| S.No | Name | Date of Order | Subject | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 171 | Prahitha Construction — GST on Transfer of Development Rights under JDA | 09-02-2024 | Whether transfer of Development Rights (TDR) by a landowner to a developer under a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) amounts to sale of land exempt under Entry 5 of Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017, or constitutes a taxable supply of service under GST � | View Download |
BackgroundPrahitha Construction Pvt. Ltd., a commercial real estate developer, entered into a JDA dated 28.12.2017 with two landowners — M/s. Jitvan Land Limited and M/s. Janina Marine Properties Pvt. Ltd. — for development of land admeasuring 8.30 acres and 1.82 acres at Hyderabad Knowledge City, Raidurg Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana into an IT/ITES and commercial office project. Under the JDA, the landowners granted permissive possession to the developer, who agreed to construct three towers. The developer was to receive the Developer's Undivided Share (UDS) of land and the built-up area as consideration, but only after handing over the Landowner's Share upon project completion. The JDA expressly stated that permissive possession shall not be construed as delivery of possession in part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The petitioner challenged Notification No. 4/2018 as amended by Notification No. 23/2019-CT(Rate) dated 30.09.2019, which imposed GST on transfer of development rights under a JDA, seeking its declaration as ultra vires Articles 14, 246A and 265 of the Constitution and the CGST/TGST Act, 2017.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Reading of the aforesaid clause further gives a clear picture of the fact that mere execution of JDA by itself would not mean that the right, title and ownership of the property or a portion of that property stands transferred in the name of the petitioner/developer. There are certain conditions/milestones/stages which have to be crossed before which the petitioner would be entitled to have a certain element of right over the completed constructed area which has been agreed to be left at the disposal of the petitioner. But that does not mean that mere execution of the JDA would amount to transfer of right to the petitioner.""The transfer of development rights is hence a service under GST Law which the landowner is offering to the developer and that too for a consideration. Thus, the transfer of development rights is a service and not an outright sale of an immovable property.""From plain reading of the JDA that was entered into between the two parties, what is apparently visible is that, there was no outright sale of land being effectuated and the JDA per se cannot be considered merely as a medium adopted by the landowner selling his land and the JDA does not lead to sale of land by itself.""The transfer of ownership from the landowner goes directly to the purchaser of the constructed property and not in favour of the petitioner unless and until the land stands transferred in the name of the petitioner. The same cannot be brought within the ambit of sale. Transferring of the development rights does not result in transfer of ownership rights. That the sale of land/transfer of land or undivided share of land would get executed only after issuance of completion certificate of the project. This itself would give a clear indication that the services rendered by the petitioner in execution of JDA was supplied prior to the issuance of completion certificate and would thus be amenable to GST.""On conjoint reading of the clauses under JDA, clause d of the JDA along with clause 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 6.1, 6.7 and 23.4...it will clearly indicate that there is no automatic transfer of ownership given to the petitioner at the time of execution of the JDA...In the absence of any cogent and substantial material to establish right, title and ownership being created in favour of the petitioner/developer, the transfer of development rights as it stands is amenable to GST and cannot be brought within the purview of Entry 5 of Schedule-III of the GST Act.""The Notification No. 4 of 2018 dated 25.01.2018 as amended by Notification No. 23/2019-Central Tax (Rate), dated 30.09.2019, on its plain reading would reveal that it is not with which there is a charge created on the transfer of development rights, but in fact only provide for the time when the tax need to be paid.""Taking into consideration the provisions of Article 246A of the Constitution of India and also considering the extraordinary powers which have been conferred upon the GST Council and upon whose recommendation the Government has issued the notification clarifying the aspect of transfer of development rights being attracted to GST/TGST, the challenge to the notification issued by the Government of India can be safely held to be devoid of merits."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court held that transfer of development rights under a JDA is a taxable supply of service under GST and does not amount to sale of land under Entry 5 of Schedule III of the CGST Act. The impugned Notification No. 23/2019-CT(Rate) dated 30.09.2019 was upheld as valid. | ||||
| Prahitha Construction — GST on Transfer of Development Rights under JDA 09-02-2024 Whether transfer of Development Rights (TDR) by a landowner to a developer under a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) amounts to sale of land exempt under Entry 5 of Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017, or constitutes a taxable supply of service under GST �BackgroundPrahitha Construction Pvt. Ltd., a commercial real estate developer, entered into a JDA dated 28.12.2017 with two landowners — M/s. Jitvan Land Limited and M/s. Janina Marine Properties Pvt. Ltd. — for development of land admeasuring 8.30 acres and 1.82 acres at Hyderabad Knowledge City, Raidurg Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana into an IT/ITES and commercial office project. Under the JDA, the landowners granted permissive possession to the developer, who agreed to construct three towers. The developer was to receive the Developer's Undivided Share (UDS) of land and the built-up area as consideration, but only after handing over the Landowner's Share upon project completion. The JDA expressly stated that permissive possession shall not be construed as delivery of possession in part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The petitioner challenged Notification No. 4/2018 as amended by Notification No. 23/2019-CT(Rate) dated 30.09.2019, which imposed GST on transfer of development rights under a JDA, seeking its declaration as ultra vires Articles 14, 246A and 265 of the Constitution and the CGST/TGST Act, 2017.Court Observations (Verbatim)"Reading of the aforesaid clause further gives a clear picture of the fact that mere execution of JDA by itself would not mean that the right, title and ownership of the property or a portion of that property stands transferred in the name of the petitioner/developer. There are certain conditions/milestones/stages which have to be crossed before which the petitioner would be entitled to have a certain element of right over the completed constructed area which has been agreed to be left at the disposal of the petitioner. But