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Latest GST Case Law and Judgements
S.No Name Date of Order Subject Actions
181Frontline Wind Energy Private Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST)02-01-2025Tax and a hundred per cent penalty confirmed on the entire annual-report value of a windmill undertaking sold as a going concern, contrary to the department’s own earlier notice accepting that the sale consideration was not taxable. At issue: an assessm View Download

Background.  The petitioner had acquired a wind electric generator park of twenty windmills by slump sale in 2015 and sold that business to Bilal Match Works under a sale of business agreement dated 14.06.2019 for a consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000. Relying on the figure of Rs. 10,34,32,205 appearing in the petitioner’s sixth annual report for FY 2019-20, being cost of machinery plus profit on sale, the assessment order dated 26.11.2021 confirmed tax of Rs. 93,08,898 each under CGST and SGST together with penalty at one hundred per cent under Section 122(1).Observations of the Court.  The Court pointed to the department’s own notice dated 21.10.2021, which had recorded that where a person ceases to be a taxable person, goods forming part of the assets of the business are deemed to be supplied immediately before he ceases to be a taxable person unless the business is transferred as a going concern to another person, in terms of entry 4(c)(i) of Schedule II, and which had categorically admitted, on the strength of the agreement filed, that the consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000 was not exigible to tax, proposing to bring only the differential of Rs. 84,32,205 to tax.The impugned order having nonetheless confirmed the demand on the entire Rs. 10,34,32,205 taken from the annual report, the Court held the demand to be unsustainable, arbitrary and contrary to that notice.Final verdict.  The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits and in accordance with law, after hearing the petitioner, within eight weeks from receipt of the order.

Frontline Wind Energy Private Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner (ST) 02-01-2025
Tax and a hundred per cent penalty confirmed on the entire annual-report value of a windmill undertaking sold as a going concern, contrary to the department’s own earlier notice accepting that the sale consideration was not taxable. At issue: an assessm

Background.  The petitioner had acquired a wind electric generator park of twenty windmills by slump sale in 2015 and sold that business to Bilal Match Works under a sale of business agreement dated 14.06.2019 for a consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000. Relying on the figure of Rs. 10,34,32,205 appearing in the petitioner’s sixth annual report for FY 2019-20, being cost of machinery plus profit on sale, the assessment order dated 26.11.2021 confirmed tax of Rs. 93,08,898 each under CGST and SGST together with penalty at one hundred per cent under Section 122(1).Observations of the Court.  The Court pointed to the department’s own notice dated 21.10.2021, which had recorded that where a person ceases to be a taxable person, goods forming part of the assets of the business are deemed to be supplied immediately before he ceases to be a taxable person unless the business is transferred as a going concern to another person, in terms of entry 4(c)(i) of Schedule II, and which had categorically admitted, on the strength of the agreement filed, that the consideration of Rs. 9,50,00,000 was not exigible to tax, proposing to bring only the differential of Rs. 84,32,205 to tax.The impugned order having nonetheless confirmed the demand on the entire Rs. 10,34,32,205 taken from the annual report, the Court held the demand to be unsustainable, arbitrary and contrary to that notice.Final verdict.  The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits and in accordance with law, after hearing the petitioner, within eight weeks from receipt of the order.

182Sterlite Power Transmission Ltd. v. The Additional Commissioner (Appeals)12-12-2024A refund sought of credit that accumulated while the electronic credit ledger stood administratively blocked, output tax for that period having been paid through the cash ledger instead. At issue: whether this fell within either of the two situations in w View Download

Background.  The petitioner’s electronic credit ledger was blocked by the State authorities on 20.03.2021 following scrutiny and an ASMT-10 notice, and was unblocked on 07.07.2021. In the meantime, to discharge its output liability for March 2021, the petitioner paid through the electronic cash ledger, and thereafter sought refund of the resulting accumulated credit of Rs. 78,20,202 in FORM GST RFD-01 under the residual category. The claim was rejected and the appeal dismissed on 14.03.2023. The petitioner had undertaken no business after March 2021 and continued to file nil returns while retaining registration for tender participation.Observations of the Court.  The Court found that the dues for March 2021 had been discharged only through the cash ledger and not also through the blocked credit ledger, so there was no duplication or double payment for the tax period, and that the legality of the blocking and unblocking between 20.03.2021 and 07.07.2021 had never been the subject matter of any litigation in which it was determined.To claim refund of unutilised credit the petitioner had to fall within Section 54(3) read with Section 54(8), which permits refund only where credit accumulates on account of zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax, or where the rate of tax on inputs is higher than that on output supplies. Neither condition was satisfied. The accumulated credit remains available for future tax liability, and the refund had been sought under a misconception of law.Final verdict.  No illegality was found in the impugned appellate order calling for interference in writ jurisdiction, and the petition was dismissed.

Sterlite Power Transmission Ltd. v. The Additional Commissioner (Appeals) 12-12-2024
A refund sought of credit that accumulated while the electronic credit ledger stood administratively blocked, output tax for that period having been paid through the cash ledger instead. At issue: whether this fell within either of the two situations in w

Background.  The petitioner’s electronic credit ledger was blocked by the State authorities on 20.03.2021 following scrutiny and an ASMT-10 notice, and was unblocked on 07.07.2021. In the meantime, to discharge its output liability for March 2021, the petitioner paid through the electronic cash ledger, and thereafter sought refund of the resulting accumulated credit of Rs. 78,20,202 in FORM GST RFD-01 under the residual category. The claim was rejected and the appeal dismissed on 14.03.2023. The petitioner had undertaken no business after March 2021 and continued to file nil returns while retaining registration for tender participation.Observations of the Court.  The Court found that the dues for March 2021 had been discharged only through the cash ledger and not also through the blocked credit ledger, so there was no duplication or double payment for the tax period, and that the legality of the blocking and unblocking between 20.03.2021 and 07.07.2021 had never been the subject matter of any litigation in which it was determined.To claim refund of unutilised credit the petitioner had to fall within Section 54(3) read with Section 54(8), which permits refund only where credit accumulates on account of zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax, or where the rate of tax on inputs is higher than that on output supplies. Neither condition was satisfied. The accumulated credit remains available for future tax liability, and the refund had been sought under a misconception of law.Final verdict.  No illegality was found in the impugned appellate order calling for interference in writ jurisdiction, and the petition was dismissed.

