Background:Para 1–2, 3.1–3.14: The Himachal Pradesh Town & Country Planning Act, 1977 (TCP Act) governs planning for the Shimla Planning Area (SPA). Respondent No.1 filed OA No. 121 of 2014 before NGT seeking protection of "Green Belt"/forest areas from non-forest activity. NGT (16.11.2017 order — "first order of NGT") went beyond the prayers and issued sweeping construction restrictions across the entire SPA (e.g., capping construction at "2 storeys + attic" in core/green areas) and directed the State to finalize the development plan within 3 months incorporating its directions. The State's review was dismissed (16.7.2018), leading to Civil Appeal Nos. 5348-5349 of 2019.Para 2, 4–4.1: Subsequently the State published a draft development plan (8.2.2022). Respondent No.1 filed a fresh OA (No. 297 of 2022); NGT stayed the draft plan (interim order 12.5.2022). The State challenged this before the Himachal Pradesh High Court (CWP No. 5960 of 2022). Despite the pendency of that writ petition, NGT passed a final order (14.10.2022 — "second order of NGT") declaring the draft plan illegal for conflicting with its first order. The Supreme Court transferred CWP No. 5960 of 2022 to itself (order dated 14.11.2022), renumbered as Transferred Case (C) No. 2 of 2023.Facts :Para 12–19: The State argued: (a) NGT's jurisdiction under the NGT Act, 2010 is confined to Schedule I enactments, which do not include town & country planning; (b) finalizing a development plan is a quasi-legislative function, and NGT cannot direct how a legislative body exercises that power; (c) NGT could not have suo motu enlarged the scope of the original OA; (d) NGT could not proceed once the High Court was already seized of the same issue in CWP No. 5960 of 2022.Para 20–28: Respondents argued the first NGT order was based on a High-Powered Committee report addressing genuine ecological risks (landslides, cloudbursts, fragile Himalayan ecology), that NGT has overriding power under the NGT Act, and relied on Mantri Techzone Private Limited v. Forward Foundation, (2019) 18 SCC 494 : 2019 INSC 315, to argue NGT could vary buffer zones/planning norms.Para 30–61: The Court analyzed Sections 13–20 of the TCP Act (Chapter IV) — preparation of draft development plan (Sec. 18), publication and objections (Sec. 19), and State Government's sanction (Sec. 20) — holding these constitute a complete delegated-legislation scheme with in-built safeguards (public notice, objections, hearings at two stages).Court Observations :Para 45: "Chapter-IV of the TCP Act is a complete code, providing for preparation of draft development plan, publication of draft development plan with a publication of its notice, inviting objections and suggestions, giving reasonable opportunity to all persons affected of being heard, making modifications in the draft development plan as may be considered necessary by the Director and thereafter submitting it to the State Government."Para 51: "...it will be amply clear that the preparation of draft development plan under Section 18 of the TCP Act, finalization of the same under Section 19 of the TCP Act by the Director and grant of approval by the State under Section 20 of the TCP Act are all legislative functions."Para 61 (citing Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 : 1987 INSC 100; Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd., (1980) 2 SCC 295 : 1980 INSC 38; Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija, (1989) 3 SCC 396 : 1989 INSC 202; Pune Municipal Corporation, (2004) 10 SCC 796 : 2004 INSC 348; Bangalore Development Authority, (2012) 3 SCC 442; Rajeev Suri, (2022) 11 SCC 1 : 2021 INSC 446): "...it is a settled position of law that the exercise of power for the preparation, finalization and approval of development plan is a power exercised by the delegatee for enacting a subordinate piece of legislation."Para 64 (citing V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 2 SCC 542 : 2012 INSC 10): "The courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its law-making power in any manner." and "Neither the court can legislate, nor has it any competence to issue directions to the legislature to enact the law in a particular manner."Para 69: "...neither the High Courts while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution nor this Court while exercising powers under Article 32 of the Constitution can direct the legislature or its delegate to enact a law or subordinate legislation in a particular manner. If the High Courts and this Court... cannot do so, the answer to the question as to whether a Tribunal constituted under a statute, having a limited jurisdiction, can do so or not, would be obviously 'No'."Para 70: "...the first order of NGT is liable to be set aside on the short ground that it has transgressed its limitations and attempted to encroach upon the field reserved for the delegate to enact a piece of delegated legislation."Para 76: On Mantri Techzone Private Limited (relied on by respondents) — "we are... of the considered view that the observations found in para 47 of the Mantri Techzone