that does not mean that mere execution of the JDA would amount to transfer of right to the petitioner.""The transfer of development rights is hence a service under GST Law which the landowner is offering to the developer and that too for a consideration. Thus, the transfer of development rights is a service and not an outright sale of an immovable property.""From plain reading of the JDA that was entered into between the two parties, what is apparently visible is that, there was no outright sale of land being effectuated and the JDA per se cannot be considered merely as a medium adopted by the landowner selling his land and the JDA does not lead to sale of land by itself.""The transfer of ownership from the landowner goes directly to the purchaser of the constructed property and not in favour of the petitioner unless and until the land stands transferred in the name of the petitioner. The same cannot be brought within the ambit of sale. Transferring of the development rights does not result in transfer of ownership rights. That the sale of land/transfer of land or undivided share of land would get executed only after issuance of completion certificate of the project. This itself would give a clear indication that the services rendered by the petitioner in execution of JDA was supplied prior to the issuance of completion certificate and would thus be amenable to GST.""On conjoint reading of the clauses under JDA, clause d of the JDA along with clause 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 6.1, 6.7 and 23.4...it will clearly indicate that there is no automatic transfer of ownership given to the petitioner at the time of execution of the JDA...In the absence of any cogent and substantial material to establish right, title and ownership being created in favour of the petitioner/developer, the transfer of development rights as it stands is amenable to GST and cannot be brought within the purview of Entry 5 of Schedule-III of the GST Act.""The Notification No. 4 of 2018 dated 25.01.2018 as amended by Notification No. 23/2019-Central Tax (Rate), dated 30.09.2019, on its plain reading would reveal that it is not with which there is a charge created on the transfer of development rights, but in fact only provide for the time when the tax need to be paid.""Taking into consideration the provisions of Article 246A of the Constitution of India and also considering the extraordinary powers which have been conferred upon the GST Council and upon whose recommendation the Government has issued the notification clarifying the aspect of transfer of development rights being attracted to GST/TGST, the challenge to the notification issued by the Government of India can be safely held to be devoid of merits."Final VerdictThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court held that transfer of development rights under a JDA is a taxable supply of service under GST and does not amount to sale of land under Entry 5 of Schedule III of the CGST Act. The impugned Notification No. 23/2019-CT(Rate) dated 30.09.2019 was upheld as valid. | ||||
| 172 | Shamhu Saran Agarwal and Company v. Additional Commissioner Grade-2 & Ors. | 31-01-2024 | Legality of detention and penalty under Section 129 GST on ground of undervaluation of goods | View Download |
Facts :The petitioner challenged a penalty order dated 20.12.2020 and appellate order dated 17.09.2021 passed under GST law. The goods were detained during transit solely on the ground of alleged undervaluation. All documents including invoice and e-way bill were available and there was no discrepancy in description of goods. The detention and penalty were confirmed by the authorities on the same ground.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation is not a valid ground for detention of goods under Section 129. It observed that when documents are proper and there is no mismatch, detention cannot be justified merely on valuation issues. The Court held that in cases of undervaluation, proceedings must be initiated under Sections 73 or 74 and not by detention and penalty during transit. Accordingly, the impugned penalty and appellate orders were quashed and set aside, with direction to refund any deposited amount.Cases Referred:Hindustan Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant State Tax OfficerN.V.K. Mohammed Sulthan Rawther caseJ.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer | ||||
| Shamhu Saran Agarwal and Company v. Additional Commissioner Grade-2 & Ors. 31-01-2024 Legality of detention and penalty under Section 129 GST on ground of undervaluation of goodsFacts :The petitioner challenged a penalty order dated 20.12.2020 and appellate order dated 17.09.2021 passed under GST law. The goods were detained during transit solely on the ground of alleged undervaluation. All documents including invoice and e-way bill were available and there was no discrepancy in description of goods. The detention and penalty were confirmed by the authorities on the same ground.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation is not a valid ground for detention of goods under Section 129. It observed that when documents are proper and there is no mismatch, detention cannot be justified merely on valuation issues. The Court held that in cases of undervaluation, proceedings must be initiated under Sections 73 or 74 and not by detention and penalty during transit. Accordingly, the impugned penalty and appellate orders were quashed and set aside, with direction to refund any deposited amount.Cases Referred:Hindustan Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant State Tax OfficerN.V.K. Mohammed Sulthan Rawther caseJ.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer | ||||
| 173 | Shamhu Saran Agarwal and Company vs Additional Commissioner Grade-2 & Others | 31-01-2024 | Whether goods can be detained and penalty imposed under Section 129 GST Act on the ground of undervaluation. | View Download |
Facts :The petitioner challenged penalty order dated 20.12.2020 and appellate order dated 17.09.2021 arising from detention of goods in transit. The goods were detained solely on the allegation of undervaluation despite accompanying invoice, e-way bill, and proper documents. The appellate authority affirmed the penalty on the same ground of undervaluation. The petitioner relied on departmental circular stating that goods should not be detained merely on valuation disputes.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation is not a valid ground for detention of goods under Section 129 of the Act. Where all documents are proper and there is no discrepancy, detention cannot be justified on valuation issues. Issues of undervaluation must be examined through proceedings under Sections 73 or 74 of the GST Act and not through detention proceedings. Penalty imposed under Section 129 on mere suspicion of undervaluation was held unsustainable and set aside. The impugned orders were quashed and consequential relief including refund was directed.Cases Referred:Hindustan Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. vs Assistant State Tax OfficerN.V.K. Mohammed Sulthan Rawther’s caseJ.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs Commercial Taxes Officer | ||||