183SPK and Co. vs The State Tax Officer22-11-2024Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Section 107 of the CGST/TNGST Act, 2017 – effect of rectification proceedings under Section 161 on computation of limitation. View Download

Facts:The petitioner challenged the assessment order dated 07.08.2024 for the years 2019-20 and 2022-23 and the rectification order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the State Tax Officer. The petitioner contended that the show cause notice was vague and that the limitation for filing appeal should not be computed from the date of the original assessment order since a rectification application under Section 161 had been filed and rejected later.Court Decision:The Court held that when a rectification application under Section 161 of the GST Act is filed, the rectification order merges with the original assessment order. If the rectification application is rejected, the limitation period for filing an appeal against the original assessment order cannot be computed from the date of the original order. The limitation would commence from the date on which the rectification application is disposed of.Since the rectification order was passed on 12.11.2024, the limitation for filing appeal against the assessment order dated 07.08.2024 would be reckoned from 12.11.2024. The writ petitions were disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal and clarifying that limitation shall be calculated from the date of rejection of the rectification application.Cases Referred by Court:·         MD Electric Co. v. State Tax Officer, Chennai, (2024) 17 Centax 348 (Mad.) 

SPK and Co. vs The State Tax Officer 22-11-2024
Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Section 107 of the CGST/TNGST Act, 2017 – effect of rectification proceedings under Section 161 on computation of limitation.

Facts:The petitioner challenged the assessment order dated 07.08.2024 for the years 2019-20 and 2022-23 and the rectification order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the State Tax Officer. The petitioner contended that the show cause notice was vague and that the limitation for filing appeal should not be computed from the date of the original assessment order since a rectification application under Section 161 had been filed and rejected later.Court Decision:The Court held that when a rectification application under Section 161 of the GST Act is filed, the rectification order merges with the original assessment order. If the rectification application is rejected, the limitation period for filing an appeal against the original assessment order cannot be computed from the date of the original order. The limitation would commence from the date on which the rectification application is disposed of.Since the rectification order was passed on 12.11.2024, the limitation for filing appeal against the assessment order dated 07.08.2024 would be reckoned from 12.11.2024. The writ petitions were disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal and clarifying that limitation shall be calculated from the date of rejection of the rectification application.Cases Referred by Court:·         MD Electric Co. v. State Tax Officer, Chennai, (2024) 17 Centax 348 (Mad.) 

184HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax & Anr.21-11-2024A show cause notice and an assessment order under Section 73, issued to an amalgamating company after its registration stood cancelled on merger and its credit transferred by FORM GST ITC-02. At issue: whether proceedings against a company that has ceased View Download

Background.  Digilife Distribution and Marketing Services Ltd. amalgamated into HCL Infosystems under a scheme approved by the NCLT on 10.08.2022, with an appointed date of 01.04.2022. The amalgamating company applied for cancellation of its registration on 12.10.2022 and HCL filed FORM GST ITC-02 with a Chartered Accountant’s certificate on the same day. The department nevertheless issued a show cause notice dated 03.12.2023 under Section 73 and a final order dated 27.04.2024 in the name of the dissolved company.Observations of the Court.  The Court applied the line of authority in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and Spice Entertainment, holding that Section 160 of the CGST Act — being pari materia with Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — cannot come to the rescue of the respondents or salvage a notice and order issued to a non-existent entity.On Section 87, the Court held that the provision was placed on the statute book ex abundanti cautela, to preserve and identify transactions occurring between the amalgamating companies and to treat them as distinct companies for the period up to the date of the order approving the scheme, so that such transactions do not escape tax. It found itself unable to read Section 87 as enabling the respondents either to continue to place a non-existent entity on notice or to pass an assessment order against it. In terms of Section 87 itself, the liabilities of the non-existent company stand transposed onto the amalgamated entity, so the revenue is not deprived of its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict.  The writ petition was allowed. The show cause notice dated 03.12.2023 and the order dated 27.04.2024 were quashed, leaving it open to the respondents to draw such proceedings as may otherwise be permissible in law.

HCL Infosystems Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax & Anr. 21-11-2024
A show cause notice and an assessment order under Section 73, issued to an amalgamating company after its registration stood cancelled on merger and its credit transferred by FORM GST ITC-02. At issue: whether proceedings against a company that has ceased

Background.  Digilife Distribution and Marketing Services Ltd. amalgamated into HCL Infosystems under a scheme approved by the NCLT on 10.08.2022, with an appointed date of 01.04.2022. The amalgamating company applied for cancellation of its registration on 12.10.2022 and HCL filed FORM GST ITC-02 with a Chartered Accountant’s certificate on the same day. The department nevertheless issued a show cause notice dated 03.12.2023 under Section 73 and a final order dated 27.04.2024 in the name of the dissolved company.Observations of the Court.  The Court applied the line of authority in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and Spice Entertainment, holding that Section 160 of the CGST Act — being pari materia with Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — cannot come to the rescue of the respondents or salvage a notice and order issued to a non-existent entity.On Section 87, the Court held that the provision was placed on the statute book ex abundanti cautela, to preserve and identify transactions occurring between the amalgamating companies and to treat them as distinct companies for the period up to the date of the order approving the scheme, so that such transactions do not escape tax. It found itself unable to read Section 87 as enabling the respondents either to continue to place a non-existent entity on notice or to pass an assessment order against it. In terms of Section 87 itself, the liabilities of the non-existent company stand transposed onto the amalgamated entity, so the revenue is not deprived of its right to subject the transactions to tax.Final verdict.  The writ petition was allowed. The show cause notice dated 03.12.2023 and the order dated 27.04.2024 were quashed, leaving it open to the respondents to draw such proceedings as may otherwise be permissible in law.