Private Limited (supra) could not be construed to be a precedent or a ratio decidendi," since the point was conceded by counsel there, not adjudicated.Para 108 (citing Priya Gupta and Another v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Others, (2013) 11 SCC 404 : 2012 INSC 601):"It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal terms held that no Court or Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore the law stated by this Court. It held that such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law would irretrievably suffer. It has been held that the law declared by the higher court in the State is binding on authorities and tribunals under its superintendence and they cannot ignore it. This Court expressed a caution that it had become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. This Court further held that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system."(This paragraph establishes that Supreme Court orders bind all courts/tribunals under Article 141; that a tribunal under a High Court's supervisory jurisdiction — such as the NGT vis-à-vis the Himachal Pradesh High Court — cannot ignore issues already before that High Court; and that disregarding this discipline undermines judicial credibility and encourages "chance litigation." It directly supports the Court's conclusion in Para 109 that the NGT breached judicial propriety by proceeding despite the High Court being seized of the same matter.)Para 109–112 (citing L. Chandra Kumar, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 INSC 288; Raghu Ramakrishna Raju Kanumuru, (2022) 8 SCC 156 : 2022 INSC 632): "...the continuation of the proceedings by the NGT during the pendency of the writ petitions before the High Court was not in conformity with the principles of judicial propriety." and "...the second order of NGT... is liable to be set aside... [also] on the ground of judicial propriety, the NGT ought not to have continued with the proceedings after the High Court was in seisin of the matter."Para 124: "...there are sufficient safeguards to balance the need for development while taking care of and addressing the environmental and ecological concerns... the development plan... cannot be stalled in entirety thereby putting the entire developmental activities to a standstill."Final Verdict (Para 126):Appeals and Transferred Case allowed; NGT's orders dated 16.11.2017, 16.7.2018, 12.5.2022 and 14.10.2022 quashed and set aside; State of Himachal Pradesh permitted to implement the development plan published on 20.6.2023, subject to the Court's observations. No order as to costs.👍 Thumbs Up — Decision in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh (Appellant); NGT's orders restraining/directing the development plan were set aside as exceeding jurisdiction.Key Cases Referred :Himachal Pradesh Bus Stand Management and Development Authority v. Central Empowered Committee, (2021) 4 SCC 309 : 2021 INSC 18State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020 INSC 516Director General (Road Development), NHAI v. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, (2021) 11 SCC 566 : 2020 INSC 452Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd., (2019) 19 SCC 479 : 2019 INSC 220Techi Tagi Tara v. Rajendra Singh Bhandari, (2018) 11 SCC 734 : 2017 INSC 986State of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini, (2017) 11 SCC 42Ambesh Kumar (Dr.) v. Principal, L.L.R.M. Medical College, 1986 Supp SCC 543 : 1986 INSC 275Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 39 : 1981 INSC 189State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raghu Ramakrishna Raju Kanumuru, (2022) 8 SCC 156 : 2022 INSC 632T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267 : 1997 INSC 226; later orders (2023 INSC 430)Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004, In Re, (2017) 1 SCC 121 : 2016 INSC 1018State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696 : 2014 INSC 373Mantri Techzone Private Limited v. Forward Foundation, (2019) 18 SCC 494 : 2019 INSC 315Pragnesh Shah v. Dr. Arun Kumar Sharma, (2022) 11 SCC 493 : 2022 INSC 47Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, (1997) 11 SCC 605Resident's Welfare Association v. UT of Chandigarh, (2023) 8 SCC 643 : 2023 INSC 22Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 : 1987 INSC 100Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, (1980) 2 SCC 295 : 1980 INSC 38Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396 : 1989 INSC 202Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association, (2004) 10 SCC 796 : 2004 INSC 348Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 442Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority, (2022) 11 SCC 1 : 2021 INSC 446V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 2 SCC 542 : 2012 INSC 10Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1 : 2014 INSC 568Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 : 1996 INSC 911L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 INSC 288Priya Gupta v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health, (2013) 11 SCC 404 : 2012 INSC 601Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 281 : 1996 INSC 237Essar Oil Limited v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti, (2004) 2 SCC 392 : 2004 INSC 40N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362 : 2003 INSC 438State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uday Education and Welfare Trust, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1469 : 2022 INSC 465 