| Shamhu Saran Agarwal and Company vs Additional Commissioner Grade-2 & Others 31-01-2024 Whether goods can be detained and penalty imposed under Section 129 GST Act on the ground of undervaluation.Facts :The petitioner challenged penalty order dated 20.12.2020 and appellate order dated 17.09.2021 arising from detention of goods in transit. The goods were detained solely on the allegation of undervaluation despite accompanying invoice, e-way bill, and proper documents. The appellate authority affirmed the penalty on the same ground of undervaluation. The petitioner relied on departmental circular stating that goods should not be detained merely on valuation disputes.Court Decision:The Court held that undervaluation is not a valid ground for detention of goods under Section 129 of the Act. Where all documents are proper and there is no discrepancy, detention cannot be justified on valuation issues. Issues of undervaluation must be examined through proceedings under Sections 73 or 74 of the GST Act and not through detention proceedings. Penalty imposed under Section 129 on mere suspicion of undervaluation was held unsustainable and set aside. The impugned orders were quashed and consequential relief including refund was directed.Cases Referred:Hindustan Coca Cola Pvt. Ltd. vs Assistant State Tax OfficerN.V.K. Mohammed Sulthan Rawther’s caseJ.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs Commercial Taxes Officer | ||||
| 174 | Tejas Arecanut Traders vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Another | 20-12-2023 | Whether the mandatory pre-deposit of 10% under Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act is to be computed on the entire demand (tax + interest + fine + fee + penalty) or exclusively on the disputed tax amount. | View Download |
BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a trader, was subjected to a confiscation order by the Enforcement Officer who determined the total demand at Rs.1,41,11,633/-, which included tax, fine, penalty and other components, with the tax component alone determined at Rs.6,71,983/-. When the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Section 107(1) of the CGST Act, the Appellate Authority declined to admit the appeal on the ground that the petitioner had failed to comply with the pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act — having calculated 10% pre-deposit on the entire demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- (i.e., Rs.14,11,163/-). The petitioner, however, had already deposited 10% of the tax component alone amounting to Rs.67,200/-. FACTSThe petitioner challenged the entire demand confirmed in the confiscation order. The Appellate Authority, while examining the maintainability of the appeal, called upon the petitioner to deposit 10% of the total composite demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- (inclusive of fine, penalty, fee and interest). The petitioner contended that the expression "tax in dispute" in Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act refers only to the tax component and does not include interest, penalty, fine and fee, and that he had already deposited 10% of the tax as determined by the Enforcement Officer. The Appellate Authority, rejecting this contention, refused to admit the appeal, leading to the present writ petition before the High Court. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"In the context of disputing the entire tax amount, the 10% pre-deposit requirement pertains exclusively to the remaining disputed tax amount as articulated in the statutory language. Consequently, there exists a statutory basis for asserting that 10% pre-deposit obligation is confined to the contested tax quantum excluding penalty, fee and interest. This interpretation aligns with the legal principle that penalties are consequential to the determination of the underlining tax liability.""The intentional exclusion of disputed interest, fine, fee, and penalty from sub-clause (b) of Section 107(6) of the CGST Act signifies a crucial legislative distinction. Analyzing this deliberate separation provides insights into the lawmaker's clear intent regarding the nature and scope of the pre-deposit obligation in appeals.""By isolating 'a sum equal to ten per cent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute' in sub-clause (b), the legislator conveys a focused pre-deposit requirement specifically related to the disputed tax amount. This implies that the legislative design prioritizes the financial commitment associated directly with the primary tax liability being contested.""The appellate authority therefore, was not justified in calling upon the petitioner to deposit 10% of not only tax liability, but, also fine which is imposed by the Enforcement Officer equivalent to the value of the goods. If the order passed by the appellate authority under challenge is accepted, then the condition under clause (b) giving an option to the aggrieved person who disputes the entire tax liability to deposit 10% of the remaining amount of tax in dispute would be defeated.""Therefore, the order under challenge is not sustainable. There is no need for the petitioner to deposit any percentage of disputed interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order. In essence, the legislative intent as construed from Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act is that aggrieved party has to pre-deposit 10% of the tax liability and it does not extend to penalties, fees or interest when the petitioner has contested the entirety of the tax liability." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was allowed. The impugned order of the Appellate Authority calling for 10% pre-deposit on the total demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- was set aside. Since the petitioner had already deposited 10% of the tax liability (Rs.67,200/-), the Appellate Authority was directed to admit the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with law.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Carbon Resources (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & OthersCivil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 24120 of 2023 (Patna High Court)2Durga Raj Vijay Kumar vs. State of U.P.(2022) (Allahabad High Court)3Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers2003 (Supreme Court)4J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. CTO(2004) (Supreme Court)5Prakash Nath Khanna vs. CIT(2004) (Supreme Court)6B. Premanand vs. Mohan Koikal[2011] (Supreme Court) | ||||