185Suriya Cement Agency vs State Tax Officer, 21-11-2024Whether rejection of a Rectification Application filed by the assessee under Section 161 of the CGST/TNGST Act — without giving any reasons as to why no error is apparent on the face of record and without affording a personal hearing — is sustainable, View Download

BackgroundAn Assessment Order dated 20th December 2023 was passed against the Petitioner under Section 73 of the TNGST Act 2017. Within the stipulated time, the Petitioner filed a Rectification Application under Section 161 seeking rectification of errors apparent on the face of the record in the Assessment Order. The first Respondent, without assigning any reasons as to why the Assessment Order did not suffer from any apparent error and without giving any opportunity of hearing, rejected the Rectification Application vide order dated 02nd February 2024. The Rectification Order merely extracted tables of figures indicating the amounts the petitioner was liable to pay — without any reasoning or analysis. The Petitioner challenged both the Assessment Order and the Rectification Order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.Relevant Facts & Rival ContentionsThe Petitioner contended that the Rectification Application was rejected without hearing and without assigning reasons as to how the Assessment Order was free from apparent errors — a clear violation of the third proviso to Section 161. The Revenue, however, vehemently argued a narrow construction — that no reasons need to be given when rejecting a rectification application, as the authority only needs to check for apparent error and can reject without reasons if none exists. More importantly, the Revenue contended that the hearing requirement under the third proviso to Section 161 arises ONLY when the Assessing Officer initiates rectification suo motu and the resulting order is detrimental to the assessee — and NOT when the rectification application had been made at the instance of the assessee himself. The Revenue further argued that the petitioner had not even indicated any apparent error in his application, and therefore no interference was warranted.Third Proviso to Section 161 — The Pivotal Statutory Text:"Provided also that where such rectification adversely affects any person, the principles of natural justice shall be followed by the authority carrying out such rectification."Revenue's ArgumentProviso applies only to suo motu rectification adverse to assessee — NOT to rejection of assessee-initiated applicationCourt's RulingProviso applies to BOTH situations — even rejection of assessee-initiated application requires hearing and reasons Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of the order does not also indicate that there had been no error apparent on the record to reject the rectification. He had only extracted the tables indicating the figures which the petitioner is liable to pay. There is also no reasonings as to why there is no error apparent on the face of the record. For this reason, the impugned order dated 02.02.2024 is liable to be set aside."— Para 8 (on the mechanical nature of the Rectification Order)"Even though, streneous efforts had been made by the learned Additional Government Pleader that no personal hearing need to be given when an application had been made at the instance of the assesse, I am not in agreementd with the learned Additional Government Pleader. The Provisio indicates that when an order is being made adverse to the assessee, then he should be given an opportunity of being heard when the rectification adversely affects any person. The principles of natural justice had been inbuilt by way of the 3rd Proviso to Section 161."— Para 8 (rejecting Revenue's narrow construction of the third proviso)"If pursuant to a Rectification Application, if a rectification is made and if it adversely affects the assesse, Proviso 3 contemplates an opportunity of hearing to be given. However, when an Rectification Application is made at the instance of assessee and the rectification is being sought to be rejected without considering the reasons for rectification or by giving reasons as to why such rectification could not be entertained. It is also imperative that the assessee to be put on notice."— Para 8 (expanding the scope of natural justice under Section 161 — the core ratio)"I am inclined to hold that the order of rectification passed by the first respondent dated 02.02.2024 is contrary to the provisions of Section 161 and in that aspect, the same alone is set aside and the Rectification Application filed by the petitioner shall be taken afresh by the first respondent and after giving an opportunity to the petitioner, the first respondent shall pass appropriate orders and in accordance with law."— Para 9 (operative conclusion and direction)Final VerdictWrit Petition allowed. Rectification Order dated 02.02.2024 set aside as contrary to the provisions of Section 161 of the CGST/TNGST Act. Rectification Application to be taken afresh; first Respondent directed to grant opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner and then pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. All further remedies of the Petitioner preserved. No order as to costs.

Suriya Cement Agency vs State Tax Officer, 21-11-2024
Whether rejection of a Rectification Application filed by the assessee under Section 161 of the CGST/TNGST Act — without giving any reasons as to why no error is apparent on the face of record and without affording a personal hearing — is sustainable,