 Facts of the Case:-* ED registered an ECIR against Ram Kishor Arora in connection with an alleged money laundering case arising out of a scheduled offence.* He was arrested by the ED under “Section 19 of the PMLA”.* He challenged his arrest before the Delhi High Court, arguing that:   * the arrest was illegal;  * he was not supplied with a copy of the ECIR; and  * the mandatory requirements of Section 19 were not followed.  * The Delhi High Court dismissed his petition, after which he approached the Supreme Court. Issues1. Whether supplying a copy of the ECIR to the accused is mandatory before arrest?2. Whether ED complied with Section 19 of the PMLA while arresting the appellant?3. Whether the arrest was illegal merely because the ECIR was not furnished?  Observations of the Supreme CourtECIR is an internal document of the ED. It is not equivalent to an FIR, and there is no statutory requirement under the PMLA to supply a copy of the ECIR to the accused.* Under Section 19 PMLA, the authorised officer must have “reason to believe” that the person is guilty of an offence under Section 3;  * record those reasons “in writing”and  * inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest.* The Court held that “communicating the grounds of arrest is mandatory”, but “supplying the ECIR is not mandatory”.  Decision* The Supreme Court “dismissed the appeal”.* It upheld the validity of the arrest, holding that the requirements of Section 19 had been complied with.* The Court reaffirmed that: * ECIR is only an internal document of the ED.  * Non-supply of the ECIR does not make the arrest illegal.  * Compliance with Section 19 PMLA is the relevant legal requirement.

Facts :Petitioner wrongly transitioned balance from Personal Ledger Account as input tax credit under Section 140 of CGST Act.Refund was sanctioned, but ₹9,25,366 was adjusted towards interest on such utilization.Petitioner contended that sufficient Input Tax Credit was available and there was no loss to revenue.Dispute arose on legality of interest adjustment while granting refund.Court Decision:Petitioner ought to have claimed refund under Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 142(3) of CGST Act.Wrong transition of credit was acknowledged, but tax liability was subsequently squared up using available Input Tax Credit.There was no loss to revenue, as sufficient credit existed.Directions:Deduction of ₹9,25,366 towards interest held unsustainable.Impugned order modified to that extent.Respondent directed to refund ₹9,25,366 to petitioner.Refund to be made within 8 weeks.

BackgroundThe dispute arose from denial of ITC claimed on purchases made against tax invoices. The purchasing dealer contended that the purchases were genuine, payments for the goods and tax were made through bank accounts, invoices were available, and movement of goods was established. However, the selling dealer, after collecting the tax component from the purchaser, did not deposit the corresponding tax with the Government. The petitioner argued that recovery should instead be made from the defaulting selling dealer and that denying ITC would result in double taxation.The State opposed the claim by relying upon Section 16 of the BGST Act, submitting that ITC is subject to the statutory conditions prescribed therein. The Court also noted that the assessment order had not been challenged through the statutory appeal under Section 107 within the prescribed period, but proceeded to examine the substantive ITC issue because it involved interpretation of the statutory provision.Court ObservationThe Court held that the conditions prescribed under Section 16(2)(a), (b) and (c) are cumulative and must be satisfied together. Possession of a tax invoice and proof of receipt/payment of goods are not, by themselves, sufficient for availing ITC. Section 16(2)(c) specifically requires that the tax charged on the supply must have been actually paid to the Government, either in cash or through admissible ITC.The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited, observing that the claimant of ITC bears the statutory burden of establishing the conditions necessary for the credit. It further held that production of invoices, proof of movement of goods and payment through banking channels does not overcome the requirement under Section 16(2)(c) that the tax must actually reach the Government.The Court rejected the contention that denial of ITC amounted to double taxation. It observed that merely because the purchaser paid the tax component to the supplier, the tax liability to the Government cannot be treated as satisfied unless the supplier actually deposits the tax with the Government. The statutory mechanism available to recover the unpaid tax from the selling dealer does not absolve the purchasing dealer from satisfying the conditions for ITC.Final VerdictThe Court concluded that the purchasing dealer cannot claim ITC unless the tax collected by the supplier has actually been paid to the Government. Even where the purchaser possesses tax invoices, establishes movement and receipt of goods, and proves payment to the supplier through bank accounts, ITC cannot be allowed in the absence of the supplier's payment of the tax to the Government.Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, with the parties directed to bear their respective costs.Cases Referred by CourtSri Vinayaga Agencies v. The Assistant Commissioner (CT) & Anr. — Madras High Court — 29.01.2013.D.Y. Beathel Enterprises v. The State Tax Officer (Data Cell) — Madras High Court — 24.02.2021.ALD. Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal Nos. 10412–10413 of 2018.Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Commissioner of Sales Tax & Others — Supreme Court — 1992 (3) SCC 624.The State of Karnataka v.  Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2023.

BackgroundThe petitioners challenged the detention of iron scrap and the vehicles transporting it while the goods were in transit from Vijayawada to Sankarampet, Telangana. The goods were accompanied by invoices, e-way bills and other documents. The Revenue detained the consignment on the ground that the seller shown in the documents did not have a place of business at Vijayawada and subsequently alleged that the seller was a fictitious/non-existing entity. The seller's GST registration was suspended and proceedings under Section 130 were initiated against him.The petitioners contended that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration on the official portal and that, at the time of interception, the goods were accompanied by valid documents. They argued that if the Revenue had any doubt regarding the transaction or the petitioners' bona fides, proceedings under Section 129 ought to have been initiated against them, rather than applying the Section 130 proceedings against the seller to the petitioners' goods.Court ObservationThe Court examined Section 68 and Rule 138A concerning inspection of goods in movement and the documents required to accompany a consignment. It noted that the officer had the authority to intercept and verify the goods and documents. However, the principal issue was whether the petitioners' goods could be confiscated merely because proceedings had been initiated against the seller under Section 130.Relying upon the distinction between Sections 129 and 130, the Court held that detention proceedings under Section 129 and confiscation proceedings under Section 130 operate in different contexts. The Court observed that although proceedings could be initiated against the seller under Section 130 because of his doubtful existence and business credentials, the petitioners' goods could not be confiscated merely because they had purchased the goods from that seller.The Court further observed that the petitioners' responsibility was to establish their own bona fides—namely, that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration and that the transaction, payment and receipt of goods were supported by authenticated documents. They could not, however, be expected to establish the seller's business activities or whether the seller had obtained registration through fabricated documents. The Revenue was therefore required to initiate independent proceedings under Section 129 against the petitioners if it intended to proceed against their goods.Final VerdictThe High Court disposed of the writ petitions and granted liberty to the first respondent to initiate proceedings against the petitioners under Section 129 of the CGST/APGST Act, 2017 within two weeks from receipt of the order. The petitioners were to be given an opportunity of hearing and the matter was to be decided in accordance with law.In the meantime, the detained goods were directed to be released in favour of the purchaser on deposit of 25% of their value and execution of a personal bond for the balance. The vehicles were also directed to be released upon execution of personal security bonds for their value as determined by the concerned Road Transport Authority. No costs were awarded.Cases Referred by the CourtRajeev Traders v. Union of India — High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench — Order dated 16.08.2022, W.P. No. 100849/2022 (T-RES). The Court relied upon this decision for the distinction between the powers of detention under Section 129 and confiscation under Section 130.Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat — High Court of Gujarat — 2020 (33) G.S.T.L. 513 (Guj.) / MANU/GJ/3200/2019. The Court referred to this decision for the proposition that Sections 129 and 130 are independent and mutually exclusive provisions dealing respectively with detention/seizure/release and confiscation.