| Tejas Arecanut Traders vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Another 20-12-2023 Whether the mandatory pre-deposit of 10% under Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act is to be computed on the entire demand (tax + interest + fine + fee + penalty) or exclusively on the disputed tax amount.BACKGROUNDThe petitioner, a trader, was subjected to a confiscation order by the Enforcement Officer who determined the total demand at Rs.1,41,11,633/-, which included tax, fine, penalty and other components, with the tax component alone determined at Rs.6,71,983/-. When the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Section 107(1) of the CGST Act, the Appellate Authority declined to admit the appeal on the ground that the petitioner had failed to comply with the pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act — having calculated 10% pre-deposit on the entire demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- (i.e., Rs.14,11,163/-). The petitioner, however, had already deposited 10% of the tax component alone amounting to Rs.67,200/-. FACTSThe petitioner challenged the entire demand confirmed in the confiscation order. The Appellate Authority, while examining the maintainability of the appeal, called upon the petitioner to deposit 10% of the total composite demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- (inclusive of fine, penalty, fee and interest). The petitioner contended that the expression "tax in dispute" in Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act refers only to the tax component and does not include interest, penalty, fine and fee, and that he had already deposited 10% of the tax as determined by the Enforcement Officer. The Appellate Authority, rejecting this contention, refused to admit the appeal, leading to the present writ petition before the High Court. COURT OBSERVATIONS (Verbatim)"In the context of disputing the entire tax amount, the 10% pre-deposit requirement pertains exclusively to the remaining disputed tax amount as articulated in the statutory language. Consequently, there exists a statutory basis for asserting that 10% pre-deposit obligation is confined to the contested tax quantum excluding penalty, fee and interest. This interpretation aligns with the legal principle that penalties are consequential to the determination of the underlining tax liability.""The intentional exclusion of disputed interest, fine, fee, and penalty from sub-clause (b) of Section 107(6) of the CGST Act signifies a crucial legislative distinction. Analyzing this deliberate separation provides insights into the lawmaker's clear intent regarding the nature and scope of the pre-deposit obligation in appeals.""By isolating 'a sum equal to ten per cent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute' in sub-clause (b), the legislator conveys a focused pre-deposit requirement specifically related to the disputed tax amount. This implies that the legislative design prioritizes the financial commitment associated directly with the primary tax liability being contested.""The appellate authority therefore, was not justified in calling upon the petitioner to deposit 10% of not only tax liability, but, also fine which is imposed by the Enforcement Officer equivalent to the value of the goods. If the order passed by the appellate authority under challenge is accepted, then the condition under clause (b) giving an option to the aggrieved person who disputes the entire tax liability to deposit 10% of the remaining amount of tax in dispute would be defeated.""Therefore, the order under challenge is not sustainable. There is no need for the petitioner to deposit any percentage of disputed interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order. In essence, the legislative intent as construed from Section 107(6)(b) of the CGST Act is that aggrieved party has to pre-deposit 10% of the tax liability and it does not extend to penalties, fees or interest when the petitioner has contested the entirety of the tax liability." FINAL VERDICTThe Writ Petition was allowed. The impugned order of the Appellate Authority calling for 10% pre-deposit on the total demand of Rs.1,41,11,633/- was set aside. Since the petitioner had already deposited 10% of the tax liability (Rs.67,200/-), the Appellate Authority was directed to admit the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with law.👍 IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE CASES REFERRED BY THE COURT#Case NameCitation1Carbon Resources (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & OthersCivil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 24120 of 2023 (Patna High Court)2Durga Raj Vijay Kumar vs. State of U.P.(2022) (Allahabad High Court)3Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers2003 (Supreme Court)4J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. CTO(2004) (Supreme Court)5Prakash Nath Khanna vs. CIT(2004) (Supreme Court)6B. Premanand vs. Mohan Koikal[2011] (Supreme Court) | ||||
| 175 | Infac India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of GST & Central Excise | 14-09-2023 | Refund of wrongly adjusted interest on transitional credit under GST regime (Sections 49(5), 50(3), 140, 142(3) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 11B – Central Excise Act, 1944) | View Download |
Facts :Petitioner wrongly transitioned balance from Personal Ledger Account as input tax credit under Section 140 of CGST Act.Refund was sanctioned, but ₹9,25,366 was adjusted towards interest on such utilization.Petitioner contended that sufficient Input Tax Credit was available and there was no loss to revenue.Dispute arose on legality of interest adjustment while granting refund.Court Decision:Petitioner ought to have claimed refund under Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 142(3) of CGST Act.Wrong transition of credit was acknowledged, but tax liability was subsequently squared up using available Input Tax Credit.There was no loss to revenue, as sufficient credit existed.Directions:Deduction of ₹9,25,366 towards interest held unsustainable.Impugned order modified to that extent.Respondent directed to refund ₹9,25,366 to petitioner.Refund to be made within 8 weeks. | ||||
| Infac India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of GST & Central Excise 14-09-2023 Refund of wrongly adjusted interest on transitional credit under GST regime (Sections 49(5), 50(3), 140, 142(3) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 11B – Central Excise Act, 1944)Facts :Petitioner wrongly transitioned balance from Personal Ledger Account as input tax credit under Section 140 of CGST Act.Refund was sanctioned, but ₹9,25,366 was adjusted towards interest on such utilization.Petitioner contended that sufficient Input Tax Credit was available and there was no loss to revenue.Dispute arose on legality of interest adjustment while granting refund.Court Decision:Petitioner ought to have claimed refund under Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 142(3) of CGST Act.Wrong transition of credit was acknowledged, but tax liability was subsequently squared up using available Input Tax Credit.There was no loss to revenue, as sufficient credit existed.Directions:Deduction of ₹9,25,366 towards interest held unsustainable.Impugned order modified to that extent.Respondent directed to refund ₹9,25,366 to petitioner.Refund to be made within 8 weeks. | ||||
| 176 | Guru Storage Batteries vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. | 11-09-2023 | Validity of blocking of Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) by an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017. | View Download |
Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Guru Storage Batteries, a partnership firm based in Nagpur, challenged the action of Respondent No. 3 — the State Tax Officer, Kamptee — in blocking its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). The blocking was carried out by Mr. Ujval Shrirampant Deshmukh, a State Tax Officer, who is admittedly an officer of a rank below that of Assistant Commissioner. The respondents sought to justify this action by relying on a Notification dated 24/01/2020, contending that the Commissioner had delegated the power to block ECL to Respondent No. 3. The petitioner also alleged that illegal recovery notices were being issued consequent to the said blocking. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, indicates that such a blocking can be done by the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him in this behalf, not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner. Admittedly, the respondent No.3 does not fall within that category and is an Officer of the rank below that of the Assistant Commissioner.""Though the Notification dated 24/1/2020 has been relied upon to contend that the power has now been delegated by the Commissioner to the respondent No.3 (page 104), the same is under the State GST Act, whereas Rule 86-A of the aforesaid Act would contemplate a delegation by way of amendment to the Rule. The Notification dated 24/01/2020, would be of no assistance to the respondents." Final VerdictThe action of Respondent No. 3 in blocking the ECL was held to be without authority and was quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed with no costs, and the Rule was made absolute. Cases ReferredDee Vee Projects Ltd. vs. Government of Maharashtra and Ors. — 2022(2) Bom.C.R. 239 (Bombay High Court) | ||||
| Guru Storage Batteries vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 11-09-2023 Validity of blocking of Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) by an officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner under Rule 86A of the CGST Rules, 2017.Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Guru Storage Batteries, a partnership firm based in Nagpur, challenged the action of Respondent No. 3 — the State Tax Officer, Kamptee — in blocking its Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL). The blocking was carried out by Mr. Ujval Shrirampant Deshmukh, a State Tax Officer, who is admittedly an officer of a rank below that of Assistant Commissioner. The respondents sought to justify this action by relying on a Notification dated 24/01/2020, contending that the Commissioner had delegated the power to block ECL to Respondent No. 3. The petitioner also alleged that illegal recovery notices were being issued consequent to the said blocking. Court Observations (Verbatim)"A perusal of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, indicates that such a blocking can be done by the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him in this behalf, not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner. Admittedly, the respondent No.3 does not fall within that category and is an Officer of the rank below that of the Assistant Commissioner.""Though the Notification dated 24/1/2020 has been relied upon to contend that the power has now been delegated by the Commissioner to the respondent No.3 (page 104), the same is under the State GST Act, whereas Rule 86-A of the aforesaid Act would contemplate a delegation by way of amendment to the Rule. The Notification dated 24/01/2020, would be of no assistance to the respondents." Final VerdictThe action of Respondent No. 3 in blocking the ECL was held to be without authority and was quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed with no costs, and the Rule was made absolute. Cases ReferredDee Vee Projects Ltd. vs. Government of Maharashtra and Ors. — 2022(2) Bom.C.R. 239 (Bombay High Court) | ||||
| 177 | Aastha Enterprises v. State of Bihar & Ors. | 18-08-2023 | Eligibility of ITC under Section 16(1) & 16(2)(a)–(d) where the supplier collected but failed to deposit tax with the Government. | View Download |
BackgroundThe dispute arose from denial of ITC claimed on purchases made against tax invoices. The purchasing dealer contended that the purchases were genuine, payments for the goods and tax were made through bank accounts, invoices were available, and movement of goods was established. However, the selling dealer, after collecting the tax component from the purchaser, did not deposit the corresponding tax with the Government. The petitioner argued that recovery should instead be made from the defaulting selling dealer and that denying ITC would result in double taxation.The State opposed the claim by relying upon Section 16 of the BGST Act, submitting that ITC is subject to the statutory conditions prescribed therein. The Court also noted that the assessment order had not been challenged through the statutory appeal under Section 107 within the prescribed period, but proceeded to examine the substantive ITC issue because it involved interpretation of the statutory provision.Court ObservationThe Court held that the conditions prescribed under Section 16(2)(a), (b) and (c) are cumulative and must be satisfied together. Possession of a tax invoice and proof of receipt/payment of goods are not, by themselves, sufficient for availing ITC. Section 16(2)(c) specifically requires that the tax charged on the supply must have been actually paid to the Government, either in cash or through admissible ITC.The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited, observing that the claimant of ITC bears the statutory burden of establishing the conditions necessary for the credit. It further held that production of invoices, proof of movement of goods and payment through banking channels does not overcome the requirement under Section 16(2)(c) that the tax must actually reach the Government.The Court rejected the contention that denial of ITC amounted to double taxation. It observed that merely because the purchaser paid the tax component to the supplier, the tax liability to the Government cannot be treated as satisfied unless the supplier actually deposits the tax with the Government. The statutory mechanism available to recover the unpaid tax from the selling dealer does not absolve the purchasing dealer from satisfying the conditions for ITC.Final VerdictThe Court concluded that the purchasing dealer cannot claim ITC unless the tax collected by the supplier has actually been paid to the Government. Even where the purchaser possesses tax invoices, establishes movement and receipt of goods, and proves payment to the supplier through bank accounts, ITC cannot be allowed in the absence of the supplier's payment of the tax to the Government.Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, with the parties directed to bear their respective costs.Cases Referred by CourtSri Vinayaga Agencies v. The Assistant Commissioner (CT) & Anr. — Madras High Court — 29.01.2013.D.Y. Beathel Enterprises v. The State Tax Officer (Data Cell) — Madras High Court — 24.02.2021.ALD. Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal Nos. 10412–10413 of 2018.Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Commissioner of Sales Tax & Others — Supreme Court — 1992 (3) SCC 624.The State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2023. | ||||