BackgroundAn Assessment Order dated 20th December 2023 was passed against the Petitioner under Section 73 of the TNGST Act 2017. Within the stipulated time, the Petitioner filed a Rectification Application under Section 161 seeking rectification of errors apparent on the face of the record in the Assessment Order. The first Respondent, without assigning any reasons as to why the Assessment Order did not suffer from any apparent error and without giving any opportunity of hearing, rejected the Rectification Application vide order dated 02nd February 2024. The Rectification Order merely extracted tables of figures indicating the amounts the petitioner was liable to pay — without any reasoning or analysis. The Petitioner challenged both the Assessment Order and the Rectification Order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.Relevant Facts & Rival ContentionsThe Petitioner contended that the Rectification Application was rejected without hearing and without assigning reasons as to how the Assessment Order was free from apparent errors — a clear violation of the third proviso to Section 161. The Revenue, however, vehemently argued a narrow construction — that no reasons need to be given when rejecting a rectification application, as the authority only needs to check for apparent error and can reject without reasons if none exists. More importantly, the Revenue contended that the hearing requirement under the third proviso to Section 161 arises ONLY when the Assessing Officer initiates rectification suo motu and the resulting order is detrimental to the assessee — and NOT when the rectification application had been made at the instance of the assessee himself. The Revenue further argued that the petitioner had not even indicated any apparent error in his application, and therefore no interference was warranted.Third Proviso to Section 161 — The Pivotal Statutory Text:"Provided also that where such rectification adversely affects any person, the principles of natural justice shall be followed by the authority carrying out such rectification."Revenue's ArgumentProviso applies only to suo motu rectification adverse to assessee — NOT to rejection of assessee-initiated applicationCourt's RulingProviso applies to BOTH situations — even rejection of assessee-initiated application requires hearing and reasons Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of the order does not also indicate that there had been no error apparent on the record to reject the rectification. He had only extracted the tables indicating the figures which the petitioner is liable to pay. There is also no reasonings as to why there is no error apparent on the face of the record. For this reason, the impugned order dated 02.02.2024 is liable to be set aside."— Para 8 (on the mechanical nature of the Rectification Order)"Even though, streneous efforts had been made by the learned Additional Government Pleader that no personal hearing need to be given when an application had been made at the instance of the assesse, I am not in agreementd with the learned Additional Government Pleader. The Provisio indicates that when an order is being made adverse to the assessee, then he should be given an opportunity of being heard when the rectification adversely affects any person. The principles of natural justice had been inbuilt by way of the 3rd Proviso to Section 161."— Para 8 (rejecting Revenue's narrow construction of the third proviso)"If pursuant to a Rectification Application, if a rectification is made and if it adversely affects the assesse, Proviso 3 contemplates an opportunity of hearing to be given. However, when an Rectification Application is made at the instance of assessee and the rectification is being sought to be rejected without considering the reasons for rectification or by giving reasons as to why such rectification could not be entertained. It is also imperative that the assessee to be put on notice."— Para 8 (expanding the scope of natural justice under Section 161 — the core ratio)"I am inclined to hold that the order of rectification passed by the first respondent dated 02.02.2024 is contrary to the provisions of Section 161 and in that aspect, the same alone is set aside and the Rectification Application filed by the petitioner shall be taken afresh by the first respondent and after giving an opportunity to the petitioner, the first respondent shall pass appropriate orders and in accordance with law."— Para 9 (operative conclusion and direction)Final VerdictWrit Petition allowed. Rectification Order dated 02.02.2024 set aside as contrary to the provisions of Section 161 of the CGST/TNGST Act. Rectification Application to be taken afresh; first Respondent directed to grant opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner and then pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. All further remedies of the Petitioner preserved. No order as to costs.

186Muhammed Abdul Saini v. State Tax Officer & Others06-11-2024Validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST/SGST Act and ITC eligibility, along with benefit of CBIC Circular Nos. 183/15/2022-GST and 193/5/2023-GST and correction of GSTR-3B errors. View Download

BackgroundThe writ petition had challenged Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST/SGST Act to the extent that it required an assessee claiming ITC to ensure that the supplier of the inputs had actually paid the output tax to the Government. The learned Single Judge had rejected the challenge to the statutory provision in a batch of writ petitions. The Division Bench had earlier affirmed that decision in Nahasshukoor v. Assistant Commissioner II Circle, Alappuzha and Others.The appellant also submitted that certain mistakes made while entering figures in Form GSTR-3B could not be brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when the writ petition was heard. The Single Judge had, however, granted liberty to claim the benefit of two CBIC circulars before the appropriate authority and directed the authority to examine and process the claim. The appellant sought an opportunity to place the GSTR-3B errors also before the assessing authority along with the claims under the circulars.Court ObservationThe Court held that the principal challenge to Section 16(2)(c) had already received approval from a Division Bench in Nahasshukoor. Consequently, the challenge to the statutory provision was bound to fail.However, the Court accepted the appellant’s request regarding the mistakes in Form GSTR-3B. It considered it appropriate to extend the time granted by the Single Judge by one month so that the appellant could claim the benefit of the two specified circulars and also raise the issue concerning errors in Form GSTR-3B before the adjudicating authority.Final VerdictThe writ appeal was dismissed insofar as it challenged the statutory provisions, and the findings of the learned Single Judge were otherwise upheld.The Court extended by one month from 6 November 2024 the time for approaching the assessing authority to claim the benefit of Circular Nos. 183/15/2022-GST and 193/5/2023-GST and to raise the issue of errors in Form GSTR-3B. The assessing authority was directed to consider and adjudicate the matter expeditiously. The writ appeal was accordingly disposed of.Cases Referred by CourtNahasshukoor v. Assistant Commissioner II Circle, Alappuzha and Others — High Court of Kerala — 2024. 

Muhammed Abdul Saini v. State Tax Officer & Others 06-11-2024
Validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST/SGST Act and ITC eligibility, along with benefit of CBIC Circular Nos. 183/15/2022-GST and 193/5/2023-GST and correction of GSTR-3B errors.

