities.Cases Referred:G.K. Trading v. Union of IndiaKuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST IntelligenceAnurag Suri v. Director General of GST IntelligenceIndo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek PrasadK.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax OfficerRais Khan v. Addl. CommissionerM/s R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGSTTvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. GST Council SecretariatVivek Narsaria v. State of JharkhandStalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaKundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P.Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd.K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT
Armour Security (India) Ltd. vs Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr. 06-03-2025
Facts :The petitioner company received a show cause notice under Section 73 CGST Act from State GST authorities for alleged tax shortfall and excess ITC.Subsequently, Central GST authorities conducted a search and issued summons under Section 70 requiring production of documents.The petitioner challenged the summons before Delhi High Court, contending that parallel proceedings on the same subject matter were barred under Section 6(2)(b).The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that summons and investigation are not “proceedings”.Court Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the SLP.It held that issuance of summons under Section 70 is part of inquiry/investigation and cannot be equated with “initiation of proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b).“Proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) refer to adjudicatory actions such as assessment, demand, or penalty proceedings under Sections 73 or 74.Summons is only a step to collect evidence and precedes formal proceedings; hence, no bar on parallel inquiry by another authority.The Court interpreted Section 6 within the framework of “single interface” and “cross-empowerment”, holding that intelligence-based enforcement actions can be initiated by both Central and State authorities.Cases Referred:G.K. Trading v. Union of IndiaKuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST IntelligenceAnurag Suri v. Director General of GST IntelligenceIndo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek PrasadK.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax OfficerRais Khan v. Addl. CommissionerM/s R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGSTTvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. GST Council SecretariatVivek Narsaria v. State of JharkhandStalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of IndiaKundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P.Chief Commissioner of CGST v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd.K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT
Facts :The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 31.10.2023 passed under Section 73(9) of the GST Act raising tax, interest and penalty demand. It contended that no show cause notice was effectively communicated, as notices were uploaded on the GST portal under the heading “additional notices and orders” instead of “notices and orders”. Due to this, the petitioner remained unaware and could not file any reply. The petitioner relied on portal screenshots to demonstrate improper placement of notices.Court Decision:The Court held that the petitioner had made out a case of improper service of notice. It observed that although Section 169 permits service through the common portal, the manner of uploading must ensure that notices are effectively communicated. Since the respondents failed to establish that notices were properly placed under the correct heading and the petitioner’s claim remained unrebutted, the impugned assessment order and demand were set aside. The matter was remanded with direction to allow the petitioner to file reply and thereafter pass a fresh order after hearing.Cases Referred:Anhad Impex v. Assistant Commissioner, Ward 16Ola Fleet Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P.M/s Sudarshan Beopar Company Limited v. Union of India
Lord Vishnu Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. 03-03-2025
Facts :The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 31.10.2023 passed under Section 73(9) of the GST Act raising tax, interest and penalty demand. It contended that no show cause notice was effectively communicated, as notices were uploaded on the GST portal under the heading “additional notices and orders” instead of “notices and orders”. Due to this, the petitioner remained unaware and could not file any reply. The petitioner relied on portal screenshots to demonstrate improper placement of notices.Court Decision:The Court held that the petitioner had made out a case of improper service of notice. It observed that although Section 169 permits service through the common portal, the manner of uploading must ensure that notices are effectively communicated. Since the respondents failed to establish that notices were properly placed under the correct heading and the petitioner’s claim remained unrebutted, the impugned assessment order and demand were set aside. The matter was remanded with direction to allow the petitioner to file reply and thereafter pass a fresh order after hearing.Cases Referred:Anhad Impex v. Assistant Commissioner, Ward 16Ola Fleet Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P.M/s Sudarshan Beopar Company Limited v. Union of India
Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.
Facts of the CaseThe present batch of writ petitions and criminal appeals raised a common question regarding the legality and scope of arrest powers exercised by officers under the Customs Act, 1962 and the GST Act, 2017. The controversy stemmed from the three-Judge Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2011), which had held that offences under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act were non-cognizable and bailable, and that arrest could not be made without a warrant from the Magistrate.After that decision, Parliament amended the Customs Act in 2012, 2013 and 2019. Certain specified offences were declared cognizable, and some were further declared non-bailable. Similar legislative structure was adopted in the GST Act. Despite these amendments, challenges continued to be raised questioning the power of customs officers to arrest without warrant, the applicability of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether customs officers were to be treated as “police officers.”The matters reached the Supreme Court to determine:Whether the ratio in Om Prakash continued to apply after statutory amendments.Whether customs officers are police officers.To what extent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to arrests under the Customs Act.What safeguards must be observed while exercising the power of arrest.Court’s Observations and DecisionThe Court declined to reopen the correctness of Om Prakash, noting that the legislature had consciously amended the Customs Act after that judgment. The amendments carved out specific offences as cognizable and certain serious offences as non-bailable. Therefore, the statutory scheme now governs the classification of offences.The Court held:Customs officers are not police officers, as consistently held in earlier Constitution Bench decisions.However, even though they are not police officers, procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply unless expressly excluded by the special statute.Sections 4 and 5 of the Code make it clear that provisions of the Code apply to offences under special laws unless a contrary procedure is prescribed.The Court clarified the legal position post-amendment:Offences specified under Section 104(4) of the Customs Act are cognizable.Certain offences under Section 104(6) are non-bailable.All other offences are non-cognizable and bailable.The Court emphasized that the power of arrest is a drastic power affecting personal liberty and must be exercised strictly in accordance with statutory safeguards. It applied principles earlier laid down in cases dealing with arrest under special statutes, including those under the PMLA.The Court held that the following safeguards are mandatory:The officer must have “material” and must form “reasons to believe” before arrest.Grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee.Proper records and diary must be maintained.Safeguards under Sections 41B, 41D, 50A and 55A of the Code apply.The arrestee has a right to meet an advocate during interrogation, though not throughout.Magistrates must ensure compliance with procedural safeguards at the time of production.The Court further held that judicial review of arrest is permissible. Courts can examine whether the statutory preconditions for arrest were satisfied.Case ReferredOm Prakash and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440, Supreme Court of India.A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Supreme Court of India.State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, Supreme Court of India.Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613, Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench).Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India.Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674, Supreme Court of India.D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, Supreme Court of India.Senior Intelligence Officer, DRI v. Jugal Kishore Samra, (2011) 12 SCC 362, Supreme Court of India.Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248, Supreme Court of India.Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, Supreme Court of India.Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 7 SCC 576, Supreme Court of India.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, Supreme Court of India.