| Aastha Enterprises v. State of Bihar & Ors. 18-08-2023 Eligibility of ITC under Section 16(1) & 16(2)(a)–(d) where the supplier collected but failed to deposit tax with the Government.BackgroundThe dispute arose from denial of ITC claimed on purchases made against tax invoices. The purchasing dealer contended that the purchases were genuine, payments for the goods and tax were made through bank accounts, invoices were available, and movement of goods was established. However, the selling dealer, after collecting the tax component from the purchaser, did not deposit the corresponding tax with the Government. The petitioner argued that recovery should instead be made from the defaulting selling dealer and that denying ITC would result in double taxation.The State opposed the claim by relying upon Section 16 of the BGST Act, submitting that ITC is subject to the statutory conditions prescribed therein. The Court also noted that the assessment order had not been challenged through the statutory appeal under Section 107 within the prescribed period, but proceeded to examine the substantive ITC issue because it involved interpretation of the statutory provision.Court ObservationThe Court held that the conditions prescribed under Section 16(2)(a), (b) and (c) are cumulative and must be satisfied together. Possession of a tax invoice and proof of receipt/payment of goods are not, by themselves, sufficient for availing ITC. Section 16(2)(c) specifically requires that the tax charged on the supply must have been actually paid to the Government, either in cash or through admissible ITC.The Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited, observing that the claimant of ITC bears the statutory burden of establishing the conditions necessary for the credit. It further held that production of invoices, proof of movement of goods and payment through banking channels does not overcome the requirement under Section 16(2)(c) that the tax must actually reach the Government.The Court rejected the contention that denial of ITC amounted to double taxation. It observed that merely because the purchaser paid the tax component to the supplier, the tax liability to the Government cannot be treated as satisfied unless the supplier actually deposits the tax with the Government. The statutory mechanism available to recover the unpaid tax from the selling dealer does not absolve the purchasing dealer from satisfying the conditions for ITC.Final VerdictThe Court concluded that the purchasing dealer cannot claim ITC unless the tax collected by the supplier has actually been paid to the Government. Even where the purchaser possesses tax invoices, establishes movement and receipt of goods, and proves payment to the supplier through bank accounts, ITC cannot be allowed in the absence of the supplier's payment of the tax to the Government.Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, with the parties directed to bear their respective costs.Cases Referred by CourtSri Vinayaga Agencies v. The Assistant Commissioner (CT) & Anr. — Madras High Court — 29.01.2013.D.Y. Beathel Enterprises v. The State Tax Officer (Data Cell) — Madras High Court — 24.02.2021.ALD. Automotive Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal Nos. 10412–10413 of 2018.Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Commissioner of Sales Tax & Others — Supreme Court — 1992 (3) SCC 624.The State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Private Limited — Supreme Court — Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2023. | ||||
| 178 | Punit Kumar Choubey vs The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Patna & Ors. | 10-08-2023 | Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the BGST Act, 2017 – writ petition against assessment order when appeal filed beyond statutory limitation. | View Download |
Facts :The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 10.12.2021 passed under Section 73(9) of the BGST Act determining excess input tax credit. Notices were issued through the GST portal and reminders were sent, but the petitioner did not respond. The petitioner later filed an appeal with delay, which was rejected as time-barred, and thereafter approached the High Court.Court Decision:The Court held that the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 must be filed within three months with a further condonable period of one month. Even considering the extension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, the appeal should have been filed by 28.06.2022, but it was filed only on 10.07.2022.The Court held that when the statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay, neither the appellate authority nor the High Court under Article 226 can extend the limitation further. As the petitioner failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed period and no jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice was established, the writ petition was dismissed.Cases Referred by Court: In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (Supreme Court of India ; State of H.P. & Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 499 | ||||
| Punit Kumar Choubey vs The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Patna & Ors. 10-08-2023 Appeal – Limitation for filing appeal under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the BGST Act, 2017 – writ petition against assessment order when appeal filed beyond statutory limitation.Facts :The petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 10.12.2021 passed under Section 73(9) of the BGST Act determining excess input tax credit. Notices were issued through the GST portal and reminders were sent, but the petitioner did not respond. The petitioner later filed an appeal with delay, which was rejected as time-barred, and thereafter approached the High Court.Court Decision:The Court held that the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 must be filed within three months with a further condonable period of one month. Even considering the extension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, the appeal should have been filed by 28.06.2022, but it was filed only on 10.07.2022.The Court held that when the statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay, neither the appellate authority nor the High Court under Article 226 can extend the limitation further. As the petitioner failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed period and no jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice was established, the writ petition was dismissed.Cases Referred by Court: In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 (Supreme Court of India ; State of H.P. & Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 499 | ||||
| 179 | Arhaan Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. | 03-08-2023 | Detention/confiscation of goods under Sections 129 & 130 where proceedings were initiated against an alleged fictitious seller. | View Download |