BackgroundThe writ petition had challenged Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST/SGST Act to the extent that it required an assessee claiming ITC to ensure that the supplier of the inputs had actually paid the output tax to the Government. The learned Single Judge had rejected the challenge to the statutory provision in a batch of writ petitions. The Division Bench had earlier affirmed that decision in Nahasshukoor v. Assistant Commissioner II Circle, Alappuzha and Others.The appellant also submitted that certain mistakes made while entering figures in Form GSTR-3B could not be brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when the writ petition was heard. The Single Judge had, however, granted liberty to claim the benefit of two CBIC circulars before the appropriate authority and directed the authority to examine and process the claim. The appellant sought an opportunity to place the GSTR-3B errors also before the assessing authority along with the claims under the circulars.Court ObservationThe Court held that the principal challenge to Section 16(2)(c) had already received approval from a Division Bench in Nahasshukoor. Consequently, the challenge to the statutory provision was bound to fail.However, the Court accepted the appellant’s request regarding the mistakes in Form GSTR-3B. It considered it appropriate to extend the time granted by the Single Judge by one month so that the appellant could claim the benefit of the two specified circulars and also raise the issue concerning errors in Form GSTR-3B before the adjudicating authority.Final VerdictThe writ appeal was dismissed insofar as it challenged the statutory provisions, and the findings of the learned Single Judge were otherwise upheld.The Court extended by one month from 6 November 2024 the time for approaching the assessing authority to claim the benefit of Circular Nos. 183/15/2022-GST and 193/5/2023-GST and to raise the issue of errors in Form GSTR-3B. The assessing authority was directed to consider and adjudicate the matter expeditiously. The writ appeal was accordingly disposed of.Cases Referred by CourtNahasshukoor v. Assistant Commissioner II Circle, Alappuzha and Others — High Court of Kerala — 2024. 

187Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax & Ors. Vs. Safari Retreats Private Ltd. & Ors.03-10-2024Eligibility of Input Tax Credit (ITC) on construction of immovable property used for renting (Section 17(5)(c) & (d), Section 16, CGST Act, 2017 – Blocked Credit, Constitutional Validity, ITC on Immovable Property) View Download

Case Facts:The respondent constructed a shopping mall for leasing purposes and paid GST on inputs like materials and services used in construction, accumulating substantial ITC. The department denied ITC relying on Section 17(5)(d), which blocks credit for construction of immovable property. The Orissa High Court read down the provision and allowed ITC, holding denial would defeat GST objectives. The Revenue challenged this before the Supreme Court along with similar matters questioning the constitutional validity of Section 17(5)(c) and (d).Court Decision:The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the CGST Act and held that ITC is a statutory right subject to conditions and restrictions under the Act. Section 17(5)(c) and (d) clearly restrict ITC on construction of immovable property (other than plant and machinery), and such restriction must be interpreted strictly.The Court upheld the validity of the provisions and rejected the interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that:A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly based on plain language.ITC cannot be claimed contrary to express statutory restrictions.The legislature is competent to restrict ITC and such restriction does not violate constitutional provisions.The expression “plant or machinery” cannot be expansively interpreted to include buildings like malls merely to claim ITC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that ITC is not available on construction of immovable property used for renting under Section 17(5)(d).Cases Referred by Court:Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Union of IndiaBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of IndiaShreya Singhal v. Union of IndiaUnion of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of IndiaR.K. Garg v. Union of IndiaTwyford Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of KeralaNitdip Textile Processors Pvt. Ltd.P. Laxmi Devi v. State of Andhra PradeshIndore Development Authority v. ManoharlalALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax OfficerHari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of IndiaJoseph Shine v. Union of IndiaCommissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of CustomsVegetable Products Ltd.R.S. Raghunath v. State of KarnatakaUnion of India v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.

Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax & Ors. Vs. Safari Retreats Private Ltd. & Ors. 03-10-2024
Eligibility of Input Tax Credit (ITC) on construction of immovable property used for renting (Section 17(5)(c) & (d), Section 16, CGST Act, 2017 – Blocked Credit, Constitutional Validity, ITC on Immovable Property)

Case Facts:The respondent constructed a shopping mall for leasing purposes and paid GST on inputs like materials and services used in construction, accumulating substantial ITC. The department denied ITC relying on Section 17(5)(d), which blocks credit for construction of immovable property. The Orissa High Court read down the provision and allowed ITC, holding denial would defeat GST objectives. The Revenue challenged this before the Supreme Court along with similar matters questioning the constitutional validity of Section 17(5)(c) and (d).Court Decision:The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the CGST Act and held that ITC is a statutory right subject to conditions and restrictions under the Act. Section 17(5)(c) and (d) clearly restrict ITC on construction of immovable property (other than plant and machinery), and such restriction must be interpreted strictly.The Court upheld the validity of the provisions and rejected the interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that:A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly based on plain language.ITC cannot be claimed contrary to express statutory restrictions.The legislature is competent to restrict ITC and such restriction does not violate constitutional provisions.The expression “plant or machinery” cannot be expansively interpreted to include buildings like malls merely to claim ITC.Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that ITC is not available on construction of immovable property used for renting under Section 17(5)(d).Cases Referred by Court:Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Union of IndiaBharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of IndiaShreya Singhal v. Union of IndiaUnion of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of IndiaR.K. Garg v. Union of IndiaTwyford Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of KeralaNitdip Textile Processors Pvt. Ltd.P. Laxmi Devi v. State of Andhra PradeshIndore Development Authority v. ManoharlalALD Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax OfficerHari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of IndiaJoseph Shine v. Union of IndiaCommissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of CustomsVegetable Products Ltd.R.S. Raghunath v. State of KarnatakaUnion of India v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd.