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged Order-in-Original No.04/2025-GST ADC dated 06.01.2025 and the consequential rectification order dated 30.04.2025 passed for the period July 2017 to March 2023. The petitioner contended that the department issued a single show cause notice and passed a single order covering multiple financial years, which is contrary to the scheme of the GST Act.Court Decision:The Court held that under the GST Act, show cause notices must be issued based on the “tax period”. Where the assessment is based on annual returns, the relevant tax period corresponds to the respective financial year.The Court relied on its earlier decision dated 21.07.2025 in a batch of cases holding that show cause notices cannot be clubbed for more than one financial year. Since the impugned order covered the period from July 2017 to March 2023 through a single proceeding, the action was held to be without jurisdiction.Accordingly, the Court quashed the assessment order dated 06.01.2025 and the rectification order dated 30.04.2025 and granted liberty to the department to initiate separate proceedings for each financial year in accordance with law.Cases Referred by Court: W.P. Nos.29716 of 2024 etc. batch (Madras High Court, Order dated 21.07.2025)
Instakart Services Private Limited vs The Additional Commissioner, Chennai South Commissionerate 22-02-2025
Facts (Background):The petitioner challenged Order-in-Original No.04/2025-GST ADC dated 06.01.2025 and the consequential rectification order dated 30.04.2025 passed for the period July 2017 to March 2023. The petitioner contended that the department issued a single show cause notice and passed a single order covering multiple financial years, which is contrary to the scheme of the GST Act.Court Decision:The Court held that under the GST Act, show cause notices must be issued based on the “tax period”. Where the assessment is based on annual returns, the relevant tax period corresponds to the respective financial year.The Court relied on its earlier decision dated 21.07.2025 in a batch of cases holding that show cause notices cannot be clubbed for more than one financial year. Since the impugned order covered the period from July 2017 to March 2023 through a single proceeding, the action was held to be without jurisdiction.Accordingly, the Court quashed the assessment order dated 06.01.2025 and the rectification order dated 30.04.2025 and granted liberty to the department to initiate separate proceedings for each financial year in accordance with law.Cases Referred by Court: W.P. Nos.29716 of 2024 etc. batch (Madras High Court, Order dated 21.07.2025)
Facts (Background):The respondent-assessee challenged a show cause notice dated 29.07.2024 issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act demanding tax, interest and penalty for the financial years 2017-18 to 2023-24 through a single consolidated notice. The Single Judge permitted the authority to pass an order for FY 2017-18 within limitation and directed separate adjudication orders for the remaining years. The department filed a writ appeal challenging that direction.Court Decision:The Division Bench held that under Section 74 of the CGST Act the determination of tax is linked to the financial year to which the alleged tax evasion relates, and the limitation for passing adjudication orders is computed separately for each financial year from the due date of filing the annual return.The Court held that although the statute does not expressly prohibit issuance of a consolidated show cause notice, the proper officer should ideally issue separate notices for different financial years because the limitation for adjudication differs for each year. A consolidated notice covering several financial years could prejudice the assessee by curtailing the effective time available for defence and evidence.Finding no error in the reasoning of the Single Judge, the Court dismissed the writ appeal and upheld the direction permitting separate adjudication orders for each financial year after granting opportunity of hearing.Cases Referred by Court: CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC 435
Joint Commissioner (Intelligence & Enforcement) & Anr. vs M/s Lakshmi Mobile Accessories 05-02-2025
Facts (Background):The respondent-assessee challenged a show cause notice dated 29.07.2024 issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act demanding tax, interest and penalty for the financial years 2017-18 to 2023-24 through a single consolidated notice. The Single Judge permitted the authority to pass an order for FY 2017-18 within limitation and directed separate adjudication orders for the remaining years. The department filed a writ appeal challenging that direction.Court Decision:The Division Bench held that under Section 74 of the CGST Act the determination of tax is linked to the financial year to which the alleged tax evasion relates, and the limitation for passing adjudication orders is computed separately for each financial year from the due date of filing the annual return.The Court held that although the statute does not expressly prohibit issuance of a consolidated show cause notice, the proper officer should ideally issue separate notices for different financial years because the limitation for adjudication differs for each year. A consolidated notice covering several financial years could prejudice the assessee by curtailing the effective time available for defence and evidence.Finding no error in the reasoning of the Single Judge, the Court dismissed the writ appeal and upheld the direction permitting separate adjudication orders for each financial year after granting opportunity of hearing.Cases Referred by Court: CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC 435