BackgroundThe petitioners challenged the detention of iron scrap and the vehicles transporting it while the goods were in transit from Vijayawada to Sankarampet, Telangana. The goods were accompanied by invoices, e-way bills and other documents. The Revenue detained the consignment on the ground that the seller shown in the documents did not have a place of business at Vijayawada and subsequently alleged that the seller was a fictitious/non-existing entity. The seller's GST registration was suspended and proceedings under Section 130 were initiated against him.The petitioners contended that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration on the official portal and that, at the time of interception, the goods were accompanied by valid documents. They argued that if the Revenue had any doubt regarding the transaction or the petitioners' bona fides, proceedings under Section 129 ought to have been initiated against them, rather than applying the Section 130 proceedings against the seller to the petitioners' goods.Court ObservationThe Court examined Section 68 and Rule 138A concerning inspection of goods in movement and the documents required to accompany a consignment. It noted that the officer had the authority to intercept and verify the goods and documents. However, the principal issue was whether the petitioners' goods could be confiscated merely because proceedings had been initiated against the seller under Section 130.Relying upon the distinction between Sections 129 and 130, the Court held that detention proceedings under Section 129 and confiscation proceedings under Section 130 operate in different contexts. The Court observed that although proceedings could be initiated against the seller under Section 130 because of his doubtful existence and business credentials, the petitioners' goods could not be confiscated merely because they had purchased the goods from that seller.The Court further observed that the petitioners' responsibility was to establish their own bona fides—namely, that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration and that the transaction, payment and receipt of goods were supported by authenticated documents. They could not, however, be expected to establish the seller's business activities or whether the seller had obtained registration through fabricated documents. The Revenue was therefore required to initiate independent proceedings under Section 129 against the petitioners if it intended to proceed against their goods.Final VerdictThe High Court disposed of the writ petitions and granted liberty to the first respondent to initiate proceedings against the petitioners under Section 129 of the CGST/APGST Act, 2017 within two weeks from receipt of the order. The petitioners were to be given an opportunity of hearing and the matter was to be decided in accordance with law.In the meantime, the detained goods were directed to be released in favour of the purchaser on deposit of 25% of their value and execution of a personal bond for the balance. The vehicles were also directed to be released upon execution of personal security bonds for their value as determined by the concerned Road Transport Authority. No costs were awarded.Cases Referred by the CourtRajeev Traders v. Union of India — High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench — Order dated 16.08.2022, W.P. No. 100849/2022 (T-RES). The Court relied upon this decision for the distinction between the powers of detention under Section 129 and confiscation under Section 130.Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat — High Court of Gujarat — 2020 (33) G.S.T.L. 513 (Guj.) / MANU/GJ/3200/2019. The Court referred to this decision for the proposition that Sections 129 and 130 are independent and mutually exclusive provisions dealing respectively with detention/seizure/release and confiscation. | ||||
| Arhaan Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. 03-08-2023 Detention/confiscation of goods under Sections 129 & 130 where proceedings were initiated against an alleged fictitious seller.BackgroundThe petitioners challenged the detention of iron scrap and the vehicles transporting it while the goods were in transit from Vijayawada to Sankarampet, Telangana. The goods were accompanied by invoices, e-way bills and other documents. The Revenue detained the consignment on the ground that the seller shown in the documents did not have a place of business at Vijayawada and subsequently alleged that the seller was a fictitious/non-existing entity. The seller's GST registration was suspended and proceedings under Section 130 were initiated against him.The petitioners contended that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration on the official portal and that, at the time of interception, the goods were accompanied by valid documents. They argued that if the Revenue had any doubt regarding the transaction or the petitioners' bona fides, proceedings under Section 129 ought to have been initiated against them, rather than applying the Section 130 proceedings against the seller to the petitioners' goods.Court ObservationThe Court examined Section 68 and Rule 138A concerning inspection of goods in movement and the documents required to accompany a consignment. It noted that the officer had the authority to intercept and verify the goods and documents. However, the principal issue was whether the petitioners' goods could be confiscated merely because proceedings had been initiated against the seller under Section 130.Relying upon the distinction between Sections 129 and 130, the Court held that detention proceedings under Section 129 and confiscation proceedings under Section 130 operate in different contexts. The Court observed that although proceedings could be initiated against the seller under Section 130 because of his doubtful existence and business credentials, the petitioners' goods could not be confiscated merely because they had purchased the goods from that seller.The Court further observed that the petitioners' responsibility was to establish their own bona fides—namely, that they had purchased the goods for valuable consideration after verifying the seller's GST registration and that the transaction, payment and receipt of goods were supported by authenticated documents. They could not, however, be expected to establish the seller's business activities or whether the seller had obtained registration through fabricated documents. The Revenue was therefore required to initiate independent proceedings under Section 129 against the petitioners if it intended to proceed against their goods.Final VerdictThe High Court disposed of the writ petitions and granted liberty to the first respondent to initiate proceedings against the petitioners under Section 129 of the CGST/APGST Act, 2017 within two weeks from receipt of the order. The petitioners were to be given an opportunity of hearing and the matter was to be decided in accordance with law.In the meantime, the detained goods were directed to be released in favour of the purchaser on deposit of 25% of their value and execution of a personal bond for the balance. The vehicles were also directed to be released upon execution of personal security bonds for their value as determined by the concerned Road Transport Authority. No costs were awarded.Cases Referred by the CourtRajeev Traders v. Union of India — High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench — Order dated 16.08.2022, W.P. No. 100849/2022 (T-RES). The Court relied upon this decision for the distinction between the powers of detention under Section 129 and confiscation under Section 130.Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat — High Court of Gujarat — 2020 (33) G.S.T.L. 513 (Guj.) / MANU/GJ/3200/2019. The Court referred to this decision for the proposition that Sections 129 and 130 are independent and mutually exclusive provisions dealing respectively with detention/seizure/release and confiscation. | ||||
| 180 | Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Assistant Commissioner, | 03-08-2023 | Whether interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit is to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original refund app | View Download |