188Klassic Traders vs. State of Karnataka & Others25-09-2024Quashing of ECL blocking order under Rule 86A of CGST Rules, 2017 passed without pre-decisional hearing and without independent 'reasons to believe', based solely on borrowed satisfaction from Enforcement authority reports View Download

BackgroundThe petitioner, Klassic Traders, a proprietary concern registered under GST, had ITC of Rs.43,18,514 available in its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). By order dated 06.06.2024, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, LGSTO-16, Bengaluru blocked the petitioner's ECL by invoking Rule 86A of the CGST Rules. No pre-decisional hearing was given to the petitioner before passing this order. The blocking order contained no independent reason to believe as to why the ECL needed to be blocked; it merely relied upon Enforcement authority reports stating that a registered supplier was found non-existent or not conducting business from its registered place. No independent application of mind was applied by the blocking authority. The petitioner challenged the blocking order by way of a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing of the order and unblocking of ITC, and also sought a declaration that Rule 86A is ultra vires Section 16(2) of the CGST Act. Court Observations (Verbatim / Near-Verbatim)"In the instant case, since no pre-decisional hearing was provided/granted by the respondents before passing the impugned order, coupled with the fact that the impugned order invoking Section 86A of the CGST Rules by blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner does not contain independent or cogent reasons to believe except by placing reliance upon the reports of Enforcement authority which is impermissible in law, since the same is on borrowed satisfaction as held by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the impugned order deserves to be quashed.""It is also pertinent to note that in the impugned order except stating that 'a registered supplier who has been found to be non-existent or not to be conducting business from his place of registration', no other reasons are forthcoming in the impugned order. On this ground also, the impugned order dated 06.06.2024 deserves to be quashed."The Court further relied upon and reproduced the binding ratio from K-9-Enterprises (Division Bench), including:"The expression 'reason to believe' would necessarily mean that the respondents must arrive at a satisfaction based on their own independent inquiry and not upon borrowed inquiry.""A bonafide purchaser cannot be denied ITC on account of a supplier's default and the recipient cannot be made to suffer denial of ITC for the wrong doings of the supplier.""The impugned orders are bald, vague, cryptic, laconic, unreasoned and non-speaking and deserve to be set aside." Final VerdictThe writ petition was allowed. The blocking order dated 06.06.2024 was quashed. The respondents were directed to immediately unblock the ECL of the petitioner upon receipt of the order to enable filing of returns forthwith. Liberty was reserved to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law and in terms of the Division Bench judgment in K-9-Enterprises. 👍 

Klassic Traders vs. State of Karnataka & Others 25-09-2024
Quashing of ECL blocking order under Rule 86A of CGST Rules, 2017 passed without pre-decisional hearing and without independent 'reasons to believe', based solely on borrowed satisfaction from Enforcement authority reports

BackgroundThe petitioner, Klassic Traders, a proprietary concern registered under GST, had ITC of Rs.43,18,514 available in its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). By order dated 06.06.2024, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, LGSTO-16, Bengaluru blocked the petitioner's ECL by invoking Rule 86A of the CGST Rules. No pre-decisional hearing was given to the petitioner before passing this order. The blocking order contained no independent reason to believe as to why the ECL needed to be blocked; it merely relied upon Enforcement authority reports stating that a registered supplier was found non-existent or not conducting business from its registered place. No independent application of mind was applied by the blocking authority. The petitioner challenged the blocking order by way of a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing of the order and unblocking of ITC, and also sought a declaration that Rule 86A is ultra vires Section 16(2) of the CGST Act. Court Observations (Verbatim / Near-Verbatim)"In the instant case, since no pre-decisional hearing was provided/granted by the respondents before passing the impugned order, coupled with the fact that the impugned order invoking Section 86A of the CGST Rules by blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner does not contain independent or cogent reasons to believe except by placing reliance upon the reports of Enforcement authority which is impermissible in law, since the same is on borrowed satisfaction as held by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the impugned order deserves to be quashed.""It is also pertinent to note that in the impugned order except stating that 'a registered supplier who has been found to be non-existent or not to be conducting business from his place of registration', no other reasons are forthcoming in the impugned order. On this ground also, the impugned order dated 06.06.2024 deserves to be quashed."The Court further relied upon and reproduced the binding ratio from K-9-Enterprises (Division Bench), including:"The expression 'reason to believe' would necessarily mean that the respondents must arrive at a satisfaction based on their own independent inquiry and not upon borrowed inquiry.""A bonafide purchaser cannot be denied ITC on account of a supplier's default and the recipient cannot be made to suffer denial of ITC for the wrong doings of the supplier.""The impugned orders are bald, vague, cryptic, laconic, unreasoned and non-speaking and deserve to be set aside." Final VerdictThe writ petition was allowed. The blocking order dated 06.06.2024 was quashed. The respondents were directed to immediately unblock the ECL of the petitioner upon receipt of the order to enable filing of returns forthwith. Liberty was reserved to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law and in terms of the Division Bench judgment in K-9-Enterprises. 👍 

189Sh. Raghav Agarwal & Connected Matters v. Commissioner of Central Tax and GST Delhi North & Ors.24-09-2024Whether Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017 permits blocking of Input Tax Credit (ITC) in the Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) in excess of the credit actually available therein, thereby creating a negative balance. View Download

BackgroundMultiple taxpayers registered under CGST Act/DGST Act filed writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Commissioner/authorized officers under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017. The grievance was that the authorities had blocked ITC in their respective ECLs in excess of the credit actually available at the time of passing such orders, resulting in an artificial negative balance. Due to this negative balance, petitioners were unable to utilize any subsequently accrued ITC until the negative balance was first neutralized, effectively paralyzing their tax payment mechanism and working capital. The petitioners confined their challenge solely to this specific issue of "negative blocking."Facts Relevant to Understanding the JudgmentThe Revenue passed orders under Rule 86A blocking ITC on the ground that the credit had been fraudulently availed or was ineligible. However, in each case, the amount blocked exceeded the ITC actually lying in the ECL on the date of the order, creating a negative balance. For instance, in W.P.(C) 10980/2024, the total amount blocked was ₹27,28,93,028 whereas the ECL showed a negative balance of ₹25,85,14,327. The petitioners contended that Rule 86A only permits blocking of credit "available" in the ECL, and no power exists to create a negative balance. Revenue argued that the power under Rule 86A extends to the entire quantum of fraudulently availed or ineligible ITC, regardless of whether such credit still exists in the ECL at the time of the order.Court Observations (Verbatim)On nature of ITC:"The right to avail and utilize the ITC is thus a statutory right, which accrues by virtue of the provisions of the CGST Act and is subject to the conditions as set out therein. This right to avail and utilize the ITC is a valuable right. It is, undeniably, an asset, which vests with a taxpayer if the taxpayer satisfies all the stipulated conditions for such entitlement." (Para 30)On Rule 86A being a drastic power:"Undisputedly, the exercise of power under Rule 86A of the Rules effectively denies a taxpayer its ability to discharge its dues by utilizing the ITC or seeking a refund which it is entitled to do under the CGST Act and the Rules. The ITC, undoubtedly, is a valuable resource available to a taxpayer for payment of taxes and other dues. Thus, the denial of access of this resource in fact denies a taxpayer, albeit temporarily, access to its assets. An order under Rule 86A of the Rules in effect reduces the working capital available to a taxpayer." (Para 40)On threshold conditions of Rule 86A:"On a plain reading of the opening sentence of Rule 86A(1) of the Rules, the necessary conditions to be satisfied at the threshold are: (a) that there is a credit of input tax available in the Electronic Credit Ledger; and, (b) that the Commissioner or an officer authorized on his behalf has reasons to believe that the credit of input tax available has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible on account of the reasons as set out in Clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 86A(1) of the Rules." (Para 56)"In view of the aforesaid, it follows that if there is no credit of input tax available in the ECL, one of the necessary conditions for passing an order under Rule 86A(1) of the Rules would not be satisfied." (Para 57)On meaning of "amount equivalent to such credit":"Plainly, the expression 'amount equivalent to such credit' refers to the credit of input tax available in the taxpayer's ECL, which the Commissioner or the officer authorized by him has reasons to believe has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. It does not refer to the ITC used in the past for payment of dues or which has been refunded." (Para 59)On literal construction:"There is no ambiguity in the plain language of Rule 86A of the Rules. The literal construction of the said Rule also does not lead to any absurdity. The words 'not allow debit of an amount equivalent to such credit in the electric credit ledger' clearly refers to such amount as is credited to the ECL to the extent that the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him has reason to believe has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible." (Para 70)On negative blocking being impermissible:"Rule 86A(1) of the Rules does not contemplate an order, the effect of which is to require a taxpayer to replenish his ECL with valid availment of ITC, to the extent of ITC used in the past, which the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him has reasons to believe, was fraudulently availed or was ineligible. Such an interpretation would in effect amount to construe an order under Rule 86A(1) of the Rules as an order for recovery of tax." (Para 82)On CBIC Circular supporting petitioners:"We find that the aforesaid paragraphs of the Circular dated 02.11.2021 relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue do not support the contentions advanced by them. On the contrary, the same support the literal construct of Rule 86A of the Rules and also clarify that the amount of debit to be disallowed from the ECL should not be more than the amount of the ITC, which is believed to have been fraudulently availed or is ineligible." (Para 73)Final VerdictAll writ petitions were allowed. The impugned orders were set aside to the extent they disallowed debit from the respective ECLs in excess of the ITC actually available in the ECL at the time of passing the orders. The "negative blocking" of ECL was held to be without jurisdiction and illegal under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017.  

Sh. Raghav Agarwal & Connected Matters v. Commissioner of Central Tax and GST Delhi North & Ors. 24-09-2024
Whether Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017 permits blocking of Input Tax Credit (ITC) in the Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) in excess of the credit actually available therein, thereby creating a negative balance.