Background & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd., was engaged in providing marketing, administration and support services to Blackberry Singapore Pte. Ltd., an overseas entity. The petitioner claimed these services constituted export of services under the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and accordingly filed three separate applications for refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit for the following periods:April–June 2012: Rs. 3,18,11,287/- filed on 28.03.2013April–June 2013: Rs. 2,89,94,208/- filed on 31.03.2014July–September 2013: Rs. 2,47,28,850/- filed on 30.06.2014Total: Rs. 8,55,34,345/-The refund applications were not processed for years. The Adjudicating Authority issued a Show Cause Notice dated 22.01.2020, proposing to reject the refund on the ground that the petitioner was an "intermediary" and hence the place of provision of services was India, not outside India. By Order-in-Original dated 31.08.2020, the refund claims were rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this rejection on 19.08.2021.The petitioner appealed to CESTAT, which by Final Order No. 51150/2022 dated 07.12.2022 allowed the appeal and held the services to be export of services — entitling the petitioner to refund. Even after CESTAT's order, the refund was not processed. The petitioner sent a letter dated 07.02.2023 requesting processing of the refund. The Revenue also filed an appeal against the CESTAT order before the Delhi High Court (SERTA 7/2023), which was dismissed on 12.07.2023.The Adjudicating Authority then processed the refund by the impugned order dated 04.05.2023 — sanctioning the principal amount of Rs. 8,55,34,345/- but denying interest under Section 11BB, treating the petitioner's letter dated 07.02.2023 as the date of refund application and holding that since refund was granted within three months thereof, no interest was payable. The petitioner challenged only the denial of interest in the present writ petition.Court Observations (Verbatim)"In a case where Revenue denies the claim for refund and the assessee succeeds before the Appellate Authorities, the interest is required to be calculated from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of application for the refund and not from the date of the appellate orders. This issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India: (2011) 10 SCC 292.""The said contention [that interest should be calculated from three months from the CESTAT order dated 07.12.2022] is unmerited and as stated above, the said issue stands authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (supra).""The impugned order is, ex facie, erroneous to the extent it rejects the petitioner's claim for interest. The impugned order sets out a tabular statement...clearly stating the dates on which the petitioner had made its claim for refund.""The Adjudicating Authority has failed to consider that the petitioner had filed its applications of refund on 28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 for the tax periods April-June 2012, April-June 2013, and July-September 2013 respectively. And the interest payable to the petitioner is required to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the dates on which those applications were made."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. The Adjudicating Authority directed to forthwith process the petitioner's claim for interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, computed from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original application dates (28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 respectively) — not from the letter dated 07.02.2023. 👍 In favour of Assessee. | ||||
| Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Assistant Commissioner, 03-08-2023 Whether interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit is to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original refund appBackground & Relevant FactsThe petitioner, Blackberry India Pvt. Ltd., was engaged in providing marketing, administration and support services to Blackberry Singapore Pte. Ltd., an overseas entity. The petitioner claimed these services constituted export of services under the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and accordingly filed three separate applications for refund of unutilised CENVAT Credit for the following periods:April–June 2012: Rs. 3,18,11,287/- filed on 28.03.2013April–June 2013: Rs. 2,89,94,208/- filed on 31.03.2014July–September 2013: Rs. 2,47,28,850/- filed on 30.06.2014Total: Rs. 8,55,34,345/-The refund applications were not processed for years. The Adjudicating Authority issued a Show Cause Notice dated 22.01.2020, proposing to reject the refund on the ground that the petitioner was an "intermediary" and hence the place of provision of services was India, not outside India. By Order-in-Original dated 31.08.2020, the refund claims were rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this rejection on 19.08.2021.The petitioner appealed to CESTAT, which by Final Order No. 51150/2022 dated 07.12.2022 allowed the appeal and held the services to be export of services — entitling the petitioner to refund. Even after CESTAT's order, the refund was not processed. The petitioner sent a letter dated 07.02.2023 requesting processing of the refund. The Revenue also filed an appeal against the CESTAT order before the Delhi High Court (SERTA 7/2023), which was dismissed on 12.07.2023.The Adjudicating Authority then processed the refund by the impugned order dated 04.05.2023 — sanctioning the principal amount of Rs. 8,55,34,345/- but denying interest under Section 11BB, treating the petitioner's letter dated 07.02.2023 as the date of refund application and holding that since refund was granted within three months thereof, no interest was payable. The petitioner challenged only the denial of interest in the present writ petition.Court Observations (Verbatim)"In a case where Revenue denies the claim for refund and the assessee succeeds before the Appellate Authorities, the interest is required to be calculated from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of application for the refund and not from the date of the appellate orders. This issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India: (2011) 10 SCC 292.""The said contention [that interest should be calculated from three months from the CESTAT order dated 07.12.2022] is unmerited and as stated above, the said issue stands authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (supra).""The impugned order is, ex facie, erroneous to the extent it rejects the petitioner's claim for interest. The impugned order sets out a tabular statement...clearly stating the dates on which the petitioner had made its claim for refund.""The Adjudicating Authority has failed to consider that the petitioner had filed its applications of refund on 28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 for the tax periods April-June 2012, April-June 2013, and July-September 2013 respectively. And the interest payable to the petitioner is required to be calculated from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the dates on which those applications were made."Final VerdictWrit petition allowed. The Adjudicating Authority directed to forthwith process the petitioner's claim for interest under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, computed from the date immediately after expiry of three months from the original application dates (28.03.2013, 31.03.2014 and 30.06.2014 respectively) — not from the letter dated 07.02.2023. 👍 In favour of Assessee. | ||||