BackgroundMultiple taxpayers registered under CGST Act/DGST Act filed writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Commissioner/authorized officers under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017. The grievance was that the authorities had blocked ITC in their respective ECLs in excess of the credit actually available at the time of passing such orders, resulting in an artificial negative balance. Due to this negative balance, petitioners were unable to utilize any subsequently accrued ITC until the negative balance was first neutralized, effectively paralyzing their tax payment mechanism and working capital. The petitioners confined their challenge solely to this specific issue of "negative blocking."Facts Relevant to Understanding the JudgmentThe Revenue passed orders under Rule 86A blocking ITC on the ground that the credit had been fraudulently availed or was ineligible. However, in each case, the amount blocked exceeded the ITC actually lying in the ECL on the date of the order, creating a negative balance. For instance, in W.P.(C) 10980/2024, the total amount blocked was ₹27,28,93,028 whereas the ECL showed a negative balance of ₹25,85,14,327. The petitioners contended that Rule 86A only permits blocking of credit "available" in the ECL, and no power exists to create a negative balance. Revenue argued that the power under Rule 86A extends to the entire quantum of fraudulently availed or ineligible ITC, regardless of whether such credit still exists in the ECL at the time of the order.Court Observations (Verbatim)On nature of ITC:"The right to avail and utilize the ITC is thus a statutory right, which accrues by virtue of the provisions of the CGST Act and is subject to the conditions as set out therein. This right to avail and utilize the ITC is a valuable right. It is, undeniably, an asset, which vests with a taxpayer if the taxpayer satisfies all the stipulated conditions for such entitlement." (Para 30)On Rule 86A being a drastic power:"Undisputedly, the exercise of power under Rule 86A of the Rules effectively denies a taxpayer its ability to discharge its dues by utilizing the ITC or seeking a refund which it is entitled to do under the CGST Act and the Rules. The ITC, undoubtedly, is a valuable resource available to a taxpayer for payment of taxes and other dues. Thus, the denial of access of this resource in fact denies a taxpayer, albeit temporarily, access to its assets. An order under Rule 86A of the Rules in effect reduces the working capital available to a taxpayer." (Para 40)On threshold conditions of Rule 86A:"On a plain reading of the opening sentence of Rule 86A(1) of the Rules, the necessary conditions to be satisfied at the threshold are: (a) that there is a credit of input tax available in the Electronic Credit Ledger; and, (b) that the Commissioner or an officer authorized on his behalf has reasons to believe that the credit of input tax available has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible on account of the reasons as set out in Clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 86A(1) of the Rules." (Para 56)"In view of the aforesaid, it follows that if there is no credit of input tax available in the ECL, one of the necessary conditions for passing an order under Rule 86A(1) of the Rules would not be satisfied." (Para 57)On meaning of "amount equivalent to such credit":"Plainly, the expression 'amount equivalent to such credit' refers to the credit of input tax available in the taxpayer's ECL, which the Commissioner or the officer authorized by him has reasons to believe has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible. It does not refer to the ITC used in the past for payment of dues or which has been refunded." (Para 59)On literal construction:"There is no ambiguity in the plain language of Rule 86A of the Rules. The literal construction of the said Rule also does not lead to any absurdity. The words 'not allow debit of an amount equivalent to such credit in the electric credit ledger' clearly refers to such amount as is credited to the ECL to the extent that the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him has reason to believe has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible." (Para 70)On negative blocking being impermissible:"Rule 86A(1) of the Rules does not contemplate an order, the effect of which is to require a taxpayer to replenish his ECL with valid availment of ITC, to the extent of ITC used in the past, which the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him has reasons to believe, was fraudulently availed or was ineligible. Such an interpretation would in effect amount to construe an order under Rule 86A(1) of the Rules as an order for recovery of tax." (Para 82)On CBIC Circular supporting petitioners:"We find that the aforesaid paragraphs of the Circular dated 02.11.2021 relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue do not support the contentions advanced by them. On the contrary, the same support the literal construct of Rule 86A of the Rules and also clarify that the amount of debit to be disallowed from the ECL should not be more than the amount of the ITC, which is believed to have been fraudulently availed or is ineligible." (Para 73)Final VerdictAll writ petitions were allowed. The impugned orders were set aside to the extent they disallowed debit from the respective ECLs in excess of the ITC actually available in the ECL at the time of passing the orders. The "negative blocking" of ECL was held to be without jurisdiction and illegal under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017.  

190Veremax Technologie Services Limited vs Assistant Commissioner of Central Tax04-09-2024Show Cause Notice – Clubbing of multiple financial years in a single show cause notice under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 – validity of consolidated show cause notice. View Download

Facts:The petitioner challenged the show cause notice dated 03.05.2024 and the Order-in-Original dated 21.11.2023 issued under Section 73 of the CGST/IGST/SGST Acts for the financial years 2017-18 (July 2017 to March 2018), 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. The petitioner contended that the department issued a single consolidated show cause notice covering multiple tax periods instead of issuing separate notices for each financial year.Court Decision:The Court held that under Section 73 of the CGST Act, the limitation period of three years for passing an order is calculated separately from the due date of furnishing the annual return for each financial year. Consequently, actions relating to different financial years must be treated independently.Relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the Madras High Court, the Court held that issuance of a single consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years is contrary to the statutory scheme of the CGST Act.Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the show cause notice dated 03.05.2024 issued for the tax periods 2017-18 to 2020-21. The Court clarified that the respondent is at liberty to issue separate show cause notices for each assessment year in accordance with Section 73 of the CGST Act.Cases Referred by Court:·         Titan Company Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST, W.P. No.33164 of 2023 (Madras High Court)·         State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1350

Veremax Technologie Services Limited vs Assistant Commissioner of Central Tax 04-09-2024
Show Cause Notice – Clubbing of multiple financial years in a single show cause notice under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 – validity of consolidated show cause notice.

Facts:The petitioner challenged the show cause notice dated 03.05.2024 and the Order-in-Original dated 21.11.2023 issued under Section 73 of the CGST/IGST/SGST Acts for the financial years 2017-18 (July 2017 to March 2018), 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. The petitioner contended that the department issued a single consolidated show cause notice covering multiple tax periods instead of issuing separate notices for each financial year.Court Decision:The Court held that under Section 73 of the CGST Act, the limitation period of three years for passing an order is calculated separately from the due date of furnishing the annual return for each financial year. Consequently, actions relating to different financial years must be treated independently.Relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the Madras High Court, the Court held that issuance of a single consolidated show cause notice for multiple financial years is contrary to the statutory scheme of the CGST Act.Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the show cause notice dated 03.05.2024 issued for the tax periods 2017-18 to 2020-21. The Court clarified that the respondent is at liberty to issue separate show cause notices for each assessment year in accordance with Section 73 of the CGST Act.Cases Referred by Court:·         Titan Company Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST, W.P. No.33164 of 2023 (Madras High Court)·         State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1350

Total: 244 case laws